the river waran account of the reconquest of the sudan by winston s. churchill chapter i: the rebellion of the mahdi the north-eastern quarter of the continentof africa is drained and watered by the nile. among and about the headstreams and tributariesof this mighty river lie the wide and fertile provinces of the egyptian soudan. situatedin the very centre of the land, these remote regions are on every side divided from theseas by five hundred miles of mountain, swamp, or desert. the great river is their only meansof growth, their only channel of progress. it is by the nile alone that their commercecan reach the outer markets, or european civilisation
can penetrate the inner darkness. the soudanis joined to egypt by the nile, as a diver is connected with the surface by his air-pipe.without it there is only suffocation. aut nilus, aut nihil! the town of khartoum, at the confluence ofthe blue and white niles, is the point on which the trade of the south must inevitablyconverge. it is the great spout through which the merchandise collected from a wide areastreams northwards to the mediterranean shore. it marks the extreme northern limit of thefertile soudan. between khartoum and assuan the river flows for twelve hundred miles throughdeserts of surpassing desolation. at last the wilderness recedes and the living worldbroadens out again into egypt and the delta.
it is with events that have occurred in theintervening waste that these pages are concerned. the real soudan, known to the statesman andthe explorer, lies far to the south—moist, undulating, and exuberant. but there is anothersoudan, which some mistake for the true, whose solitudes oppress the nile from the egyptianfrontier to omdurman. this is the soudan of the soldier. destitute of wealth or future,it is rich in history. the names of its squalid villages are familiar to distant and enlightenedpeoples. the barrenness of its scenery has been drawn by skilful pen and pencil. itsample deserts have tasted the blood of brave men. its hot, black rocks have witnessed famoustragedies. it is the scene of the war. this great tract, which may conveniently becalled 'the military soudan,' stretches with
apparent indefiniteness over the face of thecontinent. level plains of smooth sand—a little rosier than buff, a little paler thansalmon—are interrupted only by occasional peaks of rock—black, stark, and shapeless.rainless storms dance tirelessly over the hot, crisp surface of the ground. the finesand, driven by the wind, gathers into deep drifts, and silts among the dark rocks ofthe hills, exactly as snow hangs about an alpine summit; only it is a fiery snow, suchas might fall in hell. the earth burns with the quenchless thirst of ages, and in thesteel-blue sky scarcely a cloud obstructs the unrelenting triumph of the sun. through the desert flows the river—a threadof blue silk drawn across an enormous brown
drugget; and even this thread is brown forhalf the year. where the water laps the sand and soaks into the banks there grows an avenueof vegetation which seems very beautiful and luxuriant by contrast with what lies beyond.the nile, through all the three thousand miles of its course vital to everything that livesbeside it, is never so precious as here. the traveller clings to the strong river as toan old friend, staunch in the hour of need. all the world blazes, but here is shade. thedeserts are hot, but the nile is cool. the land is parched, but here is abundant water.the picture painted in burnt sienna is relieved by a grateful flash of green. yet he who had not seen the desert or feltthe sun heavily on his shoulders would hardly
admire the fertility of the riparian scrub.unnourishing reeds and grasses grow rank and coarse from the water's edge. the dark, rottensoil between the tussocks is cracked and granulated by the drying up of the annual flood. thecharacter of the vegetation is inhospitable. thorn-bushes, bristling like hedgehogs andthriving arrogantly, everywhere predominate and with their prickly tangles obstruct orforbid the path. only the palms by the brink are kindly, and men journeying along the nilemust look often towards their bushy tops, where among the spreading foliage the redand yellow glint of date clusters proclaims the ripening of a generous crop, and proteststhat nature is not always mischievous and cruel.
the banks of the nile, except by contrastwith the desert, display an abundance of barrenness. their characteristic is monotony. their attractionis their sadness. yet there is one hour when all is changed. just before the sun sets towardsthe western cliffs a delicious flush brightens and enlivens the landscape. it is as thoughsome titanic artist in an hour of inspiration were retouching the picture, painting in darkpurple shadows among the rocks, strengthening the lights on the sands, gilding and beautifyingeverything, and making the whole scene live. the river, whose windings make it look likea lake, turns from muddy brown to silver-grey. the sky from a dull blue deepens into violetin the west. everything under that magic touch becomes vivid and alive. and then the sunsinks altogether behind the rocks, the colors
fade out of the sky, the flush off the sands,and gradually everything darkens and grows grey—like a man's cheek when he is bleedingto death. we are left sad and sorrowful in the dark, until the stars light up and remindus that there is always something beyond. in a land whose beauty is the beauty of amoment, whose face is desolate, and whose character is strangely stern, the curse ofwar was hardly needed to produce a melancholy effect. why should there be caustic plantswhere everything is hot and burning? in deserts where thirst is enthroned, and where the rocksand sand appeal to a pitiless sky for moisture, it was a savage trick to add the mockery ofmirage. the area multiplies the desolation. thereis life only by the nile. if a man were to
leave the river, he might journey westwardand find no human habitation, nor the smoke of a cooking fire, except the lonely tentof a kabbabish arab or the encampment of a trader's caravan, till he reached the coast-lineof america. or he might go east and find nothing but sand and sea and sun until bombay roseabove the horizon. the thread of fresh water is itself solitary in regions where all livingthings lack company. in the account of the river war the nile isnaturally supreme. it is the great melody that recurs throughout the whole opera. thegeneral purposing military operations, the statesman who would decide upon grave policies,and the reader desirous of studying the course and results of either, must think of the nile.it is the life of the lands through which
it flows. it is the cause of the war: themeans by which we fight; the end at which we aim. imagination should paint the riverthrough every page in the story. it glitters between the palm-trees during the actions.it is the explanation of nearly every military movement. by its banks the armies camp atnight. backed or flanked on its unfordable stream they offer or accept battle by day.to its brink, morning and evening, long lines of camels, horses, mules, and slaughter cattlehurry eagerly. emir and dervish, officer and soldier, friend and foe, kneel alike to thisgod of ancient egypt and draw each day their daily water in goatskin or canteen. withoutthe river none would have started. without it none might have continued. without it nonecould ever have returned.
all who journey on the nile, whether in commerceor war, will pay their tribute of respect and gratitude; for the great river has befriendedall races and every age. through all the centuries it has performed the annual miracle of itsflood. every year when the rains fall and the mountain snows of central africa beginto melt, the head-streams become torrents and the great lakes are filled to the brim.a vast expanse of low, swampy lands, crossed by secondary channels and flooded for manymiles, regulates the flow, and by a sponge-like action prevents the excess of one year fromcausing the deficiency of the next. far away in egypt, prince, priest, and peasant looksouthwards with anxious attention for the fluctuating yet certain rise. gradually theflood begins. the bahr-el-ghazal from a channel
of stagnant pools and marshes becomes a broadand navigable stream. the sobat and the atbara from dry watercourses with occasional pools,in which the fish and crocodiles are crowded, turn to rushing rivers. but all this is remotefrom egypt. after its confluence with the atbara no drop of water reaches the nile,and it flows for seven hundred miles through the sands or rushes in cataracts among therocks of the nubian desert. nevertheless, in spite of the tremendous diminution in volumecaused by the dryness of the earth and air and the heat of the sun—all of which drinkgreedily—the river below assuan is sufficiently great to supply nine millions of people withas much water as their utmost science and energies can draw, and yet to pour into themediterranean a low-water surplus current
of 61,500 cubic feet per second. nor is itswater its only gift. as the nile rises its complexion is changed. the clear blue riverbecomes thick and red, laden with the magic mud that can raise cities from the desertsand and make the wilderness a garden. the geographer may still in the arrogance of sciencedescribe the nile as 'a great, steady-flowing river, fed by the rains of the tropics, controlledby the existence of a vast head reservoir and several areas of repose, and annuallyflooded by the accession of a great body of water with which its eastern tributaries areflushed' [encyclopaedia britannica]; but all who have drunk deeply of its soft yet fatefulwaters—fateful, since they give both life and death—will understand why the old egyptiansworshipped the river, nor will they even in
modern days easily dissociate from their mindsa feeling of mystic reverence. south of khartoum and of 'the military soudan'the land becomes more fruitful. the tributaries of the nile multiply the areas of riparianfertility. a considerable rainfall, increasing as the equator is approached, enables theintervening spaces to support vegetation and consequently human life. the greater partof the country is feverish and unhealthy, nor can europeans long sustain the attacksof its climate. nevertheless it is by no means valueless. on the east the province of sennarused to produce abundant grain, and might easily produce no less abundant cotton. westwardthe vast territories of kordofan and darfur afford grazing-grounds to a multitude of cattle,and give means of livelihood to great numbers
of baggara or cow-herd arabs, who may alsopursue with activity and stratagem the fleet giraffe and the still fleeter ostrich. tothe south-east lies bahr-el-ghazal, a great tract of country occupied by dense woods andplentifully watered. further south and nearer the equator the forests and marshes becomeexuberant with tropical growths, and the whole face of the land is moist and green. amidgroves of gigantic trees and through plains of high waving grass the stately elephantroams in herds which occasionally number four hundred, hardly ever disturbed by a well-armedhunter. the ivory of their tusks constitutes the wealth of the equatorial province. sogreatly they abound that emin pasha is provoked to complain of a pest of these valuable pachyderms[life of emin pasha, vol.i chapter ix.]: and
although they are only assailed by the nativeswith spear and gun, no less than twelve thousand hundredweight of ivory has been exported ina single year [ibid.] all other kinds of large beasts known to man inhabit these obscureretreats. the fierce rhinoceros crashes through the undergrowth. among the reeds of melancholyswamps huge hippopotami, crocodiles, and buffaloes prosper and increase. antelope of every knownand many unclassified species; serpents of peculiar venom; countless millions of birds,butterflies, and beetles are among the offspring of prolific nature. and the daring sportsmanwho should survive his expedition would not fail to add to the achievements of scienceand the extent of natural history as well as to his own reputation.
the human inhabitants of the soudan wouldnot, but for their vices and misfortunes, be disproportioned in numbers to the faunaor less happy. war, slavery, and oppression have, however, afflicted them until the totalpopulation of the whole country does not exceed at the most liberal estimate three millionsouls. the huge area contains many differences of climate and conditions, and these haveproduced peculiar and diverse breeds of men. the soudanese are of many tribes, but twomain races can be clearly distinguished: the aboriginal natives, and the arab settlers.the indigenous inhabitants of the country were negroes as black as coal. strong, virile,and simple-minded savages, they lived as we may imagine prehistoric men—hunting, fighting,marrying, and dying, with no ideas beyond
the gratification of their physical desires,and no fears save those engendered by ghosts, witchcraft, the worship of ancestors, andother forms of superstition common among peoples of low development. they displayed the virtuesof barbarism. they were brave and honest. the smallness of their intelligence excusedthe degradation of their habits. their ignorance secured their innocence. yet their eulogymust be short, for though their customs, language, and appearance vary with the districts theyinhabit and the subdivisions to which they belong, the history of all is a confused legendof strife and misery, their natures are uniformly cruel and thriftless, and their conditionis one of equal squalor and want. although the negroes are the more numerous,the arabs exceed in power. the bravery of
the aboriginals is outweighed by the intelligenceof the invaders and their superior force of character. during the second century of themohammedan era, when the inhabitants of arabia went forth to conquer the world, one adventurousarmy struck south. the first pioneers were followed at intervals by continual immigrationsof arabs not only from arabia but also across the deserts from egypt and marocco. the elementthus introduced has spread and is spreading throughout the soudan, as water soaks intoa dry sponge. the aboriginals absorbed the invaders they could not repel. the strongerrace imposed its customs and language on the negroes. the vigour of their blood sensiblyaltered the facial appearance of the soudanese. for more than a thousand years the influenceof mohammedanism, which appears to possess
a strange fascination for negroid races, hasbeen permeating the soudan, and, although ignorance and natural obstacles impede theprogress of new ideas, the whole of the black race is gradually adopting the new religionand developing arab characteristics. in the districts of the north, where the originalinvaders settled, the evolution is complete, and the arabs of the soudan are a race formedby the interbreeding of negro and arab, and yet distinct from both. in the more remoteand inaccessible regions which lie to the south and west the negro race remains as yetunchanged by the arab influence. and between these extremes every degree of mixture isto be found. in some tribes pure arabic is spoken, and prior to the rise of the mahdithe orthodox moslem faith was practised. in
others arabic has merely modified the ancientdialects, and the mohammedan religion has been adapted to the older superstitions; butalthough the gap between the arab-negro and the negro-pure is thus filled by every intermediateblend, the two races were at an early date quite distinct. the qualities of mongrels are rarely admirable,and the mixture of the arab and negro types has produced a debased and cruel breed, moreshocking because they are more intelligent than the primitive savages. the stronger racesoon began to prey upon the simple aboriginals; some of the arab tribes were camel-breeders;some were goat-herds; some were baggaras or cow-herds. but all, without exception, werehunters of men. to the great slave-market
at jedda a continual stream of negro captiveshas flowed for hundreds of years. the invention of gunpowder and the adoption by the arabsof firearms facilitated the traffic by placing the ignorant negroes at a further disadvantage.thus the situation in the soudan for several centuries may be summed up as follows: thedominant race of arab invaders was unceasingly spreading its blood, religion, customs, andlanguage among the black aboriginal population, and at the same time it harried and enslavedthem. the state of society that arose out of thismay be easily imagined. the warlike arab tribes fought and brawled among themselves in ceaselessfeud and strife. the negroes trembled in apprehension of capture, or rose locally against theiroppressors. occasionally an important sheikh
would effect the combination of many tribes,and a kingdom came into existence—a community consisting of a military class armed withguns and of multitudes of slaves, at once their servants and their merchandise, andsometimes trained as soldiers. the dominion might prosper viciously till it was overthrownby some more powerful league. all this was unheeded by the outer world,from which the soudan is separated by the deserts, and it seemed that the slow, painfulcourse of development would be unaided and uninterrupted. but at last the populationsof europe changed. another civilisation reared itself above the ruins of roman triumph andmohammedan aspiration—a civilisation more powerful, more glorious, but no less aggressive.the impulse of conquest which hurried the
french and english to canada and the indies,which sent the dutch to the cape and the spaniards to peru, spread to africa and led the egyptiansto the soudan. in the year 1819 mohammed ali, availing himself of the disorders alike asan excuse and an opportunity, sent his son ismail up the nile with a great army. thearab tribes, torn by dissension, exhausted by thirty years of general war, and no longerinspired by their neglected religion, offered a weak resistance. their slaves, having knownthe worst of life, were apathetic. the black aboriginals were silent and afraid. the wholevast territory was conquered with very little fighting, and the victorious army, leavinggarrisons, returned in triumph to the delta. what enterprise that an enlightened communitymay attempt is more noble and more profitable
than the reclamation from barbarism of fertileregions and large populations? to give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice whereall was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil,to plant the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples theircapacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain—what more beautiful idealor more valuable reward can inspire human effort? the act is virtuous, the exerciseinvigorating, and the result often extremely profitable. yet as the mind turns from thewonderful cloudland of aspiration to the ugly scaffolding of attempt and achievement, asuccession of opposite ideas arises. industrious races are displayed stinted and starved forthe sake of an expensive imperialism which
they can only enjoy if they are well fed.wild peoples, ignorant of their barbarism, callous of suffering, careless of life buttenacious of liberty, are seen to resist with fury the philanthropic invaders, and to perishin thousands before they are convinced of their mistake. the inevitable gap betweenconquest and dominion becomes filled with the figures of the greedy trader, the inopportunemissionary, the ambitious soldier, and the lying speculator, who disquiet the minds ofthe conquered and excite the sordid appetites of the conquerors. and as the eye of thoughtrests on these sinister features, it hardly seems possible for us to believe that anyfair prospect is approached by so foul a path. from 1819 to 1883 egypt ruled the soudan.her rule was not kindly, wise, or profitable.
its aim was to exploit, not to improve thelocal population. the miseries of the people were aggravated rather than lessened: butthey were concealed. for the rough injustice of the sword there were substituted the intricaciesof corruption and bribery. violence and plunder were more hideous, since they were cloakedwith legality and armed with authority. the land was undeveloped and poor. it barely sustainedits inhabitants. the additional burden of a considerable foreign garrison and a crowdof rapacious officials increased the severity of the economic conditions. scarcity was frequent.famines were periodical. corrupt and incapable governors-general succeeded each other atkhartoum with bewildering rapidity. the constant changes, while they prevented the continuityof any wise policy, did not interrupt the
misrule. with hardly any exceptions, the pashaswere consistent in oppression. the success of their administration was measured by theministries in egypt by the amount of money they could extort from the natives; amongthe officials in the soudan, by the number of useless offices they could create. therewere a few bright examples of honest men, but these, by providing a contrast, only increasedthe discontents. the rule of egypt was iniquitous: yet it preservedthe magnificent appearance of imperial dominion. the egyptian pro-consul lived in state atthe confluence of the niles. the representatives of foreign powers established themselves inthe city. the trade of the south converged upon khartoum. thither the subordinate governors,beys and mudirs, repaired at intervals to
report the state of their provinces and toreceive instructions. thither were sent the ivory of equatoria, the ostrich feathers ofkordofan, gum from darfur, grain from sennar, and taxes collected from all the regions.strange beasts, entrapped in the swamps and forests, passed through the capital on theirjourney to cairo and europe. complex and imposing reports of revenue and expenditure were annuallycompiled. an elaborate and dignified correspondence was maintained between egypt and its greatdependency. the casual observer, astonished at the unusual capacity for government displayedby an oriental people, was tempted to accept the famous assertion which nubar pasha putinto the mouth of the khedive ismail: 'we are no longer in africa, but in europe.' yetall was a hateful sham ['the government of
the egyptians in these far-off countries isnothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description.'—colonel gordonin central africa, april 11, 1879.] the arbitrary and excessive taxes were collected only atthe point of the bayonet. if a petty chief fell into arrears, his neighbours were raisedagainst him. if an arab tribe were recalcitrant, a military expedition was despatched. moreover,the ability of the arabs to pay depended on their success as slave-hunters. when therehad been a good catch, the revenue profited. the egyptian government had joined the internationalleague against the slave trade. they combined, however, indirectly but deliberately, to makemoney out of it. [egypt, no.11, 1883.] in the miserable, harassing warfare that accompaniedthe collection of taxes the viceregal commanders
gained more from fraud than force. no subterfuge,no treachery, was too mean for them to adopt: no oath or treaty was too sacred for themto break. their methods were cruel, and if honour did not impede the achievement, mercydid not restrict the effects of their inglorious successes; and the effete administrators delightedto order their timid soldiery to carry out the most savage executions. the politicalmethods and social style of the governors-general were imitated more or less exactly by thesubordinate officials according to their degree in the provinces. since they were completelyhidden from the eye of civilisation, they enjoyed a greater licence in their administration.as their education was inferior, so their habits became more gross. meanwhile the volcanoon which they disported themselves was ominously
silent. the arab tribes obeyed, and the blackpopulation cowered. the authority of a tyrannical government wassupported by the presence of a worthless army. nearly forty thousand men were distributedamong eight main and numerous minor garrisons. isolated in a roadless country by enormousdistances and natural obstacles, and living in the midst of large savage populations offanatical character and warlike habits, whose exasperation was yearly growing with theirmiseries, the viceregal forces might depend for their safety only on the skill of theirofficers, the excellence of their discipline, and the superiority of their weapons. butthe egyptian officers were at that time distinguished for nothing but their public incapacity andprivate misbehaviour. the evil reputation
of the soudan and its climate deterred themore educated or more wealthy from serving in such distant regions, and none went southwho could avoid it. the army which the khedives maintained in the delta was, judged by europeanstandards, only a rabble. it was badly trained, rarely paid, and very cowardly; and the scumof the army of the delta was the cream of the army of the soudan. the officers remainedfor long periods, many all their lives, in the obscurity of the remote provinces. somehad been sent there in disgrace, others in disfavour. some had been forced to serve outof egypt by extreme poverty, others were drawn to the soudan by the hopes of gratifying peculiartastes. the majority had harems of the women of the country, which were limited only bythe amount of money they could lay their hands
on by any method. many were hopeless and habitualdrunkards. nearly all were dishonest. all were indolent and incapable. under such leadership the finest soldierywould have soon degenerated. the egyptians in the soudan were not fine soldiers. liketheir officers, they were the worst part of the khedivial army. like them, they had beendriven to the south. like them, they were slothful and effete. their training was imperfect;their discipline was lax; their courage was low. nor was even this all the weakness andperil of their position; for while the regular troops were thus demoralised, there existeda powerful local irregular force of bazingers (soudanese riflemen), as well armed as thesoldiers, more numerous, more courageous,
and who regarded the alien garrisons withfear that continually diminished and hate that continually grew. and behind regularsand irregulars alike the wild arab tribes of the desert and the hardy blacks of theforests, goaded by suffering and injustice, thought the foreigners the cause of all theirwoes, and were delayed only by their inability to combine from sweeping them off the faceof the earth. never was there such a house of cards as the egyptian dominion in the soudan.the marvel is that it stood so long, not that it fell so soon. the names of two men of character and fameare forever connected with the actual outburst. one was an english general, the other an arabpriest; yet, in spite of the great gulf and
vivid contrast between their conditions, theyresembled each other in many respects. both were earnest and enthusiastic men of keensympathies and passionate emotions. both were powerfully swayed by religious fervour. bothexerted great personal influence on all who came in contact with them. both were reformers.the arab was an african reproduction of the englishman; the englishman a superior andcivilised development of the arab. in the end they fought to the death, but for an importantpart of their lives their influence on the fortunes of the soudan was exerted in thesame direction. mohammed ahmed, 'the mahdi,' will be discussed in his own place. charlesgordon needs little introduction. long before this tale begins his reputation was european,and the fame of the 'ever-victorious army'
had spread far beyond the great wall of china. the misgovernment of the egyptians and themisery of the soudanese reached their greatest extreme in the seventh decade of the presentcentury. from such a situation there seemed to be no issue other than by force of arms.the arab tribes lacked no provocation. yet they were destitute of two moral forces essentialto all rebellions. the first was the knowledge that better things existed. the second wasa spirit of combination. general gordon showed them the first. the mahdi provided the second. it is impossible to study any part of charlesgordon's career without being drawn to all the rest. as his wild and varied fortuneslead him from sebastopol to pekin, from gravesend
to south africa, from mauritius to the soudan,the reader follows fascinated. every scene is strange, terrible, or dramatic. yet, remarkableas are the scenes, the actor is the more extraordinary; a type without comparison in modern timesand with few likenesses in history. rare and precious is the truly disinterested man. potentatesof many lands and different degree—the emperor of china, the king of the belgians, the premierof cape colony, the khedive of egypt—competed to secure his services. the importance ofhis offices varied no less than their nature. one day he was a subaltern of sappers; onanother he commanded the chinese army; the next he directed an orphanage; or was governor-generalof the soudan, with supreme powers of life and death and peace and war; or served asprivate secretary to lord ripon. but in whatever
capacity he laboured he was true to his reputation.whether he is portrayed bitterly criticising to graham the tactics of the assault on theredan; or pulling the head of lar wang from under his bedstead and waving it in paroxysmsof indignation before the astonished eyes of sir halliday macartney; or riding aloneinto the camp of the rebel suliman and receiving the respectful salutes of those who had meantto kill him; or telling the khedive ismail that he 'must have the whole soudan to govern';or reducing his salary to half the regulation amount because 'he thought it was too much';or ruling a country as large as europe; or collecting facts for lord ripon's rhetoricalefforts—we perceive a man careless alike of the frowns of men or the smiles of women,of life or comfort, wealth or fame.
it was a pity that one, thus gloriously freefrom the ordinary restraining influences of human society, should have found in his owncharacter so little mental ballast. his moods were capricious and uncertain, his passionsviolent, his impulses sudden and inconsistent. the mortal enemy of the morning had becomea trusted ally before the night. the friend he loved to-day he loathed to-morrow. schemeafter scheme formed in his fertile brain, and jostled confusingly together. all in successionwere pressed with enthusiasm. all at times were rejected with disdain. a temperamentnaturally neurotic had been aggravated by an acquired habit of smoking; and the generalcarried this to so great an extreme that he was rarely seen without a cigarette. his virtuesare famous among men; his daring and resource
might turn the tide or war; his energy wouldhave animated a whole people; his achievements are upon record; but it must also be set downthat few more uncertain and impracticable forces than gordon have ever been introducedinto administration and diplomacy. although the egyptian government might loudlyproclaim their detestation of slavery, their behaviour in the soudan was viewed with suspicionby the european powers, and particularly by great britain. to vindicate his sinceritythe khedive ismail in 1874 appointed gordon to be governor of the equatorial provincein succession to sir samuel baker. the name of the general was a sufficient guaranteethat the slave trade was being earnestly attacked. the khedive would gladly have stopped at theguarantee, and satisfied the world without
disturbing 'vested interests.' but the mission,which may have been originally instituted as a pretence, soon became in gordon's energetichands very real. circumstances, moreover, soon enlisted the sympathies of the egyptiangovernment on the side of their zealous agent. the slave dealers had committed every varietyof atrocity for which the most odious traffic in the world afforded occasion; but when,under the leadership of zubehr rahamna, they refused to pay their annual tribute, it wasfelt in cairo that their crimes had cried aloud for chastisement. zubehr is sufficiently described when it hasbeen said that he was the most notorious slave dealer africa has ever produced. his infamyhad spread beyond the limits of the continent
which was the scene of his exploits to thedistant nations of the north and west. in reality, his rule was a distinct advance onthe anarchy which had preceded it, and certainly he was no worse than others of his vile trade.his scale of business was, however, more extended. what william whiteley was in respect of goodsand chattels, that was zubehr in respect of slaves—a universal provider. magnitude lendsa certain grandeur to crime; and zubehr in the height of his power, at the head of theslave merchants' confederacy, might boast the retinue of a king and exercise authorityover wide regions and a powerful army. as early as 1869 he was practically the independentruler of the bahr-el-ghazal. the khedive resolved to assert his rights. a small egyptian forcewas sent to subdue the rebel slaver who not
only disgraced humanity but refused to paytribute. like most of the khedivial expeditions the troops under bellal bey met with ill-fortune.they came, they saw, they ran away. some, less speedy than the rest, fell on the fieldof dishonour. the rebellion was open. nevertheless it was the khedive who sought peace. zubehrapologised for defeating the viceregal soldiers and remained supreme in the bahr-el-ghazal.thence he planned the conquest of darfur, at that time an independent kingdom. the egyptiangovernment were glad to join with him in the enterprise. the man they had been unable toconquer, they found it expedient to assist. the operations were successful. the king ofdarfur, who was distinguished no less for his valour than for his folly, was killed.the whole country was subdued. the whole population
available after the battles became slaves.zubehr thus wielded a formidable power. the khedivial government, thinking to ensure hisloyalty, created him a pasha—a rank which he could scarcely disgrace; and the authorityof the rebel was thus unwillingly recognised by the ruler. such was the situation whengordon first came to the soudan. it was beyond the power of the new governorof the equatorial province at once to destroy the slave-hunting confederacy. yet he struckheavy blows at the slave trade, and when in 1877, after a short visit to england, he returnedto the soudan as governor-general and with absolute power, he assailed it with redoubledenergy. fortune assisted his efforts, for the able zubehr was enticed to cairo, and,once there, the government refused to allow
their faithful ally and distinguished guestto go back to his happy-hunting grounds. although the slave dealers were thus robbed of theirgreat leader, they were still strong, and zubehr's son, the brave suliman, found a considerablefollowing. furious at his father's captivity, and alarmed lest his own should follow, hemeditated revolt. but the governor-general, mounted on a swift camel and attired in fulluniform, rode alone into the rebel camp and compelled the submission of its chiefs beforethey could recover from their amazement. the confederacy was severely shaken, and when,in the following year, suliman again revolted, the egyptian troops under gessi pasha wereable to disperse his forces and induce him to surrender on terms. the terms were broken,and suliman and ten of his companions suffered
death by shooting [von slatin, baron rudolfkarl. fire and sword in the soudan, p.28.] the league of the slave dealers was thus destroyed. towards the end of 1879 gordon left the soudan.with short intervals he had spent five busy years in its provinces. his energy had stirredthe country. he had struck at the root of the slave trade, he had attacked the systemof slavery, and, as slavery was the greatest institution in the land, he had underminedthe whole social system. indignation had stimulated his activity to an extraordinary degree. ina climate usually fatal to europeans he discharged the work of five officers. careless of hismethods, he bought slaves himself, drilled them, and with the soldiers thus formed pouncedon the caravans of the hunters. traversing
the country on a fleet dromedary—on whichin a single year he is said to have covered 3,840 miles—he scattered justice and freedomamong the astonished natives. he fed the infirm, protected the weak, executed the wicked. tosome he gave actual help, to many freedom, to all new hopes and aspirations. nor werethe tribes ungrateful. the fiercest savages and cannibals respected the life of the strangewhite man. the women blessed him. he could ride unarmed and alone where a brigade ofsoldiers dared not venture. but he was, as he knew himself, the herald of the storm.oppressed yet ferocious races had learned that they had rights; the misery of the soudanesewas lessened, but their knowledge had increased. the whole population was unsettled, and thewheels of change began slowly to revolve;
nor did they stop until they had accomplishedan enormous revolution. the part played by the second force is moreobscure. few facts are so encouraging to the student of human development as the desire,which most men and all communities manifest at all times, to associate with their actionsat least the appearance of moral right. however distorted may be their conceptions of virtue,however feeble their efforts to attain even to their own ideals, it is a pleasing featureand a hopeful augury that they should wish to be justified. no community embarks on agreat enterprise without fortifying itself with the belief that from some points of viewits motives are lofty and disinterested. it is an involuntary tribute, the humble tributeof imperfect beings, to the eternal temples
of truth and beauty. the sufferings of a peopleor a class may be intolerable, but before they will take up arms and risk their livessome unselfish and impersonal spirit must animate them. in countries where there iseducation and mental activity or refinement, this high motive is found in the pride ofglorious traditions or in a keen sympathy with surrounding misery. ignorance deprivessavage nations of such incentives. yet in the marvellous economy of nature this veryignorance is a source of greater strength. it affords them the mighty stimulus of fanaticism.the french communists might plead that they upheld the rights of man. the desert tribesproclaimed that they fought for the glory of god. but although the force of fanaticalpassion is far greater than that exerted by
any philosophical belief, its sanction isjust the same. it gives men something which they think is sublime to fight for, and thisserves them as an excuse for wars which it is desirable to begin for totally differentreasons. fanaticism is not a cause of war. it is the means which helps savage peoplesto fight. it is the spirit which enables them to combine—the great common object beforewhich all personal or tribal disputes become insignificant. what the horn is to the rhinoceros,what the sting is to the wasp, the mohammedan faith was to the arabs of the soudan—a facultyof offence or defence. it was all this and no more. it was not thereason of the revolt. it strengthened, it characterised, but it did not cause. ['i donot believe that fanaticism exists as it used
to do in the world, judging from what i haveseen in this so-called fanatic land. it is far more a question of property, and is morelike communism under the flag of religion.'—general gordon's journals at khartoum, bk.i. p.13.]those whose practice it is to regard their own nation as possessing a monopoly of virtueand common-sense, are wont to ascribe every military enterprise of savage peoples to fanaticism.they calmly ignore obvious and legitimate motives. the most rational conduct is consideredmad. it has therefore been freely stated, and is to some extent believed, that the revoltin the soudan was entirely religious. if the worst untruths are those that have some appearanceof veracity, this impression must be very false indeed. it is, perhaps, an historicalfact that the revolt of a large population
has never been caused solely or even mainlyby religious enthusiasm. the reasons which forced the peoples of thesoudan to revolt were as strong as the defence which their oppressors could offer was feeble.looking at the question from a purely political standpoint, we may say that upon the wholethere exists no record of a better case for rebellion than presented itself to the soudanese.their country was being ruined; their property was plundered; their women were ravished;their liberties were curtailed; even their lives were threatened. aliens ruled the inhabitants;the few oppressed the many; brave men were harried by cowards; the weak compelled thestrong. here were sufficient reasons. since any armed movement against an establishedgovernment can be justified only by success,
strength is an important revolutionary virtue.it was a virtue that the arabs might boast. they were indeed far stronger than they, theirpersecutors, or the outside world had yet learned. all were soon to be enlightened. the storm gathered and the waters rose. threegreat waves impelled the living tide against the tottering house founded on the desertsand. the arab suffered acutely from poverty, misgovernment, and oppression. infuriated,he looked up and perceived that the cause of all his miseries was a weak and cowardlyforeigner, a despicable 'turk.' the antagonism of races increased the hatred sprung fromsocial evils. the moment was at hand. then, and not till then, the third wave came—thewave of fanaticism, which, catching up and
surmounting the other waves, covered all theflood with its white foam, and, bearing on with the momentum of the waters, beat in thunderagainst the weak house so that it fell; and great was the fall thereof. down to the year 1881 there was no fanaticalmovement in the soudan. in their utter misery the hopeless inhabitants had neglected eventhe practices of religion. they were nevertheless prepared for any enterprise, however desperate,which might free them from the egyptian yoke. all that delayed them was the want of someleader who could combine the tribes and restore their broken spirits, and in the summer of1881 the leader appeared. his subsequent career is within the limits of this account, andsince his life throws a strong light on the
thoughts and habits of the arabs of the soudanit may be worth while to trace it from the beginning. the man who was the proximate cause of theriver war was born by the banks of the nile, not very far from dongola. his family werepoor and of no account in the province. but as the prophet had claimed a royal descent,and as a sacred example was sprung from david's line, mohammed ahmed asserted that he wasof the 'ashraf,'(descendants of the prophet) and the assertion, since it cannot be disproved,may be accepted. his father was a humble priest; yet he contrived to give his son some educationin the practices of religion, the principles of the koran, and the art of writing. thenhe died at kerreri while on a journey to khartoum,
and left the future mahdi, still a child,to the mercies of the world. solitary trees, if they grow at all, grow strong; and a boydeprived of a father's care often develops, if he escape the perils of youth, an independenceand vigour of thought which may restore in after life the heavy loss of early days. itwas so with mohammed ahmed. he looked around for an occupation and subsistence. a largeproportion of the population of religious countries pass their lives at leisure, supportedby the patient labour of the devout. the young man determined to follow the profession forwhich he felt his talents suited, and which would afford him the widest scope. he becamea priest. many of the religious teachers of heathen and other countries are devoid ofenthusiasm and turn their attention to the
next world because doing so affords them aneasy living in this. happily this is not true of all. it was not true of mohammed. evenat an early age he manifested a zeal for god's service, and displayed a peculiar aptitudefor learning the tenets and dogmas of the mohammedan belief. so promising a pupil didnot long lack a master in a country where intelligence and enthusiasm were scarce. hisaspirations growing with his years and knowledge, he journeyed to khartoum as soon as his religiouseducation was completed, and became a disciple of the renowned and holy sheikh, mohammedsherif. his devotion to his superior, to his studiesand to the practice of austerities, and a strange personal influence he was alreadybeginning to show, won him by degrees a few
disciples of his own: and with them he retiredto the island of abba. here by the waters of the white nile mohammed ahmed lived forseveral years. his two brothers, who were boat-builders in the neighbourhood, supportedhim by their industry. but it must have been an easy burden, for we read that he 'hollowedout for himself a cave in the mud bank, and lived in almost entire seclusion, fastingoften for days, and occasionally paying a visit to the head of the order to assure himof his devotion and obedience.' [i take this passage from fire and sword in the soudan,by slatin. his account is the most graphic and trustworthy of all known records of themahdi. he had terrible opportunities of collecting information. i have followed his version (chapteriv.) very closely on this subject.] meanwhile
his sanctity increased, and the labour andcharity of the brothers were assisted by the alms of godly travellers on the river. this virtuous and frugal existence was disturbedand terminated by an untoward event. the renowned and holy sheikh made a feast to celebratethe circumcision of his sons. that the merriment of the auspicious occasion and the entertainmentof the guests might be increased, sherif, according to the lax practice of the time,granted a dispensation from any sins committed during the festivities, and proclaimed ingod's name the suspension of the rules against singing and dancing by which the religiousorders were bound. the ascetic of abba island did not join in these seemingly innocent dissipations.with the recklessness of the reformer he protested
against the demoralisation of the age, andloudly affirmed the doctrine that god alone could forgive sins. these things were speedilybrought to the ears of the renowned sheikh, and in all the righteous indignation thataccompanies detected wrong-doing, he summoned mohammed ahmed before him. the latter obeyed.he respected his superior. he was under obligations to him. his ire had disappeared as soon asit had been expressed. he submissively entreated forgiveness; but in vain. sherif felt thatsome sort of discipline must be maintained among his flock. he had connived at disobedienceto the divine law. all the more must he uphold his own authority. rising in anger, he drovethe presumptuous disciple from his presence with bitter words, and expunged his name fromthe order of the elect.
mohammed went home. he was greatly distressed.yet his fortunes were not ruined. his sanctity was still a valuable and, unless he choseotherwise, an inalienable asset. the renowned sheikh had a rival—nearly as holy and moreenterprising than himself. from him the young priest might expect a warm welcome. neverthelesshe did not yet abandon his former superior. placing a heavy wooden collar on his neck,clad in sackcloth and sprinkled with ashes, he again returned to his spiritual leader,and in this penitential guise implored pardon. he was ignominiously ejected. nor did he ventureto revisit the unforgiving sheikh. but it happened that in a few weeks sherif had occasionto journey to the island of abba. his former disciple appeared suddenly before him, stillclad in sackcloth and defiled by ashes. careless
of his plain misery, and unmoved by his loyalty,which was the more remarkable since it was disinterested, the implacable sheikh pouredforth a stream of invective. among many insults, one went home: 'be off, you wretched dongolawi.' although the natives of the dongola provincewere despised and disliked in the southern soudan, it is not at first apparent why mohammedshould have resented so bitterly the allusion to his birthplace. but abuse by class is adangerous though effective practice. a man will perhaps tolerate an offensive word appliedto himself, but will be infuriated if his nation, his rank, or his profession is insulted. mohammed ahmed rose. all that man could doto make amends he had done. now he had been
publicly called 'a wretched dongolawi.' henceforthhe would afflict sherif with his repentance no longer. reaching his house, he informedhis disciples—for they had not abandoned him in all his trouble—that the sheikh hadfinally cast him off, and that he would now take his discarded allegiance elsewhere. therival, the sheikh el koreishi, lived near mesalamia. he was jealous of sherif and enviedhim his sanctimonious disciples. he was therefore delighted to receive a letter from mohammedahmed announcing his breach with his former superior and offering his most devoted services.he returned a cordial invitation, and the priest of abba island made all preparationfor the journey. this new development seems to have startledthe unforgiving sherif. it was no part of
his policy to alienate his followers, stillless to add to those of his rival. after all, the quality of mercy was high and noble. hewould at last graciously forgive the impulsive but repentant disciple. he wrote him a letterto this effect. but it was now too late. mohammed replied with grave dignity that he had committedno crime, that he sought no forgiveness, and that 'a wretched dongolawi' would not offendby his presence the renowned sheikh el sherif. after this indulgence he departed to mesalamia. but the fame of his doings spread far andwide throughout the land. 'even in distant darfur it was the principal topic of conversation'[slatin, fire and sword]. rarely had a fiki been known to offend his superior; never torefuse his forgiveness. mohammed did not hesitate
to declare that he had done what he had doneas a protest against the decay of religious fervour and the torpor of the times. sincehis conduct had actually caused his dismissal, it appears that he was quite justified inmaking a virtue of necessity. at any rate he was believed, and the people groaning underoppression looked from all the regions to the figure that began to grow on the politicalhorizon. his fame grew. rumour, loud-tongued, carried it about the land that a great reformerwas come to purify the faith and break the stony apathy which paralysed the hearts ofislam. whisperings added that a man was found who should break from off the necks of thetribes the hateful yoke of egypt. mohammed now deliberately entered upon the path ofambition.
throughout nubia the shukri belief prevails:some day, in a time of shame and trouble, a second great prophet will arise—a mahdiwho shall lead the faithful nearer god and sustain the religion. the people of the soudanalways look inquiringly to any ascetic who rises to fame, and the question is often repeated,'art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?' of this powerful element ofdisturbance mohammed ahmed resolved to avail himself. he requested and obtained the permissionof the sheikh koreishi to return to abba, where he was well known, and with which islandvillage his name was connected, and so came back in triumph to the scene of his disgrace.thither many pilgrims began to resort. he received valuable presents, which he distributedto the poor, who acclaimed him as 'zahed'—a
renouncer of earthly pleasures. he journeyedpreaching through kordofan, and received the respect of the priesthood and the homage ofthe people. and while he spoke of the purification of the religion, they thought that the burningwords might be applied to the freedom of the soil. he supported his sermons by writings,which were widely read. when a few months later the sheikh koreishi died, the priestof abba proceeded forthwith to erect a tomb to his memory, directing and controlling thevoluntary labours of the reverent arabs who carried the stones. while mohammed was thus occupied he receivedthe support of a man, less virtuous than but nearly as famous as himself. abdullah wasone of four brothers, the sons of an obscure
priest; but he inherited no great love ofreligion or devotion to its observances. he was a man of determination and capacity. heset before himself two distinct ambitions, both of which he accomplished: to free thesoudan of foreigners, and to rule it himself. he seems to have had a queer presentimentof his career. this much he knew: there would be a great religious leader, and he wouldbe his lieutenant and his successor. when zubehr conquered darfur, abdullah presentedhimself before him and hailed him as 'the expected mahdi.' zubehr, however, protestedwith superfluous energy that he was no saint, and the impulsive patriot was compelled toaccept his assurances. so soon as he saw mohammed ahmed rising to fame and displaying qualitiesof courage and energy, he hastened to throw
himself at his feet and assure him of hisdevotion. no part of slatin pasha's fascinating accountof his perils and sufferings is so entertaining as that in which abdullah, then become khalifaof the whole soudan, describes his early struggles and adversity: 'indeed it was a very troublesome journey.at that time my entire property consisted of one donkey, and he had a gall on his back,so that i could not ride him. but i made him carry my water-skin and bag of corn, overwhich i spread my rough cotton garment, and drove him along in front of me. at that timei wore the white cotton shirt, like the rest of my tribe. my clothes and my dialect atonce marked me out as a stranger wherever
i went; and when i crossed the nile i wasfrequently greeted with "what do you want? go back to your own country. there is nothingto steal here."' what a life of ups and downs! it was a longstride from the ownership of one saddle-galled donkey to the undisputed rule of an empire.the weary wayfarer may have dreamed of this, for ambition stirs imagination nearly as muchas imagination excites ambition. but further he could not expect or wish to see. nor couldhe anticipate as, in the complacency of a man who had done with evil days, he told thestory of his rise to the submissive slatin, that the day would come when he would leadan army of more than fifty thousand men to destruction, and that the night would followwhen, almost alone, his empire shrunk again
to the saddle-galled donkey, he would seekhis home in distant kordofan, while this same slatin who knelt so humbly before him wouldlay the fierce pursuing squadrons on the trail. mohammed ahmed received his new adherent kindly,but without enthusiasm. for some months abdullah carried stones to build the tomb of the sheikhel koreishi. gradually they got to know each other. 'but long before he entrusted me withhis secret,' said abdullah to slatin, 'i knew that he was "the expected guide."' [slatin,fire and sword, p.131.] and though the world might think that the 'messenger of god' wassent to lead men to happiness in heaven, abdullah attached to the phrase a significance of hisown, and knew that he should lead him to power on earth. the two formed a strong combination.the mahdi—for such mohammed ahmed had already
in secret announced himself—brought thewild enthusiasm of religion, the glamour of a stainless life, and the influence of superstitioninto the movement. but if he were the soul of the plot, abdullah was the brain. he wasthe man of the world, the practical politician, the general. there now commenced a great conspiracy againstthe egyptian government. it was fostered by the discontents and justified by the miseriesof the people of the soudan. the mahdi began to collect adherents and to extend his influencein all parts of the country. he made a second journey through kordofan, and received everywherepromises of support from all classes. the most distant tribes sent assurances of devotionand reverence, and, what was of more importance,
of armed assistance. the secret could notbe long confined to those who welcomed the movement. as the ramifications of the plotspread they were perceived by the renowned sheikh sherif, who still nursed his chagrinand thirsted for revenge. he warned the egyptian government. they, knowing his envy and hatredof his former disciple, discounted his evidence and for some time paid no attention to thegathering of the storm. but presently more trustworthy witnesses confirmed his statements,and raouf pasha, then governor-general, finding himself confronted with a growing agitation,determined to act. he accordingly sent a messenger to the island of abba, to summon mohammedahmed to khartoum to justify his behaviour and explain his intentions. the news of thedespatch of the messenger was swiftly carried
to the mahdi! he consulted with his trustylieutenant. they decided to risk everything, and without further delay to defy the government.when it is remembered how easily an organised army, even though it be in a bad condition,can stamp out the beginnings of revolt among a population, the courage of their resolvemust be admired. the messenger arrived. he was received withcourtesy by abdullah, and forthwith conducted before the mahdi. he delivered his message,and urged mohammed ahmed to comply with the orders of the governor-general. the mahdilistened for some time in silence, but with increasing emotion; and when the messengeradvised him, as he valued his own safety, to journey to khartoum, if only to justifyhimself, his passion overcame him. 'what!'
he shouted, rising suddenly and striking hisbreast with his hand. 'by the grace of god and his prophet i am master of this country,and never shall i go to khartoum to justify myself.' [slatin, fire and sword, p.135.]the terrified messenger withdrew. the rebellion of the mahdi had begun. both the priest and the governor-general preparedfor military enterprise. the mahdi proclaimed a holy war against the foreigners, alike theenemies of god and the scourge of men. he collected his followers. he roused the localtribes. he wrote letters to all parts of the soudan, calling upon the people to fight fora purified religion, the freedom of the soil, and god's holy prophet 'the expected mahdi.'he promised the honour of men to those who
lived, the favour of god to those who fell,and lastly that the land should be cleared of the miserable 'turk.' 'better,' he said,and it became the watchword of the revolt, 'thousands of graves than a dollar tax.' [ohrwalder,ten years' captivity in the mahdi's camp.] nor was raouf pasha idle. he sent two companiesof infantry with one gun by steamer to abba to arrest the fanatic who disturbed the publicpeace. what followed is characteristically egyptian. each company was commanded by acaptain. to encourage their efforts, whichever officer captured the mahdi was promised promotion.at sunset on an august evening in 1881 the steamer arrived at abba. the promise of thegovernor-general had provoked the strife, not the emulation of the officers. both landedwith their companies and proceeded by different
routes under the cover of darkness to thevillage where the mahdi dwelt. arriving simultaneously from opposite directions, they fired intoeach other, and, in the midst of this mistaken combat, the mahdi rushed upon them with hisscanty following and destroyed them impartially. a few soldiers succeeded in reaching the bankof the river. but the captain of the steamer would run no risks, and those who could notswim out to the vessel were left to their fate. with such tidings the expedition returnedto khartoum. mohammed ahmed had been himself wounded inthe attack, but the faithful abdullah bound up the injury, so that none might know thatgod's prophet had been pierced by carnal weapons. the effect of the success was electrical.the news spread throughout the soudan. men
with sticks had slain men with rifles. a priesthad destroyed the soldiers of the government. surely this was the expected one. the mahdi,however, profited by his victory only to accomplish a retreat without loss of prestige. abdullahhad no illusions. more troops would be sent. they were too near to khartoum. prudence counselledflight to regions more remote. but before this new hegira the mahdi appointed his fourkhalifas, in accordance with prophecy and precedent. the first was abdullah. of theothers it is only necessary at this moment to notice ali-wad-helu, the chief of one ofthe local tribes, and among the first to rally to the standard of revolt. then the retreat began; but it was more likea triumphal progress. attended by a considerable
following, and preceded by tales of the mostwonderful miracles and prodigies, the mahdi retired to a mountain in kordofan to whichhe gave the name of jebel masa, that being the mountain whence 'the expected guide' isdeclared in the koran sooner or later to appear. he was now out of reach of khartoum, but withinreach of fashoda. the egyptian governor of that town, rashid bey, a man of more enterpriseand even less military knowledge than is usual in his race, determined to make all attemptto seize the rebel and disperse his following. taking no precautions, he fell on the 9thof december into an ambush, was attacked unprepared, and was himself, with fourteen hundred men,slaughtered by the ill-armed but valiant arabs. the whole country stirred. the government,thoroughly alarmed by the serious aspect the
revolt had assumed, organised a great expedition.four thousand troops under yusef, a pasha of distinguished reputation, were sent againstthe rebels. meanwhile the mahdi and his followers suffered the extremes of want. their causewas as yet too perilous for the rich to join. only the poor flocked to the holy standard.all that mohammed possessed he gave away, keeping nothing for himself, excepting onlya horse to lead his followers in battle. abdullah walked. nevertheless the rebels were half-famished,and armed with scarcely any more deadly weapons than sticks and stones. the army of the governmentapproached slowly. their leaders anticipated an easy victory. their contempt for the enemywas supreme. they did not even trouble themselves to post sentries by night, but slept calmlyinside a slender thorn fence, unwatched save
by their tireless foes. and so it came topass that in the half-light of the early morning of the 7th of june the mahdi, his ragged khalifas,and his almost naked army rushed upon them, and slew them to a man. the victory was decisive. southern kordofanwas at the feet of the priest of abba. stores of arms and ammunition had fallen into hishands. thousands of every class hastened to join his standard. no one doubted that hewas the divine messenger sent to free them from their oppressors. the whole of the arabtribes all over the soudan rose at once. the revolt broke out simultaneously in sennarand darfur, and spread to provinces still more remote. the smaller egyptian posts, thetax-gatherers and local administrators, were
massacred in every district. only the largergarrisons maintained themselves in the principal towns. they were at once blockaded. all communicationswere interrupted. all legal authority was defied. only the mahdi was obeyed. it is now necessary to look for a moment toegypt. the misgovernment which in the soudan had caused the rebellion of the mahdi, inegypt produced the revolt of arabi pasha. as the people of the soudan longed to be ridof the foreign oppressors—the so-called 'turks'—so those of the delta were eagerto free themselves from the foreign regulators and the real turkish influence. while menwho lived by the sources of the nile asserted that tribes did not exist for officials toharry, others who dwelt at its mouth protested
that nations were not made to be exploitedby creditors or aliens. the ignorant south found their leader in a priest: the more educatednorth looked to a soldier. mohammed ahmed broke the egyptian yoke; arabi gave expressionto the hatred of the egyptians for the turks. but although the hardy arabs might scatterthe effete egyptians, the effete egyptians were not likely to disturb the solid battalionsof europe. after much hesitation and many attempts at compromise, the liberal administrationof mr. gladstone sent a fleet which reduced the forts of alexandria to silence and thecity to anarchy. the bombardment of the fleet was followed by the invasion of a powerfularmy. twenty-five thousand men were landed in egypt. the campaign was conducted withcelerity and skill. the egyptian armies were
slaughtered or captured. their patriotic butcommonplace leader was sentenced to death and condemned to exile, and great britainassumed the direction of egyptian affairs. the british soon restored law and order inegypt, and the question of the revolt in the soudan came before the english advisers ofthe khedive. notwithstanding the poverty and military misfortunes which depressed the peopleof the delta, the desire to hold their southern provinces was evident. the british government,which at that time was determined to pursue a policy of non-interference in the soudan,gave a tacit consent, and another great expedition was prepared to suppress the false prophet,as the english and egyptians deemed him—'the expected mahdi,' as the people of the soudanbelieved.
a retired officer of the indian staff corpsand a few european officers of various nationalities were sent to khartoum to organise the newfield force. meanwhile the mahdi, having failed to take by storm, laid siege to el obeid,the chief town of kordofan. during the summer of 1883 the egyptian troops gradually concentratedat khartoum until a considerable army was formed. it was perhaps the worst army thathas ever marched to war. one extract from general hicks's letters will suffice. writingon the 8th of june, 1883, to sir e. wood, he says incidentally: 'fifty-one men of thekrupp battery deserted on the way here, although in chains.' the officers and men who had beendefeated fighting for their own liberties at tel-el-kebir were sent to be destroyed,fighting to take away the liberties of others
in the soudan. they had no spirit, no discipline,hardly any training, and in a force of over eight thousand men there were scarcely a dozencapable officers. the two who were the most notable of these few—general hicks, whocommanded, and colonel farquhar, the chief of the staff—must be remarked. el obeid had fallen before the ill-fated expeditionleft khartoum; but the fact that slatin bey, an austrian officer in the egyptian service,was still maintaining himself in darfur provided it with an object. on the 9th of septemberhicks and his army (the actual strength of which was 7,000 infantry, 400 mounted bashibazuks, 500 cavalry, 100 circassians, 10 mounted guns, 4 krupps, and 6 nordenfeldt machineguns) left omdurman and marched to duem. although
the actual command of the expedition was vestedin the english officer, ala-ed-din pasha, the governor-general who had succeeded raoufpasha, exercised an uncertain authority. differences of opinion were frequent, though all the officerswere agreed in taking the darkest views of their chances. the miserable host toiled slowlyonward towards its destruction, marching in a south-westerly direction through shat andrahad. here the condition of the force was so obviously demoralised that a german servant(gustav klootz, the servant of baron seckendorf) actually deserted to the mahdi's camp. hewas paraded in triumph as an english officer. on the approach of the government troops themahdi had marched out of el obeid and established himself in the open country, where he madehis followers live under military conditions
and continually practised them in warlikeevolutions. more than forty thousand men collected round his standard, and the arabs were nowarmed with several thousand rifles and a few cannon, as well as a great number of swordsand spears. to these proportions had the little band of followers who fought at abba grown!the disparity of the forces was apparent before the battle. the mahdi thereupon wrote to hicks,calling on him to surrender and offering terms. his proposals were treated with disdain, althoughthe probable result of an engagement was clear. until the expedition reached rahad only afew cavalry patrols had watched its slow advance. but on the 1st of november the mahdi leftel obeid and marched with his whole power to meet his adversary. the collision tookplace on the 3rd of november. all through
that day the egyptians struggled slowly forward,in great want of water, losing continually from the fire of the soudanese riflemen, andleaving several guns behind them. on the next morning they were confronted by the main bodyof the arab army, and their attempts to advance further were defeated with heavy loss. theforce began to break up. yet another day was consumed before it was completely destroyed.scarcely five hundred egyptians escaped death; hardly as many of the arabs fell. the europeanofficers perished fighting to the end; and the general met his fate sword in hand, atthe head of the last formed body of his troops, his personal valour and physical strengthexciting the admiration even of the fearless enemy, so that in chivalrous respect theyburied his body with barbaric honours. mohammed
ahmed celebrated his victory with a saluteof one hundred guns; and well he might, for the soudan was now his, and his boast that,by god's grace and the favour of the prophet, he was the master of all the land had beenmade good by force of arms. no further attempt was made to subdue thecountry. the people of the soudan had won their freedom by their valour and by the skilland courage of their saintly leader. it only remained to evacuate the towns and withdrawthe garrisons safely. but what looked like the winding-up of one story was really thebeginning of another, much longer, just as bloody, commencing in shame and disaster,but ending in triumph and, let us hope, in peace.
i desire for a moment to take a more generalview of the mahdi's movement than the narrative has allowed. the original causes were socialand racial. but, great as was the misery of the people, their spirit was low, and theywould not have taken up arms merely on material grounds. then came the mahdi. he gave thetribes the enthusiasm they lacked. the war broke out. it is customary to lay to the chargeof mohammed ahmed all the blood that was spilled. to my mind it seems that he may divide theresponsibility with the unjust rulers who oppressed the land, with the incapable commanderswho muddled away the lives of their men, with the vacillating ministers who aggravated themisfortunes. but, whatever is set to the mahdi's account, it should not be forgotten that heput life and soul into the hearts of his countrymen,
and freed his native land of foreigners. thepoor miserable natives, eating only a handful of grain, toiling half-naked and without hope,found a new, if terrible magnificence added to life. within their humble breasts the spiritof the mahdi roused the fires of patriotism and religion. life became filled with thrilling,exhilarating terrors. they existed in a new and wonderful world of imagination. whilethey lived there were great things to be done; and when they died, whether it were slayingthe egyptians or charging the british squares, a paradise which they could understand awaitedthem. there are many christians who reverence the faith of islam and yet regard the mahdimerely as a commonplace religious impostor whom force of circumstances elevated to notoriety.in a certain sense, this may be true. but
i know not how a genuine may be distinguishedfrom a spurious prophet, except by the measure of his success. the triumphs of the mahdiwere in his lifetime far greater than those of the founder of the mohammedan faith; andthe chief difference between orthodox mohammedanism and mahdism was that the original impulsewas opposed only by decaying systems of government and society and the recent movement came incontact with civilisation and the machinery of science. recognising this, i do not sharethe popular opinion, and i believe that if in future years prosperity should come tothe peoples of the upper nile, and learning and happiness follow in its train, then thefirst arab historian who shall investigate the early annals of that new nation will notforget, foremost among the heroes of his race,
to write the name of mohammed ahmed. chapter ii: the fate of the envoy all great movements, every vigorous impulsethat a community may feel, become perverted and distorted as time passes, and the atmosphereof the earth seems fatal to the noble aspirations of its peoples. a wide humanitarian sympathyin a nation easily degenerates into hysteria. a military spirit tends towards brutality.liberty leads to licence, restraint to tyranny. the pride of race is distended to blusteringarrogance. the fear of god produces bigotry and superstition. there appears no exceptionto the mournful rule, and the best efforts of men, however glorious their early results,have dismal endings, like plants which shoot
and bud and put forth beautiful flowers, andthen grow rank and coarse and are withered by the winter. it is only when we reflectthat the decay gives birth to fresh life, and that new enthusiasms spring up to takethe places of those that die, as the acorn is nourished by the dead leaves of the oak,the hope strengthens that the rise and fall of men and their movements are only the changingfoliage of the ever-growing tree of life, while underneath a greater evolution goeson continually. the movement which mohammed ahmed createddid not escape the common fate of human enterprise; nor was it long before the warm generous bloodof a patriotic and religious revolt congealed into the dark clot of a military empire. withthe expulsion or destruction of the foreign
officials, soldiers, and traders, the racialelement began to subside. the reason for its existence was removed. with the increasingdisorders the social agitation dwindled; for communism pre-supposes wealth, and the wealthof the soudan was greatly diminished. there remained only the fanatical fury which thebelief in the divine mission of the mahdi had excited; and as the necessity for a leaderpassed away, the belief in his sanctity grew weaker. but meanwhile a new force was makingitself felt on the character of the revolt. the triumph no less than the plunder whichhad rewarded the mahdi's victories had called into existence a military spirit distinctfrom the warlike passions of the tribesmen—the spirit of the professional soldier.
the siege of khartoum was carried on whilethis new influence was taking the place of the original forces of revolt. there was aperiod when a neutral point was obtained and the mahdist power languished. but the invasionof the eastern soudan by the british troops in the spring and the necessary advance ofthe relieving columns in the winter of 1884 revived the patriotic element. the tribeswho had made a great effort to free themselves from foreign domination saw in the operationsof sir gerald graham and lord wolseley an attempt to bring them again under the yoke.the impulse which was given to the mahdi's cause was sufficient to raise a fierce oppositionto the invading forces. the delay in the despatch of the relief expedition had sealed the fateof khartoum, and the fall of the town established
the supremacy of the military spirit on whichthe dervish empire was afterwards founded. all the warlike operations of mohammedan peoplesare characterised by fanaticism, but with this general reservation it may be said—thatthe arabs who destroyed yusef, who assaulted el obeid, who annihilated hicks fought inthe glory of religious zeal; that the arabs who opposed graham, earle, and stewart foughtin defence of the soil; and that the arabs who were conquered by kitchener fought inthe pride of an army. fanatics charged at shekan; patriots at abu klea; warriors atomdurman. in order to describe conveniently the changingcharacter of the revolt, i have anticipated the story and must revert to a period whenthe social and racial influences were already
weakening and the military spirit was notyet grown strong. if the defeat of yusef pasha decided the whole people of the soudan torise in arms and strike for their liberties, the defeat of hicks satisfied the britishgovernment that those liberties were won. the powerful influence of the desire to ruleprompted the khedive's ministers to make still further efforts to preserve their country'spossessions. had egypt been left to herself, other desperate efforts would have been made.but the british government had finally abandoned the policy of non-interference with egyptianaction in the soudan. they 'advised' its abandonment. the protests of sherif pasha provoked lordgranville to explain the meaning of the word 'advice.' the khedive bowed to superior authority.the minister resigned. the policy of evacuation
was firmly adopted. 'let us,' said the ministers,'collect the garrisons and come away.' it was simple to decide on the course to be pursued,but almost impossible to follow it. several of the egyptian garrisons, as in darfur andel obeid, had already fallen. the others were either besieged, like sennar, tokar, and sinkat,or cut off from the north, as in the case of the equatorial province, by the area ofrebellion. the capital of the soudan was, however, as yet unmolested; and as its egyptianpopulation exceeded the aggregate of the provincial towns, the first task of the egyptian governmentwas obvious. mr. gladstone's administration had repressedthe revolt of arabi pasha. through their policy the british were in armed occupation of egypt.british officers were reorganising the army.
a british official supervised the finances.a british plenipotentiary 'advised' the re-established tewfik. a british fleet lay attentive beforethe ruins of alexandria, and it was evident that great britain could annex the countryin name as well as in fact. but imperialism was not the object of the radical cabinet.their aim was philanthropic and disinterested. as they were now determined that the egyptiansshould evacuate the soudan, so they had always been resolved that the british should evacuateegypt. throughout this chapter it will be seen thatthe desire to get out of the country at once is the keynote of the british policy. everyact, whether of war or administration, is intended to be final. every despatch is directedto breaking the connection between the two
countries and winding up the severed strings.but responsibilities which had been lightly assumed clung like the shirt of nessus. theordinary practice of civilised nations demanded that some attempt should be made to justifyinterference by reorganisation. the british government watched therefore with anxioussolicitude the efforts of egypt to evacuate the soudan and bring the garrisons safelyhome. they utterly declined to assist with military force, but they were generous withtheir advice. everybody at that time distrusted the capacities of the egyptians, and it wasthought the evacuation might be accomplished if it were entrusted to stronger and morehonest men than were bred by the banks of the nile. the ministers looked about them,wondering how they could assist the egyptian
government without risk or expense to themselves,and in an evil hour for their fame and fortunes someone whispered the word 'gordon.' forthwiththey proceeded to telegraph to cairo: 'would general charles gordon be of any use to youor to the egyptian government; and, if so, in what capacity'? the egyptian governmentreplied through sir evelyn baring that as the movement in the soudan was partly religiousthey were 'very much averse' from the appointment of a christian in high command. the eyes ofall those who possessed local knowledge were turned to a different person. there was oneman who might stem the tide of mahdism, who might perhaps restore the falling dominionof egypt, who might at least save the garrisons of the soudan. in their necessity and distressthe khedivial advisers and the british plenipotentiary
looked as a desperate remedy to the man whoseliberty they had curtailed, whose property they had confiscated, and whose son they hadexecuted—zubehr pasha. this was the agent for whom the governmentof egypt hankered. the idea was supported by all who were acquainted with the localconditions. a week after sir evelyn baring had declined general gordon's services hewrote: 'whatever may be zubehr's faults, he is said to be a man of great energy and resolution.the egyptian government considers that his services may be very useful.... baker pashais anxious to avail himself of zubehr pasha's services.'[sir evelyn baring, letter of december9, 1883.] it is certain that had the egyptian government been a free agent, zubehr wouldhave been sent to the soudan as its sultan,
and assisted by arms, money, and perhaps bymen, to make head against the mahdi. it is probable that at this particular period themahdi would have collapsed before a man whose fame was nearly equal to, and whose resourceswould have been much greater than, his own. but the british ministry would countenanceno dealings with such a man. they scouted the idea of zubehr, and by so doing increasedtheir obligation to suggest an alternative. zubehr being rejected, gordon remained. itis scarcely possible to conceive a greater contrast than that which these two men presented.it was a leap from the equator to the north pole. when difficulties and dangers perplex allminds, it has often happened in history that
many men by different lines of thought arriveat the same conclusion. no complete record has yet been published of the telegrams whichpassed between the government and their agent at this juncture. the blue-books preservea disingenuous discretion. but it is known that from the very first sir evelyn baringwas bitterly opposed to general gordon's appointment. no personal friendship existed between them,and the administrator dreaded the return to the feverish complications of egyptian politicsof the man who had always been identified with unrest, improvisation, and disturbance.the pressure was, however, too strong for him to withstand. nubar pasha, the foreignoffice, the british public, everyone clamoured for the appointment. had baring refused togive way, it is probable that he would have
been overruled. at length he yielded, and,as soon as his consent had been obtained, the government turned with delight to gordon.on the 17th of january lord wolseley requested him to come to england. on the 18th he metthe cabinet. that same night he started on the long journey from which he was never toreturn. gordon embarked on his mission in high spirits,sustained by that belief in personality which too often misleads great men and beautifulwomen. it was, he said, the greatest honour ever conferred upon him. everything smiled.the nation was delighted. the ministers were intensely relieved. the most unbounded confidencewas reposed in the envoy. his interview with the khedive was 'very satisfactory.' his completeauthority was proclaimed to all the notables
and natives of the soudan [proclamation ofthe khedive, january 26, 1884.] he was assured of the support of the egyptian government[sir e. baring to major-general gordon, january 25, 1884.] the london foreign office, havingwith becoming modesty admitted that they had not 'sufficient local knowledge,' [earl granvilleto sir e. baring, january 22, 1884.] accorded him 'widest discretionary power.' [sir e.baring to earl granville, february 1, 1884.] one hundred thousand pounds was placed tohis credit, and he was informed that further sums would be supplied when this was exhausted.he was assured that no effort would be wanting on the part of the cairene authorities, whetherenglish or egyptian, to afford him all the support and co-operation in their power [sire. baring to major-general gordon, january
25, 1884.] 'there is no sort of difference,'wrote sir evelyn baring, 'between general gordon's views and those entertained by nubarpasha and myself.' [sir e. baring to earl granville, february 1,1884.] under these propitiousauguries the dismal and disastrous enterprise began. his task, though difficult and, as it ultimatelyproved, impossible, was clearly defined. 'you will bear in mind,' wrote sir evelyn baring,'that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the soudan.' 'the object... of your missionto the soudan,' declared the khedive, 'is to carry into execution the evacuation ofthose territories and to withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants...as may wish to leave for egypt... and after
the evacuation to take the necessary stepsfor establishing an organised government in the different provinces.' nor was he himselfunder any misconception. he drew up a memorandum when on board the tanjore in which he fullyacquiesced in the evacuation of the soudan. in a sentence which breathes the same spiritas mr. gladstone's famous expression, 'a people rightly struggling to be free,' he wrote:'i must say that it would be an iniquity to conquer these peoples and then hand them backto the egyptians without guarantees of future good government.' finally, he unhesitatinglyasserted: 'no one who has ever lived in the soudan can escape the reflection "what a uselesspossession is this land!"' and colonel stewart, who accompanied him and endorsed the memorandum,added: 'and what a huge encumbrance to egypt!'
thus far there was complete agreement betweenthe british envoy and the liberal cabinet. it is beyond the scope of these pages to describehis long ride across the desert from korosko to abu hamed, his interview with the notablesat berber, or his proclamation of the abandonment of the soudan, which some affirm to have beenan important cause of his ruin. on the 22nd of february he arrived at khartoum. he wasreceived with rejoicing by the whole population. they recognised again their just governor-generaland their present deliverer. those who had been about to fly for the north took freshheart. they believed that behind the figure of the envoy stood the resources of an empire.the mahdi and the gathering dervishes were perplexed and alarmed. confusion and hesitancydisturbed their councils and delayed their
movements. gordon had come. the armies wouldfollow. both friends and foes were deceived. the great man was at khartoum, but there hewould remain—alone. whatever confidence the general had felt inthe power of his personal influence had been dispelled on the journey to khartoum. he hadno more illusions. his experienced eye reviewed the whole situation. he saw himself confrontedwith a tremendous racial movement. the people of the soudan had risen against foreigners.his only troops were soudanese. he was himself a foreigner. foremost among the leaders ofthe revolt were the arab slave dealers, furious at the attempted suppression of their trade.no one, not even sir samuel baker, had tried harder to suppress it than gordon. lastly,the whole movement had assumed a fanatical
character. islam marched against the infidel.gordon was a christian. his own soldiers were under the spell they were to try to destroy.to them their commander was accursed. every influence was hostile, and in particular hostileto his person. the combined forces of race, class, and religion were against him. he bowedbefore their irresistible strength. on the very day of his arrival at khartoum, whilethe townsfolk were cheering his name in the streets and the batteries were firing joyfulsalutes, while the people of england thought his mission already accomplished and the governmentcongratulated themselves on the wisdom of their action, general gordon sat himself downand telegraphed a formal request to cairo for zubehr pasha.
the whole story of his relations with zubehris extremely characteristic. zubehr's son, suliman, had been executed, if not by gordon'sorders, at least during his administration of the soudan and with his complete approval.'thus,' he had said, 'does god make gaps in the ranks of his enemies.' he had hardly startedfrom london on his new mission, when he telegraphed to sir evelyn baring, telling him that zubehrwas a most dangerous man and requesting that he might be at once deported to cyprus. thiswas, of course, quite beyond the powers or intention of the british agent. the generalarrived in cairo like a whirlwind close behind his telegram, and was very angry to hear thatzubehr was still in egypt. before starting up the river he went to see sherif pasha.in the ex-minister's ante-room he met the
very man he had determined to avoid—zubehr.he greeted him with effusion. they had a long talk about the soudan, after which gordonhurried to the agency and informed sir evelyn baring that zubehr must accompany him to khartoumat once. baring was amazed. he did not himself disapprove of the plan. he had, in fact, alreadyrecommended it. but he thought the change in gordon's attitude too sudden to be reliedon. to-morrow he might change again. he begged the general to think more seriously of thematter. gordon with his usual frankness admitted that his change of mind had been very sudden.he had been conscious, he said, of a 'mystic feeling' that zubehr was necessary to savethe situation in the soudan. gordon left cairo still considering the matter.so soon as he made his formal demand from
khartoum for the assistance of zubehr it wasevident that his belief in the old slave dealer's usefulness was a sound conviction and nota mere passing caprice. besides, he had now become 'the man on the spot,' and as suchhis words carried double force. sir evelyn baring determined to support the recommendationwith his whole influence. never was so good a case made out for the appointment of sobad a man. the envoy extraordinary asked for him; colonel stewart, his colleague, concurred;the british agent strongly urged the request; the egyptian government were unanimous; andbehind all these were ranged every single person who had the slightest acquaintancewith the soudan. nothing could exceed the vigour with which the demand was made. onthe 1st of march general gordon telegraphed:
'i tell you plainly, it is impossible to getcairo employees out of khartoum unless the government helps in the way i told you. theyrefuse zubehr.... but it was the only chance.' and again on the 8th: 'if you do not sendzubehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away.' 'i believe,' said sir evelynbaring in support of these telegrams, 'that general gordon is quite right when he saysthat zubehr pasha is the only possible man. nubar is strongly in favour of him. dr. bohndorf,the african traveller, fully confirms what general gordon says of the influence of zubehr.'the pasha was vile, but indispensable. her majesty's government refused absolutelyto have anything to do with zubehr. they declined to allow the egyptian government to employhim. they would not entertain the proposal,
and scarcely consented to discuss it. thehistorians of the future may occupy their leisure and exercise their wits in decidingwhether the ministers and the people were right or wrong; whether they had a right toindulge their sensitiveness at so terrible a cost; whether they were not more nice thanwise; whether their dignity was more offended by what was incurred or by what was avoided. general gordon has explained his views veryclearly and concisely: 'had zubehr pasha been sent up when i asked for him, berber wouldin all probability never have fallen, and one might have made a soudan government inopposition to the mahdi. we choose to refuse his coming up because of his antecedents inre slave trade; granted that we had reason,
yet, as we take no precautions as to the futureof these lands with respect to the slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd. i willnot send up 'a' because he will do this, but i will leave the country to 'b', who willdo exactly the same [major-general gordon, journals at khartoum.] but if the justice of the decision is doubtful,its consequences were obvious. either the british government were concerned with thesoudan, or they were not. if they were not, then they had no reason or right to prohibitthe appointment of zubehr. if they were, they were bound to see that the garrisons wererescued. it was an open question whether great britain was originally responsible for thesafety of the garrisons. general gordon contended
that we were bound to save them at all costs,and he backed his belief with his life. others may hold that governments have no right tolay, or at any rate must be very judicious in the laying of burdens on the backs of theirown countrymen in order that they may indulge a refined sense of chivalry towards foreigners.england had not misgoverned the soudan, had not raised the revolt or planted the garrisons.all that egypt had a right to expect was commiseration. but the moment zubehr was prohibited the situationwas changed. the refusal to permit his employment was tantamount to an admission that affairsin the soudan involved the honour of england as well as the honour of egypt. when the britishpeople—for this was not merely the act of the government—adopted a high moral attitudewith regard to zubehr, they bound themselves
to rescue the garrisons, peaceably if possible,forcibly if necessary. with their refusal to allow zubehr to go tothe soudan began the long and miserable disagreement between the government and their envoy. puzzledand disturbed at the reception accorded to his first request, gordon cast about for otherexpedients. he had already stated that zubehr was 'the only chance.' but it is the dutyof subordinates to suggest other courses when those they recommend are rejected; and witha whole-hearted enthusiasm and unreserved loyalty the general threw himself into theaffair and proposed plan after plan with apparent hope. gordon considered that he was personally pledgedto effect the evacuation of khartoum by the
garrison and civil servants. he had appointedsome of the inhabitants to positions of trust, thus compromising them with the mahdi. othershad undoubtedly been encouraged to delay their departure by his arrival. he therefore consideredthat his honour was involved in their safety. henceforward he was inflexible. neither rewardsnor threats could move him. nothing that men could offer would induce him to leave khartoumtill its inhabitants were rescued. the government on their side were equally stubborn. nothing,however sacred, should induce them to send troops to khartoum, or in any way involvethemselves in the middle of africa. the town might fall; the garrison might be slaughtered;their envoy—but what possibilities they were prepared to face as regards him willnot be known until all of this and the next
generation are buried and forgotten. the deadlock was complete. to some men theforeign office might have suggested lines of retreat, covered by the highest officialpraise, and leading to preferment and reward. others would have welcomed an order to leaveso perilous a post. but the man they had sent was the one man of all others who was beyondtheir control, who cared nothing for what they could give or take away. so events draggedon their wretched course. gordon's proposals became more and more impracticable as thebest courses he could devise were successively vetoed by the government, and as his irritationand disappointment increased. the editor of his journals has enumerated them with indignantcare. he had asked for zubehr. zubehr was
refused. he had requested turkish troops.turkish troops were refused. he had asked for mohammedan regiments from india. the governmentregretted their inability to comply. he asked for a firman from the sultan to strengthenhis position. it was 'peremptorily refused.' he proposed to go south in his steamers toequatoria. the government forbade him to proceed beyond khartoum. he asked that 200 britishtroops might be sent to berber. they were refused. he begged that a few might be sentto assuan. none were sent. he proposed to visit the mahdi himself and try to arrangematters with him personally. perhaps he recognised a kindred spirit. the government in this casevery naturally forbade him. at last the quarrel is open. he makes no effortto conceal his disgust. 'i leave you,' he
says, the 'indelible disgrace of abandoningthe garrisons.' [major-general gordon to sir e. baring (telegraphic), received at cairoapril 16.] such abandonment is, he declares, 'the climax of meanness.' [ibid, despatchedapril 8.] he reiterates his determination to abide with the garrison of khartoum. 'iwill not leave these people after all they have gone through.' [major-general gordonto sir e. baring, khartoum, july 30; received at cairo october 15.] he tosses his commissioncontemptuously from him: 'i would also ask her majesty's government to accept the resignationof my commission.' [major-general gordon to sir e. baring (telegraphic), khartoum, march9.] the government 'trust that he will not resign,' [earl granville to sir e. baring,foreign office, march 13.] and his offer remains
in abeyance. finally, in bitterness and vexation,thinking himself abandoned and disavowed, he appeals to sir evelyn baring personally:'i feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomatically, i have your support—and that of every manprofessing himself a gentleman—in private'; [major-general gordon to sir e. baring (telegraphic),received at cairo april 16.] and as a last hope he begs sir samuel baker to appeal to'british and american millionaires' to subscribe two hundred thousand pounds to enable himto carry out the evacuation without, and even in spite of, the governments of cairo andlondon; and sir samuel baker writes a long letter to the times in passionate protestand entreaty. such are the chief features in the wretchedbusiness. even the blue-books in their dry
recital arouse in the reader painful and indignantemotions. but meanwhile other and still more stirring events were passing outside the worldof paper and ink. the arrival of gordon at khartoum had seriouslyperplexed and alarmed mohammed ahmed and his khalifas. their following was discouraged,and they themselves feared lest the general should be the herald of armies. his berberproclamation reassured them, and as the weeks passed without reinforcements arriving, themahdi and abdullah, with that courage which in several great emergencies drew them tothe boldest courses, determined to put a brave face on the matter and blockade khartoum itself.they were assisted in this enterprise by a revival of the patriotic impulse throughoutthe country and a consequent stimulus to the
revolt. to discover the cause it is necessaryto look to the eastern soudan, where the next tragedy, after the defeat of hicks, is laid. the hadendoa tribe, infuriated by oppressionand misgovernment, had joined the rebellion under the leadership of the celebrated, andperhaps immortal, osman digna. the egyptian garrisons of tokar and sinkat were beleagueredand hard pressed. her majesty's government disclaimed all responsibility. yet, sincethese towns were not far from the coast, they did not prohibit an attempt on the part ofthe egyptian government to rescue the besieged soldiers. accordingly an egyptian force 3,500strong marched from suakin in february 1884 to relieve tokar, under the command of generalbaker, once the gallant colonel of the 10th
hussars. hard by the wells of teb they were,on the 5th of february, attacked by about a thousand arabs. 'on the square being only threatened by asmall force of the enemy... the egyptian troops threw down their arms and ran, carrying awaythe black troops with them, and allowing themselves to be killed without the slightest resistance.'[general baker to sir e. baring, february 6 (official despatch), telegraphic.] the britishand european officers in vain endeavoured to rally them. the single soudanese battalionfired impartially on friend and foe. the general, with that unshaken courage and high militaryskill which had already on the danube gained him a continental reputation, collected somefifteen hundred men, mostly unarmed, and so
returned to suakin. ninety-six officers and2,250 men were killed. krupp guns, machine guns, rifles, and a large supply of ammunitionfell to the victorious arabs. success inflamed their ardour to the point of madness. theattack of the towns was pressed with redoubled vigour. the garrison of sinkat, 800 strong,sallied out and attempted to fight their way to suakin. the garrison of tokar surrendered.both were destroyed. the evil was done. the slaughter was complete.yet the british government resolved to add to it. the garrisons they had refused to rescuethey now determined to avenge. in spite of their philanthropic professions, and in spiteof the advice of general gordon, who felt that his position at khartoum would be stillfurther compromised by operations on his only
line of retreat [sir e. baring to earl granville,cairo, february 23.], a considerable military expedition consisting of one cavalry and twoinfantry brigades, was sent to suakin. the command was entrusted to general graham. troopswere hurriedly concentrated. the 10th hussars, returning from india, were stopped and mountedon the horses of the gendarmerie. with admirable celerity the force took the field. withina month of the defeat at teb they engaged the enemy almost on the very scene of thedisaster. on the 4th of march they slew 3,000 hadendoa and drove the rest in disorder fromthe ground. four weeks later a second action was fought at tamai. again the success ofthe british troops was complete; again the slaughter of the arabs was enormous. but neithervictory was bloodless. el teb cost 24 officers
and 168 men; tamai, 13 officers and 208 men.the effect of these operations was the dispersal of osman digna's gathering. that astute man,not for the first or last time, made a good retreat. ten thousand men had thus been killed in thespace of three months in the eastern soudan. by the discipline of their armies the governmentwere triumphant. the tribes of the red sea shore cowered before them. but as they foughtwithout reason, so they conquered without profit. as soon as gordon had been finally refusedthe assistance of zubehr pasha, it was evident that the rescue of the garrisons was impossible.the general had been sent as the last hope.
rightly or wrongly, his recommendations wereignored. his mission was an admitted failure. after that the only question was how to bringhim away as quickly as possible. it was certain that he would not come willingly. force wasnecessary. yet it was difficult to know how to apply it. after the victories in the easternsoudan the opportunity presented itself. the road was open. the local tribes were crushed.berber had not then fallen. the mahdi was himself still on the road from el obeid tokhartoum. sir evelyn baring saw the chance. he did not then occupy the formidable andimposing position in egyptian politics that he has since attained. but with all his influencehe urged the despatch of a small flying column to khartoum. his idea was simple. one thousandor twelve hundred men were to mount on camels
and ride thither via berber. those who fellill or whose camels broke down would have to take their chance by the roadside. theplan, however, broke down in the military detail. only one honourable course remained—aregular expedition. this the british agent at once began to urge. this the governmentobstinately refused to admit; and meanwhile time was passing. the situation at khartoum became grave evenbefore the breach between general gordon and mr. gladstone's cabinet was complete. whilethe british government was indulging in vengeful operations in the eastern soudan, the mahdiadvanced slowly but steadily upon the town with a following variously estimated at fromfifteen to twenty thousand men. on the 7th
of march colonel stewart telegraphed fromkhartoum: 'the mahdi has attempted to raise the people of shendi by an emissary.... wemay be cut off;' [lieut.-colonel stewart to sir e. baring, march 7, 1884.] and on the11th gordon himself reported: 'the rebels are four hours distant on the blue nile.'[major-general gordon to sir e. baring, march 11, 1884.] thereafter no more telegrams came,for on the 15th the wire was cut between shendi and berber, and the blockade had commenced. the long and glorious defence of the townof khartoum will always fascinate attention. that one man, a european among africans, achristian among mohammedans, should by his genius have inspired the efforts of 7,000soldiers of inferior race, and by his courage
have sustained the hearts of 30,000 inhabitantsof notorious timidity, and with such materials and encumbrances have offered a vigorous resistanceto the increasing attacks of an enemy who, though cruel, would yet accept surrender,during a period of 317 days, is an event perhaps without parallel in history. but it may safelybe predicted that no one will ever write an account which will compare in interest orin detail with that set forth by the man himself in the famous. 'journals at khartoum.' the brief account has delighted thousandsof readers in europe and america. perhaps it is because he is careless of the sympathyof men that charles gordon so readily wins it. before the first of the six parts intowhich the journals were divided is finished,
the reader has been won. henceforth he seesthe world through gordon's eyes. with him he scoffs at the diplomatists; despises thegovernment; becomes impatient—unreasonably, perhaps—with a certain major kitchener inthe intelligence branch, whose information miscarried or was not despatched; is weariedby the impracticable shaiggia irregulars; takes interest in the turkey-cock and hisharem of four wives; laughs at the 'black sluts' seeing their faces for the first timein the mirror. with him he trembles for the fate of the 'poor little beast,' the husseinyeh,when she drifts stern foremost on the shoal, 'a penny steamer under cannon fire'; day afterday he gazes through the general's powerful telescope from the palace roof down the longbrown reaches of the river towards the rocks
of the shabluka gorge, and longs for somesign of the relieving steamers; and when the end of the account is reached, no man of britishbirth can read the last words, 'now mark this, if the expeditionary force—and i ask forno more than two hundred men—does not come within ten days, the town may fall; and ihave done my best for the honour of our country. good-bye,' without being thrilled with vainregrets and futile resolutions. and then the account stops short. nor will the silenceever be broken. the sixth instalment of the journals was despatched on the 14th of december;and when it is finished the reader, separated suddenly from the pleasant companionship,experiences a feeling of loss and annoyance. imagination, long supported, is brushed asideby stern reality. henceforward gordon's perils
were unrecorded. i would select one episode only from the journalsas an example of the peculiarity and the sternness of charles gordon's character—his behaviourtowards slatin. this austrian officer had been governor of darfur with the rank in theegyptian service of bey. for four years he had struggled vainly against the rebellion.he had fought numerous engagements with varied success. he had been several times wounded.throughout his province and even beyond its limits he bore the reputation of a brave andcapable soldier. the story of his life of suffering and adventure, written by himself,is widely known, and he is thought by those who have read it to be a man of feeling andof honour. by those who enjoy his personal
acquaintance this belief is unhesitatinglyconfirmed. he had, however, committed an act which deprived him of gordon's sympathy andrespect. during the fighting in darfur, after several defeats, his mohammedan soldiers werediscouraged and attributed their evil fortune to the fact that their commander was an infidelunder the curse of the almighty. slatin therefore proclaimed himself a follower of the prophet,and outwardly at least adopted the faith of islam. the troops, delighted at his conversionand cheered by the hope of success, renewed their efforts, and the resistance of the governorof darfur was prolonged. the end, however, was deferred, not averted. after the destructionof general hicks's army slatin was compelled to surrender to the dervishes. the religionhe had assumed to secure victory he observed
to escape death. the arab leaders, who admiredhis courage, treated him at first with respect and kindness, and he was conducted to themahdi in his encampment before khartoum. there during the siege he remained, closely watchedbut not imprisoned. thence he wrote letters to gordon explaining his surrender, excusinghis apostacy, and begging that he might be allowed—not even assisted—to escape tokhartoum. the letters are extant, and scarcely anyone who reads them, reflecting on the twelveyears of danger and degradation that lay before this man, will refuse their compassion. gordon was inflexible. before the arrivalof the letters his allusions to slatin are contemptuous: 'one cannot help being amusedat the mahdi carrying all the europeans about
with him—nuns, priests, greeks, austrianofficers—what a medley, a regular etat-major!' [journals at khartoum.] he is suspicious ofthe circumstances of his surrender. 'the greek... says slatin had 4,000 ardebs of dura, 1,500cows, and plenty of ammunition: he has been given eight horses by the mahdi.' he willnot vouch for such a man; but he adds, with characteristic justice, 'all this informationmust be taken with reserve.' at length the letters came. at the peril ofhis life, when ordered to write and demand the surrender of the town, slatin substitutedan appeal to gordon to countenance his escape. this is the uncompromising minute in the journals:'oct. 16. the letters of slatin have arrived. i have no remarks to make on them, and cannotmake out why he wrote them.' in the afternoon,
indeed, he betrays some pity; but it is thepity of a man for a mouse. 'he is evidently not a spartan... he will want some quarantine...one feels sorry for him.' the next day he is again inexorable, and gives his reasonsclearly. 'i shall have nothing to do with slatin's coming here to stay, unless he hasthe mahdi's positive leave, which he is not likely to get; his doing so would be the breakingof his parole which should be as sacred when given to the mahdi as to any other power,and it would jeopardise the safety of all these europeans, prisoners with mahdi.' slatin's position, it should be observed,was not that of an officer released on parole, but of a prisoner of war in durance in theenemy's camp. in such circumstances he was
clearly entitled to escape at his own properrisk. if his captors gave him the chance, they had only themselves to blame. his positionwas not dissimilar from that of the black soldiers who had been captured by the dervishesand were now made to serve against the government. these deserted to khartoum daily, and thegeneral fully acquiesced in their doing so. as to slatin's escape affecting the treatmentof the other european prisoners, it must be observed that when at various times escapeswere effected from omdurman, and ultimately when slatin himself escaped, no ill-treatmentwas inflicted on the rest of the prisoners; and even had such ill-treatment been the certainconsequence of an escape, that need not have debarred a man, according to the customs ofwar, from attempting to regain his liberty.
nothing but his free and formal promise, obtainedin return for favours received, can alienate that right. if the mahdi chose to slaughterthe remaining prisoners, the responsibility rested with the mahdi. slatin was, however, in no position to arguehis case. his correspondence with gordon was discovered. for some days his life hung ona thread. for several months he was heavily chained and fed on a daily handful of uncookeddoura, such as is given to horses and mules. tidings of these things were carried to gordon.'slatin,' he observes icily, 'is still in chains.' he never doubted the righteousnessof the course he had adopted, never for an instant. but few will deny that there werestrong arguments on both sides. many will
assert that they were nicely balanced. gordonmust have weighed them carefully. he never wavered. yet he needed slatin. he was alone.he had no one in whose military capacity he could put the slightest confidence. againand again in the journals he expresses his want of trustworthy subordinates. he couldnot be everywhere, he said. 'nearly every order has to be repeated two or three times.i am weary of my life.' 'what one has felt so much here is the want of men like gessi,or messadaglia, or slatin, but i have no one to whom i could entrust expeditions.....' this was the man who would have employed zubehrand bowed to expediency. but zubehr had never 'denied his lord.'
the actual defence of khartoum is within theprovince of the journals, nor shall i attempt a chronological account. after the 10th ofseptember, when general gordon sent colonel stewart and messrs. power and herbin downthe river in the ill-fated abbas steamer, he was altogether alone. many men have bowedto the weight of responsibility. gordon's responsibility was undivided. there was noone to whom he could talk as an equal. there was no one to whom he could—as to a trustysubordinate—reveal his doubts. to some minds the exercise of power is pleasant, but fewsensations are more painful than responsibility without control. the general could not supervisethe defence. the officers robbed the soldiers of their rations. the sentries slumbered attheir posts. the townspeople bewailed their
misfortunes, and all ranks and classes intriguedwith the enemy in the hope of securing safety when the town should fall. frequent effortswere made to stir up the inhabitants or sap their confidence. spies of all kinds pervadedthe town. the egyptian pashas, despairing, meditated treason. once an attempt was madeto fire the magazine. once no less than eighty thousand ardebs of grain was stolen from thearsenal. from time to time the restless and ceaseless activity of the commander mightdiscover some plot and arrest the conspirators; or, checking some account, might detect somerobbery; but he was fully aware that what he found out was scarcely a tithe of whathe could not hope to know. the egyptian officers were untrustworthy. yet he had to trust them.the inhabitants were thoroughly broken by
war, and many were disloyal. he had to feedand inspirit them. the town itself was scarcely defensible. it must be defended to the end.from the flat roof of his palace his telescope commanded a view of the forts and lines. herehe would spend the greater part of each day, scrutinising the defences and the surroundingcountry with his powerful glass. when he observed that the sentries on the forts had left theirposts, he would send over to have them flogged and their superiors punished. when his 'pennysteamers' engaged the dervish batteries he would watch, 'on tenter-hooks,' a combat whichmight be fatal to the defence, but which, since he could not direct it, must be leftto officers by turns timid and reckless: and in the dark hours of the night he could noteven watch. the journals, the only receptacle
of his confidences, display the bitternessof his sufferings no less than the greatness of his character. 'there is no contagion,'he writes, 'equal to that of fear. i have been rendered furious when from anxiety icould not eat, i would find those at the same table were in like manner affected.' to the military anxieties was added everykind of worry which may weary a man's soul. the women clamoured for bread. the townsfolkheaped reproaches upon him. the quarrel with the british government had cut him very deeply.the belief that he was abandoned and discredited, that history would make light of his efforts,would perhaps never know of them, filled his mind with a sense of wrong and injustice whichpreyed upon his spirits. the miseries of the
townsfolk wrung his noble, generous heart.the utter loneliness depressed him. and over all lay the shadow of uncertainty. to thevery end the possibility that 'all might be well' mocked him with false hopes. the firstlight of any morning might reveal the longed-for steamers of relief and the uniforms of britishsoldiers. he was denied even the numbing anaesthetic of despair. yet he was sustained by two great moral andmental stimulants: his honour as a man, his faith as a christian. the first had put allcourses which he did not think right once and for all out of the question, and so allayedmany doubts and prevented many vain regrets. but the second was the real source of hisstrength. he was sure that beyond this hazardous
existence, with all its wrongs and inequalities,another life awaited him—a life which, if he had been faithful and true here upon earth,would afford him greater faculties for good and wider opportunities for their use. 'lookat me now,' he once said to a fellow-traveller, 'with small armies to command and no citiesto govern. i hope that death will set me free from pain, and that great armies will be givenme, and that i shall have vast cities under my command.' [lieut.-colonel n. newham davis,'some gordon reminiscences,' published in the man of the world newspaper, december 14,1898.] such was his bright hope of immortality. as the severity of military operations increases,so also must the sternness of discipline. the zeal of the soldiers, their warlike instincts,and the interests and excitements of war may
ensure obedience of orders and the cheerfulendurance of perils and hardships during a short and prosperous campaign. but when fortuneis dubious or adverse; when retreats as well as advances are necessary; when supplies fail,arrangements miscarry, and disasters impend, and when the struggle is protracted, men canonly be persuaded to accept evil things by the lively realisation of the fact that greaterterrors await their refusal. the ugly truth is revealed that fear is the foundation ofobedience. it is certain that the influence of general gordon upon the garrison and townspeopleof khartoum owed its greatest strength to that sinister element. 'it is quite painful,'he writes in his journals in september, 'to see men tremble so, when they come and seeme, that they cannot hold the match to their
cigarette.' yet he employed all other methodsof inspiring their efforts. as the winter drew on, the sufferings of the besieged increasedand their faith in their commander and his promises of relief diminished. to preservetheir hopes—and, by their hopes, their courage and loyalty—was beyond the power of man.but what a great man in the utmost exercise of his faculties and authority might do, gordondid. his extraordinary spirit never burned morebrightly than in these last, gloomy days. the money to pay the troops was exhausted.he issued notes, signing them with his own name. the citizens groaned under the triplescourge of scarcity, disease, and war. he ordered the bands to play merrily and dischargedrockets. it was said that they were abandoned,
that help would never come, that the expeditionwas a myth—the lie of a general who was disavowed by his government. forthwith heplacarded the walls with the news of victories and of the advance of a triumphant britisharmy; or hired all the best houses by the river's bank for the accommodation of theofficers of the relieving force. a dervish shell crashed through his palace. he orderedthe date of its arrival to be inscribed above the hole. for those who served him faithfullyhe struck medals and presented them with pomp and circumstance. others less laudable heshot. and by all these means and expedients the defence of the city was prolonged throughthe summer, autumn, and winter of 1884 and on into the year 1885.
all this time the public anxiety in englandhad been steadily growing. if gordon was abandoned, he was by no means forgotten. as his missionhad been followed with intense interest throughout the whole country, so its failure had causedgeneral despondency. disappointment soon gave place to alarm. the subject of the personalsafety of the distinguished envoy was first raised in the house of commons on the 16thof march by lord randolph churchill. availing himself of the opportunities provided by supply,he criticised the vacillating policy of the government, their purposeless slaughter inthe eastern soudan, and their failure to establish the suakin-berber route. he proceeded to drawattention to the perilous position of general gordon at khartoum.
'colonel coetlogon has stated that khartoummay be easily captured; we know that general gordon is surrounded by hostile tribes andcut off from communications with cairo and london; and under these circumstances thehouse has a right to ask her majesty's government whether they are going to do anything to relievehim. are they going to remain indifferent to the fate of the one man on whom they havecounted to extricate them from their dilemmas, to leave him to shift for himself, and notmake a single effort on his behalf?' [hansard's parliamentary debates, march 16, 1884.] the government remained impassive. lord e.fitzmaurice made some sort of reply, and there were ministerial cheers. but the subject,once raised, was not allowed to drop. inspired
and animated by the earnest energy of a youngman, the opposition were continually growing stronger. the conduct of egyptian affairsafforded ample opportunity for criticism and attack. all through the summer months andalmost every night ministers were invited to declare whether they would rescue theirenvoy or leave him to his fate. mr. gladstone returned evasive answers. the conservativepress took the cue. the agitation became intense. even among the supporters of the governmentthere was dissatisfaction. but the prime minister was obdurate and unflinching. at length, atthe end of the session, the whole matter was brought forward in the gravest and most formalway by the moving of a vote of censure. the debate that followed sir michael hicks beach'smotion was long and acrimonious. mr. gladstone's
speech only increased the disquietude of hisfollowers and the fury of the opposition. mr. forster openly declared his disagreementwith his leader; and although lord hartington in winding up the debate threw out some hopesof an expedition in the autumn, the government majority fell on the division to twenty-eight.and after the prorogation the controversy was carried on with undiminished vigour outsidethe walls of parliament, and the clamour in the country grew louder and louder. it is usual to look upon mr. gladstone's conductin the matter of the relief of gordon as dictated by benevolent weakness. history may take anotherview. strong and stubborn as was the character of the general, that of the minister was itsequal. if gordon was the better man, gladstone
was incomparably the greater. it was easyfor the first minister of the crown to despatch an expedition against savages. he was accustomedto the exercise of power. compared with the resources of the empire, the enterprise wasinsignificant. few men have feared responsibility less than gladstone. on the other hand, theexpressed desire of the nation was a force to which he had always bowed—to which, indeed,he owed his political existence. yet, in spite of the growing agitation throughout the land,he remained stern and silent. most men do what is right, or what they persuade themselvesis right; nor is it difficult to believe that mr. gladstone did not feel justified in involvingthe nation in operations in the heart of the soudan for the purpose, not of saving thelife of the envoy—for gordon had but to
embark on his steamers and come home—butsimply in order to vindicate the personal honour of a man. and it is possible that afeeling of resentment against the officer whose intractable nature was bringing suchodium upon the government may have coloured his resolution with a darker tinge. but for all his power and influence he wasforced to give way. the government which had long ignored the call of honour abroad, wasdriven to the soudan by the cries of shame at home. lord hartington, at that time secretaryof state for war, must be dissociated from the general censure which his principal colleagueshave incurred. he was the first to recognise the obligation which lay upon the cabinet,and through the cabinet upon the nation, and
it was to his influence that the despatchof the relieving expedition was mainly due. the commander-in-chief and the adjutant-general,who were fully alive to the critical position at khartoum, added their recommendations.but even at the last moment mr. gladstone was induced to sanction the advance only bythe belief that the scale of the operations would be small, and that only a single brigadewould be necessary. the decision was taken forthwith by the ministry and announced tothe nation. the adjutant-general, however, asked for a very different force from whatthe government had anticipated, and the single brigade was expanded into an expedition often thousand men, selected from the whole army.
to reverse the decision was now, however,impossible, and the 'gordon relief expedition' began. the commander to whom the conduct ofthe operations had been entrusted reviewed the situation. he saw himself confronted witha task which was easy and safe if it were undertaken at leisure, and which was doubtfuland perilous if begun in haste. all the fruits of a long and successful career were stakedon the result, and it is scarcely wonderful that he declined to be swift and reckless.shrewdly estimating the military difficulties, he made his plans for a methodical and deliberateadvance which would leave nothing to luck, and which resembles in character that afterwardscarried out by sir h. kitchener. he excluded the idea of a wild glorious rush which mightresult in astonishing success or terrible
disaster. troops and stores were steadily collectedat wady halfa and along the nile. the new camel corps, consisting of four regiments,practised their drills and evolutions. to pilot the boats up the cataracts voyageurswere brought from canada. at length, when all preparations were complete, the expeditionstarted. the plan was simple. a strong column of infantry in boats was to work up the river.in case that should not arrive in time, the camel corps was to strike across the bayudadesert from korti to metemma. having arrived there, a small detachment was to be throwninto khartoum by gordon's steamers to sustain the defence until the arrival of the mainbody in march or even april of 1885, when
the town could be regularly relieved. the dramatic character of the enterprise andits picturesque and original features fascinated the nation, and the advance was watched withbreathless interest. the fortunes of the river column have been graphically described byone who played no small part in their attempt. 'the campaign of the cataracts' [by sir williambutler] is a record of hard and unceasing toil. day after day the long lines of soldiershauled on the tow-ropes or pulled at the oars of the broad-bottomed boats. night after nightthey camped on the banks amid the grim desolation of the monassir desert. yet their monotonouslabours were encouraged by the knowledge that as soon as the bend of the river at abu hamedwas reached the strong north wind would carry
them swiftly to khartoum. and it seemed astrange and bitter irony that the order to turn back and the news that all had been invain was announced to the troops on the very day when they had cleared the cataracts andwere moving forward at five times their former speed. the desert column started from korti on the30th of december. their strength did not exceed 1,100 officers and men, but they were theflower of the army. dropping their communications, they set forth along the caravan route towardsmetemma. the knowledge which we have since gained of the resources of the mahdists enablesthe peril of their desperate venture to be fully appreciated. although the dervisheswere neither so well armed nor trained as
at a later date, they were nearly as numerousand equally devoid of fear. their tactics were more in accordance with modern conditions:their fanaticism was at its height. the british force, on the other hand, was equipped withweapons scarcely comparable with those employed in the concluding campaigns. instead of thepowerful lee-metford rifle, with its smokeless powder, its magazine action, and its absenceof recoil, they were armed with the martini-henry, which possessed none of these advantages.in place of the deadly maxim there was the gardner gun—the very gun that jammed attamai, and that jammed again at abu klea. the artillery was also in every respect inferiorto that now in general use. besides all this, the principles of fire-discipline and of scientificmusketry were new, little understood, and
hardly admitted. nevertheless, the camel corpswent boldly forward, and engaged an enemy whose destruction ultimately required thestrength of a better-armed and better-instructed army twelve times as strong. on the 3rd of january they reached gakdulwells. a hundred miles of their march was accomplished. but they were now delayed bythe necessity of escorting a second column of supplies to gakdul, and after that untilthe arrival of reinforcements which raised their strength to 1,800 of all ranks. theinterval was employed in building two small forts and establishing an advanced depot;nor was it until the 13th that the march was resumed. the number of camels was not sufficientfor the necessities of the transport. the
food of the camels was too poor for the workthey had to perform. by the 16th, however, they had made fifty miles, and approachedthe wells of abu klea. here their further advance was disputed by the enemy. the news of the advance of the desert columnhad been duly reported to the mahdi and his arab generals. a small party of english, itwas said, with camels and some cavalry, were coming swiftly to the rescue of the accursedcity. their numbers were few, scarce 2,000 men. how should they hope to prevail against'the expected mahdi' and the conquering ansar who had destroyed hicks? they were mad; yetthey should die; not one should escape. the delay in the advance offered ample opportunity.a great force of arabs was concentrated. slatin
relates how several thousand men under importantemirs were detached from the army before khartoum and marched northward eager for the slaughterof 'the enemies of god.' at metemma the main strength of the jaalin tribe was collected.with the reinforcements from omdurman the total force of the arabs actually at handwas not less than 10,000, and behind were many thousands more. they permitted the littlecolumn to advance until their retreat, if defeated, was impossible, and then, confidentof victory, offered battle near the wells of abu klea. the camel corps remained halted during themorning of the 16th, and built a small fort, in which they placed their reserve of stores,and made some arrangement for the reception
of wounded. at one o'clock they moved leisurelyforward, passed through the rocky defile which led into the valley of abu klea and bivouacked.early the next morning the force moved out in square formation and advanced upon theenemy. the most savage and bloody action ever fought in the soudan by british troops followed.notwithstanding the numbers and the valour of the arabs, that they penetrated the square,and that they inflicted on the troops a loss of nine officers and sixty-five men killedand nine officers and eighty-five men wounded—10 percent of the entire force—they were drivenfrom the field with great slaughter, and the desert column camped at the wells. on the morning of the 18th they rested, placedtheir wounded in the small fort they had built,
and buried their dead. in the afternoon theycontinued their advance, marched all through the night, and, having covered twenty-threemiles, halted exhausted, almost within sight of the river, at daylight on the 19th. meanwhilethe enemy had again collected in great strength, and an effective rifle fire was opened onthe column. sir herbert stewart received the wound of which a few weeks later he died.the command devolved upon sir charles wilson. the position was desperate. water was runningshort. the nile was only four miles away; but the column were impeded by their woundedand stores, and between the river and the thirsty men lay the dervish army, infuriatedby their losses and fully aware of the sore straits to which their astonishing enemy wasnow reduced.
it now became necessary to divide the smallforce. some must remain to guard the baggage and the wounded; the others must fight theirway to the water. at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th, 900 men left the hastilymade zeriba and marched towards the river. without their camels or those of the transportthey appeared insignificant, a mere speck on the broad plain of metemma. the dervisheshastened to clinch the matter. the square advances slowly and painfully overthe stony ground, with frequent jerky halts to preserve order and to pick up the wounded.little puffs of white smoke dot the distant sandhills. here and there a gaudy flag wavesdefiantly. in front the green tops of the palm-trees by the nile tantalise but stimulatethe soldiers. on the left the great mud labyrinth
of metemma stretches indefinitely. suddenlythe firing stops. the low scrub in front is alive with the swarming figures of the enemy.all the flags dance forward together. ragged white figures spring up in hundreds. emirson horses appear as if by magic. everywhere are men running swiftly forward, waving theirspears and calling upon the prophet of god to speed their enterprise. the square halts.the weary men begin to fire with thoughtful care, the dervishes drop thickly. on then,children of the desert! you are so many, they are so few. they are worn with fatigue andtheir throats are parched. you have drunk deeply of the nile. one rush will tramplethe accursed under the feet of the faithful. the charge continues. a bugle sounds in thewaiting square. the firing stops. what is
this? they lose heart. their ammunition isexhausted. on, then, and make an end. again the smoke ripples along the line of bayonetsand fire is re-opened, this time at closer range and with far greater effect. the stubborngrandeur of the british soldier is displayed by desperate circumstances. the men shootto hit. the attack crumples. the emirs—horse and man—collapse. the others turn and walk—forthey will not run—sullenly back towards the town. the square starts forward. the roadto the river is open. with dusk the water is reached, and never have victors gaineda more longed-for prize. the nile is won. gordon remains. sir charles wilson, having collected his force,remained three days by the bank of the nile
before attempting any further advance on khartoum.he has explained why this delay was necessary, to the satisfaction of most military critics.nor is it easy to believe that men who had made such splendid efforts would have willinglylost a single moment. on the fourth day he embarked on two of gordon's steamers, whichawaited the relieving column, and taking with him twenty british soldiers and a few blue-jacketsset forth towards the shabluka gorge and the town that lay beyond. on the 27th of januarythe rescuers came in sight of khartoum and under the fire of the enemy. many of theirperilous adventures seem to belong to romance rather than to reality: the tiny gimcrackboats struggling with the strong stream of the cataract, running the gauntlet of thearab guns, dropping disconsolately down the
river with their terrible news, or wreckedand stranded on the sandbank; stuart-wortley rowing to the camp before metemma for help;beresford starting in the remaining steamer; the bursting of the boiler by a dervish shell;benbow mending it in a single day; wilson's rescue and the return to the entrenchmentat gubat. but the scene that appeals to the imagination above all the others is that wherewith both banks ablaze with musketry and artillery, the black smoke pouring through the shot-holesin the funnels, the water rising in spurts from the bullets, the men who had come sofar and braved so much stared at the palace roof and, seeing no flag flying, knew thatall was over and that they had come too late. the news of the dervish defeats at abu kleaand abu kru impelled the mahdi to a desperate
venture. the english were but 120 miles away.they were few, but victorious. it was difficult to say what force could stop such men. inspite of the wrath of the true god and the valour of islam they might prevail. the mahdidepended on success for existence. the tremendous forces of fanaticism are exerted only in aforward direction. retreat meant ruin. all must be staked on an immediate assault. and,besides, the moment was ripe. thus the arab chiefs reasoned, and wisely resolved to bereckless. thus the night of the 25th of january arrived. the band played as usual in the evening. graduallythe shadows fell and it became dark. the hungry inhabitants betook themselves to bed. theanxious but indomitable commander knew that
the crisis impended, and knew also that hewas powerless to avert it. perhaps he slept, satisfied that he had done his duty; and inthe silence of the night the savage enemy crawled stealthily towards the town. the wearyand disheartened sentinels, weakened by famine and tired of war, maintained a doubtful vigilancealong the ramparts. the subsiding waters of the river had left a bare gap between thewhite nile and the wall. perhaps there was treachery besides. on a sudden the loud explosionof musketry broke the stillness of the night and the slumbers of the people; and with acontinual shouting thousands of dervishes swarmed through the unprotected space andentered khartoum. one mob of assailants made their way to thepalace. gordon came out to meet them. the
whole courtyard was filled with wild, harlequinfigures and sharp, glittering blades. he attempted a parley. 'where is your master, the mahdi?'he knew his influence over native races. perhaps he hoped to save the lives of some of theinhabitants. perhaps in that supreme moment imagination flashed another picture beforehis eyes; and he saw himself confronted with the false prophet of a false religion, confrontedwith the european prisoners who had 'denied their lord,' offered the choice of death orthe koran; saw himself facing that savage circle with a fanaticism equal to, and a couragegreater than, their own; marching in all the pride of faith 'and with retorted scorn' toa martyr's death. it was not to be. mad with the joy of victoryand religious frenzy, they rushed upon him
and, while he disdained even to fire his revolver,stabbed him in many places. the body fell down the steps and lay—a twisted heap—atthe foot. there it was decapitated. the head was carried to the mahdi. the trunk was stabbedagain and again by the infuriated creatures, till nothing but a shapeless bundle of tornflesh and bloody rags remained of what had been a great and famous man and the envoyof her britannic majesty. the blood soaked into the ground, and left a dark stain whichwas not immediately effaced. slatin mentions that the arabs used often to visit the place.ohrwalder went himself, and more than six weeks after the capture of the town, saw 'blackspots' upon the steps. but they have all since been obliterated.
such, briefly, is the story of the fall ofkhartoum and of the death of gordon. the fact that the two steamers arrived only two daysafter the capture of the town has given colour to the belief that, but for the three days'delay at metemma, the catastrophe might have been averted. this view appears incorrect.the arabs had long held khartoum at their mercy. they hoped, indeed, to compel its surrenderby famine and to avoid an assault, which after their experience at el obeid they knew mustcost them dear. gordon has stated in his journals that the town became defenceless by the middleof december. the arrival of twenty british soldiers and a few officers could not havematerially affected the situation—could only, in fact, have increased the loss. yetnearly everyone who reads the tale will wish—in
spite of reason—that some help, howeverlittle, had reached the lonely man; that before the darkness fell he had grasped an englishhand, and learned that his countrymen had not abandoned him, had not forgotten—wouldnever forget. it may not be possible as yet to fix the exactplace which charles gordon will occupy in english history. it is certainly a high one.whether he will rank as a commander with peterborough, wolfe, and olive, those who come after usmust decide. we may, however, assert that he was a man of stainless honour and enduringcourage, who in varied capacities displayed a fertile and abundant genius. he was carelessalike of the honours and comforts of the world, and looked forward with firm faith to therewards of a future state. the severity of
his religion did not impair the amiabilityof his character. the uncertainty of his moods may have frequently affected the soundnessof his opinions, but not often the justice of his actions. gordon's statue, set up inthe indignant grief of the nation in the space which is appropriated to the monuments ofgreat captains by sea and land, claims the attention of the passer-by, not only becauseit is comparatively new. the figure, its pose, and its story are familiar even to the poorestcitizens of london and to people from all parts of the united kingdom. serene amid thenoise of the traffic, as formerly in that of the battle, the famous general seems still,with bowed head and thoughtful countenance, to revolve the problems of the dark soudanand, inattentive to the clamour of men, inquires
what is acceptable to god. with the capture of the city and the deathof the envoy the reason for the expedition disappeared. it remained only to withdrawthe troops. the stores which had been brought across the desert at a terrible cost werethrown hastily into the nile. the battered steamers which had waited so long at metemmawere hurriedly dismantled. the camel corps, their extraordinary efforts futile and theircamels killed, marched back on foot to korti. their retreat was pressed by the exultantenemy. the river column, whose boats after months of labour had just cleared the cataracts,and who had gained a success at kirbekan, were carried back swiftly by the strong currentagainst which they had hopefully struggled.
the whole expeditionary force—guards, highlanders,sailors, hussars, indian soldiers, canadian voyageurs, mules, camels, and artillery—troopedback forlornly over the desert sands, and behind them the rising tide of barbarism followedswiftly, until the whole vast region was submerged. for several months the garrison of kassalaunder a gallant egyptian maintained a desperate resistance, but at last famine forced themto surrender, and they shared the fate of the garrisons of el obeid, darfur, sobat,tokar, sinkat, sennar, and khartoum. the evacuation of the soudan was thus completed. chapter iii: the dervish empire it might seem at first a great advantage thatthe peoples of the soudan, instead of being
a multitude of wild, discordant tribes, shouldunite of their own accord into one strong community, actuated by a common spirit, livingunder fixed laws, and ruled by a single sovereign. but there is one form of centralised governmentwhich is almost entirely unprogressive and beyond all other forms costly and tyrannical—therule of an army. such a combination depends, not on the good faith and good will of itsconstituents, but on their discipline and almost mechanical obedience. mutual fear,not mutual trust, promotes the co-operation of its individual members. history recordsmany such dominations, ancient and modern, civilised or barbaric; and though educationand culture may modify, they cannot change their predominant characteristics—a continualsubordination of justice to expediency, an
indifference to suffering, a disdain of ethicalprinciples, a laxity of morals, and a complete ignorance of economics. the evil qualitiesof military hierarchies are always the same. the results of their rule are universallyunfortunate. the degree may vary with time and place, but the political supremacy ofan army always leads to the formation of a great centralised capital, to the consequentimpoverishment of the provinces, to the degradation of the peaceful inhabitants through oppressionand want, to the ruin of commerce, the decay of learning, and the ultimate demoralisationeven of the military order through overbearing pride and sensual indulgence. of the military dominations which historyrecords, the dervish empire was probably the
worst. all others have displayed compensatingvirtues. a high sense of personal honour has counterbalanced a low standard of public justice.an ennobling patriotism may partly repair economic follies. the miseries of the peopleare often concealed by the magnificence of the army. the laxity of morals is in somedegree excused by the elegance of manners. but the dervish empire developed no virtueexcept courage, a quality more admirable than rare. the poverty of the land prevented magnificence.the ignorance of its inhabitants excluded refinement. the dervish dominion was bornof war, existed by war, and fell by war. it began on the night of the sack of khartoum.it ended abruptly thirteen years later in the battle of omdurman. like a subsidiaryvolcano, it was flung up by one convulsion,
blazed during the period of disturbance, andwas destroyed by the still more violent shock that ended the eruption. after the fall of khartoum and the retreatof the british armies the mahdi became the absolute master of the soudan. whatever pleasureshe desired he could command, and, following the example of the founder of the mohammedanfaith, he indulged in what would seem to western minds gross excesses. he established an extensiveharem for his own peculiar use, and immured therein the fairest captives of the war. theconduct of the ruler was imitated by his subjects. the presence of women increased the vanityof the warriors: and it was not very long before the patched smock which had vauntedthe holy poverty of the rebels developed into
the gaudy jibba of the conquerors. since theunhealthy situation of khartoum amid swamps and marshes did not commend itself to thenow luxurious arabs, the mahdi began to build on the western bank of the white nile a newcapital, which, from the detached fort which had stood there in egyptian days, was calledomdurman. among the first buildings which he set his subjects to construct were a mosquefor the services of religion, an arsenal for the storage of military material, and a housefor himself. but while he was thus entering at once upon the enjoyments of supreme powerand unbridled lust, the god whom he had served, not unfaithfully, and who had given him whateverhe had asked, required of mohammed ahmed his soul; and so all that he had won by his brainsand bravery became of no more account to him.
in the middle of the month of june, scarcelyfive months after the completion of his victorious campaigns, the mahdi fell sick. for a fewdays he did not appear at the mosque. the people were filled with alarm. they were reassuredby remembering the prophecy that their liberator should not perish till he had conquered theearth. mohammed, however, grew worse. presently those who attended him could doubt no longerthat he was attacked by typhus fever. the khalifa abdullah watched by his couch continually.on the sixth day the inhabitants and the soldiers were informed of the serious nature of theirruler's illness, and public prayers were offered by all classes for his recovery. on the seventhday it was evident that he was dying. all those who had shared his fortunes—the khalifashe had appointed, the chief priests of the
religion he had reformed, the leaders of thearmies who had followed him to victory, and his own family whom he had hallowed—crowdedthe small room. for some hours he lay unconscious or in delirium, but as the end approachedhe rallied a little, and, collecting his faculties by a great effort, declared his faithful followerand friend the khalifa abdullah his successor, and adjured the rest to show him honour. 'heis of me, and i am of him; as you have obeyed me, so you should deal with him. may god havemercy upon me!' [slatin, fire and sword.] then he immediately expired. grief and dismay filled the city. in spiteof the emphatic prohibition by law of all loud lamentations, the sound of 'weeping andwailing arose from almost every house.' the
whole people, deprived at once of their acknowledgedsovereign and spiritual guide, were shocked and affrighted. only the mahdi's wives, ifwe may credit slatin, 'rejoiced secretly in their hearts at the death of their husbandand master,' and, since they were henceforth to be doomed to an enforced and inviolablechastity, the cause of their satisfaction is as obscure as its manifestation was unnatural.the body of the mahdi, wrapped in linen, was reverently interred in a deep grave dug inthe floor of the room in which he had died, nor was it disturbed until after the captureof omdurman by the british forces in 1898, when by the orders of sir h. kitchener thesepulchre was opened and the corpse exhumed. the khalifa abdullah had been declared bythe mahdi's latest breath his successor. he
determined to have the choice ratified oncefor all by the popular vote. hurrying to the pulpit in the courtyard of the mosque, headdressed the assembled multitude in a voice which trembled with intense excitement andemotion. his oratory, his reputation as a warrior, and the mahdi's expressed desirearoused the enthusiasm of his hearers, and the oath of allegiance was at once sworn bythousands. the ceremony continued long after it was dark. with an amazing endurance heharangued till past midnight, and when the exhausted slatin, who hard attended him throughoutthe crisis, lay down upon the ground to sleep, he knew that his master's succession was assured;for, says he, 'i heard the passers-by loud in their praises of the late mahdi, and assuringeach other of their firm resolve to support
his successor.' the sovereignty that abdullah had obtainedmust be held, as it had been won, by the sword. the passionate agitation which the mahdi hadexcited survived him. the whole of the soudan was in a ferment. the success which had crownedrebellion encouraged rebels. all the turbulent and fanatical elements were aroused. as thevarious provinces had been cleared of the egyptians, the new executive had appointedmilitary governors by whom the country was ruled and taxed, subject to the pleasure ofmohammed ahmed. his death was the signal for a long series of revolts of all kinds—military,political, and religious. garrisons mutinied; emirs plotted; prophets preached. nor wasthe land torn only by internal struggles.
its frontiers were threatened. on the eastthe tremendous power of abyssinia loomed terrible and menacing. there was war in the north withegypt and around suakin with england. the italians must be confronted from the directionof massowa. far to the south emin pasha still maintained a troublesome resistance. yet thekhalifa triumphed over nearly all his enemies; and the greatest spectacle which the soudanpresented from 1885 to 1898 was of this strong, capable ruler bearing up against all reverses,meeting each danger, overcoming each difficulty, and offering a firm front to every foe. it is unlikely that any complete history ofthese events will ever be written in a form and style which will interest a later generation.the complications of extraordinary names and
the imperfection of the records might alonedeter the chronicler. the universal squalor of the scenes and the ignorance of the actorsadd discouragements. nor, upon the other hand, are there great incentives. the tale is oneof war of the cruellest, bloodiest, and most confused type. one savage army slaughtersanother. one fierce general cuts his rival's throat. the same features are repeated withwearying monotony. when one battle is understood, all may be imagined. above the tumult thefigure of the khalifa rises stern and solitary, the only object which may attract the interestof a happier world. yet even the khalifa's methods were oppressively monotonous. foralthough the nature or courage of the revolts might differ with the occasion, the resultswere invariable; and the heads of all his
chief enemies, of many of his generals, ofmost of his councillors, met in the capacious pit which yawned in omdurman. during the thirteen years of his reign abdullahtried nearly every device by which oriental rulers have sought to fortify their periloussovereignty. he shrank from nothing. self-preservation was the guiding principle of his policy, hisfirst object and his only excuse. among many wicked and ingenious expedients three mainmethods are remarkable. first, he removed or rendered innocuous all real or potentialrivals. secondly, he pursued what sir alfred milner has called 'a well-considered policyof military concentration.' thirdly, he maintained among the desert and riverain people a balanceof power on the side of his own tribe. all
these three methods merit some attention orillustration. the general massacre of all possible claimantsusually follows the accession of a usurper to an oriental throne. the khalifa was ableto avoid this extreme measure. nevertheless he took precautions. availing himself of thegrief and terror that had followed mohammed ahmed's death, he had extorted the oath ofallegiance from the two other khalifas and from the 'ashraf' or relations of the prophet.[the madhi had superseded the original mohammed as 'the prophet.' his relations consequentlybecame 'ashraf.'] but these complaisant men soon repented of their submission. each khalifaboasted his independence. each marched attended by a numerous retinue. each asserted his rightto beat his own great copper drum. both the
unsuccessful khalifas combined against abdullah.but while they had been busy with the beating of war-drums and the preparation of pageants,that sagacious ruler had secured the loyalty of the baggara tribe, to a section of whichhe belonged, and of a considerable force of black riflemen. at length matters reachedclimax. both parties prepared for war. abdullah drew up his array without the city, and challengedhis rivals to the utmost proof. the combined forces of the ousted khalifas were the morenumerous. but the fierce baggara waved their swords, and the soudanese riflemen were famousfor their valour. for some hours a bloody struggle appeared imminent. then the confederacybroke up. the khalifa ali-wad-helu, a prudent man, talked of compromise and amity. the khalifsherif, thus seriously weakened, hastened
to make peace while time remained. eventuallyboth bowed to the superior force of the ruler and the superior courage of his followers.once they had submitted, their power was gone. abdullah reduced their forces to a personalescort of fifty men each, deprived them of their flags and their war-drums—the emblemsof royalty—and they became for the future the useful supporters of a government theywere unable to subvert. to other less powerful and more stubborn enemieshe showed a greater severity. the mahdi's two uncles, named respectively abdel kerimand abdel kader, were thrown chained into prison, their houses were destroyed, and theirwives and other property confiscated. the numerous persons who claimed to be of the'ashraf' found the saintly honour a burden
upon earth; for, in order to keep them outof mischief, the khalifa enjoined them to attend five times every day at the prayersin the mosque. eighteen months of these devotions, declares the christian chronicler, were considered'the highest punishment.' [ohrwalder, ten years' captivity.] still more barbarous wasthe treatment meted out to the unfortunate emir who had charge of the treasury. ahmedwad suliman had been accustomed under the mahdi's mild rule to keep no public accounts,and consequently he had amassed a large fortune. he was actively hostile to abdullah, and proclaimedhis sympathy with the ashraf. whereupon the khalifa invited him to give an account ofhis stewardship. this he was, of course, unable to do. he was then dismissed from his appointment.his private property was taken to fill the
deficiencies of the state, and the brutalpopulation of omdurman applauded his punishment as 'an act of justice.' [slatin, fire andsword.] although the khalifa might establish his authorityby such atrocities, its maintenance depended on the military policy which he consistentlypursued. the terrible power of a standing army may usually be exerted by whoever cancontrol its leaders, as a mighty engine is set in motion by the turning of a handle.yet to turn the handle some muscular force is necessary. abdullah knew that to rule thesoudan he must have a great army. to make the great army obedient he must have anotherseparate force; for the influences which keep european armies in subjection were not presentamong the dervishes. for some years, indeed,
he was compelled to leave much to chance orthe loyalty of his officers. but latterly, when he had perfected his organisation, hebecame quite independent and had no need to trust anyone. by degrees and with astonishingability he carried out his schemes. he invited his own tribe, the taaisha sectionof the baggara arabs, to come and live in omdurman. 'come,' he wrote in numerous lettersto them, 'and take possession of the lands which the lord your god has given you.' alluredby the hopes of wealth and wives and the promise of power, the savage herdsmen came to thenumber of 7,000 warriors. their path was made smooth and easy. granaries were erected alongthe route. steamers and sailing-vessels waited on the nile. arrived at the capital, all werenewly clothed at the expense of the state.
an entire district of the city was forciblycleared of its inhabitants for the accommodation of the strangers. what the generosity of thekhalifa forgot or refused, the predatory habits of his clansmen procured; and they robbed,plundered, and swindled with all the arrogance and impunity of royal favourites. the populaceof the city returned a bitter hatred for these injuries; and the khalifa's object was attained.he had created a class in omdurman who were indissolubly attached to him. like him, theywere detested by the local tribes. like him, they were foreigners in the land. but, likehim, they were fierce and brave and strong. his dangers, his enemies, his interests weretheir own. their lives depended on their loyalty. here was the motor muscle which animated therest. the taaisha baggara controlled the black
jehadia, once the irregular troops of theegyptians, now become the regulars of the khalifa. the black jehadia overawed the arabarmy in the capital. the army in the capital dominated the forces in the provinces. theforces in the provinces subdued the inhabitants. the centralisation of power was assured bythe concentration of military material. cannon, rifles, stores of ammunition, all the necessitiesof war were accumulated in the arsenal. only the armies on the frontiers, the taaisha tribe,and the khalifa's personal bodyguard habitually carried firearms and cartridges. the enormouspopulation of omdurman was forced to be content with spears and swords. rifles were issuedto the soudanese whenever safe and necessary; cartridges only when they were about to beused. thus several millions of warlike and
savage people, owning scarcely any law butthat of might, and scattered about a vast roadless territory, were brought into thefirm grip of a single man. the third principle of government which thekhalifa was compelled, or inclined, to adopt was to keep the relative power of the varioustribes and classes conveniently proportioned. if an emir rose to great influence and wealth,he became a possible rival, and suffered forthwith death, imprisonment, or spoliation. if a tribethreatened the supremacy of the taaisha it was struck down while its menace was yet amenace. the regulation of classes and tribes was a far more complicated affair than theadjustment of individuals. yet for thirteen years the khalifa held the balance, and heldit exact until the very end. such was the
statecraft of a savage from kordofan. his greatest triumph was the abyssinian war.it is not likely that two great barbaric kingdoms living side by side, but differing in raceand religion, will long continue at peace; nor was it difficult to discover a cause ofthe quarrel between the dervishes and the abyssinians. for some time a harassing anddesultory warfare disturbed the border. at length in 1885 a dervish—half-trader, halfbrigand—sacked an abyssinian church. bas adal, the governor of the amhara province,demanded that this sacrilegious robber should be surrendered to justice. the arabs haughtilyrefused. the response was swift. collecting an army which may have amounted to 30,000men, the abyssinians invaded the district
of gallabat and marched on the town. againstthis host the emir wad arbab could muster no more than 6,000 soldiers. but, encouragedby the victories of the previous four years, the dervishes accepted battle, in spite ofthe disparity of numbers. neither valour nor discipline could withstand such odds. themoslems, broken by the fierce onset and surrounded by the overwhelming numbers of their enemies,were destroyed, together with their intrepid leader. scarcely any escaped. the abyssiniansindulged in all the triumphs of savagery. the wounded were massacred: the slain weremutilated: the town of gallabat was sacked and burnt. the women were carried into captivity.all these tidings came to omdurman. under this heavy and unexpected blow the khalifaacted with prudence. he opened negotiations
with king john of abyssinia, for the ransomof the captured wives and children, and at the same time he sent the emir yunes witha large force to gallabat. the immediate necessities having thus been dealt with, abdullah preparedfor revenge. of all the arab leaders which fifteen yearsof continual war and tumult throughout the soudan produced, none displayed higher ability,none obtained greater successes, and none were more honourable, though several weremore famous, than the man whom the khalifa selected to avenge the destruction of thegallabat army. abu anga had been a slave in abdullah's family long before the mahdi hadpreached at abba island and while egypt yet oppressed the country. after the revolt hadbroken out, his adventurous master summoned
him from the distant kordofan home to attendhim in the war, and abu anga came with that ready obedience and strange devotion for whichhe was always distinguished. nominally as a slave, really as a comrade, he fought byabdullah's side in all the earlier battles of the rebellion. nor was it until after thecapture of el obeid that he rose suddenly to power and place. the khalifa was a judgeof men. he saw very clearly that the black soudanese troops, who had surrendered andwere surrendering as town after town was taken, might be welded into a powerful weapon. andin abu anga he knew a man who could not only fashion the blade, but would hold it everloyally at his master's disposal. the former slave threw himself into the duties of hiscommand with extraordinary energy. his humble
origin pleased the hardy blacks, who recognisedin their leader their equal in birth, their superior in prowess. more than any other emir,abu anga contributed to the destruction of hicks's army. the jehadia, as his soldierswere called—because they had joined in the jehad, or holy war—were armed with remingtonrifles, and their harassing fire inflicted heavy losses on the struggling column untilit was finally brought to a standstill, and the moment for the spearmen to charge arrived.henceforward the troops of abu anga became famous throughout the land for their weapons,their courage, and their cruelty. their numbers at first did not exceed 5,000; but as moretowns were taken and more slaves were turned into soldiers they increased, until at onetime they reached the formidable total of
15,000 men. during the siege of khartoum theblack riflemen distinguished themselves by the capture of omdurman fort, but their violentnatures and predatory instincts made them an undesirable garrison even for the dervishcapital, and they were despatched under their general to kordofan, where they increasedtheir reputation by a series of bloody fights with the nubas, an aboriginal mountain peoplewho cared for nothing but their independence. at the end of june abu anga reached omdurmanwith an army variously estimated at from 22,000 to 31,000 men, of whom at least 10,000 werearmed with remington rifles. the khalifa received him with the utmost honour. after a privateinterview, which lasted for several hours, a formal entry into the town was arranged.at daybreak on the following morning the whole
force marched into the city and camped alongthe northern suburbs, applauded and welcomed alike by the population and their ruler. afew days after this a great review was held under the kerreri hills, on the very groundwhere the dervish empire was doomed to be shattered. but the fateful place oppressedthe khalifa with no forebodings. he exulted in his power: and well he might, for afterthe cannon had thundered indefinite salutes, no fewer than 100,000 armed men defiled tothe music of the war-drums and the ombyas before the famous black flag. the spectacleof the enormous numbers provoked their enthusiasm. the triumphant khalifa was cheered by hismighty host, who pressed upon him in their exuberant loyalty until he was almost crushed.it was indeed a stirring scene. the whole
plain was filled with the throng. bannersof every hue and shape waved gaily in the breeze, and the sunlight glinted from innumerablespear-points. the swarming dervishes displayed their bright parti-coloured jibbas. the wildbaggara cavalry circled on the flanks of the array. the brown dome of the mahdi's tomb,rising above the city, seemed to assure the warriors of supernatural aid. abdullah wasat the summit of his power. the movement initiated by the priest of abba island had attainedits climax. behind, in the plain, the frowning rocks of surgham hill rose ragged and gloomy,as if their silence guarded the secrets of the future. after the feast of bairam had been celebratedon a gigantic scale, abu anga was despatched
to gallabat with his army and considerablereinforcements from the troops in omdurman, and it became evident that war with abyssiniawas imminent. the great leader relieved the emir yunes, much to the latter's disgust,of the chief command, and, since the strong gallabat garrison was added to his own force,abu anga was able to take the field at the head of 15,000 riflemen and 45,000 spearmen.the khalifa had embarked on a great venture in planning the invasion of abyssinia. thevast strength of the negus was known to the dervishes, and has since been proved to theworld. the mahdi had forbidden such a war. an ill-omened prophecy further declared thatthe king of abyssinia would tether his horse to a solitary tree by khartoum, while hiscavalry should ride through the city fetlock
deep in blood. but abdullah feared neithergod nor man. he reviewed the political situation, and determined at all risks to maintain hisfrontiers inviolate. his emir wad arbab had been killed. blood must settle the matter. the abyssinians had not watched the extensivehostile preparations apathetically. ras adal had collected an army which in numbers actuallyexceeded that of the dervishes. but the latter were far superior in rifles, and the blackinfantry were of invincible valour. nevertheless, confident in his strength and relying on hispowerful cavalry, the abyssinian general allowed the arabs to toil through all the mountainouscountry, to traverse the mintik pass, and to debouch unmolested on to the plain of debrasin. abu anga neglected no precaution. he
knew that since he must fight in the heartof abyssinia, with the mountains behind him, a defeat would involve annihilation. he drewup his army swiftly and with skill. then the abyssinians attacked. the rifle fire of thesoudanese repulsed them. the onset was renewed with desperate gallantry. it was resistedwith equal valour and superior weapons. after frightful losses the abyssinians wavered,and the wise arab seized the moment for a counterstroke. in spite of the devotion ofhis cavalry ras adal was driven from the field. great numbers of his army were drowned inthe river in front of which he had recklessly elected to fight. his camp was captured, anda valuable spoil rewarded the victors, who also gratified their passions with a wholesaleslaughter of the wounded—a practice commonly
followed by savages. the effect of the victorywas great. the whole of the amhara province submitted to the invaders, and in the springof 1887 abu anga was able to advance without further fighting to the capture and sack ofgondar, the ancient capital of abyssinia. meanwhile the khalifa had been anxiously expectingtidings of his army. the long silence of thirty days which followed their plunge into themountains filled him with fear, and ohrwalder relates that he 'aged visibly' during thatperiod. but his judgment was proved by the event, and the arrival of a selected assortmentof heads turned doubt to triumph. the dervishes did not long remain in abyssinia, as theysuffered from the climate. in december the army returned to gallabat, which they commencedto fortify, and their victorious general followed
his grisly but convincing despatch to omdurman,where he received the usual welcome accorded by warlike peoples to military heroes. butthe famous and faithful slave may have been more gratified by the tears of joy which hismaster and sovereign shed on beholding him again safe and successful. the greater struggle was still to come. thewhole of abyssinia was convulsed with fury, and king john in person prepared to take thefield and settle the quarrel for ever. he assembled a mighty host, which is said tohave amounted to 130,000 foot and 20,000 horsemen. the rumours of this formidable concentrationreached gallabat and omdurman, and in spite of the recent victory caused deep alarm. thekhalifa saw his frontiers—even his existence—menaced,
for king john had declared that he would sweepthe dervishes from off the face of the earth: and in the hour of need the general on whomso much depended died of some poisonous medicine with which he had endeavoured to cure himselfof indigestion. abu anga was buried in his red-brick house at gallabat amid the lamentationsof his brave black soldiers, and gloom pervaded the whole army. but, since the enemy wereapproaching, the danger had to be faced. the khalifa appointed zeki tummal, one of anga'slieutenants, to the command of the forces at gallabat, which by strenuous exertionshe brought up to a total of 85,000 men. king john sent word that he was coming, lest anyshould say that he had come secretly as a thief. the dervishes resolved to remain onthe defensive, and, fortifying themselves
in an enormous zeriba around the town, awaitedthe onslaught. at dawn on the 9th of march, 1889, the abyssinianscame within sight of their enemies, and early the next morning the battle began. great cloudsof dust obscured the scene, and all intelligible sounds were lost in the appalling din. theabyssinians, undaunted by the rifle fire of the soudanese, succeeded in setting the zeribaalight. then, concentrating all their force on one part of the defence, they burst intothe enclosure and town. the division of wad ali, a fourth part of the entire dervish army,which bore the brunt of this attack, was almost completely destroyed. the interior of thezeriba was crowded with women and children, who were ruthlessly butchered by the exultantabyssinians. the assailants scattered in all
directions in search of plunder, and theyeven had time to begin to disinter the body of abu anga, which they were eager to insultin revenge for gondar. the dervishes already wavered; their ammunition began to fail, whensuddenly a rumour spread about among the abyssinians that the king was killed. seizing what bootythey could snatch, the victorious army began a general retreat, and the zeriba was sooncleared. the arabs were too exhausted to pursue, but when on the following day the attack wasnot renewed they learned, to their surprise, that they were the victors and that theirenemy was falling back towards the atbara river. zeki tummal resolved to pursue, andhis army were further incited to the chase by the fact that the abyssinians had carriedoff with them a large number of dervish women,
including the harem of the late beloved abuanga. two days after the battle the dervishes overtook the enemy's rearguard and, surprisingtheir camp, inflicted severe loss and captured much booty. the temporary negus who had beenappointed to fill the vacancy caused by the death of king john was among the killed. thebody of that courageous monarch fell into the hands of the dervishes, who struck offthe head and sent it—a tangible proof of victory—to omdurman. the abyssinians, stillformidable, made good their retreat; nor did zeki tummal venture to follow into the mountains.internal difficulties within his dominions prevented the new negus from resuming theoffensive, and thus the dervish-abyssinian war dwindled down to, as it had arisen outof, frontier raids.
the arrival in omdurman of king john's headintoxicated the khalifa with joy. abyssinia was regarded throughout the soudan as a fargreater power than egypt, and here was its mighty ruler slain and decapitated. but thevictory had been dearly purchased. the two great battles had been fought with indescribableferocity by both sides, and the slaughter was appalling. no reliable statistics areavaliable, but it may be reasonably asserted that neither side sustained a loss in killedduring the war of fewer than 15,000 fighting men. the flower of the dervish army, the heroicblacks of abu anga, were almost destroyed. the khalifa had won a pyrrhic triumph. neveragain was he able to put so great a force in the field, and, although the army whichwas shattered at omdurman was better armed
and better drilled, it was less formidablethan that which broke the might of abyssinia. during the progress of the struggle with abyssiniathe war against egypt languished. the mahdi, counting upon the support of the population,had always declared that he would free the delta from 'the turks,' and was already planningits invasion when he and his schemes were interrupted by death. his successor inheritedall the quarrel, but not all the power. much of mohammed ahmed's influence died with him.alive, he might conquer the moslem world; dead, he was only a saint. all fanatical feelingin egypt soon subsided. nevertheless the khalifa persisted in the enterprise. the success ofthe abyssinian war encouraged and enabled him to resume the offensive on his northernfrontier, and he immediately ordered wad-el-nejumi,
who commanded in dongola, to march with hisscanty force to the invasion of egypt. the mad enterprise ended, as might have been foreseen,in the destruction of both emir and army at toski. the khalifa received the news withapparent grief, but it is difficult to avoid suspecting him of dark schemes. he was fartoo clever to believe that egypt could be conquered by five thousand men. he knew thatbesides the egyptians there was a strange white tribe of men, the same that had so nearlysaved khartoum. 'but for the english,' he exclaimed on several occasions, 'i would haveconquered egypt.' yet, knowing of the british occupation, he deliberately sent an army toits inevitable ruin. it is difficult to reconcile such conduct with the character for sagacityand intelligence which abdullah has deserved.
there is no doubt that he wanted to conqueregypt. possibly by some extraordinary chance wad-el-nejumi might succeed, even with hissmall force. if so, then the glory of god and the power of the khalifa would advancetogether. if not—and herein lies the true reason for the venture—the riverain tribeswould have received a crippling blow. the terrible slaughter of the abyssinian warhad fallen mainly on the jehadia and the eastern arabs. the jealous tribes in the north hadnot suffered. the balance of power was in need of re-adjustment. the jaalin and barabrawere fast becoming dangerous. nejumi's army was recruited almost entirely from these sources.the reinforcements sent from omdurman consisted of men selected from the flag of the khalifasherif, who was growing too powerful, and
of the batahin tribe, who had shown a mutinousspirit [ohrwalder, ten years' captivity.] the success of such an army in egypt wouldbe glorious. its destruction anywhere would be convenient. whatever abdullah's motivesmay have been, his advantage was certain. but the life of the empire thus compelledto prey upon itself must necessarily be short. other forces were soon added to the work ofexhaustion. the year following the end of the abyssinian war was marked by a fearfulfamine. slatin and ohrwalder vie with each other in relating its horrors—men eatingthe raw entrails of donkeys; mothers devouring their babies; scores dying in the streets,all the more ghastly in the bright sunlight; hundreds of corpses floating down the nile—theseare among the hideous features, the depopulation
caused by the scarcity was even greater thanthat produced by the fighting. the famine area extended over the whole soudan and ranalong the banks of the river as far as lower egypt. the effects of the famine were everywhereappalling. entire districts between omdurman and berber became wholly depopulated. in thesalt regions near shendi almost all the inhabitants died of hunger. the camel-breeding tribesate their she-camels. the riverain peoples devoured their seed-corn. the population ofgallabat, gedaref, and kassala was reduced by nine-tenths, and these once considerabletowns shrank to the size of hamlets. everywhere the deserted mud houses crumbled back intothe plain. the frightful mortality, general throughout the whole country, may be gaugedby the fact that zeki tummal's army, which
before the famine numbered not fewer than87,000, could scarcely muster 10,000 men in the spring of 1890. the new harvest came only in time to savethe inhabitants of the soudan from becoming extinct. the remnant were preserved for furthermisfortunes. war, scarcity, and oppression there had always been. but strange and mysterioustroubles began to afflict the tortured tribes. the face of heaven was pitiless or averted.in 1890 innumerable swarms of locusts descended on the impoverished soil. the multitude oftheir red or yellow bodies veiled the sun and darkened the air, and although their flesh,tasting when roasted like fried shrimps, might afford a delicate meal to the natives, theytook so heavy a toll of the crops that the
famine was prolonged and scarcity became constant.since their first appearance the locusts are said to have returned annually [ohrwalder,ten years' captivity.] their destructive efforts were aided by millions of little red mice,who destroyed the seeds before they could grow. so vast and immeasurable was the numberof these tiny pests that after a heavy rain the whole country was strewn with, and almosttinted by, the squirrel-coloured corpses of the drowned. yet, in spite of all the strokes of fate,the khalifa maintained his authority unshaken. the centralisation which always occurs inmilitary states was accelerated by the famine. the provincial towns dwindled; thousands andtens of thousands perished; but omdurman continually
grew, and its ruler still directed the energiesof a powerful army. thus for the present we might leave the dervish empire. yet the gloomycity of blood, mud, and filth that arose by the confluence of the niles deserves a finalglance while still in the pride of independent barbarism. it is early morning, and the sun, liftingabove the horizon, throws the shadows of the khartoum ruins on the brimful waters of thenile. the old capital is solitary and deserted. no sound of man breaks the silence of itsstreets. only memory broods in the garden where the pashas used to walk, and the courtyardwhere the imperial envoy fell. across the river miles of mud houses, lining the banksas far as khor shambat, and stretching back
into the desert and towards the dark hills,display the extent of the arab metropolis. as the sun rises, the city begins to live.along the road from kerreri a score of camels pad to market with village produce. the northwind is driving a dozen sailing-boats, laden to the water's edge with merchandise, to thewharves. one of gordon's old steamers lies moored by the bank. another, worked by thecrew that manned it in egyptian days, is threshing up the blue nile, sent by the khalifa to sennaron some errand of state. far away to the southward the dust of a darfur caravan breaks the clear-cutskyline with a misty blur. the prolonged beating of war-drums and loudbooming notes of horns chase away the silence of the night. it is friday, and after thehour of prayer all grown men must attend the
review on the plain without the city. alreadythe streets are crowded with devout and obedient warriors. soon the great square of the mosque—forno roof could shelter so many thousand worshippers—is filled with armed men, kneeling in humblesupplication to the stern god of islam and his most holy mahdi. it is finished. theyrise and hurry to the parade. the emirs plant their flags, and all form in the ranks. woeto the laggard; and let the speedy see that he wear his newest jibba, and carry a sharpsword and at least three spears. presently the array is complete. a salute of seven guns is fired. mounted ona fine camel, which is led by a gigantic nubian, and attended by perhaps two hundred horsemenin chain armour, the khalifa rides on to the
ground and along the ranks. it is a good muster.few have dared absent themselves. yet his brow is clouded. what has happened? is thereanother revolt in the west? do the abyssinians threaten gallabat? have the black troops mutinied;or is it only some harem quarrel? the parade is over. the troops march backto the arsenal. the rifles are collected, and the warriors disperse to their homes.many hurry to the market-place to make purchases, to hear the latest rumour, or to watch theexecutions—for there are usually executions. others stroll to the suk-er-rekik and criticisethe points of the slave girls as the dealers offer them for sale. but the khalifa has returnedto his house, and his council have been summoned. the room is small, and the ruler sits cross-leggedupon his couch. before him squat the emirs
and kadis. yakub is there, with ali-wad-heluand the khalifa sherif. only the sheikh-ed-din is absent, for he is a dissolute youth andmuch given to drinking. abdullah is grave and anxious. a messengerhas come from the north. the turks are on the move. advancing beyond their frontier,they have established themselves at akasha. wad bishara fears lest they may attack thefaithful who hold firket. in itself this is but a small matter, for all these years therehas been frontier fighting. but what follows is full of menacing significance. the 'enemiesof god' have begun to repair the railway—have repaired it, so that the train already runsbeyond sarras. even now they push their iron road out into the desert towards their positionat akasha and to the south. what is the object
of their toil? are they coming again? willthey bring those terrible white soldiers who broke the hearts of the hadendoa and almostdestroyed the degheim and kenana? what should draw them up the nile? is it for plunder,or in sheer love of war; or is it a blood feud that brings them? true, they are nowfar off. perchance they will return, as they returned before. yet the iron road is notbuilt in a day, nor for a day, and of a surety there are war-clouds in the north. chapter iv: the years of preparation in the summer of 1886, when all the troopshad retreated to wady halfa and all the soudan garrisons had been massacred, the britishpeople averted their eyes in shame and vexation
from the valley of the nile. a long successionof disasters had reached their disgraceful culmination. the dramatic features added muchto the bitterness and nothing to the grandeur of the tragedy. the cost was heavy. besidesthe pain produced by the death of general gordon, the heavy losses in officers and men,and the serious expenditure of public money, the nation smarted under failure and disappointment,and were, moreover, deeply sensible that they had been humiliated before the whole world.the situation in egypt was scarcely more pleasing. the reforms initiated by the british administratorshad as yet only caused unpopularity. baring's interference galled the khedive and his ministers.vincent's parsimony excited contempt. moncrieff's energy had convulsed the irrigation department.wood's army was the laughing-stock of europe.
among and beneath the rotten weeds and garbageof old systems and abuses the new seed was being sown. but england saw no signs of thecrop; saw only the stubborn husbandmen begrimed with the dust and dirt, and herself hopelesslyinvolved in the egyptian muddle: and so in utter weariness and disgust, stopping herears to the gibes and cat-calls of the powers, she turned towards other lands and other matters. when the attention of the nation was againdirected to egypt the scene was transformed. it was as though at the touch of an angelthe dark morasses of the slough of despond had been changed to the breezy slopes of thedelectable mountains. the khedive and his ministers lay quiet and docile in the firmgrasp of the consul-general. the bankrupt
state was spending surpluses upon internalimprovement. the disturbed irrigation department was vivifying the land. the derided army heldthe frontier against all comers. astonishment gave place to satisfaction, and satisfactiongrew into delight. the haunting nightmare of egyptian politics ended. another dreambegan—a bright if vague vision of imperial power, of trans-continental railways, of africanviceroys, of conquest and commerce. the interest of the british people in the work of regenerationgrew continually. each new reform was hailed with applause. each annual budget was scrutinisedwith pride. england exulted in the triumph of failure turned into success. there wasa general wish to know more about egypt and the men who had done these great things. in1893 this desire was satisfied, and yet stimulated
by the publication of sir alfred milner's'england in egypt.' his skilful pen displayed what had been overcome, no less than whatwas accomplished. by explaining the difficulties he enhanced the achievement. he showed how,while great britain was occupied elsewhere, her brilliant, persevering sons had repeatedon a lesser scale in egypt the marvellous evolution which is working out in india. smallersystems circulate more rapidly. the administrators were guided by experience. the movement hadbeen far swifter, and the results were more surprising. such was the wonderful story,and it was told in a happy moment. the audience were eager and sympathetic. the subject wasenthralling. the story-teller had a wit and a style that might have brightened the dullesttheme. in these propitious circumstances the
book was more than a book. the words ranglike the trumpet-call which rallies the soldiers after the parapets are stormed, and summonsthem to complete the victory. the regeneration of egypt is not a theme whichwould fall within the limits of this account, even if it had not been fully dealt with bysir alfred milner. but the reorganisation of the egyptian army, the forging of the weaponof reconquest, is an essential feature. on the 20th of december, 1882, the old egyptianarmy—or, rather, such parts as had escaped destruction—was disbanded by a single sentenceof a british decree, and it was evident that some military body must replace that whichhad been swept away. all sorts of schemes for the employment of foreign legions or turkishjanissaries were devised. but lord dufferin
adhered firmly to the principle of entrustingthe defence of a country to its inhabitants, and it was determined to form a new egyptianarmy. the poverty of the government, no less than the apparent folly of the experiment,demanded that the new army should be small. the force was intended only for the preservationof internal order and the defence of the southern and western frontiers of egypt against thebedouin arabs. the soudan still slumbered out its long nightmare. six thousand men wasthe number originally drawn by conscription—for there are no volunteers in egypt—from apopulation of more than 6,000,000. twenty-six british officers—either poor men attractedby the high rates of pay, or ambitious allured by the increased authority—and a score ofexcellent drill-sergeants undertook the duty
of teaching the recruits to fight. sir evelynwood directed the enterprise, and became the first british sirdar of the egyptian army.the work began and immediately prospered. within three months of its formation the armyhad its first review. the whole 6,000 paraded in their battalions and marched past the khediveand their country's flag. their bearing and their drill extorted the half-contemptuouspraise of the indifferent spectators. experienced soldiers noticed other points. indeed, thenew army differed greatly from the old. in the first place, it was paid. the recruitswere treated with justice. their rations were not stolen by the officers. the men were givenleave to go to their villages from time to time. when they fell sick, they were sentto hospital instead of being flogged. in short,
the european system was substituted for theoriental. it was hardly possible that the fertile soiland enervating climate of the delta would have evolved a warrior race. ages of oppressionand poverty rarely produce proud and warlike spirits. patriotism does not grow under the'kourbash.' the fellah soldier lacks the desire to kill. even the mohammedan religion hasfailed to excite his ferocity. he may be cruel. he is never fierce. yet he is not withoutcourage—a courage which bears pain and hardship in patience, which confronts ill-fortune withindifference, and which looks on death with apathetic composure. it is the courage ofdown-trodden peoples, and one which stronger breeds may often envy, though they can scarcelybe expected to admire. he has other military
virtues. he is obedient, honest, sober, well-behaved,quick to learn, and, above all, physically strong. generations of toiling ancestors,though they could not brace his nerves, have braced his muscles. under the pressure oflocal circumstances there has been developed a creature who can work with little food,with little incentive, very hard for long hours under a merciless sun. throughout theriver campaigns, if the intellect of the army, if the spirit of the troops, have come fromwithout, egypt herself has provided the sinews of war. such was the material out of which the britishofficers have formed the new egyptian army. at first, indeed, their task was embitteredby the ridicule of their comrades in the british
and indian services; but as the drill andbearing of the force improved, the thoughtless scorn would have been diverted from the englishmento fall only upon the egyptian soldiers. but this was not allowed. the british officersidentified themselves with their men. those who abused the fellah soldier were remindedthat they insulted english gentlemen. thus a strange bond of union was established betweenthe officers and soldiers of the egyptian service; and although material forces mayhave accomplished much, without this moral factor the extraordinary results would neverhave been achieved. it was not long before the new military organisationwas exposed to the stern test of war. the army that was raised to preserve internalorder was soon called upon to guard the frontier.
the revolt in the soudan, which in its earlierstages seemed the least of the egyptian difficulties, speedily dwarfed all the rest. the value ofthe new force was soon recognised. in june 1883 we find general hicks, then preparingfor his fatal march, writing to sir evelyn wood: 'send me four battalions of your newarmy, and i shall be content.' but fortune protected the infant organisation from sucha disastrous beginning. the 'new army' remained for a space in cairo; and although duringthe nile expedition of 1884-85 the egyptians were employed guarding the lines of communication,it was not until the british troops had been withdrawn from dongola that they receivedat ginniss their baptism of fire. henceforth their place was on the frontier, and from1886 onward the egyptian troops proved equal
to the task of resisting the northward pressureof the dervishes. the numbers of the army grew with its responsibilities.up to the end of 1883 the infantry still consisted of eight fellahin battalions. in 1884 thefirst soudanese battalion was raised. the black soldier was of a very different typefrom the fellahin. the egyptian was strong, patient, healthy, and docile. the negro wasin all these respects his inferior. his delicate lungs, slim legs, and loosely knit figurecontrasted unfavourably with the massive frame and iron constitution of the peasant of thedelta. always excitable and often insubordinate, he required the strictest discipline. at onceslovenly and uxorious, he detested his drills and loved his wives with equal earnestness;and altogether 'sambo'—for such is the soudanese
equivalent of 'tommy'—was a lazy, fierce,disreputable child. but he possessed two tremendous military virtues. to the faithful loyaltyof a dog he added the heart of a lion. he loved his officer, and feared nothing in theworld. with the introduction of this element the egyptian army became a formidable militarymachine. chance or design has placed the blacks ever in the forefront of the battle, and inlord kitchener's campaigns on the nile the losses in the six soudanese battalions haveexceeded the aggregate of the whole of the rest of the army. it was well that the egyptian troops werestrengthened by these valiant auxiliaries, for years of weary war lay before them. sirreginald wingate, in his exhaustive account
of the struggle of egypt with the mahdistpower, [mahdism and the egyptian soudan, sir reginald wingate] has described the successiveactions which accompanied the defence of the wady halfa frontier and of suakin. the ten years that elapsed between ginnissand the first movements of the expedition of re-conquest were the dreary years of theegyptian army. the service was hard and continual. though the operations were petty, an untiringvigilance was imperative. the public eye was averted. a pitiless economy was everywhereenforced. the british officer was deprived of his leave and the egyptian private of hisrations, that a few pounds might be saved to the egyptian treasury. the clothing ofthe battalions wore thin and threadbare, and
sometimes their boots were so bad that thesoldiers' feet bled from the cutting edges of the rocks, and the convoy escorts lefttheir trails behind them. but preparation was ever going forward. the army improvedin efficiency, and the constant warfare began to produce, even among the fellahin infantry,experienced soldiers. the officers, sweltering at weary wady halfa and suakin, looked atthe gathering resources of egypt and out into the deserts of the declining dervish empireand knew that some day their turn would come. the sword of re-conquest which evelyn woodhad forged, and grenfell had tested, was gradually sharpened; and when the process was almostcomplete, the man who was to wield it presented himself.
horatio herbert kitchener, the eldest sonof a lieutenant-colonel, was born in 1850, and, after being privately educated, enteredin 1869 the royal military academy at woolwich as a cadet of the royal engineers. in thespring of 1871 he obtained his commission, and for the first ten years of his militaryservice remained an obscure officer, performing his duties with regularity, but giving nopromise of the talents and character which he was afterwards to display. one powerfulweapon, however, he acquired in this time of waiting. in 1874 accident or instinct ledhim to seek employment in the surveys that were being made of cyprus and palestine, andin the latter country he learned arabic. for six years the advantage of knowing a languagewith which few british officers were familiar
brought him no profit. for procuring militarypreferment arabic was in 1874 as valueless as patagonian. all this was swiftly changedby the unexpected course of events. the year 1882 brought the british fleet to alexandria,and the connection between england and egypt began to be apparent. kitchener did not neglecthis opportunity. securing leave of absence, he hurried to the scene of crisis. alexandriawas bombarded. detachments from the fleet were landed to restore order. the britishgovernment decided to send an army to egypt. british officers and soldiers were badly wantedat the seat of war; an officer who could speak arabic was indispensable. thus kitchener came to egypt and set his feetfirmly on the high road to fortune. he came
to egypt when she was plunged in misery andshame, when hopeless ruin seemed already the only outcome of the public disasters, andwhen even greater misfortunes impended. he remained to see her prosperous and powerful;to restore empire to her people, peace to her empire, honour to her army; and amongthose clear-minded men of action by whom the marvellous work of regeneration has been accomplished,herbert kitchener will certainly occupy the second place. lord wolseley on his arrivalsoon found employment for the active officer who could speak arabic. he served throughthe campaign of 1882 as a major. he joined the new army which was formed at the conclusionof the war, as one of the original twenty-six officers. in the nile expedition of 1885 arabicagain led him to the front, and in the service
of the intelligence department he found ampleopportunity for his daring and energy. his efforts to communicate with gordon in khartoumdid not, however, meet with much success, and the journals bristle with so many sarcasticcomments that their editor has been at pains to explain in his preface that there was reallyno cause for complaint. major kitchener, however, gave satisfaction to his superiors in cairo,if not to the exacting general at khartoum, and in 1886 he was appointed governor of suakin.this post, always one of responsibility and danger, did not satisfy kitchener, whose ambitionwas now taking definite form. eager for more responsibility and more danger, he harriedand raided the surrounding tribes; he restricted and almost destroyed the slender trade whichwas again springing up, and in consequence
of his measures the neighbourhood of suakinwas soon in even greater ferment than usual. this culminated at the end of 1887 in there-appearance and advance of osman digna. the movements of the dervishes were, however,uncertain. the defences of the town had been greatly strengthened and improved by the skilland activity of its new governor. [see dispatch from major-general dormer to war office, cairo,april 22, 1888: 'with regard to the military works and defenses of the town, i was muchstruck with the great improvement that has been effected by colonel kitchener since mylast visit to suakin in the autumn of 1884.] osman digna retreated. the 'friendlies' wereincited to follow, and kitchener, although he had been instructed not to employ britishofficers or egyptian regulars in offensive
operations, went out in support. at handubon the morning of the 17th of january, 1888, the friendlies attacked the camp of osmandigna. they were at first successful; but while they dispersed to plunder the enemyrallied and, returning, drove them back with loss. kitchener arrived on the field withthe support, to find a defeat instead of a victory awaiting him. he bravely endeavouredto cover the retreat of the friendlies, and in so doing was severely—as it first seemeddangerously—wounded in the jaw. the loss among the friendlies and the support amountedto twenty men killed and two british officers and twenty-eight men wounded. the governorreturned in great pain and some discomfiture to suakin. in spite of his wound and his reversehe was impatient to renew the conflict, but
this was definitely forbidden by the britishgovernment. colonel kitchener's military conduct was praised, but his policy was prevented.'the policy which it is desirable to follow ... in the eastern soudan,' wrote sir evelynbaring on the 17th of march, in measured rebuke, 'should consist in standing purely on thedefensive against any hostile movement or combination of the arab tribes, in avoidingany course of action which might involve the ultimate necessity of offensive action, andin encouraging legitimate trade by every means in our power.' [sir e. baring to consul cameron,march 14, 1888.] the governor could scarcely be expected tocarry out a policy so much at variance with his views and inclinations, and in the summerof 1888 he was transferred to a purely military
appointment and became adjutant-general ofthe egyptian army. for the next four years he worked busily in the war office at cairo,effecting many useful reforms and hard economies, and revealing powers of organisation which,although not yet appreciated by his comrades in the egyptian service, were noticed by onevigilant eye. in 1892 sir f. grenfell resigned the post of sirdar, and the chief commandof the egyptian army was vacant. two men stood out prominently as candidates—colonel wodehouse,who held the command of the halfa field force, and the adjutant-general. colonel wodehousehad undoubtedly the greater claims. he had been for several years in command of a largeforce in continual contact with the enemy. he had won the action of argin, and was knownthroughout the soudan as 'the conqueror of
wad-el-nejumi.' he had conducted the civiladministration of the frontier province with conspicuous success, and he was popular withall ranks of the egyptian army. kitchener had little to set against this. he had shownhimself a brave and active soldier. he was known to be a good official. but he had notbeen in accord with the government in his civil administration, and was, moreover, littleknown to his brother officers. sir evelyn baring's influence, however, turned the scale.somewhat, therefore, to the astonishment of the egyptian army, kitchener was promotedsirdar. lord cromer had found the military officer whom he considered capable of re-conqueringthe soudan when the opportunity should come. the years of preparation, wasted by no onein egypt, were employed by no department better
than by the intelligence branch. the greatestdisadvantage from which lord wolseley had suffered was the general ignorance of thesoudan and its peoples. the british soldiers had had to learn the details of dervish fightingby bitter experience. but the experience, once gained, was carefully preserved. theintelligence branch of the egyptian army rose under the direction of colonel (now sir reginald)wingate to an extraordinary efficiency. for ten years the history, climate, geography,and inhabitants of the soudan were the objects of a ceaseless scrutiny. the sharp line betweencivilisation and savagery was drawn at wady halfa; but beyond that line, up the greatriver, within the great wall of omdurman, into the arsenal, into the treasury, intothe mosque, into the khalifa's house itself,
the spies and secret agents of the government—disguisedas traders, as warriors, or as women—worked their stealthy way. sometimes the road bythe nile was blocked, and the messengers must toil across the deserts to darfur, and soby a tremendous journey creep into omdurman. at others a trader might work his way fromsuakin or from the italian settlements. but by whatever route it came, information—whisperedat halfa, catalogued at cairo—steadily accumulated, and the diaries of the intelligence departmentgrew in weight and number, until at last every important emir was watched and located, everygarrison estimated, and even the endless intrigues and brawls in omdurman were carefully recorded. the reports of the spies were at length confirmedand amplified by two most important witnesses.
at the end of 1891 father ohrwalder made hisescape from omdurman and reached the egyptian territory. besides giving the intelligencedepartment much valuable information, he published a thrilling account of his captivity [tenyears' captivity, father ohrwalder], which created a wide and profound impression inengland. in 1895 a still more welcome fugitive reached assuan. early on the 16th of marcha weary, travel-stained arab, in a tattered jibba and mounted on a lame and emaciatedcamel, presented himself to the commandant. he was received with delighted wonder, andforthwith conducted to the best bath-room available. two hours later a little austriangentleman stepped forth, and the telegraph hastened to tell the news that slatin, sometimegovernor of darfur, had escaped from the khalifa's
clutches. here at last was a man who kneweverything that concerned the dervish empire—slatin, the khalifa's trusted and confidential servant,almost his friend, who had lived with him, who was even permitted to dine with him alone,who had heard all his counsels, who knew all his emirs, and moreover slatin, the soldierand administrator, who could appreciate all he had learned, was added with the rank ofpasha to the staff of the intelligence department. while his accurate knowledge confirmed thebelief of the egyptian authorities that the dervish power was declining, his tale of 'fireand sword in the soudan' increased the horror and anger of thoughtful people in englandat the cruelties of the khalifa. public opinion began to veer towards the policy of re-conquest.
the year 1895 brought in a conservative andunionist administration. a government came into office supported by a majority whichwas so strong that there seemed little reason to expect a transference of power for fiveor six years. ministers were likely to be able to carry to a definite conclusion anyprojects they might devise. they belonged chiefly to that party in the state which hadconsistently assailed mr. gladstone's egyptian policy. here was an opportunity of repairingthe damage done by their opponents. the comparisons that would follow such an accomplishment wereself-evident and agreeable even to anticipate. the idea of re-conquering the soudan presenteditself indefinitely, but not unpleasingly, alike to the government and the people ofgreat britain. the unforeseen course of events
crystallised the idea into a policy. on the 1st of march, 1896, the battle of adowawas fought, and italy at the hands of abyssinia sustained a crushing defeat. two results followedwhich affected other nations. first, a great blow had been struck at european prestigein north africa. it seemed probable that the abyssinian success would encourage the dervishesto attack the italians at kassala. it was possible that they might also attack the egyptiansat suakin or on the wady halfa frontier. secondly, the value of italy as a factor in europeanpolitics was depreciated. the fact that her defeat had been assisted by the arms and munitionsof war which had been supplied to the abyssinians from french and russian sources complicatedthe situation. the triple alliance was concerned.
the third partner had been weakened. the balancemight be restored if great britain would make some open sign of sympathy. moreover, the expectations of the egyptianmilitary authorities were soon fulfilled. the dervishes threatened kassala as soon asthe news of adowa reached them, and indeed there were signs of increased activity inomdurman itself. in these circumstances the british government determined to assist italyby making a demonstration on the wady halfa frontier. they turned to egypt. it had alwaysbeen recognised that the recovery of the lost provinces was a natural and legitimate aspiration.'the doubtful point was to decide the time when the military and financial resourcesof the country were sufficiently developed
to justify an assumption of the offensive.'[lord cromer's reports: egypt, no. 2, 1896.] from a purely egyptian point of view the bestpossible moment had not yet arrived. a few more years of recuperation were needed. thecountry would fight the soudan campaigns more easily if first refreshed by the great reservoirswhich were projected. for more than two years both projects had been pressed upon the governmentof his highness the khedive—or, to write definitely, upon lord cromer. at regular intervalssir herbert kitchener and sir william garstin would successively visit the british agency(it would be treason to call it 'government house')—the one to urge the case for a war,the other to plead for a reservoir. the reservoir had won. only a few weeks before the advanceto dongola was ordered garstin met kitchener
returning from the agency. the engineer inquiredthe result of the general's interview. 'i'm beaten,' said kitchener abruptly; 'you'vegot your dam'—and garstin went on his way rejoicing. the decision of the british government cametherefore as a complete surprise to the cairene authorities. the season of the year was unfavourableto military operations. the hot weather was at hand. the nile was low. lord cromer's report,which had been published in the early days of march, had in no way foreshadowed the event.the frontier was tranquil. with the exception of a small raid on a village in the wady halfadistrict and an insignificant incursion into the tokar delta the dervish forces had duringthe year maintained 'a strictly defensive
attitude.' [egypt, no. 1, 1896.] lord cromer,however, realised that while the case for the reservoirs would always claim attention,the re-conquest of the soudan might not receive the support of a liberal government. the increasingpossibility of french intrigues upon the upper nile had also to be considered. all politicsare series of compromises and bargains, and while the historian may easily mark what wouldhave been the best possible moment for any great undertaking, a good moment must contentthe administrator. those who guarded the interests of egypt could hardly consent to an emptydemonstration on the wady halfa frontier at her expense, and the original intention ofthe british government was at once extended to the re-conquest of the dongola province—adefinite and justifiable enterprise which
must in any case be the first step towardsthe recovery of the soudan. * * * * * * it will be convenient, before embarking uponthe actual chronicle of the military operations, to explain how the money was obtained to payfor the war. i desire to avoid the intricate though fascinating tangles of egyptian finance.yet even when the subject is treated in the most general way the difficulties which harassand impede the british administrators and insult the sovereign power of egypt—themischievous interference of a vindictive nation, the galling and almost intolerable financialfetters in which a prosperous country is bound—may arouse in the sympathetic reader a flush ofannoyance, or at any rate a smile of pitying
wonder. about half the revenue of egypt is devotedto the development and government of the country, and the other half to the payment of the intereston the debt and other external charges; and, with a view to preventing in the future theextravagance of the past, the london convention in 1885 prescribed that the annual expenditureof egypt shall not exceed a certain sum. when the expenditure exceeds this amount, for everypound that is spent on the government or development of egypt another pound must be paid to thecommissioners of the debt; so that, after the limit is reached, for every pound thatis required to promote egyptian interests two pounds must be raised by taxation froman already heavily taxed community. but the
working of this law was found to be so severethat, like all laws which exceed the human conception of justice, it has been somewhatmodified. by an arrangement which was effected in 1888, the caisse de la dette are empowered,instead of devoting their surplus pound to the sinking fund, to pay it into a generalreserve fund, from which the commissioners may make grants to meet 'extraordinary expenses';those expenses, that is to say, which may be considered 'once for all'(capital) expenditureand not ordinary annual charges. the dongola expedition was begun, as has beensaid, without reference to the immediate internal condition of egypt. the moment was a goodone, but not the best. it was obviously impossible for egypt to provide for the extraordinaryexpenses of the military operations out of
revenue. the ministry of finance thereforeappealed to the caisse de la dette for a grant from the general reserve fund. here was anobvious case of 'extraordinary expenses.' the egyptian government asked for â£e500,000. the caisse met in council. six commissioners—representingengland, france, russia, germany, austria, and italy—duly discussed the application.four commissioners considered that the grant should be made. two commissioners, those representingfrance and russia, voted against it. the majority decided. the grant was made. the money washanded to the egyptian government and devoted to the prosecution of the war. egypt as a sovereign power had already humblybegged to be allowed to devote part of the
surplus of her own revenues to her own objects.a greater humiliation remained. the commissioners of france and russia, who had been out-voted,brought an action against their colleagues on the grounds that the grant was ultra vires;and against the egyptian government for the return of the money thus wrongly obtained.other actions were brought at french instigation by various people purporting to representthe bondholders, who declared that their interests were threatened. the case was tried beforethe mixed tribunals, an institution which exists in egypt superior to and independentof the sovereign rights of that country. on the part of the egyptian government andthe four commissioners it was contended that the mixed tribunals had no competency to trythe case; that the attacking parties had no
right of action; that the egyptian governmenthad, in applying, done all that the law of liquidation required; and that the act ofsovereignty was complete as soon as the caisse, which was the legal representative of thebondholding interest, had pronounced its decision. the argument was a strong one; but had itbeen ten times as strong, the result would have been the same. the mixed tribunals, aninternational institution, delivered its judgment on strictly political grounds, the judgestaking their orders from the different countries they represented. it was solemnly pronouncedthat war expenses were not 'extraordinary expenses.' the proximate destruction of thekhalifa's power was treated quite as a matter of everyday occurrence. a state of war wasapparently regarded as usual in egypt. on
this wise and sensible ground the egyptiangovernment were condemned to pay back â£e500,000, together with interest and costs. after amomentary hesitation as to whether the hour had not come to join issue on the whole subjectof the financial restrictions of egypt, it was decided to bow to this iniquitous decision.the money had now to be refunded. it had already been spent. more than that, other sums wereneeded for the carrying on of the war. the army was by then occupying dongola, and wasin actual expectation of a dervish counter-attack, and it was evident that the military operationscould not be suspended or arrested. it was impossible to stop; yet without money it seemedimpossible to go on; and, besides, it appeared that egypt would be unable to repay the â£e500,000which she had been granted, and of which she
was now deprived. such was the painful and difficult situationwhich a friendly nation, in the utmost exercise of her wit and the extreme compass of herlegal rights, had succeeded in producing in a country for whose welfare she had alwaysprofessed an exaggerated regard. such was the effect of french diplomacy. but thereis a nemesis that waits on international malpractices, however cunning. now, as before and since,the very astuteness of the french ministers and agents was to strike a terrible blow atfrench interests and french influence in egypt. at this period france still exercised a considerableforce on egyptian politics. one egyptian party, the weaker, but still by no means insignificant,looked towards her for support. the news of
the french success cheered their hearts andraised their spirits. orientals appreciate results. the result was a distinct reverseto the british. the conclusion to the native mind was obvious. great britain had been weighedin the european balances and found wanting. in all eastern countries a large proportionof the population fluctuates uncertainly, eager only to be on the winning side. allthis volume of agitation and opinion began to glide and flow towards the stronger power,and when the egyptian government found their appeal from the decision of the court of firstinstance of the mixed tribunals to the international court of appeal at alexandria quashed, andthe original decision confirmed, the defeat of the british was no less complete than thetriumph of the french.
but meanwhile the consul-general acted. onthe 2nd of december he telegraphed to lord salisbury, reporting the judgment of the courtof appeal and asking that he might be 'authorised to state directly that her majesty's governmentwill be prepared to advance the money on conditions to be hereafter arranged.' the reply was prompt,though guarded. 'you are authorised,' said lord salisbury, 'by the chancellor of theexchequer to state that though of course the primary liability for the payment of the â£e500,000rests with the egyptian government, her majesty's government will hold themselves prepared toadvance, on conditions to be decided hereafter, such a sum as they feel satisfied that theegyptian treasury is powerless to provide.' [the original â£500,000 was afterwards increasedto â£800,000; which sum was paid by the british
exchequer to the egyptian government, at firstas a loan, and later as a gift.] this obvious development does not seem to have been foreseenby the french diplomatists, and when, on the 3rd of december, it was rumoured in cairothat great britain was prepared to pay the money, a great feeling of astonishment andof uncertainty was created. but the chances of the french interference proving effectivestill seemed good. it was believed that the english government would not be in a positionto make an advance to the egyptian government until funds had been voted by parliament forthe purpose. it was also thought that egypt would be utterly unable to find the moneyimmediately. in the meantime the position was humiliating. france conceived herselfmistress of the situation. a complete disillusionment,
however, awaited the french government. thetaxes in egypt, as in other countries, are not collected evenly over the whole year.during some months there is a large cash balance in the exchequer. in others the money drainsin slowly. it happened at this period of the year, after the cotton crop had been gathered,that a considerable balance had accumulated in the treasury, and on the guarantee of theenglish government being received, to the effect that they would ultimately assist egyptwith regard to the expenses of the expedition, lord cromer determined to repay the moneyat once. the event was foreshadowed. on the 5th ofdecember the egyptian council of ministers, presided over by the khedive in person, decidedon their own initiative to despatch an official
letter expressing in warm terms their gratitudefor the financial help offered them by her majesty's government. 'i am desired,' saidboutros pasha, 'to beg your lordship to be good enough to convey to his lordship themarquess of salisbury the expression of the lively gratitude of the khedive and the egyptiangovernment for the great kindness which her majesty's government has shown to them onthis occasion.' [egypt, no. 1, 1897.] on the 6th of december â£e500,000, togetherwith â£e15,600 interest and costs, in gold, was conveyed in boxes in a cart from the egyptiantreasury to the offices of the caisse de la dette. the effect was tremendous. all cairoknew of the difficulty. all cairo witnessed the manner in which it had been overcome.the lesson was too plain to be lost on the
native mind. the reverse of the french diplomacywas far greater even than its success had appeared. for many years french influencein egypt had not received so heavy a blow; yet even in the short space of time whichthis story covers it was to receive a still more terrible wound. chapter v: the beginning of the war shortly before midnight on the 12th of march,1896, the sirdar received instructions from lord cromer authorising an expedition intothe dongola province and directing him to occupy akasha. the next morning the news waspublished in the times, ostensibly as coming from its correspondent in cairo: and the egyptiancabinet was convened to give a formal assent
by voting the decree. on the 14th the reserveswere called out. on the 15th the khedive reviewed the cairo garrison; and at the terminationof the parade sir h. kitchener informed him that the earliest battalions would start forthe front that night. the egyptian frontier force had always beenkept in a condition of immediate readiness by the restless activity of the enemy. thebeginning of the long-expected advance was hailed with delight by the british officerssweltering at wady halfa and sarras. on sunday, the 15th of march, three days after the sirdarhad received his orders, and before the first reinforcements had started from cairo, colonelhunter, who commanded on the frontier, formed a small column of all arms to seize and holdakasha. at dawn on the 18th the column started,
and the actual invasion of the territory whichfor ten years had been abandoned to the dervishes began. the route lay through a wild and rockycountry—the debatable ground, desolated by years of war—and the troops straggledinto a long procession, and had several times for more than an hour to move in single fileover passes and through narrow defiles strewn with the innumerable boulders from which the'belly of stones' has derived its name. the right of their line of march was protectedby the nile, and although it was occasionally necessary to leave the bank, to avoid difficultground, the column camped each night by the river. the cavalry and the camel corps searchedthe country to the south and east; for it was expected that the dervishes would resistthe advance. creeping along the bank, and
prepared at a moment's notice to stand atbay at the water's edge, the small force proceeded on its way. wady atira was reached on the18th, tanjore on the 19th, and on the 20th the column marched into akasha. the huts of the mud village were crumblingback into the desert sand. the old british fort and a number of storehouses—relicsof the gordon relief expedition—were in ruins. the railway from sarras had been pulledto pieces. most of the sleepers had disappeared, but the rails lay scattered along the track.all was deserted: yet one grim object proclaimed the dervish occupation. beyond the old stationand near the river a single rail had been fixed nearly upright in the ground. from oneof the holes for the fishplate bolts there
dangled a rotten cord, and on the sand beneaththis improvised yet apparently effective gallows lay a human skull and bones, quite white andbeautifully polished by the action of sun and wind. half-a-dozen friendly arabs, whohad taken refuge on the island below the cataract, were the only inhabitants of the district. the troops began to place themselves in adefensive position without delay. on the 22nd the cavalry and camel corps returned withthe empty convoy to sarras to escort to the front a second and larger column, under thecommand of major macdonald, and consisting of the xith and xiith soudanese, one companyof the 3rd egyptians (dropped as a garrison at ambigole wells), and a heavy convoy ofstores numbering six hundred camels. starting
from sarras on the 24th, the column, afterfour days' marching, arrived without accident or attack, and macdonald assumed command ofthe whole advanced force. akasha was now converted into a strong entrenchedcamp, in which an advanced base was formed. its garrison of three battalions, a battery,and the mounted troops, drew their supplies by camel transport from sarras. the countryto the south and east was continually patrolled, to guard against a turning movement, and thecommunications were further strengthened by the establishment of fortified posts at semna,wady atira, and tanjore. the friendly arab tribes—bedouin, kabbabish, and foggara—rangedstill more widely in the deserts and occupied the scattered wells. all this time the dervisheswatched supinely from their position at fuket,
and although they were within a single marchof akasha they remained inactive and made no attempt to disturb the operations. meanwhile the concentration of the egyptianarmy on the frontier was proceeding. the reservists obeyed the summons to the colours of theirown free will and with gratifying promptness, instead of being tardily dragged from theirhomes in chains as in the days of ismail. all the battalions of the army were broughtup to war strength. two new battalions of reservists were formed, the 15th and 16th.the 15th was placed at assuan and korosko on the line of communications. the 16th wasdespatched to suakin to release the two battalions in garrison there for service on the nile.the 1st battalion of the north staffordshire
regiment was moved up the river from cairoto take the place of the wady halfa garrison of six battalions, which had moved on to sarrasand akasha. a maxim battery of four guns was formed from the machine-gun sections of thestaffordshires and connaught rangers and hurried south. the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th egyptianbattalions from cairo were passed in a continual succession along the railway and river tothe front. in all this busy and complicated movement of troops the egyptian war officeworked smoothly, and clearly showed the ability with which it was organised. the line of communications from cairo, thepermanent base, to the advanced post at akasha was 825 miles in length. but of this distanceonly the section lying south of assuan could
be considered as within the theatre of war.the ordinary broad-gauge railway ran from cairo to balliana, where a river base wasestablished. from balliana to assuan reinforcements and supplies were forwarded by messrs. cook'sfleet of steamers, by barges towed by small tugs, and by a number of native sailing craft.a stretch of seven miles of railway avoids the first cataract, and joins assuan and shellal.above shellal a second flotilla of gunboats, steamers, barges, and nile boats was collectedto ply between shellal and halfa. the military railway ran from halfa to sarras. south ofsarras supplies were forwarded by camels. to meet the increased demands of transport,4,500 camels were purchased in egypt and forwarded in boats to assuan, whence they marched viakorosko to the front. the british government
had authorised the construction of the militaryrailway to akasha, and a special railway battalion was collected at assuan, through which placesleepers and other material at once began to pass to sarras. the strategic railway constructionwill, however, form the subject of a later chapter, which i shall not anticipate. by the 1st of april, less than three weeksfrom the commencement of the advance, the whole line of communications had been organisedand was working efficiently, although still crowded with the concentrating troops. as soon as the 16th battalion of reservistsarrived at suakin, the ixth soudanese were conveyed by transports to kossier, and marchedthence across the desert to kena. the distance
was 120 miles, and the fact that in spiteof two heavy thunderstorms—rare phenomena in egypt—it was covered in four days isa notable example of the marching powers of the black soldiers. it had been determinedthat the xth soudanese should follow at once, but circumstances occurred which detainedthem on the red sea littoral and must draw the attention of the reader thither. the aspect and history of the town and portof suakin might afford a useful instance to a cynical politician. most of the houses standon a small barren island which is connected with the mainland by a narrow causeway. ata distance the tall buildings of white coral, often five storeys high, present an imposingappearance, and the prominent chimneys of
the condensing machinery—for there is scarcelyany fresh water—seem to suggest manufacturing activity. but a nearer view reveals the melancholysqualor of the scene. a large part of the town is deserted. the narrow streets windamong tumbled-down and neglected houses. the quaintly carved projecting windows of thefacades are boarded up. the soil exhales an odour of stagnation and decay. the atmosphereis rank with memories of waste and failure. the scenes that meet the eye intensify theseimpressions. the traveller who lands on quarantine island is first confronted with the debrisof the projected suakin-berber railway. two or three locomotives that have neither feltthe pressure of steam nor tasted oil for a decade lie rusting in the ruined workshops.huge piles of railway material rot, unguarded
and neglected, on the shore. rolling stockof all kinds—carriages, trucks, vans, and ballast waggons—are strewn or heaped nearthe sheds. the christian cemetery alone shows a decided progress, and the long lines ofwhite crosses which mark the graves of british soldiers and sailors who lost their livesin action or by disease during the various campaigns, no less than the large and newlyenclosed areas to meet future demands, increase the depression of the visitor. the numerousgraves of greek traders—a study of whose epitaphs may conveniently refresh a classicaleducation—protest that the climate of the island is pestilential. the high loopholedwalls declare that the desolate scrub of the mainland is inhabited only by fierce and valiantsavages who love their liberty.
for eleven years all trade had been practicallystopped, and the only merchants remaining were those who carried on an illicit trafficwith the arabs or, with eastern apathy, were content to wait for better days. being utterlyunproductive, suakin had been wisely starved by the egyptian government, and the gloomof the situation was matched by the poverty of its inhabitants. the island on which the town stands is joinedto the mainland by a causeway, at the further end of which is an arched gateway of curiousdesign called 'the gate of the soudan.' upon the mainland stands the crescent-shaped suburbof el kaff. it comprises a few mean coral-built houses, a large area covered with mud hutsinhabited by arabs and fishermen, and all
the barracks and military buildings. the wholeis surrounded by a strong wall a mile and a half long, fifteen feet high, six feet thick,with a parapet pierced for musketry and strengthened at intervals by bastions armed with kruppguns. three strong detached posts complete the defencesof suakin. ten miles to the northward, on the scene of sir h. kitchener's unfortunateenterprise, is the fort of handub. tambuk is twenty-five miles inland and among thehills. situate upon a high rock, and consisting only of a store, a formidable blockhouse,and a lookout tower, this place is safe from any enemy unprovided with artillery. bothhandub and tambuk were at the outset of the campaign provisioned for four months. thethird post, tokar fort, lies fifty miles along
the coast to the south. its function is todeprive the arabs of a base in the fertile delta of the tokar river. the fort is strong,defended by artillery, and requires for its garrison an entire battalion of infantry. no description of suakin would be completewithout some allusion to the man to whom it owes its fame. osman digna had been for manyyears a most successful and enterprising arab slave dealer. the attempted suppression ofhis trade by the egyptian government drove him naturally into opposition. he joined inthe revolt of the mahdi, and by his influence roused the whole of the hadendoa and otherpowerful tribes of the red sea shore. the rest is upon record. year after year, at ahorrid sacrifice of men and money, the imperial
government and the old slaver fought likewolves over the dry bone of suakin. baker's teb, el teb, tamai, tofrek, hashin, handub,gemaiza, afafit—such were the fights of osman digna, and through all he passed unscathed.often defeated, but never crushed, the wily arab might justly boast to have run furtherand fought more than any emir in the dervish armies. it had scarcely seemed possible that the advanceon dongola could influence the situation around kassala, yet the course of events encouragedthe belief that the british diversion in favour of italy had been effective; for at the endof march—as soon, that is to say, as the news of the occupation of akasha reached him—osmandigna separated himself from the army threatening
kassala, and marched with 300 cavalry, 70camelry, and 2,500 foot towards his old base in the tokar delta. on the first rumour ofhis advance the orders of the xth soudanese to move via kossier and kena to the nile werecancelled, and they remained in garrison at tokar. at home the war office, touched ina tender spot, quivered apprehensively, and began forthwith to make plans to strengthenthe suakin garrison with powerful forces. the state of affairs in the eastern soudanhas always been turbulent. the authority of the governor of the red sea littoral was notat this time respected beyond the extreme range of the guns of suakin. the hadendoaand other tribes who lived under the walls of the town professed loyalty to the egyptiangovernment, not from any conviction that their
rule was preferable to that of osman digna,but simply for the sake of a quiet life. as their distance from suakin increased, theloyalty of the tribesmen became even less pronounced, and at a radius of twenty milesall the sheikhs oscillated alternately between osman digna and the egyptian government, andtried to avoid open hostilities with either. omar tita, sheikh of the district round abouterkowit, found himself situated on this fringe of intriguing neutrality. although he wasknown to have dealings with osman, it was believed that if he had the power to choosehe would side with the egyptian government. early in april omar tita reported that osmandigna was in the neighbourhood of erkowit with a small force, and that he, the faithfulally of the government, had on the 3rd of
the month defeated him with a loss of fourcamels. he also said that if the egyptian government would send up a force to fightosman, he, the aforesaid ally, would keep him in play until it arrived. after a few days of hesitation and telegraphiccommunication with the sirdar, colonel lloyd, the governor of suakin, who was then in verybad health, decided that he had not enough troops to justify him in taking the risk ofgoing up to erkowit to fight osman. around suakin, as along the indian frontier, a battlewas always procurable on the shortest notice. when a raid has taken place, the governmentmay choose the scale of their reprisals. if they are poor, they will arrange a counter-raidby means of 'friendlies,' and nothing more
will be heard of the affair. if they are rich,they will mobilise two or three brigades, and make an expedition or fight a pitchedbattle, so that another glory may be added to the annals of the british army. in thepresent instance the egyptian government were poor, and as the british government did notdesire to profit by the opportunity it was determined to have only a small-scale operation.the governor therefore arranged a plan for a demonstration at the foot of the hills nearkhor wintri by means of combined movements from suakin and tokar. the garrison of suakinconsisted of the 1st and half the 5th egyptian battalions; the 16th egyptian reservists,who had just replaced the ixth soudanese, and were as yet hardly formed into a militarybody; one squadron of cavalry, one company
of camel corps, and some detachments of artillery.the garrison of tokar consisted of the xth soudanese and a few gunners. from these troopsthere was organised in the second week in april, with all due ceremony, a 'suakin fieldforce.' the plan of campaign was simple. colonel lloydwas to march out from suakin and effect a junction with the 'tokar column' at khor wintri,where the erkowit road enters the hills. it was then hoped that osman digna would descendand fight a battle of the required dimensions in the open; after which, if victorious, theforce would return to suakin and tokar. in order to make the suakin column as mobileas possible, the whole force was mounted on camels, of which more than 1,000 were requisitioned,as well as 60 mules and 120 donkeys. two hundred
arabs accompanied the column to hold thesebeasts when necessary. six days' forage and rations, one day's reserve of water, 200 roundsper man, and 100 shell per gun were carried. at five o'clock on the afternoon of tuesday,the 14th of april, the troops paraded outside the walls of suakin, and bivouacked in theopen ready to march at daylight. the next morning the column, which numberedabout 1,200 men of all arms, started. after marching for four or five hours in the directionof khor wintri the cavalry, who covered the advance, came in contact with the dervishscouts. the force thereupon assumed an oblong formation: the mixed soudanese company andthe two guns in front, three egyptian companies on each flank, the camel corps company inthe rear, and the transport in the centre.
the pace was slow, and, since few of the camelshad ever been saddled or ridden, progress was often interrupted by their behaviour andby the broken and difficult nature of the country. nevertheless at about four o'clockin the afternoon, teroi wells, eight miles from khor wintri, were reached; and here,having marched nineteen miles, colonel lloyd determined to halt. while the infantry weremaking the zeriba, the cavalry were sent on under captain fenwick (an infantry officeremployed on the staff) to gain touch with the tokar force, who were expected to havealready reached the rendezvous. apparently under the belief that omar tita and his arabswould give timely notice of an attack, the cavalry seem to have neglected many of theusual precautions, and in consequence at about
five o'clock, when approaching khor wintri,they found themselves suddenly confronted with a force of about 200 dervish horsemensupported by a large body of infantry. the squadron wheeled about with promptitude, andbegan to retire at a trot. the dervish horsemen immediately pursued. the result was that theegyptians began a disorderly flight at a gallop through the thick and treacherous scrub andover broken, dangerous ground. sixteen horses fell; their riders were instantly spearedby the pursuers. rallying thirty-eight troopers, captain fenwick seized a rocky hillock, anddismounting with the natural instinct of an infantry soldier, prepared to defend himselfto the last. the remainder of the squadron continued their flight, and thirty-two troopers,under an egyptian officer (whose horse is
said to have bolted), arrived at the teroizeriba with the news that their comrades had been destroyed, or had perhaps 'returned tosuakin,' and that they themselves had been closely followed by the enemy. the news causedthe gravest anxiety, which was not diminished when it was found that the bush around thezeriba was being strongly occupied by dervish spearmen. two mounted men, who volunteeredfor the perilous duty, were sent to make their way through this savage cordon, and try tofind either the remainder of the cavalry or the tokar column. both were hunted down andkilled. the rest of the force continued in hourly expectation of an attack. their suspense was aggravated towards midnight,when the dervishes began to approach the zeriba.
in the darkness what was thought to be a bodyof horsemen was seen moving along a shallow khor opposite the right face of the defence.at the same moment a loud yell was raised by the enemy on the other side. an uncontrolledmusketry fire immediately broke out. the guns fired blindly up the valley; the infantrywildly on all sides. the fusillade continued furiously for some time, and when by the effortsof the british officers the troops were restrained, it was found that the dervishes had retired,leaving behind them a single wounded man. occasional shots were fired from the scrubuntil the morning, but no fresh attack was attempted by the dervishes. meanwhile captain fenwick maintained his solitaryand perilous position on the hillock. he was
soon surrounded by considerable bodies ofthe enemy, and as soon as it became dark he was sharply attacked. but the dervishes fortunatelypossessed few rifles, and the officers and troopers, by firing steady volleys, succeededin holding their ground and repulsing them. the sound of the guns at teroi encouragedthe egyptians and revealed the direction of their friends. with the daylight the dervishes,who seem throughout the affair to have been poor-spirited fellows, drew off, and the detachment,remounting, made haste to rejoin the main body. the force, again united, pursued their wayto khor wintri, where they found the column from tokar already arrived. marching earlyon the 15th, major sidney with 250 men of
the xth soudanese, the only really trustworthytroops in the force, had reached khor wintri the same afternoon. he drove out the smalldervish post occupying the khor, and was about to bivouac, when he was sharply attacked bya force of arabs said to have numbered 80 horsemen and 500 foot. the soudanese foughtwith their usual courage, and the dervishes were repulsed, leaving thirty dead upon theground. the regulars had three men wounded. up to this point colonel lloyd's plan hadbeen successfully carried out. the columns from suakin and tokar had effected a junctionat khor wintri on the erkowit road. it now remained to await the attack of osman digna,and inflict a heavy blow upon him. it was decided, however, in view of what had occurred,to omit this part of the scheme, and both
forces returned together without delay tosuakin, which they reached on the 18th, having lost in the operations eighteen egyptian soldierskilled and three wounded. their arrival terminated a period of anxiousdoubt as to their fate. the town, which had been almost entirely denuded of troops, wasleft in charge of captain ford-hutchinson. at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the16th a few stragglers from the egyptian cavalry with half-a-dozen riderless horses knockedat the gates, and vague but sinister rumours spread on all sides. the belief that a disasterhad overtaken the egyptian force greatly excited the arabs living within the walls, and itappeared that they were about to rise, plunder the town, and massacre the christians. hermajesty's ship scout was, however, by good
fortune in the harbour. strong parties ofbluejackets were landed to patrol the streets. the guns of the warship were laid on the arabquarter. these measures had a tranquillising effect, and order reigned in suakin untilthe return of the field force, when their victory was celebrated with appropriate festivities. it was announced that as a result of the successfuloperations the dervish enterprise against the tokai delta had collapsed, and that osmandigna's power was for ever broken. in order, however, that no unfortunate incident shouldmar the triumph, the xth soudanese were sent back to tokar by sea via trinkitat, insteadof marching direct and the garrison of suakin confined themselves henceforward strictlyto their defences. osman digna remained in
the neighbourhood and raided the friendlyvillages. on the arrival of the indian contingent he was supposed to be within twelve milesof the town, but thereafter he retired to adarama on the atbara river, where he remainedduring the dongola campaign. the fact that no further offensive operations were undertakenin the eastern soudan prevented all fighting, for the dervishes were, of course, unableto assail the strong permanent fortifications behind which the egyptians took shelter. theynevertheless remained in actual possession of the surrounding country, until the wholesituation was altered by the successful advance of powerful forces behind them along the nileand by the occupation of berber. after the affair of khor wintri it was evidentthat it would not be possible to leave suakin
to the defence only of the 16th battalionof reservists. on the other hand, sir h. kitchener required every soldier the egyptian army couldmuster to carry out the operations on the nile. it was therefore determined to sendindian troops to suakin to garrison the town and forts, and thus release the xth soudaneseand the egyptian battalions for the dongola expedition. accordingly early in the monthof may the indian army authorities were ordered to prepare a brigade of all arms for servicein egypt. the troops selected were as follow: 26th bengalinfantry, 35th sikhs, 1st bombay lancers, 5th bombay mountain battery, two maxim guns,one section queen's own (madras) sappers and miners—in all about 4,000 men. the commandwas entrusted to colonel egerton, of the corps
of guides. on the 30th of may the dreary town of suakinwas enlivened by the arrival of the first detachments, and during the following weekthe whole force disembarked at the rotten piers and assumed the duties of the defence.it is mournful to tell how this gallant brigade, which landed so full of high hope and warlikeenthusiasm, and which was certainly during the summer the most efficient force in thesoudan, was reduced in seven months to the sullen band who returned to india wasted bydisease, embittered by disappointment, and inflamed by feelings of resentment and envy. the indian contingent landed in the full expectationof being immediately employed against the
enemy. after a week, when all the stores hadbeen landed, officers and men spent their time speculating when the order to march wouldcome. it was true that there was no transport in suakin, but that difficulty was easilyovercome by rumours that 5,000 camels were on their way from the somali coast to enablethe force to move on kassala or berber. as these did not arrive, general egerton sentin a proposed scheme to the sirdar, in which he undertook to hold all the advanced postsup to the kokreb range, if he were supplied with 1,000 camels for transport. a characteristicanswer was returned, to the effect that it was not intended to use the indian contingentas a mobile force. they had come as a garrison for suakin, and a garrison for suakin theyshould remain. this information was not, however,
communicated to the troops, who continuedto hope for orders to advance until the fall of dongola. the heat when the contingent arrived was notgreat, but as the months wore on the temperature rose steadily, until in august and septemberthe thermometer rarely fell below 103Ⱐduring the night, and often rose to 115Ⱐby day.dust storms were frequent. a veritable plague of flies tormented the unhappy soldiers. theunhealthy climate, the depressing inactivity, and the scantiness of fresh meat or the useof condensed water, provoked an outbreak of scurvy. at one time nearly all the followersand 50 per cent of the troops were affected. several large drafts were invalided to india.the symptoms were painful and disgusting—open
wounds, loosening of the teeth, curious fungoidgrowths on the gums and legs. the cavalry horses and transport animals suffered frombursati, and even a pinprick expanded into a large open sore. it is doubtful whetherthe brigade could have been considered fit for active service after september. all theeuropeans suffered acutely from prickly heat. malarial fever was common. there were numerouscases of abscess on the liver. twenty-five per cent of the british officers were invalidedto england or india, and only six escaped a stay in hospital. the experiences of thebattalion holding tokar fort were even worse than those of the troops in suakin. at lengththe longed-for time of departure arrived. with feelings of relief and delight the indiancontingent shook the dust of suakin off their
feet and returned to india. it is a satisfactionto pass from the dismal narrative of events in the eastern soudan to the successful campaignon the nile. by the middle of april the concentration onthe frontier was completed. the communications were cleared of their human freight, and occupiedonly by supplies and railway material, which continued to pour south at the utmost capacityof the transport. eleven thousand troops had been massed at and beyond wady halfa. butno serious operations could take place until a strong reserve of stores had been accumulatedat the front. meanwhile the army waited, and the railway grew steadily. the battalionswere distributed in three principal fortified camps—halfa, sarras, and akasha—and detachmentsheld the chain of small posts which linked
them together. including the north staffordshire regiment,the garrison of wady halfa numbered about 3,000 men. the town and cantonment, nowheremore than 400 yards in width, straggle along the river-bank, squeezed in between the waterand the desert, for nearly three miles. the houses, offices, and barracks are all builtof mud, and the aspect of the place is brown and squalid. a few buildings, however, attainto the dignity of two storeys. at the northern end of the town a group of fairly well-builthouses occupy the river-front, and a distant view of the clusters of palm-trees, of thewhite walls, and the minaret of the mosque refreshes the weary traveller from koroskoor shellal with the hopes of civilised entertainment.
the whole town is protected towards the desertsby a ditch and mud wall; and heavy krupp field-pieces are mounted on little bastions where the endsof the rampart rest upon the river. five small detached forts strengthen the land front,and the futility of an arab attack at this time was evident. halfa had now become theterminus of a railway, which was rapidly extending; and the continual arrival and despatch oftons of material, the building of sheds, workshops, and storehouses lent the african slum thebustle and activity of a civilised city. sarras fort is an extensive building, perchedon a crag of black rock rising on the banks of the nile about thirty miles south of halfa.during the long years of preparation it had been egypt's most advanced outpost and thesouthern terminus of the military railway.
the beginning of the expedition swelled itinto an entrenched camp, holding nearly 6,000 men. from each end of the black rock on whichthe fort stood a strong stone wall and wire entanglement ran back to the river. the spacethus enclosed was crowded with rows of tents and lines of animals and horses; and in thefort colonel hunter, commanding the district known as 'sarras and the south,' had his headquarters. from sarras the army seemed to have chosena double line of advance. the railway reconstruction followed the old track which had been preparedthrough the desert in 1885. the convoy route wound along by the river. both were protectedfrom attack. the 7th egyptians guarded railhead, while the chain of small posts secured theroad by the nile to akasha. the advanced base
grew during the months of april and may intoa strong position. only once did the arabs venture to approach within artillery range.a small body of horse and camel men made a sort of haphazard reconnaissance, and, beingseen from the outpost line, were fired on at a great distance by a field-gun. they fellback immediately, but it was believed that the range was too great for the projectileto have harmed them; and it was not until two days later that the discovery on the spotof a swollen, blistering corpse, clad in bright jibba, apprised the delighted gunners of theeffect of their fire. warned by this lucky shot the dervishes came no more, or came unseen. the sirdar, accompanied by colonel bundle,his chief of staff, had left cairo on the
22nd of march, and after a short stay at assuanreached wady halfa on the 29th. here he remained during the month of april, superintendingand pressing the extension of the railroad and the accumulation of supplies. on the 1stof may he arrived at akasha, with a squadron of cavalry, under major burn-murdoch, as hisescort. it happened that a convoy had come in the previous day, so that there were twoextra cavalry squadrons at the advanced post. almost at the same moment that sir h. kitchenerentered the camp, a party of friendly arabs came in with the news that they had been surprisedsome four miles to the eastward by a score of dervish camel-men, and had only succeededin escaping with the loss of two of their number. in the belief that the enemy in theimmediate vicinity were not in force, the
sirdar ordered the three squadrons of egyptiancavalry, supported by the xith soudanese, to go out and reconnoitre towards firket andendeavour to cut off any hostile patrols that might be found. at ten o'clock major burn-murdoch startedwith four british officers and 240 lances. after moving for seven or eight miles amongthe hills which surround akasha, the cavalry passed through a long, sandy defile, flankedon either side by rocky peaks and impracticable ravines. as the head of the column was aboutto debouch from this, the advanced scouts reported that there was a body of dervishesin the open ground in front of the defile. the cavalry commander rode forward to lookat them, and found himself confronted, not,
as he had expected, by a score of camel-men,but by a strong force of dervishes, numbering at least 1,500 foot and 250 horse. the cavalry,by trotting, had left the supporting infantry some distance behind them. the appearanceof the enemy was threatening. the horsemen, who were drawn up scarcely 300 yards away,were already advancing to the attack, their right flank protected by a small force ofcamelry; and behind was the solid array of the spearmen. major burn-murdoch determined to fall backon his infantry support and escape from the bad ground. he gave the order, and the squadronswheeled about by troops and began to retire. forthwith the dervish horse charged, and,galloping furiously into the defile, attacked
the cavalry in rear. both sides were crowdedin the narrow space. the wildest confusion followed, and the dust raised by the horses'hoofs hung over all like a yellow london fog, amid which the bewildered combatants dischargedtheir pistols and thrust at random. the egyptian cavalry, thus highly tried, showed at firstno disposition to turn to meet the attack. the tumult drowned all words of command. adisaster appeared imminent. but the british officers, who had naturally been at the headof the column during its advance, were now at the rear and nearest the enemy. collectinga score of troopers, they made such resistance with their swords and revolvers that theyactually held the defile and beat back the dervish horse, who retired on their infantry,leaving a dozen dead upon the ground. two
of the egyptian squadrons continued to retreatuntil clear of the defile, a distance of 700 yards; but the third and rearmost was compelledby the british officers to face about, and, galloping with this force down the ravine,major burn-murdoch drove the arabs pell-mell out of it. the other two squadrons had nowreturned, and the whole force dismounted, and, taking up a position among the sandhillsnear the mouth of the defile, opened fire with their carbines. the repulse of theircavalry seemed to have disheartened the dervishes, for they made no attempt to attack the dismountedtroopers, and contented themselves with maintaining a desultory fire, which was so ill-aimed thatbut little loss was caused. the heat of the weather was terrific, and both men and horsessuffered acutely from thirst. the squadron
which had escorted the sirdar had performeda long march before the reconnaissance and was exhausted. the cavalry, however, heldtheir position among the sandhills and easily defeated a feeble attempt to turn their right.at a quarter past twelve the dervishes began to retire slowly and deliberately, and byone o'clock, when the xith soudanese arrived, eager and agog, the last arab had disappeared.the force then returned to camp, bearing many spears and leading six captured horses astrophies of victory. the intensity of the heat may be gauged by the fact that one ofthe soudanese soldiers—that is to say, an african negro—died of sunstroke. such wasthe affair of the 1st of may, and it is pleasing to relate that in this fierce fight the losswas not severe. one british officer, captain
fitton, was slightly wounded. one native soldierwas killed; one was mortally and eight severely wounded. during may the preparations for the advanceon the dervish position at firket continued, and towards the end of the month it becameevident that they were nearly complete. the steady accumulation of stores at akasha hadturned that post into a convenient base from which the force might operate for a monthwithout drawing supplies of any kind from the north. the railway, which had progressedat the rate of about half a mile a day, had reached and was working to ambigole wells,where a four-gun fort and entrenchment had been built. the distance over which convoysmust plod was reduced by half, and the business
of supply was doubly accelerated. by degreesthe battalions and squadrons began to move forward towards akasha. sarras, deprived ofits short-lived glory, became again the solitary fort on a crag. wady halfa was also deserted,and, except for the british battalion in garrison, could scarcely boast a soldier. both the egyptianbattalions from suakin had arrived on the nile. the xth soudanese were on their way.the country beyond akasha had been thoroughly reconnoitred and mapped to within three milesof the dervish position. everything was ready. the actual concentration may be said to havebegun on the 1st of june, when the sirdar started for the front from halfa, whitherhe had returned after the cavalry skirmish. construction work on the railway came to afull stop. the railway battalions, dropping
their picks and shovels, shouldered theirremington rifles and became the garrisons of the posts on the line of communications.on the 2nd of june the correspondents were permitted to proceed to akasha. on the 3rdthe xth soudanese passed through ambigole and marched south. the horse battery fromhalfa followed. the egyptian battalions and squadrons which had been camped along theriver at convenient spots from ambigole to akasha marched to a point opposite okma. betweenthis place and the advanced post an extensive camp, stretching three miles along the nilebank, arose with magic swiftness. on the 4th the 7th egyptians moved from railhead, andwith these the last battalion reached the front. nine thousand men, with ample supplies,were collected within striking distance of
the enemy. all this time the dervishes at firket watchedin senseless apathy the deliberate, machine-like preparations for their destruction. they shouldhave had good information, for although the egyptian cavalry patrolled ceaselessly, andthe outpost line was impassable to scouts, their spies, as camel-drivers, water-carriers,and the like, were in the camp. they may not, perhaps, have known the exact moment of theintended blow, for the utmost secrecy was observed. but though they must have realisedthat it was imminent, they did nothing. there was, indeed, no course open to them but retreat.once the army was concentrated with sufficient supplies at akasha, their position was utterlyuntenable. the emir-in-chief, hammuda, then
had scarcely 3,000 men around his flag. theirrifles and ammunition were bad; their supplies scanty. nor could the valour of fifty-sevennotable emirs sustain the odds against them. there was still time to fall back on kosheh,or even on suarda—anywhere outside the sweep of their terrible enemy's sword. they wouldnot budge. obstinate and fatuous to the last, they dallied and paltered on the fatal ground,until sudden, blinding, inevitable catastrophe fell upon them from all sides at once, andswept them out of existence as a military force. chapter vi: firket june 7, 1896
since the end of 1895 the dervish force infirket had been under the command of the emir hammuda, and it was through the indolenceand neglect of this dissipated arab that the egyptian army had been able to make good itsposition at akasha without any fighting. week after week the convoys had straggled unmolestedthrough the difficult country between sarras and the advanced base. no attack had beenmade upon the brigade at akasha. no enterprise was directed against its communications. thisfatal inactivity did not pass unnoticed by wad bishara, the governor of dongola; butalthough he was nominally in supreme command of all the dervish forces in the provincehe had hardly any means of enforcing his authority. his rebukes and exhortations, however, graduallyroused hammuda, and during may two or three
minor raids were planned and executed, andthe egyptian position at akasha was several times reconnoitred. bishara remained unsatisfied, and at length,despairing of infusing energy into hammuda, he ordered his subordinate osman azrak tosupersede him. osman was a dervish of very different type. he was a fanatical and devotedbeliever in the mahdi and a loyal follower of the khalifa. for many years he had servedon the northern frontier of the dervish empire, and his name was well known to the egyptiangovernment as the contriver of the most daring and the most brutal raids. his cruelty tothe wretched inhabitants of the border villages had excluded him from all hope of mercy shouldhe ever fall into the hands of the enemy.
his crafty skill, however, protected him,and among the emirs gathered at firket there was none whose death would have given greatersatisfaction to the military authorities than the man who was now to replace hammuda. whether osman azrak had actually assumed commandon the 6th of june is uncertain. it seems more likely that hammuda declined to admithis right, and that the matter still stood in dispute. but in any case osman was determinedto justify his appointment by his activity, and about midday he started from the campat firket, and, accompanied by a strong patrol of camel-men, set out to reconnoitre akasha.moving cautiously, he arrived unperceived within sight of the position at about threeo'clock in the afternoon. the columns which
were to storm firket at dawn were then actuallyparading. but the clouds of dust which the high wind drove across or whirled about thecamp obscured the view, and the dervish could distinguish nothing unusual. he thereforemade the customary pentagonal mark on the sand to ensure good luck, and so returnedto firket to renew his dispute with hammuda, bearing the reassuring news that 'the turkslay quiet.' the force which the sirdar had concentratedfor the capture of firket amounted to about nine thousand men, and was organised as follows:— commander-in-chief: the sirdar the infantry division: colonel hunter commanding
1st brigade 2nd brigade 3rd brigademajor lewis major macdonald major maxwell 3rd egyptians ixth soudanese 2nd egyptians4th " xith " 7th " xth soudanese xiith " 8th "xiiith " mounted forces: major burn-murdoch egyptian cavalry.... 7 squadronscamel corps. .... 8 companies artillery horse artillery .... 1 batteryfield artillery .... 2 batteries maxim guns . .... 1 battery two roads led from akasha to firket—oneby the bank of the river, the other inland
and along the projected railway line. thesirdar determined to avail himself of both. the force was therefore divided into two columns.the main column, under command of the sirdar, was to move by the river road, and consistedof the infantry division, the field artillery, and the maxim guns. the desert column, undercommand of major burn-murdoch, consisted of the mounted forces, the horse artillery, andone battalion of infantry (the xiith soudanese) drawn from macdonald's brigade and mountedupon camels: in all about two thousand men. very precise orders were given to the smallercolumn, and burn-murdoch was instructed to occupy the hills to the south-east of thecentre of firket village by 4.30 a.m.; to dispose his force facing west, with the cavalryon the left, the camel corps in the centre,
and the xiith soudanese on the right. theonly point left to his discretion was the position to be occupied by the horse battery.he was especially warned not to come under the fire of the main infantry force. as soonas the enemy should be routed, the xiith soudanese were to return to the sirdar. the cavalry,camelry, and horse artillery were to pursue—the objective being, firstly, koyeka, and, secondly,suarda. the infantry column began to march out ofakasha at 3.30 in the afternoon of the 6th, and trailed southwards along the track bythe river in the following order: lewis's brigade, with the xth soudanese leading; twomaxim guns and the artillery; macdonald's brigade; maxwell's brigade; and, lastly, thefield hospitals and a half-battalion forming
rearguard. the sirdar marched behind the artillery.the rear of the long column was clear of the camp by 4.30, and about two hours later themounted force started by the desert road. the river column made good progress till dark,but thereafter the advance was slow and tedious. the track led through broken rocky ground,and was so narrow that it nowhere allowed a larger front to be formed than of four menabreast. in some places the sharp rocks and crumbling heaps of stone almost stopped thegun-mules altogether, while the infantry tripped and stumbled painfully. the moon had not risen,and the darkness was intense. still the long procession of men, winding like a whiplashbetween the jagged hills, toiled onward through the night, with no sound except the trampingof feet and the rattle of accoutrements. at
half-past ten the head of lewis's brigadedebouched into a smooth sandy plain about a mile to the north of sarkamatto village.this was the spot—scarcely three miles from the enemy's position—where the sirdar haddecided to halt and bivouac. the bank and foreshore of the river were convenient forwatering; all bottles and skins were filled, and soldiers and animals drank. a little foodwas eaten, and then, battalion by battalion, as the force arrived at the halting-place,they lay down to rest. the tail of maxwell's brigade reached the bivouac about midnight,and the whole column was then concentrated. meanwhile the mounted force were also on theirway. like the river column, they were disordered by the broken ground, and the xiith soudanese,who were unused to camel riding and mounted
only on transport saddles, were soon wearied.after one o'clock many men, both in the camel corps and in the battalion, fell asleep ontheir camels, and the officers had great difficulty in keeping them awake. however, the forcereached their point of concentration—about three miles to the south-east of firket—ata quarter to three. here the xiith soudanese dismounted from their camels and became againa fighting unit. leaving the extra camels under a guard, major burn-murdoch then advancedtowards his appointed position on the hills overlooking firket. the sirdar moved on again with the infantryat 2.30. the moon had risen over the rocks to the left of the line of march, but it wasonly a thin crescent and did not give much
light. the very worst part of the whole trackwas encountered immediately the bivouac was left, and the column of nearly six thousandmen had to trickle through one narrow place in single file. there were already signs ofthe approach of dawn; the dervish camp was near; the sirdar and his staff began to lookanxious. he sent many messages to the leading battalions to hurry; and the soldiers, althoughnow very weary, ran and scrambled through the difficult passage like sheep crowdingthrough a gate. by four o'clock the leading brigade had cleared the obstacle, and themost critical moment seemed to have passed. suddenly, a mile to the southward, rose thesound of the beating of drums. everyone held his breath. the dervishes were prepared. perhapsthey would attack the column before it could
deploy. then the sound died away, and butfor the clatter of the marching columns all was again silent. it was no alarm, but onlythe call to the morning prayer; and the dervishes, still ignorant that their enemies approachedand that swift destruction was upon them, trooped from their huts to obey the pioussummons. the great mass of firket mountain, still darkin the half-light, now rose up on the left of the line of march. between it and the riverstretched a narrow strip of scrub-covered ground; and here, though obstructed by thelong grass, bushes, palm-trees, and holes, the leading brigade was ordered to deploy.there was, however, as yet only room for the xth soudanese to form line, and the 3rd and4th egyptians contented themselves with widening
to column of companies—the 3rd in rear ofthe right of the xth, the 4th in rear of the centre. the force now began to emerge fromthe narrow space between the hills and the river, and debouch into open country. as thespace widened no. 1 field battery came into line on the left, and no. 2 on the right ofthe xth soudanese. a swell of ground hid firket village, though it was known to be withina mile, and it was now daylight. still there was no sign that the dervishes were prepared.it seemed scarcely possible to believe that the advance had not yet been discovered. thesilence seemed to forbode some unexpected attack. the leading brigade and guns haltedfor a few minutes to allow macdonald to form his battalions from 'fours' into column ofcompanies. then at five o'clock the advance
was resumed, and at this moment from the shoulderof firket mountain there rang out a solitary shot. the dervish outposts had at last learnedtheir danger. several other shots followed in quick succession, and were answered bya volley from the xth, and then from far away to the south-east came the report of a field-gun.the horse artillery battery had come into action. the operation of the two columns wassimultaneous: the surpise of the enemy was complete. the great object was now to push on and deployas fast as possible. the popping of musketry broke out from many points, and the repeatedexplosions of the horse battery added to the eager excitement of the troops. for what ismore thrilling than the sudden and swift development
of an attack at dawn? the xth soudanese hadnow reached the top of the rise which had hidden firket, and the whole scene came intoview. to the right front the village of firket stretched by the side of the river—a confusionof mud houses nearly a mile in length and perhaps 300 yards broad. on the landward sidethe tents and straw shelters of the dervish force showed white and yellow. a system ofmud walls and loop-holed houses strengthened the northern end of the village. behind itas a background stood lines and clusters of palm-trees, through which the broad riverand the masts of the arab boats might be seen. in front of the troops, but a little to theirleft, rose a low rocky ridge surmounted with flags and defended by a stone breastwork runningalong its base. across the open space between
the village and the hill hundreds of dervisheson horse and on foot were hurrying to man their defences, and others scrambled up therocks to see for themselves the numbers of the enemy. scores of little puffs of smokealready speckled the black rocks of the ridge and the brown houses of the village. the attack developed very rapidly. the narrowpassage between the mountain and the river poured forth its brigades and battalions,and the firing-line stretched away to the right and left with extraordinary speed. thexth soudanese opened fire on the village as soon as they topped the rise. the 3rd and4th egyptians deployed on the right and left of the leading regiment, two companies ofthe 4th extending down on to the foreshore
below the steep river-bank. peake's battery(no. 1) and the maxim guns, coming into action from a spur of firket mountain, began to fireover the heads of the advancing infantry. the whole of lewis's brigade now swung tothe right and attacked the village; macdonald's, coming up at the double in line of battalioncolumns, deployed to the left, inland, round the shoulder of the mountain, and, bearingaway still more to the left, advanced swiftly upon the rocky ridge. the ground in macdonald'sfront was much broken by boulders and scrub, and a deep khor delayed the advance. the enemy,though taken at obvious disadvantage, maintained an irregular fire; but the soudanese, greatlyexcited, pressed on eagerly towards the breastworks. when the brigade was still 200 yards fromthe ridge, about fifty dervish horsemen dashed
out from among the rocks and charged the leftflank. all were immediately shot down by a wild but heavy independent fire. with joyfulyells the blacks broke into a run and carried the breastworks at the bayonet. the dervishesdid not await the shock. as soon as they saw their horsemen—among whom was the emir hammudahimself and yusef angar, emir of the jehadia—swept away, they abandoned the first ridge and fellback on another which lay behind. the soudanese followed closely, and pursued the outnumberedenemy up one and down the other side of the rocky hills, up again and down again, continuallyshouldering and bringing round the left of the brigade; until at last the hills werecleared of all except the dead, and the fugitives were running towards the river-bank. thenthe scattered battalions re-formed facing
west, and the panting soldiers looked aboutthem. while macdonald's brigade was storming thehills, lewis's had advanced on the village and the dervish camp. the arabs from theirloopholed houses made a stubborn resistance, and the 4th battalion by the river-bank weresharply engaged, their commanding officer, captain sparkes, having his horse shot infour places. encouraged by their enormous superiority in number and weapons, the egyptiansshowed considerable zeal in the attack, and their conduct on this occasion was regardedas a very happy augury for the war, of which this was the first general engagement. as lewis's brigade had swung to its right,and macdonald's had borne away to the left,
a wide gap had opened in the centre of theattack. this was immediately filled by maxwell's brigade, so that the whole force was now formedin one line, which curved and wheeled continually to the right until, by the time the rockyhills had been taken, all three brigades practically faced west and were advancing together towardsthe nile. the dervishes—penned between the river and the enemy, and unable to preventthe remorseless advance, which every moment restricted them to narrower limits—now thoughtonly of flight, and they could be seen galloping hither and thither seeking for some meansof escape. the position of the desert column would have enabled the xiith soudanese, bymoving down to the river, to cut off this line of retreat; but the foreshore of theriver at the southern end of firket is concealed
from a landward view by the steep bank, andby this sandy path the greater number of the fugitives found safety. the cavalry and the camel corps, instead ofcutting at the flank, contented themselves with making a direct pursuit after the enemyhad crossed their front, and in consequence several hundred arabs made good their escapeto the south. others swam the river and fled by the west bank. the wicked osman azrak,his authority now no longer disputed, for his rival was a corpse, galloped from thefield and reached suarda. the rest of the dervish force held to the houses, and variouslyprepared to fight to the death or surrender to their conquerors.
the three brigades now closed upon the villageand, clearing it step by step, advanced to the water's edge. macdonald's brigade didnot indeed stop until they had crossed the swampy isthmus and occupied the island. thearabs, many of whom refused quarter, resisted desperately, though without much effect, andmore than eighty corpses were afterwards found in one group of buildings. by 7.20 o'clockall firing had ceased; the entire dervish camp was in the hands of the egyptian troops,and the engagement of firket was over. the sirdar now busied himself with the pursuit,and proceeded with the mounted troops as far as mograka, five miles south of firket. thewhole cavalry force, with the camel corps and horse artillery, pressed the retreat vigorouslyto suarda. osman azrak, however, succeeded
in transporting the women and children andsome stores, with a sufficient escort, to the west bank before the arrival of the troops.on the approach of the cavalry he retired along the east bank, with a small mountedforce, without fighting. the emir in charge of the escort on the other side delayed, andwas in consequence shelled at long range by the horse battery. the local inhabitants,tired of the ceaseless war which had desolated the frontier province for so long, welcomedtheir new masters with an appearance of enthusiasm. the main pursuit stopped at suarda, but aweek later two squadrons and sixteen men of the camel corps, under captain mahon, werepushed out twenty miles further south, and an arab store of grain was captured.
the dervish loss in the action was severe.more than 800 dead were left on the field, and there were besides 500 wounded and 600prisoners. the casualties in the egyptian army were 1 british officer—captain legge—wounded,20 native soldiers killed and 83 wounded. firket is officially classed as a generalaction: special despatches were written, and a special clasp struck. the reader will haveformed his own estimate of the magnitude and severity of the fight. the whole operationwas well and carefully planned, and its success in execution was complete. the long and difficultnight march, the accurate arrival and combination of the two columns, the swift deployment,the enveloping movement, proved alike the discipline and training of the troops andthe skill of their officers. the only point
on which criticism may be made is the failureof the desert column to intercept the flying dervishes. but it should be remembered theyhad marched far, and it was not at that time certain what the powers of the mounted troopswere. the brilliant aspect of the affair caused great satisfaction in england, and the furtherprosecution of the campaign was looked for with increasing interest. chapter vii: the recovery of the dongola province countless and inestimable are the chancesof war. those who read the story, and still more those who share the dangers, of a campaignfeel that every incident is surrounded with a host of possibilities, any one of which,had it become real, would have changed the
whole course of events. the influence of fortuneis powerfully and continually exerted. in the flickering light of conflict the outlinesof solid fact throw on every side the vague shadows of possibility. we live in a worldof 'ifs.' 'what happened,' is singular; 'what might have happened,' legion. but to try togauge the influence of this uncertain force were utterly futile, and it is perhaps wise,and indisputably convenient, to assume that the favourable and adverse chances equate,and then eliminate them both from the calculation. the 'sirdar's luck' became almost proverbialin the soudan. as the account progresses numerous instances will suggest themselves. it waslucky that the dervishes did not harass the communications, or assail akasha before itwas fortified. it was lucky that they fought
at firket; that they retired from berber;that mahmud did not advance in january; that he advanced in march; that he did not retirebefore the battle of the atbara; that the khalifa did not hold the shabluka; that hedid not attack on the night before omdurman, and that he did attack at dawn. but after firket all things were contrary.one unexpected misfortune succeeded another. difficulties were replaced by others as soonas they had been overcome. the autumn of 1896 was marked by delay and disappointment. thestate of the nile, the storms, the floods, the cholera, and many minor obstacles, vexedbut did not weary the commander. the victory at firket was succeeded by a long pause inthe operations. the army had made one spring
forward; it must now gather energy for another.the preparations, however, proceeded rapidly. a strong camp was formed at firket. macdonald'sbrigade occupied suarda two days after the fight, and this place now became the advancedpost, just as akasha had been in the first phase of the campaign. the accumuluation ofstores at firket and suarda began forthwith. owing to the arrangements which had been madebefore the engagement it was possible to collect within one week of the action two months'supplies at suarda for the garrison of 2,000 men, and one month's at firket for the 7,000troops encamped there. thereafter, however, the necessity of hurrying the railway constructionand the considerable daily demands of 9,000 men only allowed this margin to be increasedvery gradually.
the army had now passed beyond the scope ofa camel, or other pack-animal, system of supply, except for very short distances, and it wasobvious that they could only advance in future along either the railway or a navigable reachof the river, and preferably along both. from the dal cataract near kosheh there is a clearwaterway at high nile to merawi. to kosheh, therefore, the railway must be extended beforeactive operations could recommence. a third condition had also to be observed. for theexpulsion of the dervishes from kerma and dongola it was desirable that a flotilla ofgunboats should co-operate with the land forces. four of these vessels—the tamai, el teb,the metemma, and the abu klea; and three steamers—the kaibar, dal, and akasha, which it was proposedto arm—had, since 1885, patrolled the river
from assuan to wady halfa, and assisted inprotecting the frontier from dervish raids. all seven were now collected at the foot ofthe second cataract, and awaited the rise of the river to attempt the passage. to strengthenthe flotilla three new and very powerful gunboats had been ordered in england. these were tobe brought in sections over the railway to a point above the second cataract, and befitted together there. it was thus necessary to wait, firstly, for the railway to reachkosheh; secondly, for the nile to rise; thirdly, for the old gunboats to ascend the cataract;fourthly, for the new gunboats to be launched on the clear waterway; and, fifthly, for theaccumulation of supplies. with all of these matters the sirdar now busied himself.
the reconstruction of the railway to akashaand its extension beyond this place towards kosheh was pressed forward. by the 26th ofjune akasha was reached. thenceforward the engineers no longer followed an existing track,but were obliged to survey, and to make the formation for themselves. strong fatigue partiesfrom the egyptian and soudanese battalions were, however, employed on the embankments,and the line grew daily longer. on the 24th of july the first train ran across the battlefieldof firket; and on the 4th of august the railway was working to kosheh. kosheh is six miles south of firket, and consists,like most places in the 'military soudan,' of little more than a name and a few ruinedmud-huts which were once a village. on the
5th of july the whole camp was moved thitherfrom the scene of the action. the reasons were clear and apparent. kosheh is a pointon the river above the dal cataract whence a clear waterway runs at high nile to beyonddongola. the camp at firket had become foul and insanitary. the bodies of the dead, swellingand decaying in their shallow graves, assailed, as if in revenge, the bodies of the living.the dysentery which had broken out was probably due to the 'green' water of the nile; forduring the early period of the flood what is known as 'the false rise' washes the filthand sewage off the foreshore all along the river, and brings down the green and rottingvegetation from the spongy swamps of equatoria. the water is then dangerous and impure. therewas nothing else for the army to drink; but
it was undesirable to aggravate the evil bykeeping the troops in a dirty camp. the earliest freight which the railway carriedto kosheh was the first of the new stern-wheel gunboats. train after train arrived with itsload of steel and iron, or with the cumbrous sections of the hull, and a warship in pieces—engines,armaments, fittings and stores—soon lay stacked by the side of the river. an improviseddockyard, equipped with powerful twenty-ton shears and other appliances, was established,and the work—complicated as a chinese puzzle—of fitting and riveting together the hundredsof various parts proceeded swiftly. gradually the strange heaps of parts began to evolvea mighty engine of war. the new gunboats were in every way remarkable. the old vessels hadbeen 90 feet long. these were 140 feet. their
breadth was 24 feet. they steamed twelve milesan hour. they had a command of 30 feet. their decks were all protected by steel plates,and prepared by loopholed shields for musketry. their armament was formidable. each carriedone twelve-pounder quick-firing gun forward, two six-pounder quick-firing guns in the centralbattery, and four maxim guns. every modern improvement—such as ammunition hoists, telegraphs,search-lights, and steam-winches—was added. yet with all this they drew only thirty-nineinches of water. the contract specified that these vesselsshould be delivered at alexandria by the 5th of september, but, by exertions, the firstboat, the zafir, reached egypt on the 23rd of july, having been made in eight weeks,and in time to have assisted in the advance
on dongola. the vessels and machinery hadbeen constructed and erected in the works in london; they were then marked, numbered,and taken to pieces, and after being shipped to alexandria and transported to the frontwere finally put together at kosheh. although in a journey of 4,000 miles they were seventimes transhipped, not a single important piece was lost. the convenience of kosheh on the clear waterway,and the dirty condition of firket, were in themselves sufficient reasons for the changeof camp; but another and graver cause lay behind. during the month of june an epidemicof cholera began to creep up the nile from cairo. on the 29th there were some cases atassuan. on the 30th it reached wady halfa.
in consequence of this the north staffordshireregiment marched into camp at gemai. their three months' occupation of the town had notimproved their health or their spirits. during the sixteen-mile march along the railway trackto gemai the first fatal case occurred, and thereafter the sickness clung to the regimentuntil the middle of august, causing continual deaths. the cholera spread steadily southward up theriver, claiming successive victims in each camp. in the second week of july it reachedthe new camp at kosheh, whence all possible precautions to exclude it had proved vain.the epidemic was at first of a virulent form. as is usual, when it had expended its destructiveenergy, the recoveries became more frequent.
but of the first thousand cases between assuanand suarda nearly eight hundred proved fatal. nor were the lives thus lost to be altogethermeasured by the number. [the attacks and deaths from cholera in the dongola expeditionaryforce were as follow: british troops—24 attacks, 19 deaths; native troops—406 attacks,260 deaths; followers—788 attacks, 640 deaths.] to all, the time was one of trial, almostof terror. the violence of the battle may be cheaply braved, but the insidious attacksof disease appal the boldest. death moved continually about the ranks of the army—notthe death they had been trained to meet unflinchingly, the death in high enthusiasm and the prideof life, with all the world to weep or cheer; but a silent, unnoticed, almost ignominioussummons, scarcely less sudden and far more
painful than the bullet or the sword-cut.the egyptians, in spite of their fatalistic creed, manifested profound depression. theenglish soldiers were moody and ill-tempered. even the light-hearted soudanese lost theirspirits; their merry grins were seen no longer; their laughter and their drums were stilled.only the british officers preserved a stony cheerfulness, and ceaselessly endeavouredby energy and example to sustain the courage of their men. yet they suffered most of all.their education had developed their imaginations; and imagination, elsewhere a priceless gift,is amid such circumstances a dangerous burden. it was, indeed, a time of sore trouble. tofind the servant dead in the camp kitchen; to catch a hurried glimpse of blanketed shapeshustled quickly to the desert on a stretcher;
to hold the lantern over the grave into whicha friend or comrade—alive and well six hours before—was hastily lowered, even thoughit was still night; and through it all to work incessantly at pressure in the solid,roaring heat, with a mind ever on the watch for the earliest of the fatal symptoms anda thirst that could only be quenched by drinking of the deadly and contaminated nile: all thesethings combined to produce an experience which those who endured are unwilling to remember,but unlikely to forget. one by one some of the best of the field army and the communicationstaff were stricken down. gallant fenwick, of whom they used to say that he was 'twicea v.c. without a gazette'; polwhele, the railway subaltern, whose strange knowledge of theegyptian soldiers had won their stranger love;
trask, an heroic doctor, indifferent aliketo pestilence or bullets; mr. vallom, the chief superintendent of engines at halfa;farmer, a young officer already on his fourth campaign; mr. nicholson, the london engineer;long, quaint, kind-hearted 'roddy' owen—all filled graves in halfa cemetery or at thefoot of firket mountain. at length the epidemic was stamped out, and by the middle of augustit had practically ceased to be a serious danger. but the necessity of enforcing quarantineand other precautions had hampered movement up and down the line of communications, andso delayed the progress of the preparations for an advance. other unexpected hindrances arose. sir h.kitchener had clearly recognised that the
railway, equipped as it then was, would beat the best a doubtful means for the continual supply of a large force many miles ahead ofit. he therefore organised an auxiliary boat service and passed gyassas and nuggurs [nativesailing craft] freely up the second cataract. during the summer months, in the soudan, astrong north wind prevails, which not only drives the sailing-boats up against the stream—sometimesat the rate of twenty miles a day—but also gratefully cools the air. this year, for fortyconsecutive days, at the critical period of the campaign, the wind blew hot and adversefrom the south. the whole auxiliary boat service was thus practically arrested. but in spiteof these aggravating obstacles the preparations for the advance were forced onwards, and itsoon became necessary for the gunboats and
steamers to be brought on to the upper reachof the river. the second cataract has a total descent ofsixty feet, and is about nine miles long. for this distance the nile flows down a ruggedstairway formed by successive ledges of black granite. the flood river deeply submergesthese steps, and rushes along above them with tremendous force, but with a smooth thoughswirling surface. as the nile subsides, the steps begin to show, until the river tumblesviolently from ledge to ledge, its whole surface for miles churned to the white foam of brokenwater, and thickly studded with black rocks. at the second cataract, moreover, the onlydeep channel of the nile is choked between narrow limits, and the stream struggles furiouslybetween stern walls of rock. these dark gorges
present many perils to the navigator. themost formidable, the bab-el-kebir, is only thirty-five feet wide. the river here takesa plunge of ten feet in seventy yards, and drops five feet at a single bound. an extensivepool above, formed by the junction of two arms of the river, increases the volume ofthe water and the force of the stream, so that the 'gate' constitutes an obstacle ofdifficulty and danger which might well have been considered insurmountable. it had been expected that in the beginningof july enough water would be passing down the second cataract to enable the gunboatsand steamers waiting below to make the passage. everything depended upon the rise of the river,and in the perversity of circumstances the
river this year rose much later and slowerthan usual. by the middle of august, however, the attempt appeared possible. on the 14ththe first gunboat, the metemma, approached the cataract. the north staffordshire regimentfrom gemai, and the 6th and 7th egyptian battalions from kosheh, marched to the 'gate' to drawthe vessel bodily up in spite of the current. the best native pilots had been procured.colonel hunter and the naval officers under commander colville directed the work. theboat had been carefully prepared for the ordeal. to reduce, by raising the free-board, therisk of swamping, the bows were heightened and strengthened, and stout wooden bulwarkswere built running from bow to stern. guns and ammunition were then removed, and thevessel lightened by every possible means.
a strop of wire rope was passed completelyround the hull, and to this strong belt the five cables were fastened—two on each sideand one at the bow. so steep was the slope of the water that it was found necessary todraw all the fires, and the steamer was thus dependent entirely upon external force. itwas luckily possible to obtain a direct pull, for a crag of black rock rose above the surfaceof the pool opposite the 'gate.' on this a steel block was fixed, and the hawser wasled away at right angles until it reached the east bank, where a smooth stretch of sandafforded a convenient place for the hauling parties. two thousand men were then set topull at the cables, yet such was the extraordinary force of the current that, although the actualdistance in which these great efforts were
necessary was scarcely one hundred yards,the passage of each steamer occupied an hour and a half, and required the most strenuousexertions of the soldiers. no accident, however, occurred, and the six other vessels accomplishedthe ascent on successive days. in a week the whole flotilla steamed safely in the openwater of the upper reach. and now for a moment it seemed that the luckof the expedition had returned. the cholera was practically extinct. the new gunboat zafirwas nearly ready at kosheh, and her imposing appearance delighted and impressed the army.on the 23rd of august all the seven steamers which had passed the cataract arrived in astately procession opposite the camp. almost at the same time the wind changed to the north,and a cool and delicious breeze refreshed
the weary men and bore southward to suardaa whole fleet of sailing boats laden with supplies, which had been lying weather-boundduring the previous six weeks at the head of the rapids. the preparatory orders forthe advance tinkled along the telegraph. the north staffordshire regiment were, to theintense relief of officers and men, warned to hold themselves in readiness for an immediatemove. the mounted troops had already returned to the front from the camps in which theyhad been distributed. at last the miserable delay was over. from kosheh to kerma, the first dervish position,the distance by river is 127 miles. a study of the map shows that by land marches thiscan be shortened by nearly forty-one miles;
thirty miles being saved by cutting acrossthe great loop of the nile from kosheh to sadin fanti, and eleven miles by avoidingthe angle from fereig to abu fatmeh. from kerma to dongola, which latter town was theobjective of the expedition, a further distance of thirty-five miles must be traversed, makinga total of 120 miles by land or 161 by river. the long desert march from kosheh to sadinfanti was the only natural difficulty by land. although the river from kosheh to kerma isbroken by continual rapids, it is, with one interval, freely navigable at half nile. theamara cataract, ten miles beyond kosheh, is easily ascended by sailing boats with a fairwind, and by steamers without assistance. from amara to the kaibar cataract stretchesa reach of sixty-five miles of open water.
the kaibar cataract is, during the flood,scarcely any hindrance to navigation; but at hannek, about thirty miles further on,the three miles of islands, rocks, rapids, and broken water which are called the thirdcataract are, except at high nile, a formidable barrier, once this is passed, there is openwater for more than 200 miles at all seasons to merawi. the banks of the river, exceptnear sadin fanti, where the hills close in, are flat and low. the eastern bank is linedwith a fringe of palm-trees and a thin strip of cultivation, which constitutes what iscalled 'the fertile province of dongola.' on the other side the desert reaches the water'sedge. along the right bank of this part of the river the army was now to move.
the first act of the advance was the occupationof absarat, and on the 23rd of august macdonald's brigade marched thither from suarda, cuttingacross the desert to sadin fanti, and then following the bank of the nile. the occupationof absarat covered the next movement. on the 26th lewis's brigade was ordered to marchacross the loop from kosheh to sadin fanti, and reinforce the brigade at absarat. thedistance of thirty-seven miles was far too great to be accomplished without a systemof watering-places. this the sirdar rapidly organised. water-depots were formed by carryingtanks and water-skins on camels to two points in the desert, and replenishing them by dailyconvoys. but now a heavy calamity descended on the arrangements of the general and thehopes of the troops.
during the afternoon of the 25th the windveered suddenly to the south, and thereupon a terrific storm of sand and rain, accompaniedby thunder and lightning, burst over the whole of the nubian desert, and swept along theline of communications from suarda to halfa. on the next day a second deluge delayed themarch of lewis's brigade. but late on the 27th they started, with disastrous results.before they had reached the first watering-place a third tempest, preceded by its choking sandstorm,overtook them. nearly 300 men fell out during the early part of the night, and crawled andstaggered back to kosheh. before the column reached sadin fanti 1,700 more sank exhaustedto the ground. out of one battalion 700 strong, only sixty men marched in. nine deaths andeighty serious cases of prostration occurred,
and the movement of the brigade from koshehto absarat was grimly called 'the death march.' the 'death march' was the least of the misfortunescaused by the storms. the violent rains produced floods such as had not been seen in the soudanfor fifty years. the water, pouring down the broad valleys, formed furious torrents inthe narrower gorges. more than twelve miles of the railway was washed away. the railswere twisted and bent; the formation entirely destroyed. the telegraph wires were broken.the work of weeks was lost in a few hours. the advance was stopped as soon as it hadbeen begun. at the moment when every military reason demanded speed and suddenness, a hideousdelay became inevitable. in this time of crisis the success of thewhole campaign hung in the balance. sir herbert
kitchener did not then possess that measureof the confidence and affection of his officers which his military successes have since compelled.public opinion was still undecided on the general question of the war. the initial badluck had frightened many. all the croakers were ready. 'a jingo government'—'an incapablegeneral'—'another disaster in the soudan'—such were the whispers. a check would be the signalfor an outcry. the accounts of 'the death march' had not yet reached england; but thecorrespondents, irritated at being 'chained to headquarters,' were going to see aboutthat. and, besides all this, there were the army to feed and the dervishes to fight. inthis serious emergency, which threatened to wreck his schemes, the sirdar's organisingtalents shone more brilliantly than at any
other moment in this account. travelling swiftlyto moghrat, he possessed himself of the telephone, which luckily still worked. he knew the exactposition or every soldier, coolie, camel, or donkey at his disposal. in a few hours,in spite of his crippled transport, he concentrated 5,000 men on the damaged sections of the line,and thereafter fed them until the work was finished. in seven days traffic was resumed.the advance had been delayed, but it was not prevented. on the 5th of september the 1st (lewis) and2nd (macdonald) brigades moved to dulgo, and at the same time the remainder of the armybegan to march across the loop from kosheh by sadin fanti to absarat. every availablesoldier had been collected for the final operation
of the campaign. the expeditionary force was organised as follows: commander-in-chief: the sirdar 1st brigade 2nd brigade 3rd brigade 4th brigademajor lewis major macdonaldmajor maxwell major david 3rd egyptians xith soudanese 2nd egyptians1st egyptians 4th " xiith " 7th " 5th "ixth soudanese xiiith " 8th " 15th " xth " cavalry brigade and mounted forces: majorburn-murdoch cavalry..... 8 squadronscamel corps.... 6 companies
horse artillery... 1 battery artillery: major parsons field artillery... 2 batteriesmaxims . ... 1 battery (british) divisional troops: major currie north staffordshire regiment.... 1st battalion the flotilla: commander colville gunboats... zafir, tamai, abu klea, metemma,el teb armed steamers... kaibar, dal, akasha total: 15,000 men, 8 war-vessels, and 36 guns
thus thirteen of the sixteen battalions ofthe egyptian army were employed at the front. two others, the 6th and xivth, were disposedalong the line of communication, holding the various fortified posts. the 16th battalionof reservists remained at suakin. the whole native army was engaged in the war, and thepreservation of domestic order in the capital and throughout the khedive's dominions wasleft entirely to the police and to the british army of occupation. by the 9th all four brigadeshad reached the rendezvous at dulgo; on the 10th the british regiment, which it was determinedto send up in the steamers, was moved to kosheh by rail from sarras and gemai. the sirdarprepared to start with the flotilla on the 12th.
but a culminating disappointment remained.by tremendous exertions the zafir had been finished in time to take part in the operations.throughout the army it was expected that the zafir would be the feature of the campaign.at length the work was finished, and the zafir floated, powerful and majestic, on the watersof the nile. on the afternoon of the 11th of september many officers and men came towitness her trial trip. the bank was lined with spectators. colville took command. thesirdar and his staff embarked. flags were hoisted and amid general cheering the mooringswere cast off. but the stern paddle had hardly revolved twice when there was a loud report,like that of a heavy gun, clouds of steam rushed up from the boilers, and the enginesstopped. sir h. kitchener and commander colville
were on the upper deck. the latter rushedbelow to learn what had happened, and found that she had burst her low-pressure cylinder,a misfortune impossible to repair until a new one could be obtained from halfa and fitted. in spite of this, however, the advance wasnot delayed. on the 13th the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd brigades occupied kaderma. here the flotillaovertook them, and henceforward the boats on the river kept pace with the army on thebank. fareig was reached on the 14th, and as the numerous palms by the water affordeda pleasant shade a halt of two days was ordered. on the 16th the 4th brigade arrived, and theconcentration of the force was then complete. after the annihilation of his strong advancedpost at firket, the dervish emir, wad bishara,
concentrated his remaining forces in dongola.here during the summer he had awaited, and in the middle of august some small reinforcementsunder one emir of low rank reached him from omdurman. the khalifa, indeed, promised thatmany more should follow, but his promises long remained unfulfilled, and the greateststrength that bishara could muster was 900 jehadia, 800 baggara arabs, 2,800 spearmen,450 camelmen, 650 cavalry—in all 5,600 men, with six small brass cannon and one mitrailleusegun. to augment in numbers, if not in strength, this small force of regular soldiers, he impresseda large number of the local tribesmen; but as these were, for the most part, anxiousto join the government troops at the first opportunity, their effect in the conflictwas inconsiderable.
the first sign that the forces were drawingcloser was the cutting of the telegraph-wire by a dervish patrol on the 6th of september.on the 10th the sirdar heard that kerma was strongly held. on the 15th of september theegyptian cavalry first established contact with the dervish scouts, and a slight skirmishtook place. on the 18th the whole force advanced to sardek, and as bishara still held his positionat kerma it looked as if an action was imminent. it was resolved to attack the dervish positionat kerma at dawn. although it seemed that only four miles separated the combatants,the night passed quietly. with the first light the army began to move, and when the sun rosethe spectacle of the moving masses of men and artillery, with the gunboats on the right,was inspiring. the soldiers braced themselves
for the expected action. but no sooner werethe village and fort of kerma visible than the report passed along the ranks that theywere deserted. rumour was soon merged in certainty, for on reaching kerma it was found that thedervishes had evacuated the place, and only the strong, well-built mud fort attested therecent presence of bishara. whither had he gone? the question was not left unanswered. half a mile to the southward, on the oppositebank of the river, among the groves of palm-trees ran a long and continuous line of sheltertrenches and loopholed walls. the flanks of this new position rested on the deep morasseswhich extend from the river both on the north and south sides of hafir. a small steamer,a fleet of large gyassas and other sailing
vessels moored to the further shore explainedwhat had happened. conscious of his weakness, the prudent emir had adroitly transportedhimself across the river, and had thus placed that broad flood between his troops and theirdestruction. meanwhile the three gunboats—all that nowremained of the armed flotilla, for the teb had run on a rock in the hannek cataract—weresteaming gradually nearer the enemy, and the army swung to the right, and, forming alongthe river bank, became spectators of a scene of fascinating interest. at half-past sixthe horse battery unlimbered at the water's edge, and began to fire obliquely up and acrossthe river. as soon as the first few shells had reached the arab entrenchment the wholeline of shelter trenches was edged with smoke,
and the dervishes replied with a heavy riflefire. the distance was, however, too great for their bad rifles and inferior ammunition,and their bullets, although they occasionally struck the ground on which the infantry weredrawn up, did not during the day cause any loss to the watching army. the dervish position was about half a milein length. as the gunboats approached the northern end they opened fire with their guns,striking the mud entrenchments at every shot, and driving clouds of dust and splinters intothe air. the maxim guns began to search the parapets, and two companies of the staffordshireregiment on board the unarmoured steamers dal and akasha fired long-range volleys. now,as on other occasions throughout the war,
the dervishes by their military behaviourexcited the admiration of their enemies. encouraged by the arrival in the morning of a reinforcementfrom omdurman of 1,000 black jehadia and 500 spearmen under abdel baki, the dervish gunnersstood to their guns and the riflemen to their trenches, and, although suffering severely,maintained a formidable fire. the gunboats continued to advance, beatingup slowly against the strong current. as they came opposite hafir, where the channel narrowsto about 600 yards, they were received by a very heavy fire from guns placed in cleverlyscreened batteries, and from the riflemen sheltered in deep pits by the water's edgeor concealed amid the foliage of the tops of the palm-trees. these aerial skirmisherscommanded the decks of the vessels, and the
shields of the guns were thus rendered oflittle protection. all the water round the gunboats was torn into foam by the projectiles.the bullets pattered against their sides, and, except where they were protected by steelplates, penetrated. one shell struck the abu klea on the water-line, and entered the magazine.luckily it did not explode, the dervishes having forgotten to set the fuse. three shellsstruck the metemma. on board the tamai, which was leading, commander colville was severelywounded in the wrist; armourer-sergeant richardson was killed at his maxim gun, and on each boatsome casualties occurred. so hot was the fire that it was thought doubtful whether to proceedwith the bombardment, and the tamai swung round, and hurried down the river with thecurrent and at full steam to report to the
sirdar. the other gunboats remained in action,and continued to shell the dervish defences. the tamai soon returned to the fight, and,steaming again up the river, was immediately hotly re-engaged. the sight which the army witnessed was thrilling.beyond the flood waters of the river, backed against a sky of staring blue and in the blazingsunlight, the whole of the enemy's position was plainly visible. the long row of sheltertrenches was outlined by the white smoke of musketry and dotted with the bright-colouredflags waving defiantly in the wind and with the still brighter flashes of the guns. behindthe entrenchments and among the mud houses and enclosures strong bodies of the jibba-cladarabs were arrayed. still further back in
the plain a large force of cavalry—conspicuousby the gleams of light reflected from their broad-bladed spears—wheeled and manoeuvred.by the nile all the tops of the palm-trees were crowded with daring riflemen, whose positionswere indicated by the smoke-puffs of their rifles, or when some tiny black figure fell,like a shot rook, to the ground. in the foreground the gunboats, panting and puffing up the river,were surrounded on all sides by spouts and spurts of water, thrown up by the shells andbullets. again the flotilla drew near the narrow channel; again the watching army heldtheir breath; and again they saw the leading boat, the metemma, turn and run down streamtowards safety, pursued by the wild cheers of the arabs. it was evident that the gunboatswere not strong enough to silence the dervish
fire. the want of the terrible zafir was acutelyfelt. the firing had lasted two hours and a half,and the enemy's resistance was no less vigorous than at the beginning of the action. the sirdarnow altered his plans. he saw that his flotilla could not hope to silence the dervishes. hetherefore ordered de rougemont—who had assumed the command after colville was wounded—torun past the entrenchments without trying to crush their fire, and steam on to dongola.to support and cover the movement, the three batteries of artillery under major parsonswere brought into action from the swampy island of artagasha, which was connected at thisseason with the right bank by a shoal. at the same time three battalions of infantrywere moved along the river until opposite
the arab position. at 9 a.m. the eighteenguns on the island opened a tremendous bombardment at 1,200 yards range on the entrenchments,and at the same time the infantry and a rocket detachment concentrated their fire on thetops of the palm-trees. the artillery now succeeded in silencing three of the five dervishguns and in sinking the little dervish steamer tahra, while the infantry by a tremendouslong-range fire drove the riflemen out of the palms. profiting by this, the gunboatsat ten o'clock moved up the river in line, and, disregarding the fusillade which thearabs still stubbornly maintained, passed by the entrenchment and steamed on towardsdongola. after this the firing on both sides became intermittent, and the fight may besaid to have ended.
both forces remained during the day facingeach other on opposite sides of the river, and the dervishes, who evidently did not admita defeat, brandished their rifles and waved their flags, and their shouts of loud defiancefloated across the water to the troops. but they had suffered very heavily. their braveand skilful leader was severely wounded by the splinters of a shell. the wicked osmanazrak had been struck by a bullet, and more than 200 ansar had fallen, including severalemirs. moreover, a long train of wounded was seen to start during the afternoon for thesouth. it is doubtful, however, whether bishara would have retreated, if he had not fearedbeing cut off. he seems to have believed that the sirdar would march along the right bankat once to dongola, and cross there under
cover of his gunboats. like all moslem soldiers,he was nervous about his line of retreat. nor, considering the overwhelming force againsthim, can we wonder. there was, besides this strategic reason for retiring, a more concretecause. all his supplies of grain were accumulated in the gyassas which lay moored to the westbank. these vessels were under the close and accurate fire of the artillery and maxim gunson artagasha island. several times during the night the hungry dervishes attempted toreach their store; but the moon was bright and the gunners watchful. each time the enemyexposed themselves, a vigorous fire was opened and they were driven back. when morning dawned,it was found that hafir was evacuated, and that the enemy had retreated on dongola.
wad bishara's anxiety about his line of retreatwas unnecessary, for the sirdar could not advance on dongola with a strong dervish forceon his line of communications: and it was not desirable to divide the army and maskhafir with a covering force. but as soon as the dervishes had left their entrenchmentsthe situation was simplified. at daybreak all the arab boats were brought over to theright bank by the villagers, who reported that bishara and his soldiers had abandonedthe defence and were retreating to dongola. thereupon the sirdar, relieved of the necessityof forcing the passage, transported his army peacefully to the other bank. the operationafforded scope to his powers of organisation, and the whole force—complete with cavalry,camels, and guns—was moved across the broad,
rushing river in less than thirty-six hoursand without any apparent difficulty. the casualties on the 19th were not numerous,and in a force of nearly 15,000 men they appear insignificant. commander colville was wounded.one british sergeant and one egyptian officer were killed. eleven native soldiers were wounded.the total—fourteen—amounted to less than one per thousand of the troops engaged. neverthelessthis picturesque and bloodless affair has been solemnly called the 'battle of hafir.'special despatches were written for it. it is officially counted in records of serviceas a 'general action.' telegrams of congratulation were received from her majesty and the khedive.a special clasp was struck. of all the instances of cheaply bought glory which the militaryhistory of recent years affords, hafir is
the most remarkable. the 20th and part of the 21st were occupiedby the passage of the army across the nile. the troops were still crossing when the gunboatsreturned from dongola. the distance of this place by water from hafir is about thirty-sixmiles, and the flotilla had arrived opposite the town during the afternoon of the 19th.a few shells expelled the small dervish garrison, and a large number of sailing vessels werecaptured. the results of the movement of the gunboats to dongola must, however, be lookedfor at hafir. in consequence of the sirdar's manoeuvre that place was evacuated and theunopposed passage of the river secured. bishara continued his retreat during the 20th,and, marching all day, reached dongola in
the evening. wounded as he was, he re-occupiedthe town and began forthwith to make preparations for the defence of its considerable fortifications.the knowledge of his employment was not hidden from his enemy, and during the 21st the gunboatabu klea, under lieutenant beatty, r.n., arrived with the design of keeping him occupied. throughoutthe day a desultory duel was maintained between the entrenchments and the steamer. at daylighton the 22nd, beatty was reinforced by another gunboat, and an unceasing bombardment wasmade on the town and its defences. notwithstanding that the army did not finishcrossing the river until the afternoon of the 21st, the sirdar determined to continuehis advance without delay, and the force accordingly marched twelve miles further south and campedopposite the middle of the large island of
argo. at daybreak the troops started again,and before the sun had attained its greatest power reached zowarat. this place was scarcelysix miles from dongola, and, as it was expected that an action would be fought the next day,the rest of eighteen hours was welcomed by the weary soldiers. all day long the armyremained halted by the palms of the nile bank. looking through their glasses up the river,the officers might watch the gunboats methodically bombarding dongola, and the sound of the gunswas clearly heard. at intervals during the day odd parties of dervishes, both horse andfoot, approached the outpost line and shots were exchanged. all these things, together with the consciousnessthat the culmination of the campaign was now
at hand, raised the excitement of the armyto a high pitch, and everyone lay down that night warmed by keen anticipations. an atmosphereof unrest hung over the bivouac, and few slept soundly. at three o'clock the troops werearoused, and at half-past four the final advance on dongola had begun. it was still night. the full moon, shiningwith tropical brilliancy in a cloudless sky, vaguely revealed the rolling plains of sandand the huge moving mass of the army. as long as it was dark the battalions were closelyformed in quarter columns. but presently the warmer, yellower light of dawn began to growacross the river and through the palms, and gradually, as the sun rose and it became daylight,the dense formation of the army was extended
to an array more than two miles long. on theleft, nearest the river, marched lewis's brigade—three battalions in line and the fourth in columnas a reserve. next in order maxwell's three battalions prolonged the line. the artillerywere in the centre, supported by the north staffordshire regiment. the gunners of themaxim battery had donned their tunics, so that the lines and columns of yellow and brownwere relieved by a vivid flash of british red. macdonald's brigade was on the right.david's brigade followed in rear of the centre as a reserve. the cavalry, the camel corps,and the horse artillery watched the right flank; and on the left the gunboats steamedalong the river. for two hours the army were the only livingthings visible on the smooth sand, but at
seven o'clock a large body of dervish horseappeared on the right flank. the further advance of half a mile discovered the arab forces.their numbers were less than those of the egyptians, but their white uniforms, conspicuouson the sand, and the rows of flags of many colours lent an imposing appearance to theirarray. their determined aspect, no less than the reputation of bishara, encouraged thebelief that they were about to charge. the disparity of the forces was, however,too great; and as the egyptian army steadily advanced, the dervishes slowly retired. theirretreat was cleverly covered by the baggara horse, who, by continually threatening thedesert flank, delayed the progress of the troops. bishara did not attempt to re-enterthe town, on which the gunboats were now concentrating
their fire, but continued to retire in excellentorder towards the south and debba. the egyptian infantry halted in dongola, whichwhen they arrived they found already in the hands of detachments from the flotilla. thered flag with the crescent and star waved once again from the roof of the mudiria. thegarrison of 400 black jehadia had capitulated, and were already fraternising with their soudanesecaptors, whose comrades in arms they were soon to be. while the infantry occupied thetown the cavalry and camel corps were despatched in pursuit. the baggara horse, however, maintaineda firm attitude, and attempted several charges to cover the retreat of their infantry. inone of these an actual collision occurred, and captain adams's squadron of egyptian cavalryinflicted a loss of six killed on the enemy
at a cost to themselves of eight men wounded.the cavalry and camel corps had about twenty casualties in the pursuit. but although thedervishes thus withdrew in an orderly manner from the field, the demoralising influenceof retreat soon impaired their discipline and order, and many small parties, becomingdetached from the main body, were captured by the pursuers. the line of retreat was strewnwith weapons and other effects, and so many babies were abandoned by their parents thatan artillery waggon had to be employed to collect and carry them. wad bishara, osmanazrak, and the baggara horse, however, made good their flight across the desert to metemma,and, in spite of terrible sufferings from thirst, retained sufficient discipline todetach a force to hold abu klea wells in case
the retreat was followed. the dervish infantrymade their way along the river to abu hamed, and were much harassed by the gunboats untilthey reached the fourth cataract, when the pursuit was brought to an end. the egyptian losses in the capture of dongolaand in the subsequent pursuit were: british, nil. native ranks: killed, 1; wounded, 25.total, 26. the occupation of dongola terminated the campaignof 1896. about 900 prisoners, mostly the black jehadia, all the six brass cannon, large storesof grain, and a great quantity of flags, spears, and swords fell to the victors, and the wholeof the province, said to be the most fertile in the soudan, was restored to the egyptianauthority. the existence of a perpetual clear
waterway from the head of the third cataractto merawi enabled the gunboats at once to steam up the river for more than 200 miles,and in the course of the following month the greater part of the army was established inmerawi below the fourth cataract, at debba, or at korti, drawing supplies along the railway,and from railhead by a boat service on the long reach of open water. the position ofa strong force at merawi—only 120 miles along the river bank from abu hamed, the northerndervish post—was, as will be seen, convenient to the continuance of the campaign wheneverthe time should arrive. but a long delay in the advance was now inevitable, and nearlya year was destined to pass without any collision between the forces of the khedive and thoseof the khalifa.
the success of the operations caused greatpublic satisfaction in england. the first step had been taken. the soudan was re-entered.after ten years of defensive war the dervishes had been attacked, and it was clear that whenthey were attacked with adequate forces they were not so very terrible after all. the croakerswere silent. a general desire was manifested in the country that the operations shouldcontinue, and although the government did not yet abandon their tentative policy, orresolve utterly to destroy the khalifa's power, it was decided that, as the road had so farbeen safe and pleasant, there was at present no need to stop or turn back. a generous gazette of honours was published.with a single exception, which it would be
invidious to specify, all the officers ofthe egyptian army were mentioned in despatches. sir h. kitchener, colonel hunter, and colonelrundle were promoted major-generals for distinguished service in the field; a special medal—onwhose ribbon the blue nile is shown flowing through the yellow desert—was struck; andboth the engagement at firket and the affair at hafir were commemorated by clasps. thecasualties during the campaign, including the fighting round suakin, were 43 killedand 139 wounded; 130 officers and men died from cholera; and there were 126 deaths fromother causes. a large number of british officers were also invalided. chapter viii: the desert railway
it often happens that in prosperous publicenterprises the applause of the nation and the rewards of the sovereign are bestowedon those whose offices are splendid and whose duties have been dramatic. others whose labourswere no less difficult, responsible, and vital to success are unnoticed. if this be trueof men, it is also true of things. in a tale of war the reader's mind is filled with thefighting. the battle—with its vivid scenes, its moving incidents, its plain and tremendousresults—excites imagination and commands attention. the eye is fixed on the fightingbrigades as they move amid the smoke; on the swarming figures of the enemy; on the general,serene and determined, mounted in the middle of his staff. the long trailing line of communicationsis unnoticed. the fierce glory that plays
on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer;nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles of rail, road, andriver, the convoys are crawling to the front in uninterrupted succession. victory is thebeautiful, bright-coloured flower. transport is the stem without which it could never haveblossomed. yet even the military student, in his zeal to master the fascinating combinationsof the actual conflict, often forgets the far more intricate complications of supply. it cannot be denied that a battle, the climaxto which all military operations tend, is an event which is not controlled by strategyor organisation. the scheme may be well planned, the troops well fed, the ammunition plentiful,and the enemy entangled, famished, or numerically
inferior. the glorious uncertainties of thefield can yet reverse everything. the human element—in defiance of experience and probability—mayproduce a wholly irrational result, and a starving, out-manoeuvred army win food, safety,and honour by their bravery. but such considerations apply with greater force to wars where bothsides are equal in equipment and discipline. in savage warfare in a flat country the powerof modern machinery is such that flesh and blood can scarcely prevail, and the chancesof battle are reduced to a minimum. fighting the dervishes was primarily a matter of transport.the khalifa was conquered on the railway. hitherto, as the operations have progressed,it has been convenient to speak of the railway in a general manner as having been laid orextended to various points, and merely to
indicate the direction of the lines of communication.the reader is now invited to take a closer view. this chapter is concerned with boats,railways, and pack animals, but particularly with railways. throughout the dongola campaign in 1896 thenile was the main channel of communication between the expeditionary force and its basein egypt. all supplies were brought to the front as far as possible by water transport.wherever the nile was navigable, it was used. other means of conveyance—by railways andpack animals—though essential, were merely supplementary. boats carry more and cost lessthan any other form of transport. the service is not so liable to interruption; the plantneeds only simple repair; the waterway is
ready-made. but the nile is not always available.frequent cataracts obstruct its course for many miles. other long reaches are only navigablewhen the river is in flood. to join the navigable reaches, and thus preserve the continuityof the communications, a complex system of railways and caravans was necessary. in the expedition to dongola a line of railwaywas required to connect the two navigable reaches of the nile which extend from assuanto wady halfa, and from kerma to merawi. before the capture of dongola, however, this distancewas shortened by the fact that the river at high nile is navigable between the third cataractand kerma. in consequence it was at first only necessary to construct the stretch of108 miles between wady halfa and kosheh. during
the years when wady halfa was the southernmostgarrison of the egyptian forces a strong post had been maintained at sarras. in the nileexpeditions of 1885 the railway from halfa had been completed through sarras and as faras akasha, a distance of eighty-six miles. after the abandonment of the soudan the dervishesdestroyed the line as far north as sarras. the old embankments were still standing, butthe sleepers had been burnt and the rails torn up, and in many cases bent or twisted.the position in 1896 may, in fact, be summed up as follows: the section of thirty-threemiles from wady halfa to sarras was immediately available and in working order. the sectionof fifty-three miles from sarras to akasha required partial reconstruction. the sectionof thirty-two miles from akasha to kosheh
must, with the exception of ten miles of embankmentcompleted in 1885, at once be newly made. and, finally, the section from kosheh to kermamust be completed before the nile flood subsided. the first duty, therefore, which the engineerofficers had to perform was the reconstruction of the line from sarras to akasha. no trainedstaff or skilled workmen were available. the lack of men with technical knowledge was doubtfullysupplied by the enlistment of a 'railway battalion' 800 strong. these men were drawn from manytribes and classes. their only qualification was capacity and willingness for work. theypresented a motley appearance. dervish prisoners, released but still wearing their jibbas, assistedstalwart egyptians in unloading rails and sleepers. dinkas, shillooks, jaalin, and barabrasshovelled contentedly together at the embankments.
one hundred civilian soudanese—chiefly time-expiredsoldiers—were also employed; and these, since they were trustworthy and took an especialpride in their work, soon learned the arts of spiking rails and sleepers, fishing railstogether, and straightening. to direct and control the labours of these men of variedrace and language, but of equal inexperience, some civilian foremen platelayers were obtainedat high rates of pay from lower egypt. these, however, with very few exceptions were notsatisfactory, and they were gradually replaced by intelligent men of the 'railway battalion,'who had learned their trade as the line progressed. the projection, direction, and execution ofthe whole work were entrusted to a few subalterns of engineers, of whom the best-known was edouardgirouard.
work was begun south of sarras at the latterend of march. at first the efforts of so many unskilled workmen, instructed by few experiencedofficers, were productive of results ridiculous rather than important. gradually, however,the knowledge and energy of the young director and the intelligence and devotion of his stillmore youthful subordinates began to take effect. the pace of construction increased, and thelabour was lightened by the contrivances of experience and skill. as the line grew longer, native officers andnon-commissioned officers from the active and reserve lists of the egyptian army wereappointed station-masters. intelligent non-commissioned officers and men were converted into shunters,guards, and pointsmen. traffic was controlled
by telephone. to work the telephone, men werediscovered who could read and write—very often who could read and write only theirown names, and even that with such difficulty that they usually preferred a seal. they developedinto clerks by a simple process of selection. to improve their education, and to train astaff in the office work of a railway, two schools were instituted at halfa. in theseestablishments, which were formed by the shade of two palm-trees, twenty pupils receivedthe beginnings of knowledge. the simplicity of the instruction was aided by the zeal ofthe students, and learning grew beneath the palm-trees more quickly perhaps than in themagnificent schools of civilisation. the rolling stock of the halfa-sarras linewas in good order and sufficient quantity,
but the eight locomotives were out of allrepair, and had to be patched up again and again with painful repetition. the regularityof their break-downs prevented the regularity of the road, and the soudan military railwaygained a doubtful reputation during the dongola expedition and in its early days. nor werethere wanting those who employed their wits in scoffing at the undertaking and in pouringthoughtless indignation on the engineers. nevertheless the work went on continually. the initial difficulties of the task wereaggravated by an unexpected calamity. on the 26th of august the violent cyclonic rain-stormof which some account has been given in the last chapter broke over the dongola province.
a writer on the earlier phases of the war[a. hilliard atteridge, towards freedom.] has forcibly explained why the consequenceswere so serious: 'in a country where rain is an ordinary eventthe engineer lays his railway line, not in the bottom of a valley, but at a higher levelon one slope or the other. where he passes across branching side valleys, he takes careto leave in all his embankments large culverts to carry off flood-water. but here, in whatwas thought to be the rainless soudan, the line south of sarras followed for mile aftermile the bottom of the long valley of khor ahrusa, and no provision had been made, orhad been thought necessary, for culverts in the embankments where minor hollows were crossed.thus, when the flood came, it was not merely
that the railway was cut through here andthere by the rushing deluge. it was covered deep in water, the ballast was swept away,and some of the banks so destroyed that in places rails and sleepers were left hangingin the air across a wide gap.' nearly fourteen miles of track were destroyed.the camp of the construction gangs was wrecked and flooded. some of the rifles of the escort—forthe conditions of war were never absent—were afterwards recovered from a depth of threefeet of sand. in one place, where the embankment had partly withstood the deluge, a great lakeseveral miles square appeared. by extraordinary exertions the damage was repaired in a week. as soon as the line as far as kosheh was completed,the advance towards dongola began. after the
army had been victorious at hafir the wholeprovince was cleared of dervishes, and the egyptian forces pushed on to merawi. herethey were dependent on river transport. but the nile was falling rapidly, and the armywere soon in danger of being stranded by the interruption of river traffic between thethird cataract and kenna. the extension of the line from kosheh to kerma was thereforeof vital importance. the survey was at once undertaken, and a suitable route was chosenthrough the newly acquired and unmapped territory. of the ninety-five miles of extended track,fifty-six were through the desert, and the constructors here gained the experience whichwas afterwards of value on the great desert railway from wady halfa to the atbara. battalionsof troops were distributed along the line
and ordered to begin to make the embankments.track-laying commenced south of kosheh on the 9th of october, and the whole work wascarried forward with feverish energy. as it progressed, and before it was completed, thereach of the river from the third cataract to kenna ceased to be navigable. the armywere now dependent for their existence on the partly finished railway, from the headof which supplies were conveyed by an elaborate system of camel transport. every week theline grew, railhead moved forward, and the strain upon the pack animals diminished. butthe problem of feeding the field army without interfering with the railway constructionwas one of extraordinary intricacy and difficulty. the carrying capacity of the line was strictlylimited. the worn-out engines frequently broke
down. on many occasions only three were inworking order, and the other five undergoing 'heavy repairs' which might secure them anothershort span of usefulness. three times the construction had to be suspended to allowthe army to be revictualled. every difficulty was, however, overcome. by the beginning ofmay the line to kenna was finished, and the whole of the railway battalion, its subalternsand its director, turned their attention to a greater enterprise. in the first week in december the sirdar returnedfrom england with instructions or permission to continue the advance towards khartoum,and the momentous question of the route to be followed arose. it may at first seem thatthe plain course was to continue to work along
the nile, connecting its navigable reachesby sections of railway. but from merawi to abu hamed the river is broken by continualcataracts, and the broken ground of both banks made a railway nearly an impossibility. themovements of the french expeditions towards the upper nile counselled speed. the povertyof egypt compelled economy. the nile route, though sure, would be slow and very expensive.a short cut must be found. three daring and ambitious schemes presented themselves: (1)the line followed by the desert column in 1884 from korti to metemma; (2) the celebrated,if not notorious, route from suakin to berber; (3) across the nubian desert from koroskoor wady halfa to abu hamed. the question involved the whole strategy ofthe war. no more important decision was ever
taken by sir herbert kitchener, whether inoffice or in action. the request for a british division, the attack on mahmud's zeriba, thegreat left wheel towards omdurman during that battle, the treatment of the marchand expedition,were matters of lesser resolve than the selection of the line of advance. the known strengthof the khalifa made it evident that a powerful force would be required for the destructionof his army and the capture of his capital. the use of railway transport to some pointon the nile whence there was a clear waterway was therefore imperative. berber and metemmawere known, and abu hamed was believed, to fulfil this condition. but both berber andmetemma were important strategic points. it was improbable that the dervishes would abandonthese keys to khartoum and the soudan without
severe resistance. it seemed likely, indeed,that the khalifa would strongly reinforce both towns, and desperately contest theirpossession. the deserts between korti and metemma, and between suakin and berber, containedscattered wells, and small raiding parties might have cut the railway and perhaps havestarved the army at its head. it was therefore too dangerous to project the railway towardseither berber or metemma until they were actually in our hands. the argument is circular. thetowns could not be taken without a strong force; so strong a force could not advanceuntil the railway was made; and the railway could not be made till the towns were taken. both the korti-metemma and the suakin-berberroutes were therefore rejected. the resolution
to exclude the latter was further strengthenedby the fact that the labour of building a railway over the hills behind suakin wouldhave been very great. the route via abu hamed was selected by theexclusion of the alternatives. but it had distinct and apparent advantages. abu hamedwas within striking distance of the army at merawi. it was not a point essential to thedervish defences, and not, therefore, likely to be so strongly garrisoned as berber ormetemma. it might, therefore, be captured by a column marching along the river, andsufficiently small to be equipped with only camel transport. the deserts through whichthe railway to abu hamed would pass contain few wells, and therefore it would be difficultfor small raiding parties to cut the line
or attack the construction gangs; and beforethe line got within reach of the dervish garrison at abu hamed, that garrison would be dislodgedand the place seized. the plan was perfect, and the argument inits favour conclusive. it turned, however, on one point: was the desert railway a possibility?with this question the general was now confronted. he appealed to expert opinion. eminent railwayengineers in england were consulted. they replied with unanimity that, having due regardto the circumstances, and remembering the conditions of war under which the work mustbe executed, it was impossible to construct such a line. distinguished soldiers were approachedon the subject. they replied that the scheme was not only impossible, but absurd. manyother persons who were not consulted volunteered
the opinion that the whole idea was that ofa lunatic, and predicted ruin and disaster to the expedition. having received this advice,and reflected on it duly, the sirdar ordered the railway to be constructed without moredelay. a further question immediately arose: shouldthe railway to abu hamed start from korosko or from wady halfa? there were arguments onboth sides. the adoption of the korosko line would reduce the river stage from assuan byforty-eight hours up stream. the old caravan route, by which general gordon had travelledto khartoum on his last journey, had been from korosko via murat wells to abu hamed.on the other hand, many workshops and appliances for construction were already existing atwady halfa. it was the northern terminus of
the dongola railway. this was an enormousadvantage. both routes were reconnoitred: that from wady halfa was selected. the decisionhaving been taken, the enterprise was at once begun. lieutenant girouard, to whom everything wasentrusted, was told to make the necessary estimates. sitting in his hut at wady halfa,he drew up a comprehensive list. nothing was forgotten. every want was provided for; everydifficulty was foreseen; every requisite was noted. the questions to be decided were numerousand involved. how much carrying capacity was required? how much rolling stock? how manyengines? what spare parts? how much oil? how many lathes? how many cutters? how many punchingand shearing machines? what arrangements of
signals would be necessary? how many lamps?how many points? how many trolleys? what amount of coal should be ordered? how much waterwould be wanted? how should it be carried? to what extent would its carriage affect thehauling power and influence all previous calculations? how much railway plant was needed? how manymiles of rail? how many thousand sleepers? where could they be procured at such shortnotice? how many fishplates were necessary? what tools would be required? what appliances?what machinery? how much skilled labour was wanted? how much of the class of labour available?how were the workmen to be fed and watered? how much food would they want? how many trainsa day must be run to feed them and their escort? how many must be run to carry plant? how didthese requirements affect the estimate for
rolling stock? the answers to all these questions,and to many others with which i will not inflict the reader, were set forth by lieutenant girouardin a ponderous volume several inches thick; and such was the comprehensive accuracy ofthe estimate that the working parties were never delayed by the want even of a pieceof brass wire. in any circumstances the task would have beenenormous. it was, however, complicated by five important considerations: it had to beexecuted with military precautions. there was apparently no water along the line. thefeeding of 2,000 platelayers in a barren desert was a problem in itself. the work had to becompleted before the winter. and, finally, the money voted was not to be outrun. thesirdar attended to the last condition.
girouard was sent to england to buy the plantand rolling stock. fifteen new engines and two hundred trucks were ordered. the necessarynew workshops were commenced at halfa. experienced mechanics were procured to direct them. fifteenhundred additional men were enlisted in the railway battalion and trained. then the waterquestion was dealt with. the reconnoitring surveys had reported that though the linewas certainly 'good and easy' for 110 miles—and, according to arab accounts, for the remaining120 miles—no drop of water was to be found, and only two likely spots for wells were noted.camel transport was, of course, out of the question. each engine must first of all haulenough water to carry it to railhead and back, besides a reserve against accidents. it wasevident that the quantity of water required
by any locomotive would continually increaseas the work progressed and the distance grew greater, until finally the material trainswould have one-third of their carrying power absorbed in transporting the water for theirown consumption. the amount of water necessary is largely dependent on the grades of theline. the 'flat desert' proved to be a steady slope up to a height of 1,600 feet above halfa,and the calculations were further complicated. the difficulty had, however, to be faced,and a hundred 1,500-gallon tanks were procured. these were mounted on trucks and connectedby hose; and the most striking characteristic of the trains of the soudan military railwaywas the long succession of enormous boxes on wheels, on which the motive power of theengine and the lives of the passengers depended.
the first spadeful of sand of the desert railwaywas turned on the first day of 1897; but until may, when the line to kerma was finished,no great efforts were made, and only forty miles of track had been laid. in the meanwhilethe men of the new railway battalion were being trained; the plant was steadily accumulating;engines, rolling stock, and material of all sorts had arrived from england. from the growingworkshops at wady halfa the continual clatter and clang of hammers and the black smoke ofmanufacture rose to the african sky. the malodorous incense of civilisation was offered to thestartled gods of egypt. all this was preparation; nor was it until the 8th of may that track-layinginto the desert was begun in earnest. the whole of the construction gangs and railroadstaff were brought from kerma to wady halfa,
and the daring pioneers of modern war startedon their long march through the wilderness, dragging their railway behind them—safeand sure road which infantry, cavalry, guns, and gunboats might follow with speed and convenience. it is scarcely within the power of words todescribe the savage desolation of the regions into which the line and its constructors plunged.a smooth ocean of bright-coloured sand spread far and wide to distant horizons. the tropicalsun beat with senseless perseverance upon the level surface until it could scarcelybe touched with a naked hand, and the filmy air glittered and shimmered as over a furnace.here and there huge masses of crumbling rock rose from the plain, like islands of cindersin a sea of fire. alone in this vast expanse
stood railhead—a canvas town of 2,500 inhabitants,complete with station, stores, post-office, telegraph-office, and canteen, and only connectedwith the living world of men and ideas by two parallel iron streaks, three feet sixinches apart, growing dim and narrower in a long perspective until they were twistedand blurred by the mirage and vanished in the indefinite distance. every morning in the remote nothingness thereappeared a black speck growing larger and clearer, until with a whistle and a welcomeclatter, amid the aching silence of ages, the 'material' train arrived, carrying itsown water and 2,500 yards of rails, sleepers, and accessories. at noon came another speck,developing in a similar manner into a supply
train, also carrying its own water, food andwater for the half-battalion of the escort and the 2,000 artificers and platelayers,and the letters, newspapers, sausages, jam, whisky, soda-water, and cigarettes which enablethe briton to conquer the world without discomfort. and presently the empty trains would depart,reversing the process of their arrival, and vanishing gradually along a line which appearedat last to turn up into the air and run at a tangent into an unreal world. the life of the strange and lonely town wascharacterised by a machine-like regularity, born perhaps of the iron road from which itderived its nourishment. daily at three o'clock in the morning the 'camp-engine' started withthe 'bank parties.' with the dawn the 'material'
train arrived, the platelaying gangs swarmedover it like clusters of flies, and were carried to the extreme limit of the track. every manknew his task, and knew, too, that he would return to camp when it was finished, and notbefore. forthwith they set busily to work without the necessity of an order. a hundredyards of material was unloaded. the sleepers were arranged in a long succession. the railswere spiked to every alternate sleeper, and then the great 80-ton engine moved cautiouslyforward along the unballasted track, like an elephant trying a doubtful bridge. theoperation was repeated continually through the hours of the burning day. behind the trainthere followed other gangs of platelayers, who completed the spiking and ballasting process;and when the sun sank beneath the sands of
the western horizon, and the engine pushedthe empty trucks and the weary men home to the railhead camp, it came back over a finishedand permanent line. there was a brief interval while the camp-fires twinkled in the waste,like the lights of a liner in mid-ocean, while the officers and men chatted over their eveningmeal, and then the darkness and silence of the desert was unbroken till morning broughtthe glare and toil of another long day. so, week in, week out, the work went on. everyfew days saw a further advance into the wilderness. the scene changed and remained unaltered—'another,yet the same.' as wady halfa became more remote and abu hamed grew near, an element of danger,the more appalling since it was peculiar, was added to the strange conditions underwhich the inhabitants of railhead lived. what
if the dervishes should cut the line behindthem? they had three days' reserve of water. after that, unless the obstruction were removedand traffic restored, all must wither and die in the sand, and only their bones andtheir cooking-pots would attest the folly of their undertaking. by the 20th of july a hundred and thirty milesof line had been finished, and it became too dangerous to advance further until abu hamedhad been cleared of the dervish force. they were still a hundred miles away, but camelstravel fast and far, and the resources of the enemy were uncertain. it appeared thatprogress would be checked, but on the 7th of august general hunter, marching from merawialong the river bank, attacked and took abu
hamed—an operation which will be describedhereafter. work was at once resumed with renewed energy. the pace of construction now becameremarkable. as much as 5,300 yards of track was surveyed, embanked, and laid in a singleday. on the 1st of november abu hamed was reached, and by the banks of the nile themen who had fought their way across the desert joined hands with those who had fought theirway along the river. the strain and hardship had not, however,been without effect on the constructors. two of the engineer subalterns—polwhele andcator—out of the eight concerned in the laying of the dongola and the desert railwayshad died. their places were eagerly filled by others.
the completion of the line was acceleratedby nearly a month through the fortunate discovery of water. at the beginning of july a wellwas sunk in what was thought to be a likely place at 'no. 4 station,' seventy-seven milesfrom halfa. after five weeks' work water was found in abundance at a depth of 90 feet.a steam-pump was erected, and the well yielded a continual supply. in october a second wellwas sunk at 'no. 6 station,' fifty-five miles further on, whence water was obtained in stillgreater quantity. these discoveries modified, though they did not solve, the water question.they substantially increased the carrying capacity of the line, and reduced the dangerto which the construction gangs were exposed. the sinking of the wells, an enterprise atwhich the friendly arabs scoffed, was begun
on the sirdar's personal initiative; but thechronicler must impartially observe that the success was won by luck as much as by calculation,for, since the first two wells were made, eight others of greater depth have been boredand in no case has water been obtained. as the railway had been made, the telegraph-wirehad, of course, followed it. every consignment of rails and sleepers had been accompaniedby its proportion of telegraph-poles, insulators, and wire. another subaltern of engineers,lieutenant manifold, who managed this part of the military operations against the arabs,had also laid a line from merawi to abu hamed, so that immediate correspondence was effectedround the entire circle of rail and river. the labours of the railway battalion and itsofficers did not end with the completion of
the line to abu hamed. the desert railwaywas made. it had now to be maintained, worked, and rapidly extended. the terminus at halfahad become a busy town. a mud village was transformed into a miniature crewe. the greatworkshops that had grown with the line were equipped with diverse and elaborate machines.plant of all kinds purchased in cairo or requisitioned from england, with odds and ends collectedfrom ishmail's scrap heaps, filled the depots with an extraordinary variety of stores. foundries,lathes, dynamos, steam-hammers, hydraulic presses, cupola furnaces, screw-cutting machines,and drills had been set up and were in continual work. they needed constant attention. everyappliance for repairing each must be provided. to haul the tonnage necessary to supply thearmy and extend the line nearly forty engines
were eventually required. purchased at differenttimes and from different countries, they included ten distinct patterns; each pattern neededa special reserve of spare parts. the permutations and combinations of the stores were multiplied.some of the engines were old and already worn out. these broke down periodically. the frictionalparts of all were affected by the desert sand, and needed ceaseless attention and repair.the workshops were busy night and day for seven days a week. to the complication of machinery was addedthe confusion of tongues. natives of various races were employed as operatives. foremenhad been obtained from europe. no fewer than seven separate languages were spoken in theshops. wady halfa became a second babel. yet
the undertaking prospered. the engineer officersdisplayed qualities of tact and temper: their director was cool and indefatigable. overall the sirdar exercised a regular control. usually ungracious, rarely impatient, neverunreasonable, he moved among the workshops and about the line, satisfying himself thatall was proceeding with economy and despatch. the sympathy of common labour won him theaffection of the subalterns. nowhere in the soudan was he better known than on the railroad.nowhere was he so ardently believed in. it is now necessary to anticipate the courseof events. as soon as the railway reached abu hamed, general hunter's force, which washolding that place, dropped its slender camel communications with merawi and drew its suppliesalong the new line direct from wady halfa.
after the completion of the desert line therewas still left seventeen miles of material for construction, and the railway was consequentlyat once extended to dakhesh, sixteen miles south of abu hamed. meanwhile berber was seized,and military considerations compelled the concentration of a larger force to maintainthat town. the four battalions which had remained at merawi were floated down stream to kerma,and, there entraining, were carried by halfa and abu hamed to dakhesh—a journey of 450miles. when the railway had been begun across thedesert, it was believed that the nile was always navigable above abu hamed. in formercampaigns it had been reconnoitred and the waterway declared clear. but as the riverfell it became evident that this was untrue.
with the subsidence of the waters cataractsbegan to appear, and to avoid these it became necessary first of all to extend the railwayto bashtinab, later on to abadia, and finally to the atbara. to do this more money had tobe obtained, and the usual financial difficulties presented themselves. finally, however, thematter was settled, and the extension began at the rate of about a mile a day. the characterof the country varies considerably between abu hamed and the atbara river. for the firstsixty miles the line ran beside the nile, at the edge of the riparian belt. on the rightwas the cultivable though mostly uncultivated strip, long neglected and silted up with finesand drifted into dunes, from which scattered, scraggy dom palms and prickly mimosa bushesgrew. between the branches of these sombre
trees the river gleamed, a cool and attractiveflood. on the left was the desert, here broken by frequent rocks and dry watercourses. frombashtinab to abadia another desert section of fifty miles was necessary to avoid somevery difficult ground by the nile bank. from abadia to the atbara the last stretch of theline runs across a broad alluvial expanse from whose surface plane-trees of mean appearance,but affording welcome shade, rise, watered by the autumn rains. the fact that the railwaywas approaching regions where rain is not an almost unknown phenomenon increased thelabour of construction. to prevent the embankments from being washed away in the watercourses,ten bridges and sixty culverts had to be made; and this involved the transport over the railwayof more than 1,000 tons of material in addition
to the ordinary plant. by the arrival of the reinforcements at berberthe fighting force at the front was doubled: doubled also was the business of supply. thetask of providing the food of an army in a desert, a thousand miles from their base,and with no apparent means of subsistence at the end of the day's march, is less picturesque,though not less important, than the building of railways along which that nourishment isdrawn to the front. supply and transport stand or fall together; history depends on both;and in order to explain the commissariat aspect of the river war, i must again both repeatand anticipate the account. the sirdar exercised a direct and personal supervision over thewhole department of supply, but his action
was restricted almost entirely to the distributionof the rations. their accumulation and regular supply were the task of colonel rogers, andthis officer, by three years of exact calculation and unfailing allowance for the unforeseen,has well deserved his high reputation as a feeder of armies. the first military necessity of the war was,as has been described, to place the bulk of the egyptian army at akasha. in ordinary circumstancesthis would not have been a serious commissariat problem. the frontier reserves of food werecalculated to meet such an emergency. but in 1895 the crops in egypt had been much belowthe average. at the beginning of 1896 there was a great scarcity of grain. when the orderfor the advance was issued, the frontier grain
stores were nearly exhausted. the new cropscould not be garnered until the end of april. thus while the world regarded egypt as a vastgranary, her soldiers were obliged to purchase 4,000 tons of doura and 1,000 tons of barleyfrom india and russia on which to begin the campaign. the chief item of a soldier's diet in mostarmies is bread. in several of our wars the health, and consequently the efficiency, ofthe troops has been impaired by bad bread or by the too frequent substitution of hardbiscuit. for more than a year the army up the river ate 20 tons of flour daily, andit is easy to imagine how bitter amid ordinary circumstances would have been the battle betweenthe commissariat officers, whose duty it was
to insist on proper quality, and the contractors—often,i fear, meriting the epithet 'rascally'—intent only upon profit. but in the well-managedegyptian service no such difficulties arose. the war department had in 1892 converted oneof ismail pasha's gun factories near cairo into a victualling-yard. here were set uptheir own mills for grinding flour, machinery for manufacturing biscuit to the extent of60,000 rations daily, and even for making soap. three great advantages sprang from thiswise arrangement. firstly, the good quality of the supply was assured. complaints aboutbread and biscuit were practically unknown, and the soap—since the soldier, in contrastto the mixture of rubble and grease with which the contractors had formerly furnished him,could actually wash himself and his clothes
with it—was greatly prized. secondly, allrisk of contractors failing to deliver in time was avoided. lastly, the funds resultingfrom the economy had been utilised to form a useful corps of 150 bakers. and thus, althoughthe purchase of foreign grain added to the expense, the beginning of the war found thecommissariat of the egyptian army in a thoroughly efficient state. vast reserves of stores were quickly accumulatedat assuan. from these not an ounce of food was issued without the sirdar's direct sanction.at the subsidiary depot, formed at wady halfa, the same rule prevailed. the man who was responsibleto no one took all the responsibility; and the system whereby a chief of the staff issubjected to the continual bombardment of
heads of departments was happily avoided.sufficient supplies having been accumulated at akasha to allow of a forward movement,firket was fought. after firket the situation became difficult, and the problem of the supplyofficers was to keep the troops alive without delaying the progress of the railway withthe carriage of their food. a small quantity of provisions was painfully dragged, withan average loss of 50 per cent from theft and water damage, up the succession of cataractswhich obstruct the river-way from halfa to kosheh. camel convoys from railhead carriedthe rest. but until the line reached kosheh the resources of the transport were terriblystrained, and at one time it was even necessary to send the mounted troops north to avoidactual famine. the apparent inadequacy of
the means to the end reached a climax whenthe army moved southward from dulgo. the marches and halts to dongola were estimated to taketen days, which was the utmost capacity of camel and steam transport, a few boat-loadsof grain might be captured; a few handfuls of dates might be plucked; but scarcely anylocal supplies would be available. the sailing-boats, which were the only regular means of transport,were all delayed by the adverse winds. fortune returned at the critical moment. by good luckon the first day of the march the north wind began to blow, and twelve days' supplies,over and above those moved by camel and steamer, reached dongola with the troops. with thisreserve in hand, the occupation of the province was completed, and although the army onlyexisted from hand to mouth until the railway
reached kerma, no further serious difficultywas experienced in supplying them. the account of the commissariat is now completeto the end of the dongola expedition; but it may conveniently be carried forward withthe railway construction. in the abu hamed phase the supplies were so regulated thata convoy travelling from murat wells along the caravan route arrived the day after thefight; and thereafter communications were opened with merawi. the unexpected occupationof berber, following abu hamed, created the most difficult situation of the war. untilthe railway was forced on to berber a peculiarly inconvenient line of supply had to be used;and strings of camels, scattering never less than 30 per cent of their loads, meanderedthrough the rough and thorny country between
merawi and abu hamed. this line was strengthenedby other convoys from murat and the approaching railhead, and a system of boats and camelportages filtered the supplies to their destination. even when the railway had reached dakheshthe tension was only slightly relaxed. the necessity of supplying the large force atberber, 108 miles from railhead, still required the maintenance of a huge and complicatedsystem of boat and camel transport. of course, as the railway advanced, it absorbed stageafter stage of river and portage, and the difficulties decreased. but the reader maygain some idea of their magnitude by following the progress of a box of biscuits from cairoto berber in the month of december 1897. the route was as follows: from cairo to nagh hamadi(340 miles) by rail; from nagh hamadi to assuan
(205 miles) by boat; from assuan to shellal(6 miles) by rail; from shellal to halfa (226 miles) by boat; from halfa to dakhesh (railhead)—248miles—by military railway; from dakhesh to shereik (45 miles) by boat; from shereikby camel (13 miles) round a cataract to bashtinab; from bashtinab by boat (25 miles) to omsheyo;from omsheyo round another impracticable reach (11 miles) by camel to geneinetti, and thence(22 miles) to berber by boat. the road taken by this box of biscuits was followed by everyton of supplies required by 10,000 men in the field. the uninterrupted working of thelong and varied chain was vital to the welfare of the army and the success of the war. itcould only be maintained if every section was adequately supplied and none were eitherchoked or starved. this problem had to be
solved correctly every day by the transportofficers, in spite of uncertain winds that retarded the boats, of camels that grew sickor died, and of engines that repeatedly broke down. in the face of every difficulty a regularsupply was maintained. the construction of the railway was not delayed, nor the foodof the troops reduced. the line continued to grow rapidly, and asit grew the difficulties of supply decreased. the weight was shifted from the backs of thecamels and the bottoms of the sailing-boats to the trucks of the iron road. the stronghands of steam were directed to the prosecution of the war, and the swiftness of the trainreplaced the toilsome plodding of the caravan. the advance of the dervishes towards berberchecked the progress of the railway. military
precautions were imperative. constructionwas delayed by the passage of the 1st british brigade from cairo to the front, and by theconsequently increased volume of daily supplies. by the 10th of march, however, the line wascompleted to bashtinab. on the 5th of may it had reached abadia. on the 3rd of julythe whole railway from wady halfa to the atbara was finished, and the southern terminus wasestablished in the great entrenched camp at the confluence of the rivers. the questionof supply was then settled once and for all. in less than a week stores sufficient forthree months were poured along the line, and the exhausting labours of the commissariatofficers ended. their relief and achievement were merged in the greater triumph of therailway staff. the director and his subalterns
had laboured long, and their efforts werecrowned with complete success. on the day that the first troop train steamed into thefortified camp at the confluence of the nile and the atbara rivers the doom of the dervisheswas sealed. it had now become possible with convenience and speed to send into the heartof the soudan great armies independent of the season of the year and of the resourcesof the country; to supply them not only with abundant food and ammunition, but with allthe varied paraphernalia of scientific war; and to support their action on land by a powerfulflotilla of gunboats, which could dominate the river and command the banks, and couldat any moment make their way past khartoum even to sennar, fashoda, or sobat. thoughthe battle was not yet fought, the victory
was won. the khalifa, his capital, and hisarmy were now within the sirdar's reach. it remained only to pluck the fruit in the mostconvenient hour, with the least trouble and at the smallest cost. chapter ix: abu hamed the last chapter carried the account of thewar forward at express speed. the reader, who had already on the railway reached theatbara encampment and was prepared for the final advance on khartoum, must allow hismind to revert to a period when the egyptian forces are distributed along the river ingarrisons at dongola, debba, korti, and merawi; when the reorganisation of the conquered provincehas been begun; and when the desert railway
is still stretching steadily forward towardsabu hamed. the news of the fall of dongola created apanic in omdurman. great numbers of arabs, believing that the khalifa's power was aboutto collapse, fled from the city. all business was at a standstill. for several days therewere no executions. abdullah himself kept his house, and thus doubtfully concealed hisvexation and alarm from his subjects. on the fifth day, however, having recovered his ownconfidence, he proceeded to the mosque, and after the morning prayer ascended his smallwooden pulpit and addressed the assembled worshippers. after admitting the retreat ofthe dervishes under wad bishara, he enlarged on the losses the 'turks' had sustained anddescribed their miserable condition. he deplored
the fact that certain of the jehadia had surrendered,and reminded his listeners with a grim satisfaction of the horrible tortures which it was thepractice of the english and egyptians to inflict upon their captives. he bewailed the lackof faith in god which had allowed even the meanest of the ansar to abandon the jehadagainst the infidel, and he condemned the lack of piety which disgraced the age. buthe proclaimed his confidence in the loyalty of his subjects and his enjoyment of the favourof god and the counsels of the late mahdi; and having by his oratory raised the fanaticalmultitude to a high pitch of excitement, he thus concluded his long harangue: 'it is truethat our chiefs have retired from dongola. yet they are not defeated. only they thatdisobeyed me have perished. i instructed the
faithful to refrain from fighting and returnto metemma. it was by my command that they have done what they have done. for the angelof the lord and the spirit of the mahdi have warned me in a vision that the souls of theaccursed egyptians and of the miserable english shall leave their bodies between dongola andomdurman, at some spot which their bones shall whiten. thus shall the infidels be conquered.'then, drawing his sword, he cried with a loud voice: 'ed din mansur! the religion is victorious!islam shall triumph!' whereupon the worshippers, who to the number of 20,000 filled the greatquadrangle—although they could not all hear his voice—saw his sword flashing in thesunlight, and with one accord imitated him, waving their swords and spears, and raisinga mighty shout of fury and defiance. when
the tumult had subsided, the khalifa announcedthat those who did not wish to remain faithful might go where they liked, but that he forhis part would remain, knowing that god would vindicate the faith. public confidence wasthus restored. in order that the divine favour might be assistedby human effort, abdullah adopted every measure or precaution that energy or prudence couldsuggest. at first he seems to have apprehended that the sirdar's army would advance at onceupon omdurman, following the route of the desert column in 1885 from korti to metemma.he therefore ordered osman azrak—in spite of his severe wound—to hold abu klea wellswith the survivors of his flag. bishara, who had rallied and reorganised the remains ofthe dongola army, was instructed to occupy
metemma, the headquarters of the jaalin. messengerswere despatched to the most distant garrisons to arrange for a general concentration uponomdurman. the emir ibrahim khalil was recalled from the ghezira, or the land between theblue and white niles, and with his force of about 4,000 jehadia and baggara soon reachedthe city. another chief, ahmed fedil, who was actually on his way to gedaref, was orderedto return to the capital. thither also osman digna repaired from adarama. but it appearsthat the khalifa only required the advice of that wily councillor, for he did not reducethe number of dervishes in the small forts along the line of the atbara—ed darner,adarama, asubri, el fasher—and after a short visit and a long consultation osman dignareturned to his post at adarama. last of all,
but not least in importance, mahmud, who commandedthe 'army of the west,' was ordered to leave very reduced garrisons in kordofan and darfur,and march with his whole remaining force, which may have numbered 10,000 fighting men,to the nile, and so to omdurman. mahmud, who was as daring and ambitious as he was conceitedand incapable, received the summons with delight, and began forthwith to collect his troops. the khalifa saw very clearly that he couldnot trust the riverain tribes. the jaalin and barabra were discontented. he knew thatthey were weary of his rule and of war. in proportion as the egyptian army advanced,so their loyalty and the taxes they paid decreased. he therefore abandoned all idea of makinga stand at berber. the emir yunes—who, since
he had been transferred from dongola in 1895,had ruled the district—was directed to collect all the camels, boats, grain, and other thingsthat might assist an invading army and send them to metemma. the duty was most thoroughlyperformed. the inhabitants were soon relieved of all their property and of most of theirmeans of livelihood, and their naturally bitter resentment at this merciless treatment explainsto some extent the astonishing events which followed the capture of abu hamed. this lastplace abdullah never regarded as more than an outpost. its garrison was not large, andalthough it had now become the most northerly dervish position, only a slender reinforcementwas added to the force under the command of mohammed-ez-zein.
the power of the gunboats and their effectin the dongola campaign were fully appreciated by the arabs; and the khalifa, in the hopesof closing the sixth cataract, began to construct several forts at the northern end of the shablukagorge. the bordein, one of gordon's old steamers, plied busily between omdurman and wad hamed,transporting guns and stores; and ahmed fedil was sent with a sufficient force to hold theworks when they were made. but the prophecy of the mahdi exercised a powerful effect onthe khalifa's mind, and while he neglected no detail he based his hopes on the issueof a great battle on the plains of kerreri, when the invaders should come to the wallsof the city. with this prospect continually before him he drilled and organised the increasingarmy at omdurman with the utmost regularity,
and every day the savage soldiery practisedtheir evolutions upon the plain they were presently to strew with their bodies. but after a while it became apparent thatthe 'turks' were not advancing. they tarried on the lands they had won. the steamers wentno further than merawi. the iron road stopped at kerma. why had they not followed up theirsuccess? obviously because they feared the army that awaited them at omdurman. at thisthe khalifa took fresh courage, and in january 1897 he began to revolve schemes for takingthe offensive and expelling the invaders from the dongola province. the army drilled andmanoeuvred continually on the plains of kerreri; great numbers of camels were collected atomdurman; large stores of dried kisru or 'soudan
biscuit,' the food of dervishes on expeditions,were prepared. the sirdar did not remain in ignorance ofthese preparations. the tireless enterprise of the intelligence branch furnished the mostcomplete information; and preparations were made to concentrate the troops in dongolaon any threatened point, should the enemy advance. regular reconnaissances were madeby the cavalry both into the desert towards gakdul wells and along the river. towardsthe end of may it was reported that the emir yunes had crossed the nile and was raidingthe villages on the left bank below abu hamed. in consequence the sirdar ordered a strongpatrol under captain le gallais, and consisting of three squadrons of cavalry under captainmahon, three companies of the camel corps,
and 100 men of the ixth soudanese on camels,with one maxim gun, to reconnoitre up the nile through the shukuk pass and as far assalamat. the outward journey was unbroken by incident;but as the patrol was returning it was attacked by an equal force of dervishes, and a sharplittle skirmish ensued in which one british officer—captain peyton—was severely wounded,nine egyptian troopers were killed, and three others wounded. this proof that the dervisheswere on the move enforced the greatest vigilance in all the dongola garrisons. at the end of may, mahmud with his army arrivedat omdurman. the khalifa received him with delight, and several imposing reviews wereheld outside the city. mahmud himself was
eager to march against the 'turks.' he hadno experience of modern rifles, and felt confident that he could easily destroy or at least rollback the invading forces. partly persuaded by the zeal of his lieutenant, and partlyby the wavering and doubtful attitude of the jaalin, the khalifa determined early in juneto send the kordofan army to occupy metemma, and thereby either to awe the tribe into loyalty,or force them to revolt while the egyptian troops were still too distant to assist them.he summoned the chief of the jaalin, abdalla-wad-saad, to omdurman, and informed him that the jaalinterritories were threatened by the turks. in the goodness of his heart, therefore, andbecause he knew that they loved the mahdi and practised the true religion, he was resolvedto protect them from their enemies. the chief
bowed his head. the khalifa continued thatthe trusty mahmud with his army would be sent for that purpose; abdalla might show his loyaltyin furnishing them with all supplies and accommodation. he intimated that the interview was over.but the jaalin chief had the temerity to protest. he assured the khalifa of his loyalty, andof the ability of his tribe to repel the enemy. he implored him not to impose the burden ofan army upon them. he exaggerated the poverty of metemma; he lamented the misfortunes ofthe times. finally he begged forgiveness for making his protest. the khalifa was infuriated. forgetting hisusual self-control and the forms of public utterance, he broke out into a long and abusiveharangue. he told the chief that he had long
doubted his loyalty, that he despised hisprotestations, that he was worthy of a shameful death, that his tribe were a blot upon theface of the earth, and that he hoped mahmud would improve their manners and those of theirwives. abdalla-wad-saad crept from the presence,and returned in fury and disgust to metemma. having collected the head men of his tribe,he informed them of his reception and the khalifa's intent. they did not need to betold that the quartering upon them of mahmud's army meant the plunder of their goods, theruin of their homes, and the rape of their women. it was resolved to revolt and jointhe egyptian forces. as a result of the council the jaalin chief wrote two letters. the firstwas addressed to the sirdar, and reached general
rundle at merawi by messenger on the 24thof june. it declared the jaalin submission to the government, and begged for help, ifpossible in men, or, failing that, in arms; but ended by saying that, help or no help,the tribe were resolved to fight the dervishes and hold metemma to the death. the secondletter—a mad and fatal letter—carried defiance to the khalifa. rundle, who was at merawi when the jaalinmessenger found him, lost no time. a large amount of ammunition and 1,100 remington rifleswere speedily collected and hurried on camels across the desert by the korti-metemma route,escorted by a strong detachment of the camel corps. the khalifa did not receive his letteruntil the 27th of june. but he acted with
even greater promptitude. part of mahmud'sarmy had already started for the north. mahmud and the rest followed on the 28th. on the30th the advanced guard arrived before metemma. the jaalin prepared to resist desperately.nearly the whole tribe had responded to the summons of their chief, and more than 2,500men were collected behind the walls of the town. but in all this force there were onlyeighty serviceable rifles, and only fifteen rounds of ammunition each. abdalla expectedthat the dervishes would make their heaviest attack on the south side of metemma, and hetherefore disposed his few riflemen along that front. the defence of the rest of thetown had perforce to be entrusted to the valour of the spearmen.
on the morning of the 1st of july, mahmud,with a force variously estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men, began his assault. the firstattack fell, as the chief had anticipated, on the southern face. it was repulsed withsevere loss by the jaalin riflemen. a second attack followed immediately. the enemy hadmeanwhile surrounded the whole town, and just as the jaalin ammunition was exhausted a strongforce of the dervishes penetrated the northern face of their defences, which was held onlyby spearmen. the whole of mahmud's army poured in through the gap, and the garrison, aftera stubborn resistance, were methodically exterminated. an inhuman butchery of the children and someof the women followed. abdalla-wad-saad was among the killed.
a few of the jaalin who had escaped from thegeneral destruction fled towards gakdul. here they found the camel corps with their caravanof rifles and ammunition. like another force that had advanced by this very road to carrysuccour to men in desperate distress, the relief had arrived too late. the remnantsof the jaalin were left in occupation of gakdul wells. the convoy and its escort returnedto korti. but while the attention of the khalifa wasdirected to these matters, a far more serious menace offered from another quarter. unnoticedby the dervishes, or, if noticed, unappreciated, the railway was stretching farther and fartherinto the desert. by the middle of july it had reached the 130th mile, and, as is relatedin the last chapter, work had to be suspended
until abu hamed was in the hands of the egyptianforces. the nile was rising fast. very soon steamers would be able to pass the fourthcataract. it should have been evident that the next movement in the advance of the 'turks'impended. the khalifa seems, indeed, to have understood that the rise of the river increasedhis peril, for throughout july he continued to send orders to the emir in berber—yunes—thathe should advance into the monassir district, harry such villages as existed, and obstructthe frequent reconnaissances from merawi. yunes, however, preferred to do otherwise,and remained on the left bank opposite berber until, at length, his master recalled himto omdurman to explain his conduct. meanwhile, determined with mathematical exactness bythe rise of the nile and progress of the railway,
the moment of the egyptian advance arrived. at the end of july preparations were made,as secretly as possible, to despatch a flying column against abu hamed. the dervish garrison,under mohammed-ez-zein, was not believed to exceed 600 men, but in order that there shouldbe no doubt as to the result it was determined to employ a strong force. a brigade of all arms was formed as follows:— commanding: major-general hunter cavalry....... one troopartillery ...... no. 2 field battery [this battery consisted of six krupp guns,two maxims, one gardner gun,
and one nordenfeldt—an effective medley.] infantry....... macdonald's brigade—3rd egyptian —ixth soudanese—xth " —xith " major-general sir archibald hunter, the officerto whom the operation was entrusted, was from many points of view the most imposing figurein the egyptian army. he had served through the nile expedition of 1884-85, with somedistinction, in the khedive's service. thenceforward his rise was rapid, even for an egyptian officer,and in ten years he passed through all the grades from captain to major-general. hispromotion was not, however, undeserved. foremost
in every action, twice wounded—once at thehead of his brigade—always distinguished for valour and conduct, hunter won the admirationof his comrades and superiors. during the river war he became, in spite of his hardseverity, the darling of the egyptian army. all the personal popularity which great successmight have brought to the sirdar focussed itself on his daring, good-humoured subordinate,and it was to hunter that the soldiers looked whenever there was fighting to be done. theforce now placed under his command for the attack upon abu hamed amounted to about 3,600men. until that place was taken all other operations were delayed. the sirdar awaitedthe issue at merawi. the railway paused in mid-desert.
the troops composing the 'flying column' concentratedat kassingar, a small village a few miles above merawi, on the right (or abu hamed)bank of the nile. general hunter began his march on the 29th of july. the total distancefrom kassingar to abu hamed is 146 miles. the greatest secrecy had been observed inthe preparation of the force, but it was known that as soon as the column actually startedthe news would be carried to the enemy. speed was therefore essential; for if the dervishgarrison in abu hamed were reinforced from berber, the flying column might not be strongenough to take the village. on the other hand, the great heat and the certainty that thetroops would have to fight an action at the end of the march imposed opposite considerationson the commander. to avoid the sun, the greater
part of the distance was covered at night.yet the advantage thus gained was to some extent neutralised by the difficulty of marchingover such broken ground in the darkness. throughout the whole length of the courseof the nile there is no more miserable wilderness than the monassir desert. the stream of theriver is broken and its channel obstructed by a great confusion of boulders, betweenand among which the water rushes in dangerous cataracts. the sandy waste approaches thevery brim, and only a few palm-trees, or here and there a squalid mud hamlet, reveal theexistence of life. the line of advance lay along the river; but no road relieved thelabour of the march. sometimes trailing across a broad stretch of white sand, in which thesoldiers sank to their ankles, and which filled
their boots with a rasping grit; sometimeswinding over a pass or through a gorge of sharp-cut rocks, which, even in the moonlight,felt hot with the heat of the previous day—always in a long, jerky, and interrupted processionof men and camels, often in single file—the column toiled painfully like the serpent towhom it was said, 'on thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat.' the column started at 5.30 in the evening,and by a march of sixteen and a half miles reached mushra-el-obiad at about midnight.here a convenient watering-place, not commanded by the opposite bank, and the shade of eightor ten thorny bushes afforded the first suitable bivouac. at 3.30 p.m. on the 30th the marchwas continued eight and a half miles to a
spot some little distance beyond shebabit.the pace was slow, and the route stony and difficult. it was after dark when the halting-placewas reached. several of the men strayed from the column, wandered in the gloom, and reachedthe bivouac exhausted. general hunter had proposed to push on the next day to hosh-el-geref,but the fatigues of his troops in the two night marches had already been severe, andas, after abu haraz, the track twisted away from the river so that there was no waterfor five miles, he resolved to halt for the day and rest. hosh-el-geref was thereforenot reached until the 1st of august—a day later than had been expected; but the resthad proved of such benefit to the troops that the subsequent acceleration of progress fullycompensated for the delay. the column moved
on again at midnight and halted at daybreakat salmi. in the small hours of the next morning the march was resumed. the road by the nilewas found too difficult for the maxim guns, which were on wheels, and these had to makea detour of twenty-eight miles into the desert while the infantry moved ten miles along theriver. in order that the maxims should not arrive alone at dakfilli, general hunter hadmarched thither with the ixth soudanese at 11 p.m. on the previous day. the rest of thecolumn followed a few hours later. on the 4th, by an eighteen-mile march through deepsand, el kab was reached. a single shot was fired from the opposite bank of the riveras the cavalry patrol entered the village; and there was no longer any doubt that thedervishes knew of the advance of the column.
both the troops and the transport were nowmoving admirably; nevertheless, their sufferings were severe. the nights were consumed in movement. withoutshade the soldiers could not sleep by day. all ranks wearied, and the men would frequently,during the night marches, sink down upon the ground in profound slumber, only to be sternlyaroused and hurried on. but the pace of the advance continued to be swift. on the 5th,the force, by a fourteen-mile march, reached khula. here they were joined by sheikh abdel-azimwith 150 ababda camel-men from murat wells. up to this point three egyptians had diedand fifty-eight men had been left behind exhausted in depots. a double ration of meat was issuedto the whole force. the column moved on during
the night, and arrived at ginnifab at 8 a.m.on the morning of the 6th. here startling news of the enemy was received. it was knownthat mohammed-ez-zein was determined to fight, and a trustworthy report was now receivedthat a large force was coming down from berber to support the abu hamed garrison. in spiteof the long marches and the fatigues of the troops, general hunter resolved to hurry on.he had already made up the day spent at abu haraz. he now decided to improve on the prescribeditinerary, accelerate his own arrival and anticipate that of the dervish reinforcements.accordingly the troops marched all through the night of the 6-7th with only a short haltof an hour and a half, so as to attack abu hamed at dawn. after covering sixteen milesof bad ground, the 'flying column' reached
ginnifab, 144 miles from kassingar and onlytwo from the dervish post, at 3.30 on the morning of the 7th of august. a halt of twohours was allowed for the troops to prepare themselves. half the 3rd egyptian battalionremained as escort to the transport and reserve ammunition, and then the force moved off inthe darkness towards the enemy's position. the village of abu hamed straggles along thebank of the nile, and consists of a central mass of mud houses, intersected by a networkof winding lanes and alleys, about 500 yards long by perhaps 100 yards wide. to the northand south are detached clusters of ruined huts, and to the south there rises a large,ragged pile of rocks. the ground slopes gradually up from the river, so that at a distance of300 yards the village is surrounded on three
sides by a low plateau. upon this plateaustand three stone watch-towers, which were erected by general gordon. the dervish garrisonwere strongly posted in shelter trenches and loop-holed houses along the eastern face ofthe village. the towers were held by their outposts. making a wide circuit to their left, and thenswinging round to the right, so as to front facing the river, the brigade silently movedtowards the enemy's position, and at a quarter past six occupied the plateau in a crescent-shapedformation; the xith soudanese on the right, opposite the north-east corner of the village;the battery, escorted by the remaining half-battalion of the 3rd egyptians, next; then the ixthin the centre, and the xth soudanese on the
left flank. as the troops approached the watch-towersthe dervish outposts fell back and the force continued to advance until the edge of theplateau was reached. from here the whole scene was visible. the day was just breaking, and the mist hunglow and white over the steel-grey surface of the river. the outlines of the mud houseswere sharply defined on this pale background. the dervish riflemen crouched in the sheltertrench that ran round the village. their cavalry, perhaps a hundred strong, were falling inhurriedly on the sandy ground to the south near the ragged rocks. the curve of the hills,crowned with the dark line of the troops, completed and framed the picture. within thissmall amphitheatre one of the minor dramas
of war was now to be enacted. at half past six the battery came into action,and after a few shells had been fired at the loopholed houses in the left centre of theposition, a general advance was ordered. in excellent order the three soudanese battalions,with general hunter, lieut.-colonel macdonald, and the other british officers on horsebackin front of their line, advanced slowly down the hill, opening a destructive fire on theentrenchment. the distance was scarcely three hundred yards; but the crescent formationof the attack made the lines of advance converge, and before half the distance was covered thexth were compelled to halt, lest the xith soudanese on the right flank should fire intothem. the dervishes remained silent until
the troops were within a hundred yards, whenthey discharged two tremendous volleys, which were chiefly effective upon the halted battalion.major sidney, lieutenant fitzclarence, and a dozen men were shot dead. more than fiftymen were wounded. all the soudanese thereupon with a loud shout rushed upon the entrenchment,stormed it, and hunted the dervishes into the houses. in the street-fighting which followed,the numbers of the troops prevailed. the advance scarcely paused until the river bank was reached,and by 7.30 abu hamed was in the possession of the egyptian forces. the dervish horsemen, who had remained spectatorsnear the southern crag during the attack, fled towards berber as soon as they saw theattack successful. scarcely any of the infantry
escaped. in this action, besides the two british officers,major h. m. sidney and lieutenant e. fitzclarence, 21 native soldiers were killed; 61 nativesoldiers were wounded. the news of the capture of abu hamed was carriedswiftly by camel and wire to all whom it might concern. the sirdar, anticipating the result,had already ordered the gunboats to commence the passage of the fourth cataract. the campat railhead sprang to life after an unaccustomed rest, and the line began again to grow rapidly.the dervishes who were hurrying from berber were only twenty miles from abu hamed whenthey met the fugitives. they immediately turned back, and retired to the foot of the fifthcataract, whence after a few days' halt they
continued their retreat. their proximity tothe captured village shows how little time the column had to spare, and that generalhunter was wise to press his marches. the emir who commanded at berber heard of theloss of the outpost on the 9th. he sent the messenger on to metemma. mahmud replied onthe 11th that he was starting at once with his whole army to reinforce berber. apparently,however, he did not dare to move without the khalifa's permission; for his letters, aslate as the 20th, show that he had not broken his camp, and was still asking the emir forinformation as to the doings of the 'turks.' of a truth there was plenty to tell. on the 4th of august the gunboats el teb andtamai approached the fourth cataract to ascend
to the abu hamed-berber reach of the river.major david was in charge of the operation. lieutenants hood and beatty (royal navy) commandedthe vessels. two hundred men of the 7th egyptians were towed in barges to assist in haulingthe steamers in the difficult places. the current was, however, too strong, and it wasfound necessary to leave three barges, containing 160 soldiers, at the foot of the rapids. nevertheless,as the cataract was not considered a very formidable barrier, major david determinedto make the attempt. early on the 5th, therefore, the tamai tried the ascent. about 300 localshaiggia tribesmen had been collected, and their efforts were directed—or, as the resultproved, mis-directed—by those few of the egyptian soldiers who had not been left behind.the steamer, with her engines working at full
speed, succeeded in mounting half the distance.but the rush of water was then so great that her bows were swept round, and, after a narrowescape of capsizing, she was carried swiftly down the stream. the officers thought that this failure wasdue to the accidental fouling of a rope at a critical moment, and to the fact that therewere not enough local tribesmen pulling at the hawsers. four hundred more shaiggia weretherefore collected from the neighbouring villages, and in the afternoon the teb attemptedthe passage. her fortunes were far worse than those of the tamai. owing to the lack of co-operationand discipline among the local tribesmen, their utter ignorance of what was requiredof them, and the want of proper supervision,
the hauling power was again too weak. againthe bows of the steamer were swept round, and, as the hawsers held, a great rush ofwater poured over the bulwarks. in ten seconds the teb heeled over and turned bottom upwards.the hawsers parted under this new strain, and she was swept down stream with only herkeel showing. lieutenant beatty and most of the crew were thrown, or glad to jump, intothe foaming water of the cataract, and, being carried down the river, were picked up belowthe rapids by the tamai, which was luckily under steam. their escape was extraordinary,for of the score who were flung into the water only one egyptian was drowned. two other menwere, however, missing, and their fate seemed certain. the capsized steamer, swirled alongby the current, was jammed about a mile below
the cataract between two rocks, where shebecame a total wreck. anxious to see if there was any chance of raising her, the officersproceeded in the tamai to the scene. the bottom of the vessel was just visible above the surface.it was evident to all that her salvage would be a work of months. the officers were aboutto leave the wreck, when suddenly a knocking was heard within the hull. tools were brought,a plate was removed, and there emerged, safe and sound from the hold in which they hadbeen thus terribly imprisoned, the second engineer and a stoker. when the rapidity withwhich the steamer turned upside down, with the engines working, the fires burning, andthe boilers full—the darkness, with all the floors become ceilings—the violent inrushof water—the wild career down the stream—are
remembered, it will be conceded that the experienceof these men was sufficiently remarkable. search was now made for another passage. thiswas found on the 6th, nearer the right bank of the river. on the 8th the metemma arrivedwith 300 more men of the 7th egyptians. three days were spent in preparations and to allowthe nile to rise a little more. on the 13th, elaborate precautions being observed, themetemma passed the cataract safely, and was tied up to the bank on the higher reach. thetamai followed the next day. on the 19th and 20th the new gunboats fateh, naser, and zafir,the most powerful vessels on the river, accomplished the passage. meanwhile the metemma and tamaihad already proceeded up stream. on the 23rd the unarmed steamer dal made the ascent, andby the 29th the whole flotilla reached abu
hamed safely. after the arrival of the gunboats events beganto move at the double. the sudden dart upon abu hamed had caused the utmost consternationamong the dervishes. finding that mahmud was not going to reinforce him, and fearing thetreachery of the local tribes, zeki osman, the emir in berber, decided to fall back,and on the 24th he evacuated berber and marched south. on the 27th general hunter at abu hamedheard that the dervish garrison had left the town. the next day he despatched abdel-azim,the chief of irregulars, and ahmed bey khalifa, his brother, with forty ababda tribesmen,to reconnoitre. these bold fellows pushed on recklessly, and found the inhabitants everywhereterrified or acquiescent. spreading extraordinary
tales of the strength of the army who werefollowing them, they created a panic all along the river, and, in spite of a sharp fightwith a dervish patrol, reached berber on the 31st. as there was no armed force in the town,the enterprising allies rode into the streets and occupied the grain store—the only publicbuilding—in the name of the government. they then sent word back to abu hamed of whatthey had done, and sat down in the town, thus audaciously captured, to await developments. the astonishing news of the fall of berberreached general hunter on the 2nd of september. he immediately telegraphed to merawi. sirherbert kitchener was confronted with a momentous question: should berber be occupied or not?it may at first seem that there could be little
doubt about the matter. the objective of theexpedition was omdurman. the occupation of berber by an egyptian garrison would settleat once the difficulties near suakin. the town was believed to be on the clear waterwayto the dervish capital. the moral effect of its capture upon the riverain tribes and throughoutthe soudan would be enormous. berber was, in fact, the most important strategic pointon the whole line of advance. this great prize and advantage was now to be had for the asking. the opposite considerations were, however,tremendous. abu hamed marked a definite stage in the advance. as long as merawi and theother posts in dongola were strongly held, the line from abu hamed to debba was capableof easy defence. abu hamed could soon be made
impregnable to dervish attack. the forcesin dongola could be quickly concentrated on any threatened point. at this moment in thecampaign it was possible to stop and wait with perfect safety. in the meantime the khalifawould steadily weaken and the railway might steadily grow. when the line reached the angleof the river, it would be time to continue the systematic and cautious advance. untilthen prudence and reason counselled delay. to occupy berber was to risk much. mahmud,with a large and victorious army, lay at metemma. osman digna, with 2,000 men, held adaramaalmost within striking distance. the railway still lagged in the desert. the dongola garrisonsmust be weakened to provide a force for berber. the dervishes had the advantage of occupyingthe interior of the angle which the nile forms
at abu hamed. the troops in berber would haveto draw their supplies by a long and slender line of camel communication, winding alongall the way from merawi, and exposed, as a glance at the map will show, throughout itswhole length to attack. more than all this: to advance to berber must inevitably forcethe development of the whole war. the force in the town would certainly have its communicationsthreatened, would probably have to fight for its very existence. the occupation of berberwould involve sooner or later a general action; not a fight like firket, hafir, or abu hamed,with the advantage of numbers on the side of the egyptian troops, but an even battle.for such a struggle british troops were necessary. at this time it seemed most unlikely thatthey would be granted. but if berber was occupied,
the war, until the arrival of british troops,would cease to be so largely a matter of calculation, and must pass almost entirely into the sphereof chance. the whole situation was premature and unforeseen. the sirdar had already wonsuccess. to halt was to halt in safety; to go on was to go on at hazard. most of theofficers who had served long in the egyptian army understood the question. they waitedthe decision in suspense. the sirdar and the consul-general unhesitatinglyfaced the responsibility together. on the 3rd of september general hunter received ordersto occupy berber. he started at once with 350 men of the ixth soudanese on board thegunboats tamai, zafir, naser, and fateh. shortly after daybreak on the 5th the egyptian flagwas hoisted over the town. having disembarked
the infantry detachment, the flotilla steamedsouth to try to harass the retreating emir. they succeeded; for on the next day they caughthim, moving along the bank in considerable disorder, and, opening a heavy fire, soondrove the mixed crowd of fugitives, horse and foot, away from the river into the desert.the gunboats then returned to berber, towing a dozen captured grain-boats. meanwhile thesirdar had started for the front himself. riding swiftly with a small escort acrossthe desert from merawi, he crossed the nile at the baggara cataract and reached berberon the 10th of september. having inspected the immediate arrangements for defence, hewithdrew to abu hamed, and there busily prepared to meet the developments which he well knewmight follow at once, and must follow in the
course of a few months. chapter x: berber the town of berber stands at a little distancefrom the nile, on the right bank of a channel which is full only when the river is in flood.between this occasional stream and the regular waterway there runs a long strip of rich alluvialsoil, covered during the greater part of the year with the abundant crops which resultfrom its annual submersion and the thick coating of nile mud which it then receives. the situationof berber is fixed by this fertile tract, and the houses stretch for more than sevenmiles along it and the channel by which it is caused. the town, as is usual on the nile,is comparatively narrow, and in all its length
it is only at one point broader than three-quartersof a mile. two wide streets run longitudinally north and south from end to end, and fromthese many narrow twisting alleys lead to the desert or the river. the berber of egyptiandays lies in ruins at the southern end of the main roads. the new town built by thedervishes stands at the north. both are foul and unhealthy; and if old berber is the moredilapidated, new berber seemed to the british officers who visited it to be in a more activestate of decay. the architectural style of both was similar. the houses were constructedby a simple method. a hole was dug in the ground. the excavated mud formed the wallsof the building. the roof consisted of palm-leaves and thorn bushes. the hole became a convenientcesspool. such was berber, and this 'emporium
of soudan trade,' as it has been called byenthusiasts, contained at the time of its recapture by the egyptian forces a miserablepopulation of 5,000 males and 7,000 females, as destitute of property as their dwellingswere of elegance. the egyptian garrison of berber at first consistedonly of the 350 men of the ixth soudanese, and two companies of the camel corps, whoarrived on the 16th of september, having marched across the desert from merawi. but the proximityof osman digna at adarama made it necessary speedily to strengthen the force. during the latter part of september macdonald'sbrigade, with the exception of half the 3rd egyptians, was moved south from abu hamed,and by the end of the month the infantry in
berber were swollen to three and a half battalions.this was further increased on the 11th of october by the arrival of the xiiith soudaneseand the remaining half of the 3rd egyptians, and thereafter the place was held by fivebattalions (3rd, ixth, xth, xith, xiiith), no. 2 field battery, and two companies ofthe camel corps. as all the dervishes on the right bank of the nile had fled to the southof the atbara, it was found possible to establish a small advanced post of camel corps and friendlyarabs in the village of dakhila, at the confluence of the rivers. from this humble beginningthe atbara fort with its great entrenchment was soon to develop. the effect of the occupation of berber uponthe tribes around suakin was decisive, and
the whole country between these towns becameat once tranquil and loyal. osman digna's influence was destroyed. the friendly villageswere no longer raided. the governor of the town became in reality, as well as in name,the governor of the red sea littoral. the route from suakin to berber was opened; anda camel corps patrol, several small caravans of traders, and a party of war correspondents—whomight boast that they were the first europeans to make the journey for thirteen years—passedsafely along it. it is now necessary to look to the enemy.had the khalifa allowed the emir mahmud to march north immediately after the destructionof the dervish outpost in abu hamed, the course of the operations would have been very different.mahmud would certainly have defended berber
with his whole army. the advance of the expeditionaryforce must have been delayed until the desert railway reached the river, and probably foranother year. but, as the last chapter has described, the sudden seizure of abu hamed,the defection of the riverain tribes, and the appearance of the gunboats above the fourthcataract persuaded abdullah that the climax of the war approached, and that he was aboutto be attacked in his capital. he accordingly devoted himself to his preparations for defence,and forbade his lieutenant to advance north of metemma or attempt any offensive operations.in consequence berber fell, and its fall convinced the khalifa that his belief was well founded.he worked with redoubled energy. an elaborate system of forts armed with artillery was constructedoutside the great wall of omdurman along the
river-bank. the concentration of arab andblack soldiery from gedaref, kordofan, and darfur continued. large quantities of grain,of camels and other supplies, were requisitioned from the people of the ghezira (the countrylying between the blue and white niles) and stored or stabled in the city. the discontentto which this arbitrary taxation gave rise was cured by a more arbitrary remedy. as manyof the doubtful and embittered tribesmen as could be caught were collected in omdurman,where they were compelled to drill regularly, and found it prudent to protest their loyalty.the strength and tenacity of the ruler were surprisingly displayed. the khalifa sherif,who had been suspected of sympathising with the jaalin, was made a prisoner at large.the direst penalties attended the appearance
of sedition. a close cordon around the city,and especially towards the north, prevented much information from reaching the egyptiantroops; and though small revolts broke out in kordofan in consequence of the withdrawalof mahmud's army, the dervish empire as a whole remained submissive, and the khalifawas able to muster all its remaining force to meet the expected onslaught of his enemies. during the first week in october the sirdardecided to send the gunboats—which now plied, though with some difficulty, up and down thefifth cataract—to reconnoitre metemma and discover the actual strength and positionof mahmud's army. on the 14th the zafir, fateh, and naser steamed south from berber, undercommander keppel, each carrying, besides its
ordinary native crew, fifty men of the ixthsoudanese and two british sergeants of marine artillery. shortly after daybreak on the 16ththe flotilla approached the enemy's position. so silently had they moved that a small dervishoutpost a few miles to the north of shendi was surprised still sleeping, and the negligentguards, aroused by a splutter of firing from the maxim guns, awoke to find three terriblemachines close upon them. the gunboats pursued their way, and, disdaining a few shots whichwere fired from the ruins of shendi, arrived, at about seven o'clock, within range of metemma.the town itself stood more than a thousand yards from the nile, but six substantial mudforts, armed with artillery, lined and defended the riverside. creeping leisurely forwardalong the east bank, remote from the dervish
works, the flotilla came into action at arange of 4,000 yards. the fire was at first concentrated on the two northern forts, andthe shells, striking the mud walls in rapid succession or bursting in the interior, soonenveloped them in dust and smoke. the dervishes immediately replied, but the inferiority oftheir skill and weapons was marked, and, although their projectiles reached the flotilla, veryfew took effect. one shell, however, crashed through the deck of the zafir, mortally woundinga soudanese soldier, and two struck the fateh. after the long-range bombardment had continuedfor about an hour the gunboats moved forward opposite to the enemy's position, and poureda heavy and continuous fire of shrapnel and double shell into all the forts, graduallysubduing their resistance. the fugitives from
the batteries, and small parties of baggarahorse who galloped about on the open plain between the works and the town, afforded goodtargets to the maxims, and many were licked up even at extreme ranges. no sooner had the gunboats passed the fortsthan the dervish fire ceased entirely, and it was discovered that their embrasures onlycommanded the northern approach. as the guns could not be pointed to the southward, theflotilla need fear nothing from any fort that had been left behind. the officers were congratulatingthemselves on the folly of their foes, when danger threatened from another quarter. theboats had hugged the eastern bank as closely as possible during their duel with the forts.they were scarcely a hundred yards from the
shore, when suddenly a sharp fire of musketrywas opened from twenty or thirty dervish rifle-men concealed in the mimosa scrub. the bulletspattered all over the decks, but while many recorded narrow escapes no one was actuallyhit, and the maxim guns, revolving quickly on their pivots, took a bloody vengeance forthe surprise. the flotilla then steamed slowly past the town, and, having thoroughly reconnoitredit, turned about and ran down stream, again exchanging shells with the dervish artillery.all firing ceased at half-past two; but six sailing-boats containing grain were capturedon the return voyage, and with these the gunboats retired in triumph to a small island six milesnorth of metemma, where they remained for the night.
it being now known that bombarding the dervisheswas no less enjoyable than exciting, it was determined to spend another day with them;and at four o'clock the next morning the flotilla again steamed southward, so as to be in positionopposite metemma before daylight. fire was opened on both sides with the dawn, and itwas at once evident that the dervishes had not been idle during the night. it appearedthat on the previous day mahmud had expected a land attack from the direction of gakdul,and had placed part of his artillery and nearly all his army in position to resist it. butas soon as he was convinced that the gunboats were unsupported he moved several of the landwardguns into the river forts, and even built two new works, so that on the 17th the dervishesbrought into action eleven guns, firing from
eight small round forts. the gunboats, however,contented themselves with keeping at a range at which their superior weapons enabled themto strike without being struck, and so, while inflicting heavy loss on their enemies, sustainedno injury themselves. after four hours' methodical and remorseless bombardment commander keppelconsidered the reconnaissance complete, and gave the order to retire down stream. thedervish gunners, elated in spite of their losses by the spectacle of the retreatingvessels, redoubled their fire, and continued hurling shell after shell in defiance downthe river until their adversaries were far beyond their range. as the gunboats floatednorthward their officers, looking back towards metemma, saw an even stranger scene than theimpotent but exulting forts. during the morning
a few flags and figures had been distinguishedmoving about the low range of sandhills near the town; and as soon as the retirement ofthe flotilla began, the whole of the dervish army, at least 10,000 men, both horse andfoot, and formed in an array more than a mile in length, marched triumphantly into view,singing, shouting, and waving their banners amid a great cloud of dust. it was their onlyvictory. the loss on the gunboats was limited to thesingle soudanese soldier, who died of his wounds, and a few trifling damages. the arabslaughter is variously estimated, one account rating it at 1,000 men; but half that numberwould probably be no exaggeration. the gunboats fired in the two days' bombardment 650 shellsand several thousand rounds of maxim-gun ammunition.
they then returned to berber, reporting fullyon the enemy's position and army. as soon as berber had been strongly occupiedby the egyptian troops, osman digna realised that his position at adarama was not onlyuseless but very dangerous. mahmud had long been imperiously summoning him to join theforces at metemma; and although he hated the kordofan general, and resented his superiorauthority, the wary and cunning osman decided that in this case it would be convenient toobey and make a virtue of necessity. accordingly about the same time that the gunboats weremaking their first reconnaissance and bombardment of metemma, he withdrew with his two thousandhadendoa from adarama, moved along the left bank of the atbara until the tongue of desertbetween the rivers became sufficiently narrow
for it to be crossed in a day, and so madehis way by easy stages to shendi. when the sirdar heard of the evacuation ofadarama he immediately determined to assure himself of the fact, to reconnoitre the unmappedcountry in that region, and to destroy any property that osman might have left behindhim. on the 23rd of october, therefore, a flying column started from berber under thecommand of general hunter, and formed as follows: xith soudanese (major jackson), two guns,one company of the camel corps, and abdel-azim and 150 irregulars. lightly equipped, andcarrying the supplies on a train of 500 camels, the small force moved rapidly along the nileand reached the post at the confluence on the 24th, and arrived at adarama on the 29th,after a journey of eighty-four miles. the
report that osman digna had returned to thenile proved to be correct. his former headquarters were deserted, and although a patrol of sixtyof the camel corps and the arab irregulars scouted for forty miles further up the river,not a single dervish was to be seen. having thus collected a great deal of negative information,and delaying only to burn adarama to the ground, the column returned to berber. it was now november. the nile was fallingfast, and an impassable rapid began to appear at um tiur, four miles north of the confluence.the sirdar had a few days in which to make up his mind whether he would keep his gunboatson the upper or lower reach. as in the latter case their patrolling limits would have beenrestricted, and they would no longer have
been able to watch the army at metemma, hedetermined to leave them on the enemy's side of the obstruction. this involved the formationof a depot at dakhila ['atbara fort'], where simple repairs could be executed and woodand other necessities stored. to guard this little dockyard half the 3rd egyptian battalionwas moved from berber and posted in a small entrenchment. the other half-battalion followedin a few weeks. the post at the confluence was gradually growing into the great campof a few months later. a regular system of gunboat patrolling wasestablished on the upper reach, and on the 1st of november the zafir, naser, and metemma,under commander keppel, again steamed south to reconnoitre mahmud's position. the nextday they were joined by the fateh, and on
the 3rd the three larger boats ran the gauntletof the forts. a brisk artillery duel ensued, but the dervish aim was, as usual, erratic,and the vessels received no injury. it was observed that the position of the dervishforce was unchanged, but that three new forts had been constructed to the south of the town.the gunboats continued on their way and proceeded as far as wad habeshi. the arab cavalry keptpace with them along the bank, ready to prevent any landing. having seen all there was tobe seen, the flotilla returned and again passed the batteries at metemma. but this time theywere not unscathed, and a shell struck the fateh, slightly wounding three men. no other incident enlivened the monotony ofnovember. the khalifa continued his defensive
preparations. mahmud remained motionless atmetemma; and although he repeatedly begged to be allowed to advance against the forcenear berber he was steadily refused, and had to content himself with sending raiding partiesalong the left bank of the nile, and collecting large stores of grain from all the villageswithin his reach. meanwhile the railway was stretching further and further to the south,and the great strain which the sudden occupation of berber had thrown upon the transport wasto some extent relieved. the tranquillity which had followed the advance to berber wasas opportune as it was unexpected. the sirdar, delighted that no evil consequences had followedhis daring move, and finding that he was neither attacked nor harassed in any way, journeyedto kassala to arrange the details of its retrocession.
the convenient situation of kassala—almostequally distant from omdurman, berber, suakin, massowa, and rosaires—and the fertilityof the surrounding region raise it to the dignity of the most important place in theeastern soudan. the soil is rich; the climate, except in the rainy season, not unhealthy.a cool night breeze relieves the heat of the day, and the presence of abundant water atthe depth of a few feet below the surface supplies the deficiency of a river. in theyear 1883 the population is said to have numbered more than 60,000. the egyptians consideredthe town of sufficient value to require a garrison of 3,900 soldiers. a cotton milladequately fitted with machinery and a factory chimney gave promise of the future developmentof manufacture. a regular revenue attested
the existence of trade. but disasters fellin heavy succession on the eastern soudan and blighted the prosperity of its mud metropolis.in 1885, after a long siege and a stubborn resistance, kassala was taken by the dervishes.the garrison were massacred, enslaved, or incorporated in the mahdi's army. the townwas plundered and the trade destroyed. for nearly ten years an arab force occupied theruins and a camp outside them. kassala became a frontier post of the dervish empire. itspopulation perished or fled to the italian territory. this situation might have remainedunaltered until after the battle of omdurman if the dervishes had been content with thepossession of kassala. but in 1893 the emir in command of the garrison, being anxiousto distinguish himself, disobeyed the khalifa's
instructions to remain on the defensive andattacked the europeans at agordat. the arab force of about 8,000 men were confronted by2,300 italian troops, protected by strong entrenchments, under colonel arimondi. aftera fierce but hopeless attack the dervishes were repulsed with a loss of 3,000 men, amongwhom was their rash leader. the engagement was, however, as disastrous to italy as tothe khalifa. the fatal african policy of signor crispi received a decided impetus, and inthe next year, agreeably to their aspirations in abyssinia, the italians under general baratieriadvanced from agordat and captured kassala. the occupation was provisionally recognisedby egypt without prejudice to her sovereign rights, and 900 italian regulars and irregularsestablished themselves in a well-built fort.
the severe defeat at adowa in 1896, the disgraceof baratieri, the destruction of his army, and the fall of the crispi cabinet rudelydispelled the african ambitions of italy. kassala became an encumbrance. nor was thatall. the dervishes, encouraged by the victory of the abyssinians, invested the fort, andthe garrison were compelled to fight hard to hold what their countrymen were anxiousto abandon. in these circumstances the italian government offered, at a convenient opportunity,to retrocede kassala to egypt. the offer was accepted, and an arrangement made. the advanceof the khedivial forces into the dongola province relieved, as has been described, the pressureof the dervish attacks. the arabs occupied various small posts along the atbara and inthe neighbourhood of the town, and contented
themselves with raiding. the italians remainedentirely on the defensive, waiting patiently for the moment when the fort could be handedover to the egyptian troops. the sirdar had no difficulty in coming toa satisfactory arrangement with general caneva, the italian commander. the fort was to beoccupied by an egyptian force, the stores and armament to be purchased at a valuation,and a force of italian arab irregulars to be transferred to the egyptian service. sirh. kitchener then returned to the nile, where the situation had suddenly become acute. duringnovember colonel parsons, the 16th egyptian battalion, and a few native gunners marchedfrom suakin, and on the 20th of december arrived at kassala. the italian irregulars—henceforthto be known as the arab battalion—were at
once despatched to the attack of the smalldervish posts at el fasher and asubri, and on the next day these places were surprisedand taken with scarcely any loss. the italian officers, although a little disgusted at theturn of events, treated the egyptian representatives with the most perfect courtesy, and the formaltransference of kassala fort was arranged to take place on christmas day. an imposing ceremonial was observed, and thescene itself was strange. the fort was oblong in plan, with mud ramparts and parapets piercedfor musketry. tents and stores filled the enclosure. in the middle stood the cottonfactory. its machinery had long since been destroyed, but the substantial building formedthe central keep of the fort. the tall chimney
had become a convenient look-out post. thelightning-conductor acted as a flagstaff. the ruins of the old town of kassala lay brownand confused on the plain to the southward, and behind all rose the dark rugged spursof the abyssinian mountains. the flags of egypt and of italy were hoisted. the troopsof both countries, drawn up in line, exchanged military compliments. then the egyptian guardmarched across the drawbridge into the fort and relieved the italian soldiers. the brassband of the 16th battalion played appropriate airs. the italian flag was lowered, and witha salute of twenty-one guns the retrocession of kassala was complete. here, then, for a year we leave colonel parsonsand his small force to swelter in the mud
fort, to carry on a partisan warfare withthe dervish raiders, to look longingly towards gedaref, and to nurse the hope that when omdurmanhas fallen their opportunity will come. the reader, like the sirdar, must return in ahurry to the upper nile. towards the end of november the khalifa hadbegun to realise that the turks did not mean to advance any further till the next floodof the river. he perceived that the troops remained near berber, and that the railwaywas only a little way south of abu hamed. the blow still impended, but it was delayed.as soon as he had come to this conclusion, he no longer turned a deaf ear to mahmud'ssolicitations. he knew that the falling nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats.he knew that there were only 2,000 men in
berber—a mere handful. he did not realisethe tremendous power of rapid concentration which the railway had given his enemies; andhe began to think of offensive operations. but mahmud should not go alone. the wholestrength of the dervish army should be exerted to drive back the invaders. all the troopsin omdurman were ordered north. a great camp was again formed near kerreri. thousands ofcamels were collected, and once more every preparation was made for a general advance.at the beginning of december he sent his own secretary to mahmud to explain the plan, andto assure him of early reinforcements and supplies. lastly, abdullah preached a newjehad, and it is remarkable that, while all former exhortations had been directed against'the infidel'—i.e., those who did not believe
in the mahdi—his letters and sermons onthis occasion summoned the tribes to destroy not the egyptians but the christians. thekhalifa had no doubts as to who inspired the movement which threatened him. there wereat this time scarcely 150 europeans in the soudan; but they had made their presence felt. the sirdar was returning from kassala whenthe rumours of an intended dervish advance began to grow. every scrap of informationwas assiduously collected by the intelligence department, but it was not until the 18thof december, just as he reached wady halfa, that the general received apparently certainnews that the khalifa, mahmud, all the emirs, and the whole army were about to march north.there can be no doubt that even this tardy
movement of the enemy seriously threatenedthe success of the operations. if the dervishes moved swiftly, it looked as if a very criticalengagement would have to be fought to avoid a damaging retreat. sir h. kitchener's replyto the khalifa's open intent was to order a general concentration of the available egyptianarmy towards berber, to telegraph to lord cromer asking for a british brigade, and toclose the suakin-berber route. the gunboat depot at the confluence, withonly a half-battalion escort, was now in an extremely exposed position. the gunboats couldnot steam north, for the cataract four miles below the confluence was already impassable.since they must remain on the enemy's side, so must their depot; and the depot must beheld by a much stronger force. although the
sirdar felt too weak to maintain himself evenon the defensive without reinforcements, he was now compelled to push still further south.on the 22nd of december lewis's brigade of four battalions and a battery were hurriedalong the nile to its junction with the atbara, and began busily entrenching themselves ina angle formed by the rivers. the atbara fort sprang into existence. meanwhile the concentration was proceeding.all the troops in dongola, with the exception of scanty garrisons in merawi, korti, anddebba, were massed at berber. the infantry and guns, dropping down the river in boats,entrained at kerma, were carried back to halfa, then hustled across the invaluable desertrailway, past abu hamed, and finally deposited
at railhead, which then (january 1) stoodat dakhesh. the whole journey by rail from merawi to dakhesh occupied four days, whereasgeneral hunter with his flying column had taken eight—a fact which proves that, incertain circumstances which euclid could not have foreseen, two sides of a triangle aretogether shorter than the third side. the egyptian cavalry at merawi received theirorders on the 25th of december, and the british officers hurried from their christmas dinnersto prepare for their long march across the bend of the nile to berber. of the eight squadrons,three were pushed on to join lewis's force at the position which will hereinafter becalled 'the atbara encampment,' or more familiarly 'the atbara'; three swelled the gatheringforces at berber; and two remained for the
present in the dongola province, looking anxiouslyout towards gakdul wells and metemma. the war office, who had been nervous aboutthe situation in the soudan since the hasty occupation of berber, and who had a very livelyrecollection of the events of 1884 and 1885, lost no time in the despatch of british troops;and the speed with which a force, so suddenly called for, was concentrated shows the capacityfor energy which may on occasion be developed even by our disjointed military organisation.the 1st battalions of the royal warwickshire regiment, of the lincoln regiment, and ofthe cameron highlanders were formed into a brigade and moved from cairo into the soudan.the 1st battalion of the seaforth highlanders was brought from malta to egypt, and heldin immediate readiness to reinforce the troops
at the front. other battalions were sent totake the places of those moved south, so that the army of occupation was not diminished. the officer selected for the command of thebritish brigade was a man of high character and ability. general gatacre had already leda brigade in the chitral expedition, and, serving under sir robert low and sir bindonblood had gained so good a reputation that after the storming of the malakand pass andthe subsequent action in the plain of khar it was thought desirable to transpose hisbrigade with that of general kinloch, and send gatacre forward to chitral. from themountains of the north-west frontier the general was ordered to bombay, and in a stubborn strugglewith the bubonic plague, which was then at
its height, he turned his attention from campsof war to camps of segregation. he left india, leaving behind him golden opinions, just beforethe outbreak of the great frontier rising, and was appointed to a brigade at aldershot.thence we now find him hurried to the soudan—a spare, middle-sized man, of great physicalstrength and energy, of marked capacity and unquestioned courage, but disturbed by a restlessirritation, to which even the most inordinate activity afforded little relief, and whichoften left him the exhausted victim of his own vitality. by the end of january a powerful force layencamped along the river from abu hamed to the atbara. meanwhile the dervishes made noforward movement. their army was collected
at kerreri; supplies were plentiful; all preparationshad been made. yet they tarried. the burning question of the command had arisen. a disputethat was never settled ensued. when the whole army was regularly assembled, the khalifaannounced publicly that he would lead the faithful in person; but at the same time hearranged privately that many emirs and notables should beg him not to expose his sacred person.after proper solicitation, therefore, he yielded to their appeals. then he looked round fora subordinate. the khalifa ali-wad-helu presented himself. in the soudan every advantage andhonour accrues to the possessor of an army, and the rival chief saw a chance of regaininghis lost power. this consideration was not, however, lost upon abdullah. he accepted theoffer with apparent delight, but he professed
himself unable to spare any rifles for thearmy which ali-wad-helu aspired to lead. 'alas!' he cried, 'there are none. but that will makeno difference to so famous a warrior.' ali-wad-helu, however, considered that it would make a greatdeal of difference, and declined the command. osman sheikh-ed-din offered to lead the army,if he might arm the riverain tribes and use them as auxiliaries to swell his force. thisroused the disapproval of yakub. such a policy, he declared, was fatal. the riverain tribeswere traitors—dogs—worthy only of being destroyed; and he enlarged upon the more refinedmethods by which his policy might be carried out. the squabble continued, until at lastthe khalifa, despairing of any agreement, decided merely to reinforce mahmud, and accordinglyordered the emir yunes to march to metemma
with about 5,000 men. but it was then discoveredthat mahmud hated yunes, and would have none of him. at this the khalifa broke up his camp,and the dervish army marched back for a second time, in vexation and disgust, to the city. it seemed to those who were acquainted withthe dervish movements that all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned.even in the intelligence department it was believed that the break-up of the kerrericamp was the end of the khalifa's determination to move north. there would be a hot and uneventfulsummer, and with the flood nile the expedition would begin its final advance. the news whichwas received on the 15th of february came as a great and pleasant surprise. mahmud wascrossing the nile and proposed to advance
on berber without reinforcements of any kind.the sirdar, highly satisfied at this astounding piece of good fortune, immediately began tomass his force nearer the confluence. on the 21st the british at abu dis were instructedto hold themselves in readiness. the seaforths began their journey from cairo, and the variousbattalions of the egyptian army pressed forward towards berber and atbara fort. on the 25th,mahmud being reported as having crossed to the right bank, the general concentrationwas ordered. chapter xi: reconnaissance although the story of a campaign is made upof many details which cannot be omitted, since they are essential to the truth as well asthe interest of the account, it is of paramount
importance that the reader should preservethroughout a general idea. for otherwise the marches, forays, and reconnaissance will seemdisconnected and purposeless affairs, and the battle simply a greater operation undertakenin the same haphazard fashion. to appreciate the tale it is less necessary to contemplatethe wild scenes and stirring incidents, than thoroughly to understand the logical sequenceof incidents which all tend to and ultimately culminate in a decisive trial of strength. the hazards which were courted by the daringoccupation of berber have been discussed in the last chapter. from october to decemberthe situation was threatening. in december it suddenly became critical. had the emirmahmud advanced with the dervishes at metemma
even as late as the middle of january, hemight possibly have re-captured berber. if the great omdurman army had taken the field,the possibility would have become a certainty. the young kordofan general saw his opportunity,and begged to be allowed to seize it. but it was not until the khalifa had sent hisown army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the numbers and dispositionof the egyptian force, he allowed the metemma dervishes to move. mahmud received permission to advance at theend of january. he eagerly obeyed the longed-for order. but the whole situation was now changed.the egyptian army was concentrated; the british brigade had arrived; the railway had reachedgeneinetti; the miserable hamlet of dakhila,
at the confluence, had grown from a smalldepot to a fort, and from a fort to an entrenched camp, against which neither dervish sciencenor strength could by any possibility prevail. perhaps mahmud did not realise the amazingpower of movement that the railway had given his foes; perhaps he still believed, withthe khalifa, that berber was held only by 2,000 egyptians; or else—and this is themost probable—he was reckless of danger and strong in his own conceit. at any rate,during the second week in february he began to transport himself across the nile, withthe plain design of an advance north. with all the procrastination of an arab he crawledleisurely forward towards the confluence of the rivers. at el aliab some idea of the strengthof the atbara entrenchment seems to have dawned
upon him. he paused undecided. a council washeld. mahmud was for a continued advance and for making a direct attack on the enemy'sposition. osman digna urged a more prudent course. many years of hard fighting againstdisciplined troops had taught the wily hadendoa slaver the power of modern rifles, and muchsound tactics besides. he pressed his case with jealous enthusiasm upon the commanderhe detested and despised. an insurmountable obstacle confronted them. yet what could notbe overcome might be avoided. the hardy dervishes could endure privations which would destroythe soldiers of civilisation. barren and inhospitable as was the desert, they might move round thearmy at the atbara fort and so capture berber after all. once they were behind the egyptians,these accursed ones were lost. the railway—that
mysterious source of strength—could be cut.the host that drew its life along it must fight at a fearful disadvantage or perishmiserably. besides, he reminded mahmud—not without reason—that they could count onhelp in berber itself. the agreement of the emirs, called to thecouncil, decided the dervish leader. his confidence in himself was weakened, his hatred of osmandigna increased. nevertheless, following the older man's advice, he left aliab on the 18thof march, and struck north-east into the desert towards the village and ford of hudi on theatbara river. thence by a long desert march he might reach the nile and berber. but whilehis information of the sirdar's force and movements was uncertain, the british generalwas better served. what mahmud failed to derive
from spies and 'friendlies,' his adversaryobtained by gunboats and cavalry. as soon, therefore, as sir h. kitchener learned thatthe dervishes had left the nile and were making a detour around his left flank, he marchedup the atbara river to hudi. this offered mahmud the alternative of attacking him ina strong position or of making a still longer detour. having determined upon caution hechose the latter, and, deflecting his march still more to the east, reached the atbaraat nakheila. but from this point the distance to berber was far too great for him to cover.he could not carry enough water in his skins. the wells were few, and held against him.further advance was impossible. so he waited and entrenched himself, sorely troubled, butuncertain what to do. supplies were running
short. his magazines at shendi had been destroyedas soon as he had left the nile. the dervishes might exist, but they did not thrive, on thenuts of the dom palms. soldiers began to desert. osman digna, although his advice had beenfollowed, was at open enmity. his army dwindled. and all this time his terrible antagonistwatched him as a tiger gloats on a helpless and certain prey—silent, merciless, inexorable.then the end came suddenly. as soon as the process of attrition was sufficiently faradvanced to demoralise the dervish host, without completely dissolving them, the sirdar andhis army moved. the victim, as if petrified, was powerless to fly. the tiger crept forwardtwo measured strides—from ras-el-hudi to abadar, from abadar to umdabia—crouchedfor a moment, and then bounded with irresistible
fury upon its prey and tore it to pieces. such is a brief strategic account of the atbaracampaign; but the tale must be told in full. on the 23rd of january the khalifa, havinglearned of the arrival of british troops near abu hamed, and baffled by the disputes aboutthe command of his army, ordered kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted his forcesto return within the city, which he continued to fortify. a few days later he authorisedmahmud to advance against berber. what he had not dared with 60,000 men he now attemptedwith 20,000. the course of action which had for three months offered a good hope of successhe resolved to pursue only when it led to ruin. he forbade the advance while it wasadvisable. when it was already become mad
and fatal he commanded it. and this was aman whose reputation for intelligence and military skill had been bloodily demonstrated! the gunboats ceaselessly patrolled the river,and exchanged shots with the dervish forts. throughout january nothing of note had happened.the reports of spies showed the khalifa to be at kerreri or in omdurman. ahmed fedilheld the shabluka gorge, osman digna was at shendi, and his presence was proved by theconstruction of two new forts on that side of the river. but beyond this the dervisheshad remained passive. on the 12th of february, however, it was noticed that their small outpostat khulli had been withdrawn. this event seemed to point to a renewal of activity. it wasfelt that some important movement impended.
but it was not until the 15th that its naturewas apparent, and the gunboats were able to report definitely that mahmud was crossingto the east bank of the nile. the flotilla exerted itself to harass the dervishes andimpede the transportation; but although several sailing-boats and other river craft were captured,mahmud succeeded in moving his whole army to shendi by the 28th of february. his ownheadquarters were established at hosh-ben-naga, a little village about five miles furthersouth. a delay of more than a fortnight followed, during which the gunboats exercised the utmostvigilance. the suakin-berber road was again closed for caravans, and the sirdar himselfproceeded to berber. on the 11th of march the remnants of the jaalin tribe, having collectedat gakdul, re-occupied the now abandoned metemma,
to find its streets and houses choked withthe decaying bodies of their relations. on the 13th the egyptian look-out station, whichhad been established on shebaliya island, was attacked by the dervishes, and in theskirmish that ensued major sitwell was wounded. on the same day the enemy were reported movingnorthwards to aliab, and it became evident that mahmud had begun his advance. he started from shendi with a force whichhas been estimated at 19,000 souls, but which included many women and children, and mayhave actually numbered 12,000 fighting men, each and all supplied with a month's rationsand about ninety rounds of ammunition. the sirdar immediately ordered the anglo-egyptianarmy, with the exception of the cavalry and
lewis's egyptian brigade—which, with threesquadrons, held the fort at the confluence—to concentrate at kunur. broadwood, with theremaining five squadrons, marched thither on the 16th; and the whole cavalry force,with the camel corps in support, on the three subsequent days reconnoitred twenty milesup the nile and the atbara. meanwhile the concentration was proceedingapace. the two soudanese brigades, formed into a division under command of major-generalhunter, with the artillery, reached kunur on the night of the 15th. the british brigade—thelincolns, the warwicks, and the camerons—marched thither from dabeika. the seaforth highlanders,who on the 13th were still at wady halfa, were swiftly railed across the desert to geneinetti.thence the first half-battalion were brought
to kunur in steamers. the second wing—sincethe need was urgent and the steamers few—were jolted across the desert from railhead oncamels, an experience for which neither their training nor their clothes had prepared them.by the 16th the whole force was concentrated at kunur, and on the following day they werereviewed by the sirdar. the first three days at kunur were days of eager expectation. rumourwas king. the dervish army had crossed the atbara at hudi, and was within ten miles ofthe camp. mahmud was already making a flank march through the desert to berber. a battlewas imminent. a collision must take place in a few hours. officers with field-glassesscanned the sandy horizon for the first signs of the enemy. but the skyline remained unbroken,except by the wheeling dust devils, and gradually
the excitement abated, and the british brigadebegan to regret all the useful articles they had scrupulously left behind them at dabeika,when they marched in a hurry and the lightest possible order to kunur. on the 19th of march the gunboats reportedthat the dervishes were leaving the nile, and mahmud's flanking movement became apparent.the next day the whole force at kunur marched across the desert angle between the riversto hudi. the appearance of the army would have been formidable. the cavalry, the camelcorps, and the horse artillery covered the front and right flank; the infantry, withthe british on the right, moved in line of brigade masses; the transport followed. allwas, however, shrouded in a fearful dust-storm.
the distance, ten miles, was accomplishedin five hours, and the army reached hudi in time to construct a strong zeriba before thenight. here they were joined from atbara fort by lewis's brigade of egyptians—with theexception of the 15th battalion, which was left as garrison—and the troops at the sirdar'sdisposal were thus raised to 14,000 men of all arms. this force was organised as follows: british brigade: major-general gatacre 1st battalion royal warwickshire regiment(6 companies) " " lincolnshire regiment" " seaforth highlanders " " cameron highlanders
egyptian infantry division: major-generalhunter 1st brigade 2nd brigade 3rd brigadelieut.-col. maxwell lieut.-col. macdonald lieut.-col. lewis8th egyptians 2nd egyptians 3rd egyptians xiith soudanese ixth soudanese 4th "xiiith " xth " 7th " xivth " xith " cavalry: lieut.-col. broadwood 8 squadrons2 maxim guns camel corps: major tudway 6 companies
artillery: lieut.-col. long detachment, no. 16 company, e division r.a.,with 6 five-inch b.l. howitzers egyptian horse battery (6 guns)nos. 1, 2, and 3 field batteries egyptian army (18 guns)british maxim battery (4 guns) rocket detachment (2 sections) mahmud had early intelligence of the movementof the anglo-egyptian army. his original intention had been to march to hudi. but he now learnedthat at hudi he would have to fight the sirdar's main force. not feeling strong enough to attackthem, he determined to march to nakheila. the mobility of the arabs was now as conspicuousas their dilatory nature had formerly been.
the whole dervish army—horse, foot, andartillery, men, women, children, and animals—actually traversed in a single day the forty milesof waterless desert which lie between aliab and nakheila, at which latter place they arrivedon the night of the 20th. the sirdar's next object was to keep the enemy so far up theatbara that they could not possibly strike at berber or railhead. accordingly, at dawnon the 21st, the whole force was ordered to march to ras-el-hudi, five miles nearer thedervishes' supposed halting-place. the detour which the arabs would have to make to marchround the troops was nearly doubled by this movement. the utter impossibility of theirflank march with a stronger enemy on the radius of the circle was now apparent.
the movement of the anglo-egyptian force wasscreened by seven squadrons of cavalry and the horse artillery, and colonel broadwoodwas further instructed to reconnoitre along the river and endeavour to locate the enemy.the country on either bank of the atbara is covered with dense scrub, impassable for civilisedtroops. from these belts, which average a quarter of a mile in depth, the dom palmsrise in great numbers. all the bush is leafy, and looks very pretty and green by contrastwith the sombre vegetation of the nile. between the trees fly gay parrots and many other brightbirds. the river itself above ras-el-hudi is, during march and april, only a dry bedof white sand about 400 yards broad, but dotted with deep and beautifully clear pools, inwhich peculiarly brilliant fish and crocodiles,
deprived of their stream, are crowded together.the atmosphere is more damp than by the nile, and produces, in the terrible heat of thesummer, profuse and exhausting perspiration. the natives dislike the water of the atbara,and declare that it does not quench the thirst like that of the great river. it has, indeed,a slightly bitter taste, which is a strong contrast with the sweet waters of the nile.nevertheless the british soldiers, with characteristic contrariness, declared their preference forit. outside the bush the ground undulated gently, but the surface was either stony anduneven or else cracked and fissured by the annual overflow. both these conditions madeit hard for cavalry, and still more for artillery, to move freely; and the difficulties werecomplicated by frequent holes and small khors
full of long grass. amid such scenes the squadrons moved cautiouslyforward. having made the ground good for fifteen miles from hudi, colonel broadwood haltedhis force at abadar, an old fort, and sent one squadron under captain le gallais sevenmiles further. at two o'clock this squadron returned, having met a few of the enemy'sscouts, but no formed bodies. while the force watered by turns at the river captain baring'ssquadron was extended in a line of outposts about a mile and a quarter to the south-east.but the reconnoitring squadron had been followed homeward by several hundred dervish horsemen.creeping along through the dense bush by the bank and evading the vedettes, these suddenlyfell on the picket line and drove in all the
outposts. in this affair eight troopers werekilled and seven wounded. thirteen horses were also lost, as, having rid themselvesof their riders on the broken ground, they galloped off after the arab mares on whichthe dervishes were mostly mounted. the news of an attack on adarama was receivedon this same afternoon. it appeared that the arabs had been repulsed by the abyssinianirregulars raised by colonel parsons. glowing details were forthcoming, but i do not proposeto recount the homeric struggles of the 'friendlies.' little in them is worthy of remembrance; muchseeks oblivion. for more than a week the anglo-egyptian forceremained halted at ras-el-hudi, waiting for privation to demoralise mahmud's army or toexasperate him into making an attack. every
morning the cavalry rode out towards the enemy'scamp. all day long they skirmished with or watched the baggara horse, and at night theyreturned wearily to camp. each morning the army awoke full of the hopes of battle, waitedduring the long hours, and finally retired to sleep in deep disgust and profound peace.and while the army halted, the camp began to assume a more homely appearance. the zeribagrew stronger and thicker, the glacis wider, the field kitchens more elaborate, the poolsof the atbara more dirty. over all the sun beat down in merciless persistence, till allwhite men quivered with weary suffering when in the open air, and even under the grasshuts or improvised tents the temperature always registered 115â° during the hottest hoursof the day. the nights were, however, cool
and pleasant. but although the main part of the force foundthe days long and tedious, the time which the army spent at ras-el-hudi was by no meansuneventful. the work of the squadrons was hard, and ceased only with the night. thecontinual patrolling told severely on men and horses; and the fact that the dervisheswere far stronger in the mounted arm than the sirdar's army necessitated the utmostvigilance of the cavalry commander. employment was also found for the gunboats. when mahmud had left the nile he had establisheda sort of depot at shendi, in which the wives of the emirs and the surplus stores had beendeposited. this treasure house was protected
only by a slender garrison of 700 riflemenand twenty-five horsemen. on ordinary military grounds, and also since the event might infuriatethe arabs, it was decided to capture this place and disperse its defenders. accordingly,on the afternoon of the 24th the 3rd egyptian battalion from lewis's brigade marched fromras-el-hudi to atbara fort and relieved the 15th egyptians then in garrison, and a smallforce under commander keppel—consisting of the 15th egyptians under major hickman,two field-guns of peake's battery, and 150 jaalin irregulars—was embarked on, or inboats towed by, the three gunboats zafir, naser, and fateh, and started the same nightfor shendi. at dawn on the 27th the flotilla appearedoff shendi. the dervishes had been apprised
of its approach and prepared to offer resistance.but the force against them was overwhelming. under cover of the gunboats the infantry andguns were landed. the artillery then came into action, but after they had dischargedtwo shells, the arabs fled, firing their rifles with little effect. shendi was occupied bythe egyptians. the pursuit was left to the jaalin, and in it they are said to have killed160 men—a revenge which must have been doubly sweet since it was consummated so near tothe scene of the destruction of their tribe, and was also attended by scarcely any danger.loot of all kinds fell to the victors, and the gunboats were soon laden with a miscellaneousspoil. the wives of the important emirs made their escape to omdurman, but upwards of 650women and children of inferior rank were taken
prisoners and transported to the atbara, wherein due course they contracted new family ties with the soudanese soldiery and, as far ascan be ascertained, lived happily ever afterwards. there were no casualties among the troops,but the jaalin lost a few men in their pursuit. the force then returned to the atbara. the 3rd of april was the last day the armyspent at ras-el-hudi. the period of waiting was over. the enemy's position had been dulyreconnoitred. his strength was believed to be sufficiently impaired for a successfulattack to be made. the camp at hudi was becoming very insanitary. moreover, the situation,satisfactory though it was, was not one which the commander could view without anxiety.all the time that the army was operating on
the atbara it drew its supplies from the fortat the confluence. between this and the camp, convoys, protected only by a handful of camelcorps, passed once in every four days. only the idiotic apathy of the dervishes allowedthe communications to remain uninterrupted. mahmud was strong in cavalry. it will be evidentto anyone who looks at the map how easily a force might have moved along the left bankto attack the convoys. such tactics would have occurred to most savage tribes. but intheir last campaigns the dervishes thought only of battles, and disregarded all smallerenterprises. had they assailed the communications, the sirdar might have been forced to builda chain of forts and to guard his convoys with strong infantry escorts. the fightingforce would have been weakened, the troops
have been wearied, and the result must havebeen delayed. the dervishes had as yet attempted nothing. but there was no reason why theyshould not at any moment become enterprising. it was time to make an end. on the 4th ofapril the whole force moved to abadar, and established themselves in a new camp fivemiles nearer the enemy. the tiger was tired of watching: he had taken his first stridetowards his prey. although the information as to the enemy'sstrength and position was accurate and complete, the sirdar decided to order a final reconnaissanceon the 5th of april. starting at four o'clock broadwood cut offthe sharp angle which the atbara forms at umdabia, and, avoiding the thick bush, soonapproached the dervish camp. not a sign of
the enemy was seen during the march. the bushby the atbara appeared deserted. the camp gave no sign of life; an ominous silence prevailed.the squadrons moved forward at a walk, keeping about 1,200 yards away from the enemy's zeribaand almost parallel to it. presently, as they did so, a large force of cavalry became visiblein front. it was difficult to estimate their strength, but they appeared to be superiorin numbers to the reconnaissance. the dervish horsemen continued to retire towards the south-east,always reaching round the egyptian left flank. and while the egyptian force advanced, assoon as they were opposite the southern end of the zeriba, another considerable body ofdervish horse issued from the northern side and threatened the line of retreat. at thesame time the camp began to swarm with men,
and crowds of tiny figures were observed clamberingon to the entrenchments and gun emplacements, eagerly watching the development of the fight.the cavalry had by this time approached to within 1,000 yards of the zeriba, and thearab artillery began to fire occasional round shot and clumsily fused shells. at nine o'clock, the enemy's position havingbeen again sketched and the approaches reconnoitred, colonel broadwood ordered the retirement tobegin. the maxims and artillery were in the centre, supported by colonel broadwood andthree squadrons. captain baring with three squadrons watched the left flank, now in retirementbecome the right. captains le gallais and persse guarded the river flank.
the cavalry retired by alternate wings inmeasured fashion. but the enemy pressed on impetuously, and their horsemen, soon completelyenveloping the desert flank of the egyptians, began to threaten a charge. to meet this colonelbroadwood sent one of his squadrons from the centre to join those under captain baring,so that at about a quarter to ten the reconnoitring force was formed with four squadrons towardsthe desert, two with the guns, and two towards the river. the weakness of the river flankof the troops encouraged the dervish horse lurking in the scrub to make a bold attemptto capture the guns. the movement was shrewd and daring, but the cavalry commander metit with admirable skill. the springing-up of dust-clouds hardly 300 yards away was hisonly warning. he immediately took command
of the two squadrons under persse and le gallais,and ordered them to 'right about wheel' and charge. thus headed by broadwood himself,and with their british officers several horse-lengths in front, the egyptians broke into a gallopand encountered the baggara line, which numbered not fewer than 400 men but was in loose order,with firmness. they struck them obliquely and perhaps a third of the way down theirline, and, breaking through, routed them utterly. while this dashing operation was carried outon the river flank the dervish cavalry, following up the retirement, also delivered an attacktowards the guns. thereupon captain baring with two squadrons galloped from the desertflank across the front of the artillery, and, riding through the advancing enemy, repulsedthem with loss. the charge was good and effective,
but the shock and confusion broke both squadrons,and, although successful, they came through the dervishes and back on to the river flankin some disorder. persse and le gallais, who had just rallied, at once dismounted theirmen and opened carbine fire on the retreating dervishes. their action not only checked theenemy, but prevented, by getting the troopers off their horses, any chance of their beinginvolved in the disorder of the squadrons who had just charged. although their horsemen were thus sharplychecked, the dervish infantry continued in spite of losses to advance rapidly, and fora few minutes a hot musketry fire was exchanged by the arab riflemen and the two dismountedsquadrons. captain persse was severely wounded,
and several other casualties occurred. butthe whole force was drawing away from the enemy, and by eleven o'clock it had passedthrough the gap to the north-east and had shaken off all pursuit. the casualties inthe operation were fortunately small. one british officer was wounded; six egyptiantroopers were killed and ten wounded; and about thirty horses were lost or disabled. the details of the enemy's defences were nowknown; his strength was estimated from trustworthy information. it was evident from the frequentdesertions that his army was disheartened, and from his inactivity that he was scarcelyhopeful of success. the moment for destroying him had arrived. at daybreak on the morningof the 6th the whole army broke camp at abadar
and marched to the deserted village of umdabia,where they bivouacked close by a convenient pool of the atbara and seven miles nearerthe dervish camp. chapter xii: the battle of the atbara april 8, 1898 in the evening of thursday, the 7th of april,the army at umdabia paraded for the attack on mahmud's zeriba. the camp lay in the scrubwhich grows by the banks of the atbara, as by those of the nile, and in order to profitby the open, level ground the four infantry brigades moved by parallel routes into thedesert, and then formed facing south-east in column of brigade squares, the britishbrigade leading. the mounted forces, with
four batteries of artillery, waited in campuntil two o'clock the next morning, and did not break their march. the distance from theriver bank to the open plain was perhaps a mile and a half, and the whole infantry forcehad cleared the scrub by six o'clock. the sun was setting, and the red glow, brighteningthe sandy hillocks, made the western horizon indefinite, so that it was hard to tell wherethe desert ended and the sky began. a few gazelle, intercepted on their way to the waterby the unexpected movement of troops, trotted slowly away in the distance—white spotson the rosy-brown of the sand—and on the great plain 12,000 infantry, conscious oftheir strength and eager to encounter the enemy, were beautifully arranged in four solidmasses. then the march began. the actual distance
from the camp to the dervish position wasscarcely seven miles, but the circle necessary to avoid the bushes and the gradual bendsof the river added perhaps another five to the length of the road. the pace of the advancewas slow, and the troops had not gone far when the sun sank and, with hardly an intervalof twilight, darkness enveloped everything. in the stillness of the night the brigadesmoved steadily forward, and only the regular scrunching of the hard sand betrayed the advanceof an overwhelming force upon their enemies. no operation of a war is more critical thana night-march. over and over again in every country frightful disaster has overtaken therash or daring force that has attempted it. in the gloom the shape and aspect of the groundare altered. places well known by daylight
appear strange and unrecognisable. the smallestobstacle impedes the column, which can only crawl sluggishly forward with continual checksand halts. the effect of the gloom upon the nerves of the soldiers is not less than onthe features of the country. each man tries to walk quietly, and hence all are listeningfor the slightest sound. every eye seeks to pierce the darkness. every sense in the bodyis raised to a pitch of expectancy. in such hours doubts and fears come unbidden to thebrain, and the marching men wonder anxiously whether all will be well with the army, andwhether they themselves will survive the event. and if suddenly out of the black silence thereburst the jagged glare of rifles and the crash of a volley followed by the yell of an attackingfoe, the steadiest troops may be thrown into
confusion, and a panic, once afoot, stopsonly with the destruction or dispersal of the whole force. nevertheless, so paramountis the necessity of attacking at dawn, with all the day to finish the fight, that in spiteof the recorded disasters and the known dangers, the night-march is a frequent operation. for more than two hours the force advanced,moving across smooth swells of sand broken by rocks and with occasional small bushes.several shallow khors traversed the road, and these rocky ditches, filled with a strange,sweet-scented grass, delayed the brigades until the pace was hardly two miles an hour.the smell of the grass was noticed by the alert senses of many, and will for ever refreshin their minds the strong impression of the
night. the breeze which had sprung up at sundowngradually freshened and raised clouds of fine sand, which deepened the darkness with a whitermist. at nine o'clock the army halted in a previouslyselected space, near the deserted village of mutrus and about two miles from the river.nearly half the distance to mahmud's zeriba was accomplished, and barely four miles inthe direct line divided the combatants; but since it was not desirable to arrive beforethe dawn, the soldiers, still formed in their squares, lay down upon the ground. meat andbiscuits were served out to the men. the transport animals went by relays to the pools of theatbara bed to drink and to replenish the tanks. all water-bottles were refilled, pickets beingthrown out to cover the business. then, after
sufficient sentries had been posted, the armyslept, still in array. during the halt the moon had risen, and whenat one o'clock the advance was resumed, the white beams revealed a wider prospect and,glinting on the fixed bayonets, crowned the squares with a sinister glitter. for threehours the army toiled onwards at the same slow and interrupted crawl. strict silencewas now enforced, and all smoking was forbidden. the cavalry, the camel corps, and the fivebatteries had overtaken the infantry, so that the whole attacking force was concentrated.meanwhile the dervishes slept. at three o'clock the glare of fires becamevisible to the south, and, thus arrived before the dervish position, the squares, with theexception of the reserve brigade, were unlocked,
and the whole force, assuming formation ofattack, now advanced in one long line through the scattered bush and scrub, presently toemerge upon a large plateau which overlooked mahmud's zeriba from a distance of about 900yards. it was still dark, and the haze that shroudedthe dervish camp was broken only by the glare of the watch-fires. the silence was profound.it seemed impossible to believe that more than 25,000 men were ready to join battleat scarcely the distance of half a mile. yet the advance had not been unperceived, andthe arabs knew that their terrible antagonists crouched on the ridge waiting for the morning;for a while the suspense was prolonged. at last, after what seemed to many an interminableperiod, the uniform blackness of the horizon
was broken by the first glimmer of the dawn.gradually the light grew stronger until, as a theatre curtain is pulled up, the darknessrolled away, the vague outlines in the haze became definite, and the whole scene was revealed. the british and egyptian army lay along thelow ridge in the form of a great bow—the british brigade on the left, macdonald inthe centre, maxwell curving forward on the right. the whole crest of the swell of groundwas crowned with a bristle of bayonets and the tiny figures of thousands of men sittingor lying down and gazing curiously before them. behind them, in a solid square, wasthe transport, guarded by lewis's brigade. the leading squadrons of the cavalry wereforming leisurely towards the left flank.
the four batteries and a rocket detachment,moving between the infantry, ranged themselves on two convenient positions about a hundredyards in front of the line of battalions. all was ready. yet everything was very quiet,and in the stillness of the dawn it almost seemed that nature held her breath. half a mile away, at the foot of the ridge,a long irregular black line of thorn bushes enclosed the dervish defences. behind thiszeriba low palisades and entrenchments bent back to the scrub by the river. odd shapelessmounds indicated the positions of the gun-emplacements, and various casemates could be seen in themiddle of the enclosure. without, the bushes had been cleared away, and the smooth sandstretched in a gentle slope to where the army
waited. within were crowds of little strawhuts and scattered bushes, growing thicker to the southward. from among this rose thepalm-trees, between whose stems the dry bed of the atbara was exposed, and a single poolof water gleamed in the early sunlight. such was mahmud's famous zeriba, which for morethan a month had been the predominant thought in the minds of the troops. it was scarcelyimposing, and at first the soldiers thought it deserted. only a dozen stray horsemen satsilently on their horses outside the entrenchment, watching their enemies, and inside a few dirty-whitefigures appeared and disappeared behind the parapets. yet, insignificant as the zeribalooked, the smoke of many fires cooking the morning meal—never to be eaten—showedthat it was occupied by men; and gay banners
of varied colour and device, flaunting alongthe entrenchments or within the enclosure, declared that some at least were preparedto die in its defence. the hush of the hour and the suspense of thearmy were broken by the bang of a gun. everyone on the ridge jumped up and looked towardsthe sound. a battery of krupps a little to the right of the cameron highlanders had openedfire. another gun further to the right was fired. another shell burst over the strawhuts among the palm-trees. the two maxim-nordenfeldt batteries had come into action. the officerslooked at their watches. it was a quarter-past six. the bombardment had begun. explosion followed explosion in quick successionuntil all four batteries were busily engaged.
the cannonade grew loud and continuous. therocket detachment began to fire, and the strange projectiles hissed and screamed as they leftthe troughs and jerked erratically towards the zeriba. in the air above the enclosureshell after shell flashed into existence, smote the ground with its leaden shower, anddispersed—a mere film—into the haze and smoke which still hung over the dervish encampment.at the very first shot all the dirty-white figures disappeared, bobbing down into theirpits and shelters; but a few solitary horsemen remained motionless for a while in the middleof the enclosure, watching the effect of the fire, as if it had no concern with them. thebritish infantry stood up on tip-toe to look at the wonderful spectacle of actual war,and at first every shell was eagerly scrutinised
and its probable effect discussed. but thebusy gunners multiplied the projectiles until so many were alive in the air at once thatall criticism was prevented. gradually even the strange sight became monotonous. the officersshut up their glasses. the men began to sit down again. many of them actually went tosleep. the rest were soon tired of the amazing scene, the like of which they had never lookedon before, and awaited impatiently further developments and 'some new thing.' after the bombardment had lasted about tenminutes a great cloud of dust sprang up in the zeriba, and hundreds of horsemen wereseen scrambling into their saddles and galloping through a gap in the rear face out into theopen sand to the right. to meet the possibility
of an attempt to turn the left flank of theattack, the eight squadrons of cavalry and two maxim guns jingled and clattered off inthe direction of the danger. the dust, which the swift passage of so many horsemen raised,shut the scene from the eyes of the infantry, but continual dust-clouds above the scrubto the left and the noise of the maxims seemed to indicate a cavalry fight. the baggara horse,however, declined an unequal combat, and made no serious attempt to interfere with the attack.twice they showed some sort of front, and the squadrons thought they might find opportunityto charge; but a few rounds from the maxims effectually checked the enemy, inflictingon each occasion the loss of about twenty killed and wounded. with the exception ofone squadron detached on the right, the egyptian
cavalry force, however, remained on the leftflank, and shielded the operations of the assaulting infantry. meanwhile the bombardment—no longer watchedwith curiosity—continued with accuracy and precision. the batteries searched the interiorof the zeriba, threshing out one section after another, and working the whole ground regularlyfrom front to rear. the zeriba and palisades were knocked about in many places, and ata quarter to seven a cluster of straw huts caught fire and began to burn briskly. ata quarter-past seven the infantry were ordered to form in column for assault. the plan of the attack for the army was simple.the long, deployed line were to advance steadily
against the entrenchments, subduing by theircontinual fire that of the enemy. they were then to tear the zeriba to pieces. coveredby their musketry, the dense columns of assault which had followed the line were to enterthe defences through the gaps, deploy to the right, and march through the enclosure, clearingit with the bayonet and by fire. at twenty minutes to eight the sirdar orderedhis bugles to sound the general advance. the call was repeated by all the brigades, andthe clear notes rang out above the noise of the artillery. the superior officers—withthe exception of hunter, maxwell, and macdonald—dismounted and placed themselves at the head of theircommands. the whole mass of the infantry, numbering nearly eleven thousand men, immediatelybegan to move forward upon the zeriba. the
scene as this great force crested the ridgeand advanced down the slope was magnificent and tremendous. large solid columns of men,preceded by a long double line, with the sunlight flashing on their bayonets and displayingtheir ensigns, marched to the assault in regular and precise array. the pipes of the highlanders,the bands of the soudanese, and the drums and fifes of the english regiments added awild and thrilling accompaniment. as soon as the advance masked the batteries, the gunswere run forward with the firing line, in order effectually to support the attack. thedeployed battalions opened a ceaseless and crushing fire on the entrenchment, and asthe necessity of firing delayed the advance of the attacking columns, the pace did notexceed a slow march.
the dervishes remained silent until the troopswere within 300 yards. then the smoke-puffs spurted out all along the stockades, and asharp fusillade began, gradually and continually growing in intensity until the assaultingtroops were exposed to a furious and effective fire. from 250 yards up to the position lossesbegan to occur. the whole entrenchment was rimmed with flame and smoke, amid which theactive figures of the dervish riflemen were momentarily visible, and behind the filmycurtain solid masses of swordsmen and spearmen appeared. the fortunate interposition of asmall knoll in some degree protected the advance of the lincoln regiment, but in both highlandbattalions soldiers began to drop. the whole air was full of a strange chirping whistle.the hard pebbly sand was everywhere dashed
up into dust-spurts. numerous explosive bullets,fired by the arabs, made queer startling reports. the roar of the rifles drowned even the noiseof the artillery. all the deployed battalions began to suffer. but they and the assaultingcolumns, regardless of the fire, bore down on the zeriba in all the majesty of war—anavalanche of men, stern, unflinching, utterly irresistible. two hundred yards from the entrenchment andone hundred and fifty from the thorn bushes independent firing broke out, running alongthe line from end to end. shooting continually, but without any hurry or confusion, the britishand soudanese battalions continued their slow, remorseless advance; and it was evident that,in spite of the fierce fire of the defence,
which was now causing many casualties, theassault would be successful. the loss during the passage of the zeribaand in the assault of the entrenchments was severe. captain findlay and major urquhart,of the cameron highlanders, were both mortally wounded in the fight at the stockades, andexpired still cheering on their men. major napier, of the same regiment, and captainbaillie, of the seaforth highlanders, received the wounds, of which they subsequently died,a few yards further on. at all points the troops broke into the enclosure. behind thestockade there ran a treble trench. the whole interior was honeycombed with pits and holes.from these there now sprang thousands of dervishes, desperately endeavouring to show a front tothe attack. second-lieutenant gore, a young
officer fresh from sandburst, was shot deadbetween the thorn fence and the stockade. other officers in the lincoln and the warwickshireregiments sustained severe wounds. many soldiers were killed and wounded in the narrow space.these losses were general throughout the assaulting brigades. in the five minutes which were occupiedin the passage of the obstruction about four hundred casualties occurred. the attack continued. the british brigade had struck the extremityof the north front of the zeriba, and thus took the whole of the eastern face in enfilade,sweeping it with their terrible musketry from end to end, and strewing the ground with corpses.although, owing to the lines of advance having converged, there was not room for more thanhalf the force to deploy, the brigades pushed
on. the conduct of the attack passed to thecompany commanders. all these officers kept their heads, and brought their companies upinto the general line as the front gradually widened and gaps appeared. so the whole force—companies,battalions, even brigades—mixed up together and formed in one dense, ragged, but triumphantline, marched on unchecked towards the river bed, driving their enemies in hopeless confusionbefore them. yet, although the dervishes were unable to make head against the attack, theydisdained to run. many hundreds held their ground, firing their rifles valiantly tillthe end. others charged with spear and sword. the greater part retired in skirmishing order,jumping over the numerous pits, walking across the open spaces, and repeatedly turning roundto shoot. the xith soudanese encountered the
most severe resistance after the defenceswere penetrated. as their three deployed companies pressed on through the enclosure, they wereconfronted by a small inner zeriba stubbornly defended by the emir mahmud's personal bodyguard.these poured a sudden volley into the centre company at close range, and so deadly wasthe effect that nearly all the company were shot, falling to the ground still in theirranks, so that a british officer passing at a little distance was provoked to inquire'what they were doing lying down.' notwithstanding this severe check the regiment, gallantlyled by their colonel and supported by the xth soudanese, rushed this last defence andslew its last defenders. mahmud was himself captured. having duly inspected his defencesand made his dispositions, he had sheltered
in a specially constructed casemate. thencehe was now ignominiously dragged, and, on his being recognised, the intervention ofa british officer alone saved him from the fury of the excited soudanese. still the advance continued, and it seemedto those who took part in it more like a horrible nightmare than a waking reality. captainsand subalterns collected whatever men they could, heedless of corps or nationality, andstrove to control and direct their fire. jibba-clad figures sprang out of the ground, fired orcharged, and were destroyed at every step. and onwards over their bodies—over pitschoked with dead and dying, among heaps of mangled camels and donkeys, among decapitatedor eviscerated trunks, the ghastly results
of the shell fire; women and little childrenkilled by the bombardment or praying in wild terror for mercy; blacks chained in theirtrenches, slaughtered in their chains—always onwards marched the conquerors, with bayonetsrunning blood; clothes, hands, and faces all besmeared; the foul stench of a month's accumulatedfilth in their nostrils, and the savage whistle of random bullets in their ears. but at about twenty minutes past eight thewhole force, with the seaforth highlanders well forward on the left, arrived at the bankof the atbara, having marched completely through the position, and shot or bayoneted all intheir path. hundreds of dervishes were still visible retiring across the dry bed of theriver, and making for the scrub on the opposite
bank. the leading companies of the seaforthhighlanders and lincolns, with such odd parties of camerons as had been carried on with theattack, opened a murderous fire on these fugitives. since they would not run their loss was heavy,and it was a strange sight—the last vivid impression of the day—to watch them strugglingthrough the deep sand, with the dust knocked up into clouds by the bullets which struckall round them. very few escaped, and the bodies of the killed lay thickly dotting theriver-bed with heaps of dirty-white. then at 8.25 the 'cease fire' sounded, and thebattle of the atbara ended. forthwith the battalions began to re-form,and in every company the roll was called. the losses had been severe. in the assault—aperiod not exceeding half an hour—eighteen
british, sixteen native officers and 525 menhad been killed or wounded, the greater part during the passage of the zeriba. the actual pursuit was abortive. colonel lewis,with his two battalions, followed a line of advance which led south of the zeriba, andjust before reaching the river bank found and fired upon a few dervishes retreatingthrough the scrub. all the cavalry and the camel corps crossed the atbara and plungedinto the bush on the further side. but so dense and tangled was the country that afterthree miles of peril and perplexity they abandoned he attempt, and the routed arabs fled unmolested.the baggara horse had ridden off during the action, headed by the prudent osman digna—whoseposition in the zeriba was conveniently suited
to such a manoeuvre—and under that carefulleadership suffered little loss. the rest of the army was, however, destroyed or dispersed.the fugitives fled up the atbara river, leaving many wounded to die in the scrub, all alongtheir line of retreat. of the powerful force of 12,000 fighting men which mahmud had gatheredat metemma, scarcely 4,000 reached gedaret in safety. these survivors were added to thearmy of ahmed fedil, and thus prevented from spreading their evil tidings among the populaceat omdurman. osman digna, wad bishara, and other important emirs whose devotion and discretionwere undoubted, alone returned to the capital. as soon as the troops were re-formed, thezeriba was evacuated and the army drew up in line along the neighbouring ridge. it wasthen only nine o'clock, and the air was still
cool and fresh. the soldiers lit fires, madesome tea, and ate their rations of biscuits and meat. then they lay down and waited forevening. gradually, as the hours passed, the sun became powerful. there was no shade, andonly a few thin, leafless bushes rose from the sand. the hours of a day, peculiarly hot,even for the country and season, dragged wearily away. the sandy ridge beat back the rays tillthe air above was like the breath of a furnace and the pebbly ground burned. the water inthe fantasses and bottles was hot and scarce. the pool of the atbara was foul and tainted.in spite of the devoted efforts of the few medical officers who had been allowed to accompanythe force, the wounded officers and soldiers endured the greatest miseries, and it is certainthat several died of their wounds who might
in happier circumstances have been saved. several hundred prisoners were taken. theywere mostly negroes—for the arabs refused to surrender, and fought to the last or triedto escape. the captive blacks, who fight with equal willingness on either side, were contentto be enlisted in the soudanese regiments; so that many of those who served the khalifaon the atbara helped to destroy him at omdurman. the most notable prisoner was the emir mahmud—atall, strong arab, about thirty years old. immediately after his capture he was draggedbefore the sirdar. 'why,' inquired the general, 'have you come into my country to burn andkill?' 'i have to obey my orders, and so have you,' retorted the captive sullenly, yet notwithout a certain dignity. to other questions
he returned curt or evasive answers, and volunteeredthe opinion that all this slaughter would be avenged at omdurman. he was removed incustody—a fine specimen of proud brutality, worthy perhaps of some better fate than tolinger indefinitely in the gaol at rosetta. with the cool of the evening the army leftits bed of torment on the ridge and returned to umdabia. the homeward march was a severetrial; the troops were exhausted; the ground was broken; the guides, less careful or lessfortunate than on the previous night, lost their way. the columns were encumbered withwounded, most of whom were already in a high state of fever, and whose sufferings werepainful to witness. it was not until after midnight that the camp was reached. the infantryhad been continuously under arms—marching,
fighting, or sweltering in the sun—for thirtyhours, and most of them had hardly closed their eyes for two days. officers and soldiers—british,soudanese, and egyptian—struggled into their bivouacs, and fell asleep, very weary butvictorious. british and egyptian casualties on the atbaraincluded 20 officers and 539 men killed or wounded. the dervish loss was officially estimatedat 40 emirs and 3,000 dervishes killed. no statistics as to their wounded are forthcoming. . . . . . . . . . . as the battle of the atbara had been decisive,the whole expeditionary force went into summer quarters. the egyptian army was distributedinto three principal garrisons—four battalions
at atbara camp, six battalions and the cavalryat berber, three battalions at abadia. the artillery and transport were proportionatelydivided. the british brigade encamped with two battalions at darmali and two at the villageof selim, about a mile and a half distant. for the final phase of the campaign threenew gunboats had been ordered from england. these were now sent in sections over the desertrailway. special arrangements were made to admit of the clumsy loads passing trains onthe ordinary sidings. as usual, the contrivances of the railway subalterns were attended withsuccess. sir h. kitchener himself proceeded to abadia to accelerate by his personal activityand ingenuity the construction of the vessels on which so much depended. here during theheat of the summer he remained, nursing his
gunboats, maturing his plans, and waitingonly for the rise of the river to complete the downfall of his foes. chapter xiii: the grand advance all through the early months of the summerthe preparations for the final advance were steadily proceeding. a second british brigadewas ordered to the soudan. a new battery of howitzer artillery—the 37th—firing enormousshells charged with lyddite, was despatched from england. two large 40-pounder guns weresent from cairo. another british maxim battery of four guns was formed in cairo from menof the royal irish fusiliers. three new screw gunboats of the largest size and most formidablepattern had been passed over the indefatigable
railway in sections, and were now launchedon the clear waterway south of the atbara encampment; and last, but not least, the 21stlancers [the author led a troop in this regiment during the final advance to omdurman; andit is from this standpoint that the ensuing chapters are to some extent conceived] wereordered up the nile. events now began to move rapidly. within three weeks of the arrivalof the reinforcements the climax of the war was over; within five weeks the british troopswere returning home. there was no delay at the atbara encampment. even before the wholeof the second brigade had arrived, some of its battalions were being despatched to wadhamed, the new point of concentration. this place was a few miles north of shabluka, andonly fifty-eight miles from omdurman. it was
evident, therefore, that the decisive momentof the three years' war approached. the staff, the british infantry, one squadron, the guns,and the stores were carried south in steamers and barges. the egyptian division marchedto wad hamed by brigades. the horses of the batteries, the transport animals of the britishdivision (about 1,400 in number), the chargers of the officers, some cattle, and most ofthe war correspondents were sent along the left bank of the river escorted by two squadronsof the 21st lancers and two maxim guns. all the thirteen squadrons of cavalry remainedthree days at wad hamed. after the fatigues of the march we were glad to have an opportunityof looking about, of visiting regiments known in other circumstances, and of writing a fewletters. this last was the most important,
for it was now known that after leaving wadhamed there would be no post or communication with cairo and europe until the action hadbeen fought and all was over. the halt was welcome for another reason. the camp itselfwas well worth looking at. it lay lengthways along the river-bank, and was nearly two milesfrom end to end. the nile secured it from attack towards the east. on the western andsouthern sides were strong lines of thorn bushes, staked down and forming a zeriba;and the north face was protected by a deep artificial watercourse which allowed the watersof the river to make a considerable inundation. from the bank of this work the whole campcould be seen. far away to the southward the white tents of the british division; a littlenearer rows and rows of grass huts and blanket
shelters, the bivouacs of the egyptian andsoudanese brigades; the sirdar's large white tent, with the red flag of egypt flying froma high staff, on a small eminence; and to the right the grove of palm-trees in whichthe officers of the egyptian cavalry had established themselves. the whole riverside was filledby a forest of masts. crowds of gyassas, barges, and steamers were moored closely together;and while looking at the furled sails, the tangled riggings, and the tall funnels itwas easy for the spectator to imagine that this was the docks of some populous city ina well-developed and civilised land. but the significance of the picture grew whenthe mind, outstripping the eye, passed beyond the long, low heights of the gorge and cataractof shabluka and contemplated the ruins of
khartoum and the city of omdurman. there wereknown to be at least 50,000 fighting men collected in their last stronghold. we might imaginethe scene of excitement, rumour, and resolve in the threatened capital. the khalifa declaresthat he will destroy the impudent invaders. the mahdi has appeared to him in a dream.countless angelic warriors will charge with those of islam. the 'enemies of god' willperish and their bones will whiten the broad plain. loud is the boasting, and many arethe oaths which are taken, as to what treatment the infidel dogs shall have when they arecome to the city walls. the streets swarm with men and resound with their voices. everywhereis preparation and defiance. and yet over all hangs the dark shadow of fear. nearerand nearer comes this great serpent of an
army, moving so slowly and with such terribledeliberation, but always moving. a week ago it was sixty miles away, now it is but fifty.next week only twenty miles will intervene, and then the creep of the serpent will cease,and, without argument or parley, one way or the other the end will come. the road to the next camp was a long one;for though royan island, opposite to which the site had been selected, was only sevenmiles in the direct line, it was necessary to march eight miles into the desert to avoidthe shabluka heights, and then to turn back to the nile. the infantry were therefore providedwith camel transport to carry sufficient water in small iron tanks for one night; and theywere thus able to bivouac half-way, and to
complete the journey on the next morning,thus making a two days' march. the mounted troops, who remained at wad hamed till allhad gone south, were ordered to move on the 27th of august, and by a double march catchup the rest of the army. wad hamed then ceased for the time being toexist except in name. all the stores and transport were moved by land or water to the south ofshabluka, and an advanced base was formed upon royan island. communications with theatbara encampment and with cairo were dropped, and the army carried with them in their boatssufficient supplies to last until after the capture of omdurman, when the british divisionwould be immediately sent back. it was calculated that the scope of this operation would notbe greater than three weeks, and on the 27th
the army were equipped with twenty-one days'supplies, of which two were carried by the troops, five by the regimental barges, andfourteen in the army transport sailing-vessels. all surplus stores were deposited at royanisland, where a field hospital was also formed. the expeditionary force which was thus concentrated,equipped, and supplied for the culminating moment of the river war, was organised asfollows: the british division: major-general gatacrecommanding 1st brigade 2nd brigadebrigadier-gen. wauchope brigadier-gen. lyttelton 1st btn. royal warwickshire regt. 1st btn.grenadier guards " " lincoln regiment " " northumberland fusiliers" " seaforth highlanders 2nd " lancashire
fusiliers" " cameron highlanders " " rifle brigade the egyptian division: major-general huntercommanding 1st brigade 2nd brigade 3rd brigade 4th brigadecol. macdonald col. maxwell col. lewis col. collinson2nd egyptians 8th egyptians 3rd egyptians 1st egyptiansixth soudanese xiith soudanese 4th " 5th (half) "xth " xiiith " 7th " 17th " xith " xivth " 15th " 18th " mounted forces 21st lancers camel corps egyptian cavalrycolonel martin major tudway colonel broadwood
4 squadrons 8 companies 9 squadrons artillery: colonel long commanding (british) 32nd field battery, r.a.(with two40-pounder guns) 8 guns " 37th " " " (5-inch howitzers). 6 guns(egyptian) the horse battery, e.a. (krupp). . . 6 guns" no. 1 field battery, e.a. (maxim-nordenfeldt) 6 guns" no. 2 " " " . . . . 6 guns " no. 3 " " " . . . . 6 guns" no. 4 " " " . . . . 6 guns machine guns (british) detachment 16th co. eastern divisionr.a.. 6 maxim
" " royal irish fusiliers . . 4 "(egyptian) 2 maxim guns to each of the five egyptian batteries . . . . 10 " engineers detachment of royal engineers the flotilla: commander keppel 1898 class armoured screw gunboats (3): thesultan, the melik, the sheikh each carrying: 2 nordenfeldt guns1 quick-firing 12-pounder gun 1 howitzer4 maxims 1896 class armoured screw gunboats (3): thefateh, the naser, the zafir
each carrying: 1 quick-firing 12-pounder gun2 6-pounder guns 4 maxims old class armoured stern-wheel gunboats (4):the tamai, the hafir*, the abu klea, the metemma each carrying: 1 12-pounder gun2 maxim-nordenfeldt guns steam transport 5 steamers: the dal, the akasha, the tahra,the okma, the kaibar [*the steamer el teb, wrecked at the fourthcataract in 1897, had been refloated, and to change the luck was renamedhafir.]
the total strength of the expeditionary forceamounted to 8,200 british and 17,600 egyptian soldiers, with 44 guns and 20 maxims on land,with 36 guns and 24 maxims on the river, and with 2,469 horses, 896 mules, 3,524 camels,and 229 donkeys, besides followers and private animals. while the army were to move along the westbank of the river—the omdurman side—a force of arab irregulars, formed from thefriendly tribes, would march along the east bank and clear it of any dervishes. all thedebris which the egyptian advance had broken off the dervish empire was thus to be hurledagainst that falling state. eager for plunder, anxious to be on the winning side, sheikhsand emirs from every tribe in the military
soudan had hurried, with what following theyears of war had left them, to wad hamed. on the 26th of august the force of irregularsnumbered about 2,500 men, principally jaalin survivors, but also comprising bands and individualsof bisharin; of hadendoa from suakin; of shukria, the camel-breeders; of batahin, who had suffereda bloody diminution at the khalifa's hands; of shaiggia, gordon's vexatious allies; andlastly some gellilab arabs under a reputed son of zubehr pasha. the command of the wholemotley force was given to major stuart-wortley, lieutenant wood accompanying him as staffofficer; and the position of these officers among the cowed and untrustworthy arabs wasone of considerable peril. while the infantry divisions were marchinground the heights of shabluka to the camp
opposite royan island, the steamers and gunboatsascended the stream and passed through the gorge, dragging up with them the whole fleetof barges and gyassas. the northern end of the narrow passage had been guarded by thefive dervish forts, which now stood deserted and dismantled. they were well built, andformed nearly a straight line—four on one bank and one on the other. each fort had threeembrasures, and might, when occupied, have been a formidable defence to the cataract. threshing up against the current, the gunboatsand stern-wheelers one after another entered the gorge. the nile, which below is nearlya mile across, narrows to a bare 200 yards. the pace of the stream becomes more swift.great swirls and eddies disturb its surface.
high on either side rise black, broken, andprecipitous cliffs, looking like piles of gigantic stones. through and among them theflood-river pours with a loud roaring, breaking into foam and rapids wherever the submergedrocks are near the surface. between the barren heights and the water is a strip of greenbushes and grass. the bright verdant colour seems the more brilliant by contrast withthe muddy water and the sombre rocks. it is a forbidding passage. a few hundred riflemenscattered afridiwise among the tops of the hills, a few field-guns in the mud forts bythe bank, and the door would be shut. the mounted forces marched from wad hamedat dawn on the 27th and, striking out into the desert, skirted the rocky hills. besidesthe 21st lancers and nine squadrons of egyptian
cavalry, the column included the camel corps,800 strong, and a battery of horse artillery; and it was a fine sight to see all these horsemenand camel-men trotting swiftly across the sand by squadrons and companies, with a greatcloud of dust rising from each and drifting away to the northward. the zeriba of the camp at royan had been alreadymade and much of the ground cleared by the energy of the soudanese division, which hadbeen the first to arrive. an advanced depot was established at royan island which wascovered with white hospital tents, near which there was a forest of masts and sails. thebarges and boats containing the stores and kits awaited the troops, and they had onlyto bivouac along the river-bank and shelter
themselves as quickly as possible from thefierce heat of the sun. the dark hills of shabluka, among and beneath which the campand army nestled, lay behind us now. to the south the country appeared a level plain coveredwith bush and only broken by occasional peaks of rock. the eternal nile flowed swiftly bythe tents and shelters, and disappeared mysteriously in the gloom of the gorge; and on the furtherbank there rose a great mountain—jebel royan—from the top of which it was said that men mightsee khartoum. the whole army broke camp at royan on the28th of august at four o'clock in the afternoon, and marched to wady el abid six miles furthersouth. we now moved on a broad front, which could immediately be converted into a fightingformation. this was the first time that it
had been possible to see the whole force—infantry,cavalry, and guns—on the march at once. in the clear air the amazing detail of thepicture was striking. there were six brigades of infantry, composed of twenty-four battalions;yet every battalion showed that it was made up of tiny figures, all perfectly definedon the plain. a soudanese brigade had been sent on to hold the ground with pickets untilthe troops had constructed a zeriba. but a single dervish horseman managed to evade theseand, just as the light faded, rode up to the warwickshire regiment and flung his broad-bladedspear in token of defiance. so great was the astonishment which this unexpected apparitioncreated that the bold man actually made good his escape uninjured.
on the 29th the forces remained halted oppositeum teref, and only the egyptian cavalry went out to reconnoitre. they searched the countryfor eight or nine miles, and colonel broadwood returned in the afternoon, having found aconvenient camping-ground, but nothing else. during the day the news of two river disastersarrived—the first to ourselves, the second to our foes. on the 28th the gunboat zafirwas steaming from the atbara to wad hamed, intending thereafter to ascend the shablukacataract. suddenly—overtaken now, as on the eve of the advance on dongola, by misfortune—shesprang a leak, and, in spite of every effort to run her ashore, foundered by the head indeep water near metemma. the officers on board—among whom was keppel, the commander of the wholeflotilla—had scarcely time to leap from
the wreck, and with difficulty made theirway to the shore, where they were afterwards found very cold and hungry. the sirdar receivedthe news at royan. his calculations were disturbed by the loss of a powerful vessel; but he hadallowed for accidents, and in consequence accepted the misfortune very phlegmatically.the days of struggling warfare were over, and the general knew that he had a safe marginof strength. the other catastrophe afflicted the khalifa,and its tale was brought to the advancing army by the intelligence spies, who to thelast—even when the forces were closing—tried to pass between them. not content with buildingbatteries along the banks, abdullah, fearing the gunboats, had resolved to mine the river.an old officer of the old egyptian army, long
a prisoner in omdurman, was brought from hischains and ordered to construct mines. two iron boilers were filled with gunpowder, andit was arranged that these should be sunk in the nile at convenient spots. buried inthe powder of each was a loaded pistol with a string attached to the trigger. on pullingthe string the pistol, and consequently the mine, would be exploded. so the khalifa argued;nor was he wrong. it was resolved to lay one mine first. on the 17th of august the dervishsteamer ismailia moved out into the middle of the nile, carrying one of the boilers fullycharged and equipped with pistol detonator. arrived at the selected spot, the great cylinderof powder was dropped over the side. its efficiency as a destructive engine was immediately demonstrated,for, on the string being pulled by accident,
the pistol discharged itself, the powder exploded,and the ismailia and all on board were blown to pieces. undeterred by the loss of life, and encouragedby the manifest power of the contrivance, the khalifa immediately ordered the secondof the two boilers to be sunk in the stream. as the old egyptian officer had been killedby the explosion, the emir in charge of the arsenal was entrusted with the perilous business.he rose, however, to the occasion, and, having first taken the precaution of letting thewater into the boiler so as to damp the powder, he succeeded in laying the second mine inmid-stream, to the joy and delight of abdullah, who, not understanding that it was now useless,overwhelmed him with praise and presents.
beguiled with such stories and diversions,the day of rest at wady el abid passed swiftly. night brought beetles, bugs, and ants, andseveral men were stung by scorpions—a most painful though not dangerous affair. towardsmorning it began to rain, and everyone was drenched and chilled when the sun rose acrossthe river from behind a great conical hill and dispersed the clouds into wisps of creamyflame. then we mounted and set out. this day the army moved prepared for immediate action,and all the cavalry were thrown out ten miles in front in a great screen which reached fromthe gunboats on the river to the camel corps far out in the desert. when we had advanced a little further, therearose above the scrub the dark outlines of
a rocky peak, the hill of merreh. the wholeof the 21st lancers now concentrated, and, trotting quickly forward, occupied this position,whence a considerable tract of country was visible. we were hardly twenty-five milesfrom khartoum, and of that distance at least ten miles were displayed. yet there were noenemy. had they all fled? would there be no opposition? should we find omdurman desertedor submissive? these were questions which occurred to everyone, and many answered themaffirmatively. colonel martin had meanwhile heliographed back to the sirdar that all theground was up to this point clear, and that there were no dervishes to be seen. aftersome delay orders were signalled back for one squadron to remain till sunset in observationon the hill and for the rest to return to
camp. with two troops thrown out a mile in frontwe waited watching on the hill. time passed slowly, for the sun was hot. suddenly it becameevident that one of the advanced troops was signalling energetically. the message wasspelt out. the officer with the troop perceived dervishes in his front. we looked throughour glasses. it was true. there, on a white patch of sand among the bushes of the plain,were a lot of little brown spots, moving slowly across the front of the cavalry outposts towardsan egyptian squadron, which was watching far out to the westward. there may have been seventyhorsemen altogether. we could not take our eyes off those distant specks we had travelledso far, if possible, to destroy. presently
the dervish patrol approached our right troop,and apparently came nearer than they imagined, for the officer who commanded—lieutenantconolly—opened fire on them with carbines, and we saw them turn and ride back, but withouthurrying. the camp to which we returned was a very differentplace from the one we had left in the morning. instead of lying along the river-bank, itwas pitched in the thinner scrub. the bushes had on all sides been cut down, the groundcleared, and an immense oblong zeriba was built, around which the six brigades weredrawn up, and into which cavalry, guns, and transport were closely packed. very early next morning the advance was continued.the army paraded by starlight, and with the
first streak of the dawn the cavalry wereagain flung far out in advance. secure behind the screen of horsemen and camel corps, theinfantry advanced in regular array. up to the 27th of august the force marched by divisions;but on and after the 30th of august the whole force commenced to march in fighting formation.the british division was on the left, the egyptian army on the right. all the brigadesmarched in line, or in a slight echelon. the flank brigades kept their flank battalionsin column or in fours. other british battalions had six companies in the front line (in companycolumn of fours) and two companies in support. the egyptian brigades usually marched withthree battalions in the front line and one in reserve, each of the three in the frontline having four companies in front and two
in support. the spectacle of the moving army—the grandarmy of the nile—as it advanced towards its goal was especially wonderful in the clearair of the early morning; a long row of great brown masses of infantry and artillery, witha fringe of cavalry dotting the plain for miles in front, with the camel corps—chocolate-colouredmen on cream-coloured camels—stretching into the desert on the right, and the whitegunboats stealing silently up the river on the left, scrutinising the banks with theirguns; while far in rear the transport trailed away into the mirage, and far in front thefield-glass disclosed the enemy's patrols. day after day and hour after hour the advancewas maintained. arrived at the camping-ground,
the zeriba had to be built; and this involveda long afternoon of fatigue. in the evening, when the dusty, tired-out squadrons returned,the troopers attended to their horses, and so went to sleep in peace. it was then thatthe dusty, tired-out infantry provided sentries and pickets, who in a ceaseless successionpaced the zeriba and guarded its occupants. the position of the next camp was a strongone, on a high swell of open ground which afforded a clear field of fire in every direction.everyone that night lay down to sleep with a feeling of keen expectancy. one way or theother all doubts would be settled the next day. the cavalry would ride over the kerrerihills, if they were not occupied by the enemy, and right up to the walls of omdurman. ifthe dervishes had any army—if there was
to be any battle—we should know within afew hours. the telegrams which were despatched that evening were the last to reach englandbefore the event. during the night heavy rain fell, and all the country was drenched. thetelegraph-wire had been laid along the ground, as there had been no time to pole it. thesand when dry is a sufficient insulator, but when wet its non-conductivity is destroyed.hence all communications ceased, and those at home who had husbands, sons, brothers,or friends in the expeditionary force were left in an uncertainty as great as that inwhich we slept—and far more painful. the long day had tired everyone. indeed, thewhole fortnight since the cavalry convoy had started from the atbara had been a periodof great exertion, and the lancers, officers
and men, were glad to eat a hasty meal, andforget the fatigues of the day, the hardness of the ground, and the anticipations of themorrow in deep sleep. the camp was watched by the infantry, whose labours did not endwith the daylight. at two o'clock in the morning the clouds broke in rain and storm. greatblue flashes of lightning lit up the wide expanse of sleeping figures, of crowded animals,and of shelters fluttering in the wind; and from the centre of the camp it was even possibleto see for an instant the continuous line of sentries who watched throughout the nightwith ceaseless vigilance. nor was this all. far away, near the kerreri hills, the yellowlight of a burning village shot up, unquenched by the rain, and only invisible in the brightestflashes of the lightning. there was war to
the southward. chapter xiv: the operations of the first ofseptember the british and egyptian cavalry, supportedby the camel corps and horse artillery, trotted out rapidly, and soon interposed a distanceof eight miles between them and the army. as before, the 21st lancers were on the leftnearest the river, and the khedivial squadrons curved backwards in a wide half-moon to protectthe right flank. meanwhile the gunboat flotilla was seen to be in motion. the white boatsbegan to ascend the stream leisurely. yet their array was significant. hitherto theyhad moved at long and indefinite intervals—one following perhaps a mile, or even two miles,behind the other. now a regular distance of
about 300 yards was observed. the orders ofthe cavalry were to reconnoitre omdurman; of the gunboats to bombard it. as soon as the squadrons of the 21st lancershad turned the shoulder of the steep kerreri hills, we saw in the distance a yellow-brownpointed dome rising above the blurred horizon. it was the mahdi's tomb, standing in the veryheart of omdurman. from the high ground the field-glass disclosed rows and rows of mudhouses, making a dark patch on the brown of the plain. to the left the river, steel-greyin the morning light, forked into two channels, and on the tongue of land between them thegleam of a white building showed among the trees. before us were the ruins of khartoumand the confluence of the blue and white niles.
a black, solitary hill rose between the kerreriposition and omdurman. a long, low ridge running from it concealed the ground beyond. for therest there was a wide-rolling, sandy plain of great extent, surrounded on three sidesby rocky hills and ridges, and patched with coarse, starveling grass or occasional bushes.by the banks of the river which framed the picture on the left stood a straggling mudvillage, and this, though we did not know it, was to be the field of omdurman. it wasdeserted. not a living creature could be seen. and now there were many who said once andfor all that there would be no fight; for here we were arrived at the very walls ofomdurman, and never an enemy to bar our path. then, with four squadrons looking very tinyon the broad expanse of ground, we moved steadily
forward, and at the same time the egyptiancavalry and the camel corps entered the plain several miles further to the west, and theytoo began to trot across it. it was about three miles to the last ridgewhich lay between us and the city. if there was a dervish army, if there was to be a battle,if the khalifa would maintain his boast and accept the arbitrament of war, much must bevisible from that ridge. we looked over. at first nothing was apparent except the wallsand houses of omdurman and the sandy plain sloping up from the river to distant hills.then four miles away on our right front emerged a long black line with white spots. it wasthe enemy. it seemed to us, as we looked, that there might be 3,000 men behind a highdense zeriba of thorn-bushes. that, said the
officers, was better than nothing. it is scarcelynecessary to describe our tortuous movements towards the dervish position. looking at itnow from one point of view, now from another, but always edging nearer, the cavalry slowlyapproached, and halted in the plain about three miles away—three great serpents ofmen—the light-coloured one, the 21st lancers; a much longer and a blacker one, the egyptiansquadrons; a mottled one, the camel corps and horse artillery. from this distance aclearer view was possible, and we distinguished many horsemen riding about the flanks andfront of the broad dark line which crowned the crest of the slope. a few of these rodecarelessly towards the squadrons to look at them. they were not apparently acquaintedwith the long range of the lee-metford carbine.
several troops were dismounted, and at 800yards fire was made on them. two were shot and fell to the ground. their companions,dismounting, examined them, picked up one, let the other lie, and resumed their ride,without acknowledging the bullets by even an increase of pace. while this passed, so did the time. it wasnow nearly eleven o'clock. suddenly the whole black line which seemed to be zeriba beganto move. it was made of men, not bushes. behind it other immense masses and lines of men appearedover the crest; and while we watched, amazed by the wonder of the sight, the whole faceof the slope became black with swarming savages. four miles from end to end, and, as it seemed,in five great divisions, this mighty army
advanced—swiftly. the whole side of thehill seemed to move. between the masses horsemen galloped continually; before them many patrolsdotted the plain; above them waved hundreds of banners, and the sun, glinting on manythousand hostile spear-points, spread a sparkling cloud. it is now known that the khalifa had succeededin concentrating at omdurman an army of more than 60,000 men. he remembered that all theformer victories over the egyptians had been won by the dervishes attacking. he knew thatin all the recent defeats they had stood on the defensive. he therefore determined notto oppose the advance at the shabluka or on the march thence to omdurman. all was to bestaked on the issue of a great battle on the
plains of kerreri. the mahdi's prophecy waspropitious. the strength of the dervish army seemed overwhelming. when the 'turks' arrived,they should be driven into the river. accordingly the khalifa had only watched the advance ofthe expeditionary force from wad hamed with a patrol of cavalry about 200 strong. on the30th he was informed that the enemy drew near, and on the 31st he assembled his bodyguardand regular army, with the exception of the men needed for the river batteries, on theomdurman parade ground. he harangued the leaders; and remained encamped with his troops duringthe night. the next day all the male population of the city were compelled to join the armyin the field, and only the gunners and garrisons on the river-face remained within. in spite,however, of his utmost vigilance, nearly 6,000
men deserted during the nights of the 31stof august and the 1st of september. this and the detachments in the forts reduced the forceactually engaged in the battle to 52,000 men. the host that now advanced towards the britishand egyptian cavalry was perhaps 4,000 stronger. their array was regular and precise, and,facing northeast, stretched for more than four miles from flank to flank. a strong detachmentof the mulazemin or guard was extended in front of the centre. ali-wad-helu, with hisbright green flag, prolonged the line to the left; and his 5,000 warriors, chiefly of thedegheim and kenana tribes, soon began to reach out towards the egyptian cavalry. the centreand main force of the army was composed of the regular troops, formed in squares underosman sheikh-ed-din and osman azrak. this
great body comprised 12,000 black riflemenand about 13,000 black and arab spearmen. in their midst rose the large, dark greenflag which the sheikh-ed-din had adopted to annoy ali-wad-helu, of whose distinctive emblemhe was inordinately jealous. the khalifa with his own bodyguard, about 2,000 strong, followedthe centre. in rear of all marched yakub with the black flag and 13,000 men—nearly allswordsmen and spearmen, who with those extended in front of the army constituted the guard.the right wing was formed by the brigade of the khalifa sherif, consisting of 2,000 danaglatribesmen, whose principal ensign was a broad red flag. osman digna, with about 1,700 hadendoa,guarded the extreme right and the flank nearest omdurman, and his fame needed no flag. suchwas the great army which now moved swiftly
towards the watching squadrons; and these,pausing on the sandy ridge, pushed out a fringe of tentative patrols, as if to assure themselvesthat what they saw was real. the egyptian cavalry had meanwhile a somewhatdifferent view of the spectacle. working on the right of the 21st lancers, and keepingfurther from the river, the leading squadrons had reached the extreme western end of thekerreri ridge at about seven o'clock. from here the mahdi's tomb was visible, and, sincethe rocks of surgham did not obstruct the view from this point, the british officers,looking through their field-glasses, saw what appeared to be a long column of brown spotsmoving south-westwards across the wide plain which stretches away to the west of omdurman.the telescope, an invaluable aid to reconnaissance,
developed the picture. the brown objects provedto be troops of horses grazing; and beyond, to the southward, camels and white flappingtents could be distinguished. there were no signs that a retreat was in progress; butfrom such a distance—nearly four miles—no certain information could be obtained, andcolonel broadwood decided to advance closer. he accordingly led his whole command south-westwardtowards a round-topped hill which rose about four miles from the end of the kerreri ridgeand was one of the more distant hill features bounding the plain on the western side. theegyptian cavalry moved slowly across the desert to this new point of observation. on theirway they traversed the end of the khor shambat, a long depression which is the natural drainagechannel of the plains of kerreri and omdurman,
and joins the nile about four miles from thecity. the heavy rain of the previous night had made the low ground swampy, and poolsof water stood in the soft, wet sand. the passage, however, presented no great difficulty,and at half-past eleven the egyptian squadrons began to climb the lower slopes of the round-toppedhill. here the whole scene burst suddenly upon them. scarcely three miles away the dervisharmy was advancing with the regularity of parade. the south wind carried the martialsound of horns and drums and—far more menacing—the deep murmur of a multitude to the astonishedofficers. like the 21st lancers—three miles away to their left, at the end of the longsandy ridge which runs westward from surgham—the soldiers remained for a space spell-bound.but all eyes were soon drawn from the thrilling
spectacle of the dervish advance by the soundof guns on the river. at about eleven o'clock the gunboats had ascendedthe nile, and now engaged the enemy's batteries on both banks. throughout the day the loudreports of their guns could be heard, and, looking from our position on the ridge, wecould see the white vessels steaming slowly forward against the current, under cloudsof black smoke from their furnaces and amid other clouds of white smoke from the artillery.the forts, which mounted nearly fifty guns, replied vigorously; but the british aim wasaccurate and their fire crushing. the embrasures were smashed to bits and many of the dervishguns dismounted. the rifle trenches which flanked the forts were swept by the maximguns. the heavier projectiles, striking the
mud walls of the works and houses, dashedthe red dust high into the air and scattered destruction around. despite the tenacity andcourage of the dervish gunners, they were driven from their defences and took refugeamong the streets of the city. the great wall of omdurman was breached in many places, anda large number of unfortunate non-combatants were killed and wounded. meanwhile the arab irregulars, under majorwortley, had been sharply engaged. that officer's orders were to co-operate with the flotillaby taking in rear the forts and fortified villages on the east bank of the river. assoon as the gunboats had silenced the lower forts, major wortley ordered the irregularsto advance on them and on the houses. he placed
the jaalin, who were practically the onlytrustworthy men in his force, in reserve, and formed the tribes according to their capabilitiesand prejudices. on the order to attack being given, the whole force, some 3,000 strong,advanced on the buildings, from which the dervishes at once opened fire. arrived within500 yards they halted, and began to discharge their rifles in the air; they also indulgedin frantic dances expressive of their fury and valour, but declined to advance any further. major wortley then ordered the jaalin to attack.these—formed in a long column, animated by the desire for vengeance, and being besidesbrave men—moved upon the village at a slow pace, and, surrounding one house after another,captured it and slew all its defenders; including
the dervish emir and 350 of his followers.the jaalin themselves suffered a loss of about sixty killed and wounded. the village being captured, and the enemyon the east bank killed or dispersed, the gunboats proceeded to engage the batterieshigher up the river. the howitzer battery was now landed, and at 1.30 began to bombardthe mahdi's tomb. this part of the proceedings was plainly visible to us, waiting and watchingon the ridge, and its interest even distracted attention from the dervish army. the domeof the tomb rose tall and prominent above the mud houses of the city. a lyddite shellburst over it—a great flash, a white ball of smoke, and, after a pause, the dull thudof the distant explosion. another followed.
at the third shot, instead of the white smoke,there was a prodigious cloud of red dust, in which the whole tomb disappeared. whenthis cleared away we saw that, instead of being pointed, it was now flat-topped. othershells continued to strike it with like effect, some breaking holes in the dome, others smashingoff the cupolas, all enveloping it in dust. all this time the dervishes were coming nearer,and the steady and continuous advance of the great army compelled the egyptian cavalryto mount their horses and trot off to some safer point of view. colonel broadwood conceivedhis direct line of retreat to camp threatened, and shortly after one o'clock he began a regularretirement. eight squadrons of egyptian cavalry and the horse artillery moved off first. fivecompanies of the camel corps, a maxim gun
section, and the ninth squadron of cavalryfollowed as a rear-guard under major tudway. the dervish horsemen contented themselveswith firing occasional shots, which were replied to by the camel corps with volleys wheneverthe ground was suited to dismounted action. from time to time one of the more daring arabswould gallop after the retreating squadrons, but a shot from a carbine or a threatenedadvance always brought the adventurous horseman to a halt. the retirement was continued withoutserious interference, and the boggy ground of the khor shambat was recrossed in safety. as soon as the egyptian squadrons—a darkermass under the dark hills to the westward—were seen to be in retirement, the 21st lancerswere withdrawn slowly along the sandy ridge
towards the rocks of surgham—the positionwhence we had first seen the dervish army. the regiment wheeled about and fell back byalternate wings, dropping two detached troops to the rear and flanks to make the enemy'spatrols keep their distance. but when the arab horsemen saw all the cavalry retiringthey became very bold, and numerous small groups of fives and sixes began to draw nearerat a trot. accordingly, whenever the ground was favourable, the squadrons halted in turnfor a few minutes to fire on them. in this way perhaps half-a-dozen were killed or wounded.the others, however, paid little attention to the bullets, and continued to pry curiously,until at last it was thought necessary to send a troop to drive them away. the scoreof lancers galloped back towards the inquisitive
patrols in the most earnest fashion. the dervishes,although more numerous, were scattered about in small parties, and, being unable to collect,they declined the combat. the great army, however, still advanced majestically, pressingthe cavalry back before it; and it was evident that if the khalifa's movement continued,in spite of it being nearly one o'clock, there would be a collision between the main forcesbefore the night. from the summit of the black hill of surghamthe scene was extraordinary. the great army of dervishes was dwarfed by the size of thelandscape to mere dark smears and smudges on the brown of the plain. looking east, anotherarmy was now visible—the british and egyptian army. all six brigades had passed the kerrerihills, and now stood drawn up in a crescent,
with their backs to the nile. the transportand the houses of the village of egeiga filled the enclosed space. neither force could seethe other, though but five miles divided them. the array of the enemy was, without doubt,both longer and deeper. yet there seemed a superior strength in the solid battalions,whose lines were so straight that they might have been drawn with a ruler. the camp presented an animated appearance.the troops had piled arms after the march, and had already built a slender hedge of thorn-bushesaround them. now they were eating their dinners, and in high expectation of a fight. the wholearmy had been ordered to stand to arms at two o'clock in formation to resist the attackwhich it seemed the dervishes were about to
deliver. but at a quarter to two the dervisharmy halted. their drill was excellent, and they all stopped as by a single command. thensuddenly their riflemen discharged their rifles in the air with a great roar—a barbaricfeu de joie. the smoke sprang up along the whole front of their array, running from oneend to the other. after this they lay down on the ground, and it became certain thatthe matter would not be settled that day. we remained in our position among the sandhillsof the ridge until the approach of darkness, and during the afternoon various petty encounterstook place between our patrols and those of the enemy, resulting in a loss to them ofabout a dozen killed and wounded, and to us of one corporal wounded and one horse killed.then, as the light failed, we returned to
the river to water and encamp, passing intothe zeriba through the ranks of the british division, where officers and men, lookingout steadfastly over the fading plain, asked us whether the enemy were coming—and, ifso, when. and it was with confidence and satisfaction that we replied, and they heard, 'probablyat daylight.' when the gunboats had completed their bombardment,had sunk a dervish steamer, had silenced all the hostile batteries, and had sorely batteredthe mahdi's tomb, they returned leisurely to the camp, and lay moored close to the bankto lend the assistance of their guns in case of attack. as the darkness became completethey threw their powerful searchlights over the front of the zeriba and on to the distanthills. the wheeling beams of dazzling light
swept across the desolate, yet not deserted,plain. the dervish army lay for the night along the eastern slope of the shambat depression.all the 50,000 faithful warriors rested in their companies near the flags of their emirs.the khalifa slept in rear of the centre of his host, surrounded by his generals. suddenlythe whole scene was lit by a pale glare. abdullah and the chiefs sprang up. everything aroundthem was bathed in an awful white illumination. far away by the river there gleamed a brilliantcircle of light—the cold, pitiless eye of a demon. the khalifa put his hand on osmanazrak's shoulder—osman, who was to lead the frontal attack at dawn—and whispered,'what is this strange thing?' 'sire,' replied osman, 'they are looking at us.' thereat agreat fear filled all their minds. the khalifa
had a small tent, which showed conspicuouslyin the searchlight. he had it hurriedly pulled down. some of the emirs covered their faces,lest the baleful rays should blind them. all feared that some terrible projectile wouldfollow in the path of the light. and then suddenly it passed on—for the sapper whoworked the lens could see nothing at that distance but the brown plain—and swept alongthe ranks of the sleeping army, rousing up the startled warriors, as a wind sweeps overa field of standing corn. the anglo-egyptian army had not formed a quadrilateralcamp, as on other nights, but had lain down to rest in the formation for attack they hadassumed in the afternoon. every fifty yards behind the thorn-bushes were double sentries.every hundred yards a patrol with an officer
was to be met. fifty yards in rear of thisline lay the battalions, the men in all their ranks, armed and accoutred, but sprawled intoevery conceivable attitude which utter weariness could suggest or dictate. the enemy, twiceas strong as the expeditionary force, were within five miles. they had advanced thatday with confidence and determination. but it seemed impossible to believe that theywould attack by daylight across the open ground. two explanations of their advance and haltpresented themselves. either they had offered battle in a position where they could notthemselves be attacked until four o'clock in the afternoon, and hoped that the sirdar'sarmy, even though victorious, would have to fight a rear-guard action in the darknessto the river; or they intended to make a night
attack. it was not likely that an experiencedcommander would accept battle at so late an hour in the day. if the dervishes were anxiousto attack, so much the worse for them. but the army would remain strictly on the defensive—atany rate, until there was plenty of daylight. the alternative remained—a night attack. here lay the great peril which threatenedthe expedition. what was to be done with the troops during the hours of darkness? in thedaytime they recked little of their enemy. but at night, when 400 yards was the extremerange at which their fire could be opened, it was a matter of grave doubt whether thefront could be kept and the attack repelled. the consequences of the line being penetratedin the darkness were appalling to think of.
the sudden appearance of crowds of figuresswarming to the attack through the gloom; the wild outburst of musketry and artilleryall along the zeriba; the crowds still coming on in spite of the bullets; the fire gettinguncontrolled, and then a great bunching and crumpling of some part of the front, and madconfusion, in which a multitude of fierce swordsmen would surge through the gap, cuttingand slashing at every living thing; in which transport animals would stampede and rushwildly in all directions, upsetting every formation and destroying all attempts to restoreorder; in which regiments and brigades would shift for themselves and fire savagely onall sides, slaying alike friend and foe; and out of which only a few thousand, perhapsonly a few hundred, demoralised men would
escape in barges and steamers to tell thetale of ruin and defeat. the picture—true or false—flamed beforethe eyes of all the leaders that night; but, whatever their thoughts may have been, theirtactics were bold. whatever advice was given, whatever opinions were expressed, the responsibilitywas sir herbert kitchener's. upon his shoulders lay the burden, and the decision that wastaken must be attributed solely to him. he might have formed the army into a solid massof men and animals, arranged the infantry four deep all round the perimeter, and dugas big a ditch or built as high a zeriba as time allowed. he might have filled the numeroushouses with the infantry, making them join the buildings with hasty entrenchments, andso enclose a little space in which to squeeze
cavalry, transport, and guns. instead he formedhis army in a long thin curve, resting on the river and enclosing a wide area of ground,about which baggage and animals were scattered in open order and luxurious accommodation.his line was but two deep; and only two companies per battalion and one egyptian brigade (collinson's)were in reserve. he thus obtained the greatest possible development of fire, and waited,prepared if necessary to stake everything on the arms of precision, but hoping withfervour that he would not be compelled to gamble by night. the night was, however, undisturbed; and themoonlit camp, with its anxious generals, its weary soldiers, its fearful machinery of destruction,all strewn along the bank of the great river,
remained plunged in silence, as if broodingover the chances of the morrow and the failures of the past. and hardly four miles away anotherarmy—twice as numerous, equally confident, equally brave—were waiting impatiently forthe morning and the final settlement of the long quarrel. chapter xv: the battle of omdurman september 2, 1898 the bugles all over the camp by the riverbegan to sound at half-past four. the cavalry trumpets and the drums and fifes of the britishdivision joined the chorus, and everyone awoke amid a confusion of merry or defiant notes.then it grew gradually lighter, and the cavalry
mounted their horses, the infantry stood totheir arms, and the gunners went to their batteries; while the sun, rising over thenile, revealed the wide plain, the dark rocky hills, and the waiting army. it was as ifall the preliminaries were settled, the ground cleared, and nothing remained but the finalact and 'the rigour of the game.' even before it became light several squadronsof british and egyptian cavalry were pushed swiftly forward to gain contact with the enemyand learn his intentions. the first of these, under captain baring, occupied surgham hill,and waited in the gloom until the whereabouts of the dervishes should be disclosed by thedawn. it was a perilous undertaking, for he might have found them unexpectedly near. asthe sun rose, the 21st lancers trotted out
of the zeriba and threw out a spray of officers'patrols. as there had been no night attack, it was expected that the dervish army wouldhave retired to their original position or entered the town. it was hardly conceivablethat they would advance across the open ground to attack the zeriba by daylight. indeed,it appeared more probable that their hearts had failed them in the night, and that theyhad melted away into the desert. but these anticipations were immediately dispelled bythe scene which was visible from the crest of the ridge. it was a quarter to six. the light was dim,but growing stronger every minute. there in the plain lay the enemy, their numbers unaltered,their confidence and intentions apparently
unshaken. their front was now nearly fivemiles long, and composed of great masses of men joined together by thinner lines. behindand near to the flanks were large reserves. from the ridge they looked dark blurs andstreaks, relieved and diversified with an odd-looking shimmer of light from the spear-points.at about ten minutes to six it was evident that the masses were in motion and advancingswiftly. their emirs galloped about and before their ranks. scouts and patrols scatteredthemselves all over the front. then they began to cheer. they were still a mile away fromthe hill, and were concealed from the sirdar's army by the folds of the ground. the noiseof the shouting was heard, albeit faintly, by the troops down by the river. but to thosewatching on the hill a tremendous roar came
up in waves of intense sound, like the tumultof the rising wind and sea before a storm. the british and egyptian forces were arrangedin line, with their back to the river. the flanks were secured by the gunboats lyingmoored in the stream. before them was the rolling sandy plain, looking from the slightelevation of the ridge smooth and flat as a table. to the right rose the rocky hillsof the kerreri position, near which the egyptian cavalry were drawn up—a dark solid massof men and horses. on the left the 21st lancers, with a single squadron thrown out in advance,were halted watching their patrols, who climbed about surgham hill, stretched forward beyondit, or perched, as we did, on the ridge. the ground sloped gently up from the river;so that it seemed as if the landward ends
of the surgham and kerreri ridges curved intowards each other, enclosing what lay between. beyond the long swell of sand which formedthe western wall of this spacious amphitheatre the black shapes of the distant hills rosein misty confusion. the challengers were already in the arena; their antagonists swiftly approached. although the dervishes were steadily advancing,a belief that their musketry was inferior encouraged a nearer view, and we trotted roundthe south-west slopes of surgham hill until we reached the sandhills on the enemy's side,among which the regiment had waited the day before. thence the whole array was visiblein minute detail. it seemed that every single man of all the thousands could be examinedseparately. the pace of their march was fast
and steady, and it was evident that it wouldnot be safe to wait long among the sandhills. yet the wonder of the scene exercised a dangerousfascination, and for a while we tarried. the emblems of the more famous emirs wereeasily distinguishable. on the extreme left the chiefs and soldiers of the bright greenflag gathered under ali-wad-helu; between this and the centre the large dark green flagof osman sheikh-ed-din rose above a dense mass of spearmen, preceded by long lines ofwarriors armed presumably with rifles; over the centre, commanded by yakub, the sacredblack banner of the khalifa floated high and remarkable; while on the right a great squareof dervishes was arrayed under an extraordinary number of white flags, amid which the redensign of sherif was almost hidden. all the
pride and might of the dervish empire weremassed on this last great day of its existence. riflemen who had helped to destroy hicks,spearmen who had charged at abu klea, emirs who saw the sack of gondar, baggara freshfrom raiding the shillooks, warriors who had besieged khartoum—all marched, inspiredby the memories of former triumphs and embittered by the knowledge of late defeats, to chastisethe impudent and accursed invaders. the advance continued. the dervish left beganto stretch out across the plain towards kerreri—as i thought, to turn our right flank. theircentre, under the black flag, moved directly towards surgham. the right pursued a lineof advance south of that hill. this mass of men were the most striking of all. they couldnot have mustered fewer than 6,000. their
array was perfect. they displayed a greatnumber of flags—perhaps 500—which looked at the distance white, though they were reallycovered with texts from the koran, and which by their admirable alignment made this divisionof the khalifa's army look like the old representations of the crusaders in the bayeux tapestry. the attack developed. the left, nearly 20,000strong, toiled across the plain and approached the egyptian squadrons. the leading massesof the centre deployed facing the zeriba and marched forthwith to the direct assault. asthe whole dervish army continued to advance, the division with the white flags, which haduntil now been echeloned in rear of their right, moved up into the general line andbegan to climb the southern slopes of surgham
hill. meanwhile yet another body of the enemy,comparatively insignificant in numbers, who had been drawn up behind the 'white flags,'were moving slowly towards the nile, echeloned still further behind their right, and notfar from the suburbs of omdurman. these men had evidently been posted to prevent the dervisharmy being cut off from the city and to secure their line of retreat; and with them the 21stlancers were destined to have a much closer acquaintance about two hours later. the dervish centre had come within range.but it was not the british and egyptian army that began the battle. if there was one armin which the arabs were beyond all comparison inferior to their adversaries, it was in guns.yet it was with this arm that they opened
their attack. in the middle of the dervishline now marching in frontal assault were two puffs of smoke. about fifty yards shortof the thorn fence two red clouds of sand and dust sprang up, where the projectileshad struck. it looked like a challenge. it was immediately answered. great clouds ofsmoke appeared all along the front of the british and soudanese brigades. one afteranother four batteries opened on the enemy at a range of about 3,000 yards. the soundof the cannonade rolled up to us on the ridge, and was re-echoed by the hills. above theheads of the moving masses shells began to burst, dotting the air with smoke-balls andthe ground with bodies. but a nearer tragedy impended. the 'white flags' were nearly overthe crest. in another minute they would become
visible to the batteries. did they realisewhat would come to meet them? they were in a dense mass, 2,800 yards from the 32nd fieldbattery and the gunboats. the ranges were known. it was a matter of machinery. the moredistant slaughter passed unnoticed, as the mind was fascinated by the approaching horror.in a few seconds swift destruction would rush on these brave men. they topped the crestand drew out into full view of the whole army. their white banners made them conspicuousabove all. as they saw the camp of their enemies, they discharged their rifles with a greatroar of musketry and quickened their pace. for a moment the white flags advanced in regularorder, and the whole division crossed the crest and were exposed. forthwith the gunboats,the 32nd british field battery, and other
guns from the zeriba opened on them. abouttwenty shells struck them in the first minute. some burst high in the air, others exactlyin their faces. others, again, plunged into the sand and, exploding, dashed clouds ofred dust, splinters, and bullets amid their ranks. the white banners toppled over in alldirections. yet they rose again immediately, as other men pressed forward to die for themahdi's sacred cause and in the defence of the successor of the true prophet. it wasa terrible sight, for as yet they had not hurt us at all, and it seemed an unfair advantageto strike thus cruelly when they could not reply. under the influence of the shells themass of the 'white flags' dissolved into thin lines of spearmen and skirmishers, and cameon in altered formation and diminished numbers,
but with unabated enthusiasm. and now, thewhole attack being thoroughly exposed, it became the duty of the cavalry to clear thefront as quickly as possible, and leave the further conduct of the debate to the infantryand the maxim guns. all the patrols trotted or cantered back to their squadrons, and theregiment retired swiftly into the zeriba, while the shells from the gunboats screamedoverhead and the whole length of the position began to burst into flame and smoke. nor wasit long before the tremendous banging of the artillery was swollen by the roar of musketry. taking advantage of the shelter of the river-bank,the cavalry dismounted; we watered our horses, waited, and wondered what was happening. andevery moment the tumult grew louder and more
intense, until even the flickering stutterof the maxims could scarcely be heard above the continuous din. eighty yards away, andperhaps twenty feet above us, the 32nd field battery was in action. the nimble figuresof the gunners darted about as they busied themselves in their complicated process ofdestruction. the officers, some standing on biscuit-boxes, peered through their glassesand studied the effect. of this i had one glimpse. eight hundred yards away a raggedline of men were coming on desperately, struggling forward in the face of the pitiless fire—whitebanners tossing and collapsing; white figures subsiding in dozens to the ground; littlewhite puffs from their rifles, larger white puffs spreading in a row all along their frontfrom the bursting shrapnel.
the infantry fired steadily and stolidly,without hurry or excitement, for the enemy were far away and the officers careful. besides,the soldiers were interested in the work and took great pains. but presently the mere physicalact became tedious. the tiny figures seen over the slide of the backsight seemed a littlelarger, but also fewer at each successive volley. the rifles grew hot—so hot thatthey had to be changed for those of the reserve companies. the maxim guns exhausted all thewater in their jackets, and several had to be refreshed from the water-bottles of thecameron highlanders before they could go on with their deadly work. the empty cartridge-cases,tinkling to the ground, formed a small but growing heap beside each man. and all thetime out on the plain on the other side bullets
were shearing through flesh, smashing andsplintering bone; blood spouted from terrible wounds; valiant men were struggling on througha hell of whistling metal, exploding shells, and spurting dust—suffering, despairing,dying. such was the first phase of the battle of omdurman. the khalifa's plan of attack appears to havebeen complex and ingenious. it was, however, based on an extraordinary miscalculation ofthe power of modern weapons; with the exception of this cardinal error, it is not necessaryto criticise it. he first ordered about 15,000 men, drawn chiefly from the army of osmansheikh-ed-din and placed under the command of osman azrak, to deliver a frontal attack.he himself waited with an equal force near
surgham hill to watch the result. if it succeeded,he would move forward with his bodyguard, the flower of the arab army, and completethe victory. if it failed, there was yet another chance. the dervishes who were first launchedagainst the zeriba, although very brave men, were not by any means his best or most reliabletroops. their destruction might be a heavy loss, but it would not end the struggle. whilethe attack was proceeding, the valiant left, consisting of the rest of the army of osmansheikh-ed-din, might move unnoticed to the northern flank and curve round on to the frontof the zeriba held by the egyptian brigade. ali-wad-helu was meanwhile to march to thekerreri hills, and remain out of range and, if possible, out of sight among them. shouldthe frontal and flank attacks be unhappily
repulsed, the 'enemies of god,' exulting intheir easy victory over the faithful, would leave their strong place and march to thecapture and sack of the city. then, while they were yet dispersed on the plain, withno zeriba to protect them, the chosen warriors of the true religion would abandon all concealment,and hasten in their thousands to the utter destruction of the accursed—the khalifawith 15,000 falling upon them from behind surgham; ali-wad-helu and all that remainedof osman's army assailing them from kerreri. attacked at once from the north and south,and encompassed on every side, the infidels would abandon hope and order, and kitchenermight share the fate of hicks and gordon. two circumstances, which will appear as theaccount proceeds, prevented the accomplishment
of this plan. the second attack was not executedsimultaneously by the two divisions of the dervish army; and even had it been, the powerof the musketry would have triumphed, and though the expeditionary force might havesustained heavier losses the main result could not have been affected. the last hopes ofbarbarism had passed with the shades of night. colonel broadwood, with nine squadrons ofcavalry, the camel corps, and the horse artillery, had been ordered to check the dervish left,and prevent it enveloping the downstream flank of the zeriba, as this was held by the egyptianbrigade, which it was not thought desirable to expose to the full weight of an attack.with this object, as the dervishes approached, he had occupied the kerreri ridge with thehorse battery and the camel corps, holding
his cavalry in reserve in rear of the centre. the kerreri ridge, to which reference hasso frequently been made, consists of two main features, which rise to the height of about300 feet above the plain, are each above a mile long, and run nearly east and west, witha dip or trough about 1,000 yards wide between them. the eastern ends of these main ridgesare perhaps 1,000 yards from the river, and in this intervening space there are severalrocky under-features and knolls. the kerreri hills, the spaces between them, and the smallerfeatures are covered with rough boulders and angular stones of volcanic origin, which renderthe movements of horses and camels difficult and painful.
the cavalry horses and camels were in thedip between the two ridges; and the dismounted men of the camel corps were deployed alongthe crest of the most southerly of the ridges, with their right at the desert end. next inorder to the camel corps, the centre of the ridge was occupied by the dismounted cavalry.the horse artillery were on the left. the remainder of the cavalry waited in the hollowbehind the guns. the tempestuous advance of osman soon broughthim into contact with the mounted force. his real intentions are still a matter of conjecture.whether he had been ordered to attack the egyptian brigade, or to drive back the cavalry,or to disappear behind the kerreri hills in conformity with ali-wad-helu, is impossibleto pronounce. his action was, however, clear.
he could not safely assail the egyptians witha powerful cavalry force threatening his left rear. he therefore continued his move acrossthe front of the zeriba. keeping out of the range of infantry fire, bringing up his right,and marching along due north, he fell upon broadwood. this officer, who had expectedto have to deal with small bodies on the dervish flank, found himself suddenly exposed to theattack of nearly 15,000 men, many of whom were riflemen. the sirdar, seeing the situationfrom the zeriba, sent him an order to withdraw within the lines of infantry. colonel broadwood,however, preferred to retire through the kerreri hills to the northward, drawing osman afterhim. he replied to that effect. the first position had soon to be abandoned.the dervishes, advancing in a north-easterly
direction, attacked the kerreri hills obliquely.they immediately enveloped the right flank of the mounted troops holding them. it willbe seen from the map that as soon as the dervish riflemen gained a point west and in prolongationof the trough between the two ridges, they not only turned the right flank, but alsothreatened the retreat of the defenders of the southerly ridge; for they were able tosweep the trough from end to end with their fire. as soon as it became certain that thesoutherly ridge could not be held any longer, colonel broadwood retired the battery to theeast end of the second or northern ridge. this was scarcely accomplished when the dipwas enfiladed, and the cavalry and camel corps who followed lost about fifty men and manyhorses and camels killed and wounded. the
camel corps were the most unfortunate. theywere soon encumbered with wounded, and it was now painfully evident that in rocky groundthe dervishes could go faster on their feet than the soldiers on their camels. pressingon impetuously at a pace of nearly seven miles an hour, and unchecked by a heavy artilleryfire from the zeriba and a less effective fire from the horse battery, which was onlyarmed with 7-pounder krupps of an obsolete pattern, the arabs rapidly diminished thedistance between themselves and their enemies. in these circumstances colonel broadwood decidedto send the camel corps back to the zeriba under cover of a gunboat, which, watchfullyobserving the progress of the fight, was coming down stream to assist. the distance whichdivided the combatants was scarcely 400 yards
and decreasing every minute. the cavalry weredrawn up across the eastern or river end of the trough. the guns of the horse batteryfired steadily from their new position on the northern ridge. but the camel corps werestill struggling in the broken ground, and it was clear that their position was one ofgreat peril. the dervishes already carpeted the rocks of the southern ridge with dullyellow swarms, and, heedless of the shells which still assailed them in reverse fromthe zeriba, continued to push their attack home. on the very instant that they saw thecamel corps make for the river they realised that those they had deemed their prey weretrying, like a hunted animal, to run to ground within the lines of infantry. with that instinctiveknowledge of war which is the heritage of
savage peoples, the whole attack swung tothe right, changed direction from north to east, and rushed down the trough and alongthe southern ridge towards the nile, with the plain intention of cutting off the camelcorps and driving them into the river. the moment was critical. it appeared to thecavalry commander that the dervishes would actually succeed, and their success must involvethe total destruction of the camel corps. that could not, of course, be tolerated. thewhole nine squadrons of cavalry assumed a preparatory formation. the british officersbelieved that a terrible charge impended. they would meet in direct collision the swarmsof men who were hurrying down the trough. the diversion might enable the camel corpsto escape. but the ground was bad; the enemy's
force was overwhelming; the egyptian trooperswere prepared to obey—but that was all. there was no exalted enthusiasm such as atthese moments carries sterner breeds to victory. few would return. nevertheless, the operationappeared inevitable. the camel corps were already close to the river. but thousandsof dervishes were running swiftly towards them at right angles to their line of retreat,and it was certain that if the camelry attempted to cross this new front of the enemy theywould be annihilated. their only hope lay in maintaining themselves by their fire nearthe river-bank until help could reach them, and, in order to delay and weaken the dervishattack the cavalry would have to make a desperate charge.
but at the critical moment the gunboat arrivedon the scene and began suddenly to blaze and flame from maxim guns, quick-firing guns,and rifles. the range was short; the effect tremendous. the terrible machine, floatinggracefully on the waters—a beautiful white devil—wreathed itself in smoke. the riverslopes of the kerreri hills, crowded with the advancing thousands, sprang up into cloudsof dust and splinters of rock. the charging dervishes sank down in tangled heaps. themasses in rear paused, irresolute. it was too hot even for them. the approach of anothergunboat completed their discomfiture. the camel corps, hurrying along the shore, slippedpast the fatal point of interception, and saw safety and the zeriba before them.
exasperated by their disappointment, the soldiersof osman sheikh-ed-din turned again upon the cavalry, and, forgetting in their anger themobile nature of their foe, pursued the elusive squadrons three long miles to the north. thecavalry, intensely relieved by the escape of the camel corps, played with their powerfulantagonist, as the banderillo teases the bull. colonel broadwood thus succeeded in luringthis division of the dervish army far away from the field of battle, where they weresorely needed. the rough ground, however, delayed the horse battery. they lagged, asthe camel corps had done, and caused constant anxiety. at length two of their guns stuckfast in a marshy spot, and as several men and horses were shot in the attempt to extricatethem broadwood wisely ordered them to be abandoned,
and they were soon engulfed in the dervishmasses. encouraged by this capture, the horsemen of osman's command daringly attacked the retreatingcavalry. but they were effectually checked by the charge of a squadron under major mahon. both gunboats, having watched the camel corpssafely into the zeriba, now returned with the current and renewed their attack uponthe arabs. opening a heavy and accurate fire upon the river flank, they drove them westwardand away from the nile. through the gap thus opened broadwood and his squadrons trottedto rejoin the main body, picking up on the way the two guns which had been abandoned. while these things were passing on the northernflank, the frontal attack was in progress.
the debris of the 'white flags' joined thecentre, and the whole 14,000 pressed forward against the zeriba, spreading out by degreesand abandoning their dense formations, and gradually slowing down. at about 800 yardsfrom the british division the advance ceased, and they could make no headway. opposite thesoudanese, who were armed only with the martini-henry rifle, the assailants came within 300 yards;and one brave old man, carrying a flag, fell at 150 paces from the shelter trench. butthe result was conclusive all along the line. the attack was shattered. the leader, cladin his new jibba of many colours, rode on steadfastly towards the inexorable firingline, until, pierced by several bullets, he fell lifeless. such was the end of that stubbornwarrior of many fights—wicked osman azrak,
faithful unto death. the surviving dervisheslay down on the ground. unable to advance, they were unwilling to retire; and their riflemen,taking advantage of the folds of the plain, opened and maintained an unequal combat. byeight o'clock it was evident that the whole attack had failed. the loss of the enemy wasmore than 2,000 killed, and perhaps as many wounded. to the infantry, who were busy withtheir rifles, it had scarcely seemed a fight. yet all along the front bullets had whizzedover and into the ranks, and in every battalion there were casualties. captain caldecott,of the warwicks, was killed; the camerons had two officers, captain clarke and lieutenantnicholson, severely wounded; the grenadiers one, captain bagot. colonel f. rhodes, ashe sat on his horse near the maxim battery
of the 1st british brigade, was shot throughthe shoulder and carried from the field just as the attack reached its climax. there were,besides these officers, about 150 casualties among the soldiers. the attack languished. the enemy's rifle firecontinued, and as soon as the heavy firing ceased it began to be annoying. the ground,although it appeared flat and level to the eye, nevertheless contained depressions andswellings which afforded good cover to the sharpshooters, and the solid line behind thezeriba was an easy target. the artillery now began to clear out these depressions by theirshells, and in this work they displayed a searching power very remarkable when theirflat trajectory is remembered. as the shells
burst accurately above the dervish skirmishersand spearmen who were taking refuge in the folds of the plain, they rose by hundredsand by fifties to fly. instantly the hungry and attentive maxims and the watchful infantryopened on them, sweeping them all to the ground—some in death, others in terror. again the shellsfollowed them to their new concealment. again they rose, fewer than before, and ran. againthe maxims and the rifles spluttered. again they fell. and so on until the front of thezeriba was clear of unwounded men for at least half a mile. a few escaped. some, notwithstandingthe vices of which they have been accused and the perils with which they were encompassed,gloriously carried off their injured comrades. after the attack had been broken, and whilethe front of the zeriba was being cleared
of the dervish riflemen, the 21st lancerswere again called upon to act. the sirdar and his generals were all agreed on one point.they must occupy omdurman before the dervish army could get back there. they could fightas many dervishes as cared to come in the plain; among the houses it was different.as the khalifa had anticipated, the infidels, exulting in their victory, were eager, thoughfor a different reason, to seize the city. and this they were now in a position to do.the arabs were out in the desert. a great part of their army was even as far away askerreri. the troops could move on interior lines. they were bound to reach omdurman first.the order was therefore given to march on the city at once. but first the surgham ridgemust be reconnoitred, and the ground between
the zeriba and omdurman cleared of the dervishes—withinfantry if necessary, but with cavalry if possible, because that would be quicker. as the fusillade slackened, the lancers stoodto their horses. then general gatacre, with captain brooke and the rest of his staff,came galloping along the rear of the line of infantry and guns, and shouted for colonelmartin. there was a brief conversation—an outstretched arm pointing at the ridge—anorder, and we were all scrambling into our saddles and straightening the ranks in highexpectation. we started at a trot, two or three patrols galloping out in front, towardsthe high ground, while the regiment followed in mass—a great square block of ungainlybrown figures and little horses, hung all
over with water-bottles, saddle-bags, picketing-gear,tins of bully-beef, all jolting and jangling together; the polish of peace gone; soldierswithout glitter; horsemen without grace; but still a regiment of light cavalry in activeoperation against the enemy. the crest of the ridge was only half a mileaway. it was found unoccupied. the rocky mass of surgham obstructed the view and concealedthe great reserve collected around the black flag. but southward, between us and omdurman,the whole plain was exposed. it was infested with small parties of dervishes, moving about,mounted and on foot, in tens and twenties. three miles away a broad stream of fugitives,of wounded, and of deserters flowed from the khalifa's army to the city. the mirages blurredand distorted the picture, so that some of
the routed arabs walked in air and some throughwater, and all were misty and unreal. but the sight was sufficient to excite the fiercestinstincts of cavalry. only the scattered parties in the plain appeared to prevent a gloriouspursuit. the signalling officer was set to heliograph back to the sirdar that the ridgewas unoccupied and that several thousand dervishes could be seen flying into omdurman. pendingthe answer, we waited; and looking back northwards, across the front of the zeriba, where thefirst attack had been stopped, perceived a greyish-white smudge, perhaps a mile long.the glass disclosed details—hundreds of tiny white figures heaped or scattered; dozenshopping, crawling, staggering away; a few horses standing stolidly among the corpses;a few unwounded men dragging off their comrades.
the skirmishers among the rocks of surghamsoon began to fire at the regiment, and we sheltered among the mounds of sand, whilea couple of troops replied with their carbines. then the heliograph in the zeriba began totalk in flashes of light that opened and shut capriciously. the actual order is important.'advance,' said the helio, 'and clear the left flank, and use every effort to preventthe enemy re-entering omdurman.' that was all, but it was sufficient. in the distancethe enemy could be seen re-entering omdurman in hundreds. there was no room for doubt.they must be stopped, and incidentally these small parties in the plain might be brushedaway. we remounted; the ground looked smooth and unbroken; yet it was desirable to reconnoitre.two patrols were sent out. the small parties
of dervishes who were scattered all over theplain and the slopes of the hill prevented anything less than a squadron moving, exceptat their peril. the first patrol struck out towards omdurman, and began to push in betweenthe scattered dervishes, who fired their rifles and showed great excitement. the other patrol,under lieutenant grenfell, were sent to see what the ground looked like from further alongthe ridge and on the lower slopes of surgham. the riflemen among the rocks turned theirfire from the regiment to these nearer objects. the five brown figures cantered over the roughground, presenting difficult targets, but under continual fire, and disappeared roundthe spur. however, in two or three minutes they re-appeared, the riflemen on the hillmaking a regular rattle of musketry, amid
which the lancers galloped safely back, followedlast of all by their officer. he said that the plain looked as safe from the other sideof the hill as from where we were. at this moment the other patrol returned. they, too,had had good fortune in their adventurous ride. their information was exact. they reportedthat in a shallow and apparently practicable khor about three-quarters of a mile to thesouth-west, and between the regiment and the fugitives, there was drawn up a formed bodyof dervishes about 1,000 strong. colonel martin decided on this information to advance andattack this force, which alone interposed between him and the arab line of retreat.then we started. but all this time the enemy had been busy.at the beginning of the battle the khalifa
had posted a small force of 700 men on hisextreme right, to prevent his line of retreat to omdurman being harassed. this detachmentwas composed entirely of the hadendoa tribesmen of osman digna's flag, and was commanded byone of his subordinate emirs, who selected a suitable position in the shallow khor. assoon as the 21st lancers left the zeriba the dervish scouts on the top of surgham carriedthe news to the khalifa. it was said that the english cavalry were coming to cut himoff from omdurman. abdullah thereupon determined to strengthen his extreme right; and he immediatelyordered four regiments, each 500 strong, drawn from the force around the black flag and underthe emir ibrahim khalil, to reinforce the hadendoa in the khor. while we were waitingfor orders on the ridge these men were hurrying
southwards along the depression, and concealedby a spur of surgham hill. the lancer patrol reconnoitred the khor, at the imminent riskof their lives, while it was only occupied by the original 700 hadendoa. galloping back,they reported that it was held by about 1,000 men. before they reached the regiment thisnumber was increased to 2,700. this, however, we had no means of knowing. the khalifa, havingdespatched his reinforcement, rode on his donkey with a scanty escort nearly half amile from the black flag towards the khor, in order to watch the event, and in consequencehe was within 500 yards of the scene. as the 21st lancers left the ridge, the fireof the arab riflemen on the hill ceased. we advanced at a walk in mass for about 300 yards.the scattered parties of dervishes fell back
and melted away, and only one straggling lineof men in dark blue waited motionless a quarter of a mile to the left front. they were scarcelya hundred strong. the regiment formed into line of squadron columns, and continued ata walk until within 300 yards of this small body of dervishes. the firing behind the ridgeshad stopped. there was complete silence, intensified by the recent tumult. far beyond the thinblue row of dervishes the fugitives were visible streaming into omdurman. and should thesefew devoted men impede a regiment? yet it were wiser to examine their position fromthe other flank before slipping a squadron at them. the heads of the squadrons wheeledslowly to the left, and the lancers, breaking into a trot, began to cross the dervish frontin column of troops. thereupon and with one
accord the blue-clad men dropped on theirknees, and there burst out a loud, crackling fire of musketry. it was hardly possible tomiss such a target at such a range. horses and men fell at once. the only course wasplain and welcome to all. the colonel, nearer than his regiment, already saw what lay behindthe skirmishers. he ordered, 'right wheel into line' to be sounded. the trumpet jerkedout a shrill note, heard faintly above the trampling of the horses and the noise of therifles. on the instant all the sixteen troops swung round and locked up into a long gallopingline, and the 21st lancers were committed to their first charge in war. two hundred and fifty yards away the dark-bluemen were firing madly in a thin film of light-blue
smoke. their bullets struck the hard gravelinto the air, and the troopers, to shield their faces from the stinging dust, bowedtheir helmets forward, like the cuirassiers at waterloo. the pace was fast and the distanceshort. yet, before it was half covered, the whole aspect of the affair changed. a deepcrease in the ground—a dry watercourse, a khor—appeared where all had seemed smooth,level plain; and from it there sprang, with the suddenness of a pantomime effect and ahigh-pitched yell, a dense white mass of men nearly as long as our front and about twelvedeep. a score of horsemen and a dozen bright flags rose as if by magic from the earth.eager warriors sprang forward to anticipate the shock. the rest stood firm to meet it.the lancers acknowledged the apparition only
by an increase of pace. each man wanted sufficientmomentum to drive through such a solid line. the flank troops, seeing that they overlapped,curved inwards like the horns of a moon. but the whole event was a matter of seconds. theriflemen, firing bravely to the last, were swept head over heels into the khor, and jumpingdown with them, at full gallop and in the closest order, the british squadrons struckthe fierce brigade with one loud furious shout. the collision was prodigious. nearly thirtylancers, men and horses, and at least two hundred arabs were overthrown. the shock wasstunning to both sides, and for perhaps ten wonderful seconds no man heeded his enemy.terrified horses wedged in the crowd, bruised and shaken men, sprawling in heaps, struggled,dazed and stupid, to their feet, panted, and
looked about them. several fallen lancershad even time to re-mount. meanwhile the impetus of the cavalry carried them on. as a ridertears through a bullfinch, the officers forced their way through the press; and as an ironrake might be drawn through a heap of shingle, so the regiment followed. they shattered thedervish array, and, their pace reduced to a walk, scrambled out of the khor on the furtherside, leaving a score of troopers behind them, and dragging on with the charge more thana thousand arabs. then, and not till then, the killing began; and thereafter each mansaw the world along his lance, under his guard, or through the back-sight of his pistol; andeach had his own strange tale to tell. stubborn and unshaken infantry hardly evermeet stubborn and unshaken cavalry. either
the infantry run away and are cut down inflight, or they keep their heads and destroy nearly all the horsemen by their musketry.on this occasion two living walls had actually crashed together. the dervishes fought manfully.they tried to hamstring the horses, they fired their rifles, pressing the muzzles into thevery bodies of their opponents. they cut reins and stirrup-leathers. they flung their throwing-spearswith great dexterity. they tried every device of cool, determined men practised in war andfamiliar with cavalry; and, besides, they swung sharp, heavy swords which bit deep.the hand-to-hand fighting on the further side of the khor lasted for perhaps one minute.then the horses got into their stride again, the pace increased, and the lancers drew outfrom among their antagonists. within two minutes
of the collision every living man was clearof the dervish mass. all who had fallen were cut at with swords till they stopped quivering,but no artistic mutilations were attempted. two hundred yards away the regiment halted,rallied, faced about, and in less than five minutes were re-formed and ready for a secondcharge. the men were anxious to cut their way back through their enemies. we were alonetogether—the cavalry regiment and the dervish brigade. the ridge hung like a curtain betweenus and the army. the general battle was forgotten, as it was unseen. this was a private quarrel.the other might have been a massacre; but here the fight was fair, for we too foughtwith sword and spear. indeed the advantage of ground and numbers lay with them. all preparedto settle the debate at once and for ever.
but some realisation of the cost of our wildride began to come to those who were responsible. riderless horses galloped across the plain.men, clinging to their saddles, lurched helplessly about, covered with blood from perhaps a dozenwounds. horses, streaming from tremendous gashes, limped and staggered with their riders.in 120 seconds five officers, 65 men, and 119 horses out of fewer than 400 had beenkilled or wounded. the dervish line, broken by the charge, beganto re-form at once. they closed up, shook themselves together, and prepared with constancyand courage for another shock. but on military considerations it was desirable to turn themout of the khor first and thus deprive them of their vantage ground. the regiment againdrawn up, three squadrons in line and the
fourth in column, now wheeled to the right,and, galloping round the dervish flank, dismounted and opened a heavy fire with their magazinecarbines. under the pressure of this fire the enemy changed front to meet the new attack,so that both sides were formed at right angles to their original lines. when the dervishchange of front was completed, they began to advance against the dismounted men. butthe fire was accurate, and there can be little doubt that the moral effect of the chargehad been very great, and that these brave enemies were no longer unshaken. be this asit may, the fact remains that they retreated swiftly, though in good order, towards theridge of surgham hill, where the khalifa's black flag still waved, and the 21st lancersremained in possession of the ground—and
of their dead. such is the true and literal account of thecharge; but the reader may care to consider a few incidents. colonel martin, busy withthe direction of his regiment, drew neither sword nor revolver, and rode through the pressunarmed and uninjured. major crole wyndham had his horse shot under him by a dervishwho pressed the muzzle of his rifle into its hide before firing. from out of the middleof that savage crowd the officer fought his way on foot and escaped in safety. lieutenantmolyneux fell in the khor into the midst of the enemy. in the confusion he disentangledhimself from his horse, drew his revolver, and jumped out of the hollow before the dervishesrecoved from the impact of the charge. then
they attacked him. he fired at the nearest,and at the moment of firing was slashed across the right wrist by another. the pistol fellfrom his nerveless hand, and, being wounded, dismounted, and disarmed, he turned in thehopes of regaining, by following the line of the charge, his squadron, which was justgetting clear. hard upon his track came the enemy, eager to make an end. beset on allsides, and thus hotly pursued, the wounded officer perceived a single lancer riding acrosshis path. he called on him for help. whereupon the trooper, private byrne, although alreadyseverely wounded by a bullet which had penetrated his right arm, replied without a moment'shesitation and in a cheery voice, 'all right, sir!' and turning, rode at four dervisheswho were about to kill his officer. his wound,
which had partly paralysed his arm, preventedhim from grasping his sword, and at the first ineffectual blow it fell from his hand, andhe received another wound from a spear in the chest. but his solitary charge had checkedthe pursuing dervishes. lieutenant molyneux regained his squadron alive, and the trooper,seeing that his object was attained, galloped away, reeling in his saddle. arrived at histroop, his desperate condition was noticed and he was told to fall out. but this he refusedto do, urging that he was entitled to remain on duty and have 'another go at them.' atlength he was compelled to leave the field, fainting from loss of blood. lieutenant nesham had an even more extraordinaryescape than molyneux. he had scrambled out
of the khor when, as his horse was nearlystopping, an arab seized his bridle. he struck at the man with his sword, but did not preventhim cutting his off-rein. the officer's bridle-hand, unexpectedly released, flew out, and, as itdid so, a swordsman at a single stroke nearly severed it from his body. then they cut athim from all sides. one blow sheared through his helmet and grazed his head. another inflicteda deep wound in his right leg. a third, intercepted by his shoulder-chains, paralysed his rightarm. two more, missing him narrowly, cut right through the cantel of the saddle and intothe horse's back. the wounded subaltern—he was the youngest of all—reeled. a man oneither side seized his legs to pull him to the ground; but the long spurs stuck intothe horse's flanks, and the maddened animal,
throwing up its head and springing forward,broke away from the crowd of foes, and carried the rider—bleeding, fainting, but stillalive—to safety among the rallying squadrons. lieutenant nesham's experience was that ofthe men who were killed, only that he escaped to describe it. the wounded were sent with a small escorttowards the river and hospitals. an officer was despatched with the news to the sirdar,and on the instant both cannonade and fusillade broke out again behind the ridge, and grewin a crashing crescendo until the whole landscape seemed to vibrate with the sound of explosions.the second phase of the battle had begun. even before the 21st lancers had reconnoitredsurgham ridge, the sirdar had set his brigades
in motion towards omdurman. he was determined,even at a very great risk, to occupy the city while it was empty and before the army inthe plain could return to defend it. the advantage might be tremendous. nevertheless the movementwas premature. the khalifa still remained undefeated west of surgham hill; ali-wad-helulurked behind kerreri; osman was rapidly re-forming. there were still at least 35,000 men on thefield. nor, as the event proved, was it possible to enter omdurman until they had been beaten. as soon as the infantry had replenished theirammunition, they wheeled to the left in echelon of brigades, and began to march towards surghamridge. the movements of a great force are slow. it was not desirable that the britishdivision, which led the echelon, should remain
in the low ground north of surgham—wherethey were commanded, had no field of fire, and could see nothing—and accordingly boththese brigades moved forward almost together to occupy the crest of the ridge. thus twosteps of the ladder were run into one, and maxwell's brigade, which followed wauchope's,was 600 yards further south than it would have been had the regular echelon been observed.in the zeriba macdonald had been next to maxwell. but a very significant change in the orderwas now made. general hunter evidently conceived the rear of the echelon threatened from thedirection of kerreri. had the earth swallowed all the thousands who had moved across theplain towards the hills? at any rate, he would have his best brigade and his most experiencedgeneral in the post of possible danger. he
therefore ordered lewis's brigade to followmaxwell, and left macdonald last of all, strengthening him with three batteries of artillery andeight maxim guns. collinson marched with the transport. macdonald moved out westward intothe desert to take his place in the echelon, and also to allow lewis to pass him as ordered.lewis hurried on after maxwell, and, taking his distance from him, was thus also 600 yardsfurther south than the regular echelon admitted. the step which had been absorbed when bothbritish brigades moved off—advisedly—together, caused a double gap between macdonald andthe rest of the army. and this distance was further increased by the fact that while hewas moving west, to assume his place in correct echelon, the other five brigades were drawingoff to the southward. hence macdonald's isolation.
at 9.15 the whole army was marching southin echelon, with the rear brigade at rather more than double distance. collinson had alreadystarted with the transport, but the field hospitals still remained in the deserted zeriba,busily packing up. the medical staff had about 150 wounded on their hands. the sirdar's ordershad been that these were to be placed on the hospital barges, and that the field hospitalswere to follow the transport. but the moving of wounded men is a painful and delicate affair,and by a stupid and grievous mistake the three regular hospital barges, duly prepared forthe reception of the wounded, had been towed across to the right bank. it was necessaryto use three ammunition barges, which, although in no way arranged for the reception of wounded,were luckily at hand. meanwhile time was passing,
and the doctors, who worked with devoted energy,became suddenly aware that, with the exception of a few detachments from the british divisionand three egyptian companies, there were no troops within half a mile, and none betweenthem and the dark kerreri hills. the two gunboats which could have guarded them from the riverwere down stream, helping the cavalry; macdonald with the rear brigade was out in the plain;collinson was hurrying along the bank with his transport. they were alone and unprotected.the army and the river together formed a huge "v" pointing south. the northern extremity—thegorge of the redan, as it were—gaped open towards kerreri; and from kerreri there nowbegan to come, like the first warning drops before a storm of rain, small straggling partiesof dervish cavalry. the interior of the "v"
was soon actually invaded by these predatorypatrols, and one troop of perhaps a score of baggara horse watered their ponies within300 yards of the unprotected hospitals. behind, in the distance, the banners of an army beganto re-appear. the situation was alarming. the wounded were bundled on to the barges,although, since there was no steamer to tow them, they were scarcely any safer when embarked.while some of the medical officers were thus busied, colonel sloggett galloped off, and,running the gauntlet of the baggara horsemen, hurried to claim protection for the hospitalsand their helpless occupants. in the midst of this excitement and confusion the woundedfrom the cavalry charge began to trickle in. when the british division had moved out ofthe zeriba, a few skirmishers among the crags
of surgham hill alone suggested the presenceof an enemy. each brigade, formed in four parallel columns of route, which closed inuntil they were scarcely forty paces apart, and both at deploying interval—the secondbrigade nearer the river, the first almost in line with it and on its right—hurriedon, eager to see what lay beyond the ridge. all was quiet, except for a few 'sniping'shots from the top of surgham. but gradually as maxwell's brigade—the third in the echelon—approachedthe hill, these shots became more numerous, until the summit of the peak was spotted withsmoke-puffs. the british division moved on steadily, and, leaving these bold skirmishersto the soudanese, soon reached the crest of the ridge. at once and for the first timethe whole panorama of omdurman—the brown
and battered dome of the mahdi's tomb, themultitude of mud houses, the glittering fork of water which marked the confluence of therivers—burst on their vision. for a moment they stared entranced. then their attentionwas distracted; for trotting, galloping, or halting and gazing stupidly about them, terrifiedand bewildered, a dozen riderless troop-horses appeared over the further crest—for theridge was flat-topped—coming from the plain, as yet invisible, below. it was the firstnews of the lancers' charge. details soon followed in the shape of the wounded, whoin twos and threes began to make their way between the battalions, all covered with bloodand many displaying most terrible injuries—faces cut to rags, bowels protruding, fishhook spearsstill stuck in their bodies—realistic pictures
from the darker side of war. thus absorbed,the soldiers hardly noticed the growing musketry fire from the peak. but suddenly the bangof a field-gun set all eyes looking backward. a battery had unlimbered in the plain betweenthe zeriba and the ridge, and was beginning to shell the summit of the hill. the reportof the guns seemed to be the signal for the whole battle to reopen. from far away to theright rear there came the sound of loud and continuous infantry firing, and immediatelygatacre halted his division. almost before the british had topped the crestof the ridge, before the battery had opened from the plain, while colonel sloggett wasstill spurring across the dangerous ground between the river and the army, the sirdarknew that his enemy was again upon him. looking
back from the slopes of surgham, he saw thatmacdonald, instead of continuing his march in echelon, had halted and deployed. the veteranbrigadier had seen the dervish formations on the ridge to the west of surgham, realisedthat he was about to be attacked, and, resolving to anticipate the enemy, immediately broughthis three batteries into action at 1,200 yards, five minutes later the whole of the khalifa'sreserve, 15,000 strong, led by yakub with the black flag, the bodyguard and 'all theglories' of the dervish empire, surged into view from behind the hill and advanced onthe solitary brigade with the vigour of the first attack and thrice its chances of success.thereupon sir herbert kitchener ordered maxwell to change front to the right and storm surghamhill. he sent major sandbach to tell lewis
to conform and come into line on maxwell'sright. he galloped himself to the british division—conveniently halted by generalgatacre on the northern crest of the ridge—and ordered lyttelton with the 2nd brigade toform facing west on maxwell's left south of surgham, and wauchope with the 1st brigadeto hurry back to fill the wide gap between lewis and macdonald. last of all he sent anofficer to collinson and the camel corps with orders that they should swing round to theirright rear and close the open part of the "v". by these movements the army, insteadof facing south in echelon, with its left on the river and its right in the desert,was made to face west in line, with its left in the desert and its right reaching backto the river. it had turned nearly a complete
somersault. in obedience to these orders lyttelton's brigadebrought up their left shoulders, deployed into line, and advanced west; maxwell's soudanesescrambled up the surgham rocks, and, in spite of a sharp fire, cleared the peak with thebayonet and pressed on down the further side; lewis began to come into action on maxwell'sright; macdonald, against whom the khalifa's attack was at first entirely directed, remainedfacing south-west, and was soon shrouded in the smoke of his own musketry and artilleryfire. the three brigades which were now moving west and away from the nile attacked the rightflank of the dervishes assailing macdonald, and, compelling them to form front towardsthe river, undoubtedly took much of the weight
of the attack off the isolated brigade. thereremained the gap between lewis and macdonald. but wauchope's brigade—still in four parallelcolumns of route—had shouldered completely round to the north, and was now doubling swiftlyacross the plain to fill the unguarded space. with the exception of wauchope's brigade andof collinson's egyptians, the whole infantry and artillery force were at once furiouslyengaged. the firing became again tremendous, and thesound was even louder than during the attack on the zeriba. as each fresh battalion wasbrought into line the tumult steadily increased. the three leading brigades continued to advancewestward in one long line looped up over surgham hill, and with the right battalion held backin column. as the forces gradually drew nearer,
the possibility of the dervishes penetratingthe gap between lewis and macdonald presented itself, and the flank battalion was wheeledinto line so as to protect the right flank. the aspect of the dervish attack was at thismoment most formidable. enormous masses of men were hurrying towards the smoke-cloudsthat almost hid macdonald. other masses turned to meet the attack which was developing ontheir right. within the angle formed by the three brigades facing west and macdonald facingnearly south a great army of not fewer than 15,000 men was enclosed, like a flock of sheepin a fold, by the thin brown lines of the british and egyptian brigades. as the 7thegyptians, the right battalion of lewis's brigade and nearest the gap between that unitand macdonald, deployed to protect the flank,
they became unsteady, began to bunch and waver,and actually made several retrograde movements. there was a moment of danger; but generalhunter, who was on the spot, himself ordered the two reserve companies of the 15th egyptiansunder major hickman to march up behind them with fixed bayonets. their morale was thusrestored and the peril averted. the advance of the three brigades continued. yakub found himself utterly unable to withstandthe attack from the river. his own attack on macdonald languished. the musketry wasproducing terrible losses in his crowded ranks. the valiant wad bishara and many other lessfamous emirs fell dead. gradually he began to give ground. it was evident that the civilisedtroops were the stronger. but even before
the attack was repulsed, the khalifa, whowatched from a close position, must have known that the day was lost; for when he launchedyakub at macdonald, it was clear that the only chance of success depended on ali-wad-heluand osman sheikh-ed-din attacking at the same time from kerreri. and with bitter rage andmortification he perceived that, although the banners were now gathering under the kerrerihills, ali and osman were too late, and the attacks which should have been simultaneouswould only be consecutive. the effect of broadwood's cavalry action upon the extreme right wasnow becoming apparent. regrets and fury were alike futile. the threebrigades advancing drove the khalifa's dervishes back into the desert. along a mile of frontan intense and destructive fire flared and
crackled. the 32nd british field battery onthe extreme left was drawn by its hardy mules at full gallop into action. the maxim gunspulsated feverishly. two were even dragged by the enterprise of a subaltern to the verysummit of surgham, and from this elevated position intervened with bloody effect. thusthe long line moved forward in irresistible strength. in the centre, under the red egyptianflag, careless of the bullets which that conspicuous emblem drew, and which inflicted some lossamong those around him, rode the sirdar, stern and sullen, equally unmoved by fear or enthusiasm.a mile away to the rear the gunboats, irritated that the fight was passing beyond their reach,steamed restlessly up and down, like caged polar bears seeking what they might devour.before that terrible line the khalifa's division
began to break up. the whole ground was strewnwith dead and wounded, among whose bodies the soldiers picked their steps with the customarysoudan precautions. surviving thousands struggled away towards omdurman and swelled the broadstream of fugitives upon whose flank the 21st lancers already hung vengefully. yakub andthe defenders of the black flag disdained to fly, and perished where they stood, beneaththe holy ensign, so that when their conquerors reached the spot the dark folds of the bannerwaved only over the dead. while all this was taking place—for eventswere moving at speed—the 1st british brigade were still doubling across the rear of maxwelland lewis to fill the gap between the latter and macdonald. as they had wheeled round,the regiments gained on each other according
to their proximity to the pivot flank. thebrigade assumed a formation which may be described as an echelon of columns of route, with thelincolns, who were actually the pivot regiment, leading. by the time that the right of lewis'sbrigade was reached and the british had begun to deploy, it was evident that the khalifa'sattack was broken and that his force was in full retreat. in the near foreground the arabdead lay thick. crowds of fugitives were trooping off in the distance. the black flag alonewaved defiantly over the corpses of its defenders. in the front of the brigade the fight wasover. but those who looked away to the right saw a different spectacle. what appeared tobe an entirely new army was coming down from the kerreri hills. while the soldiers lookedand wondered, fresh orders arrived. a mounted
officer galloped up. there was a report thatterrible events were happening in the dust and smoke to the northward. the spearmen hadclosed with macdonald's brigade; were crumpling his line from the flank; had already brokenit. such were the rumours. the orders were more precise. the nearest regiment—the lincolnshire—wasto hurry to macdonald's threatened flank to meet the attack. the rest of the brigade wasto change front half right, and remain in support. the lincolnshires, breathless butelated, forthwith started off again at the double. they began to traverse the rear ofmacdonald's brigade, dimly conscious of rapid movements by its battalions, and to the soundof tremendous independent firing, which did not, however, prevent them from hearing thevenomous hiss of bullets.
had the khalifa's attack been simultaneouswith that which was now developed, the position of macdonald's brigade must have been almosthopeless. in the actual event it was one of extreme peril. the attack in his front wasweakening every minute, but the far more formidable attack on his right rear grew stronger andnearer in inverse ratio. both attacks must be met. the moment was critical; the dangernear. all depended on macdonald, and that officer, who by valour and conduct in warhad won his way from the rank of a private soldier to the command of a brigade, and willdoubtless obtain still higher employment, was equal to the emergency. to meet the khalifa's attack he had arrangedhis force facing south-west, with three battalions
in line and the fourth held back in columnof companies in rear of the right flank—an inverted l-shaped formation. as the attackfrom the south-west gradually weakened and the attack from the north-west continuallyincreased, he broke off his battalions and batteries from the longer side of the l andtransferred them to the shorter. he timed these movements so accurately that each faceof his brigade was able to exactly sustain the attacks of the enemy. as soon as the khalifa'sforce began to waver he ordered the xith soudanese and a battery on his left to move across theangle in which the brigade was formed, and deploy along the shorter face to meet theimpending onslaught of ali-wad-helu. perceiving this, the ixth soudanese, who were the regimentin column on the right of the original front,
wheeled to the right from column into linewithout waiting for orders, so that two battalions faced towards the khalifa and two towardsthe fresh attack. by this time it was clear that the khalifa was practically repulsed,and macdonald ordered the xth soudanese and another battery to change front and prolongthe line of the ixth and xith. he then moved the 2nd egyptians diagonally to their rightfront, so as to close the gap at the angle between their line and that of the three otherbattalions. these difficult manoeuvres were carried out under a heavy fire, which in twentyminutes caused over 120 casualties in the four battalions—exclusive of the lossesin the artillery batteries—and in the face of the determined attacks of an enemy whooutnumbered the troops by seven to one and
had only to close with them to be victorious.amid the roar of the firing and the dust, smoke, and confusion of the change of front,the general found time to summon the officers of the ixth soudanese around him, rebukedthem for having wheeled into line in anticipation of his order, and requested them to drillmore steadily in brigade. the three soudanese battalions were now confrontedwith the whole fury of the dervish attack from kerreri. the bravery of the blacks wasno less conspicuous than the wildness of their musketry. they evinced an extraordinary excitement—firingtheir rifles without any attempt to sight or aim, and only anxious to pull the trigger,re-load, and pull it again. in vain the british officers strove to calm their impulsive soldiers.in vain they called upon them by name, or,
taking their rifles from them, adjusted thesights themselves. the independent firing was utterly beyond control. soon the ammunitionbegan to be exhausted, and the soldiers turned round clamouring for more cartridges, whichtheir officers doled out to them by twos and threes in the hopes of steadying them. itwas useless. they fired them all off and clamoured for more. meanwhile, although suffering fearfullyfrom the close and accurate fire of the three artillery batteries and eight maxim guns,and to a less extent from the random firing of the soudanese, the dervishes drew nearerin thousands, and it seemed certain that there would be an actual collision. the valiantblacks prepared themselves with delight to meet the shock, notwithstanding the overwhelmingnumbers of the enemy. scarcely three rounds
per man remained throughout the brigade. thebatteries opened a rapid fire of case-shot. still the dervishes advanced, and the survivorsof their first wave of assault were scarcely 100 yards away. behind them both green flagspressed forward over enormous masses of armed humanity, rolling on as they now believedto victory. at this moment the lincoln regiment beganto come up. as soon as the leading company cleared the right of macdonald's brigade,they formed line, and opened an independent fire obliquely across the front of the soudanese.groups of dervishes in twos and threes were then within 100 yards. the great masses werewithin 300 yards. the independent firing lasted two minutes, during which the whole regimentdeployed. its effect was to clear away the
leading groups of arabs. the deployment havingbeen accomplished with the loss of a dozen men, including colonel sloggett, who fellshot through the breast while attending to the wounded, section volleys were ordered.with excellent discipline the independent firing was instantly stopped, and the battalionbegan with machine-like regularity to carry out the principles of modern musketry, forwhich their training had efficiently prepared them and their rifles were admirably suited.they fired on an average sixty rounds per man, and finally repulsed the attack. the dervishes were weak in cavalry, and hadscarcely 2,000 horsemen on the field. about 400 of these, mostly the personal retainersof the various emirs, were formed into an
irregular regiment and attached to the flagof ali-wad-helu. now when these horsemen perceived that there was no more hope of victory, theyarranged themselves in a solid mass and charged the left of macdonald's brigade. the distancewas about 500 yards, and, wild as was the firing of the soudanese, it was evident thatthey could not possibly succeed. nevertheless, many carrying no weapon in their hands, andall urging their horses to their utmost speed, they rode unflinchingly to certain death.all were killed and fell as they entered the zone of fire—three, twenty, fifty, two hundred,sixty, thirty, five and one out beyond them all—a brown smear across the sandy plain.a few riderless horses alone broke through the ranks of the infantry.
after the failure of the attack from kerrerithe whole anglo-egyptian army advanced westward, in a line of bayonets and artillery nearlytwo miles long, and drove the dervishes before them into the desert, so that they could byno means rally or reform. the egyptian cavalry, who had returned along the river, formed lineon the right of the infantry in readiness to pursue. at half-past eleven sir h. kitchenershut up his glasses, and, remarking that he thought the enemy had been given 'a good dusting,'gave the order for the brigades to resume their interrupted march on omdurman—a movementwhich was possible, now that the forces in the plain were beaten. the brigadiers thereuponstopped the firing, massed their commands in convenient formations, and turned againtowards the south and the city. the lincolnshire
regiment remained detached as a rearguard. meanwhile the great dervish army, who hadadvanced at sunrise in hope and courage, fled in utter rout, pursued by the egyptian cavalry,harried by the 21st lancers, and leaving more than 9,000 warriors dead and even greaternumbers wounded behind them. thus ended the battle of omdurman—the mostsignal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians. within the spaceof five hours the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern europeanpower had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any difficulty, comparatively smallrisk, and insignificant loss to the victors. chapter xvi: the fall of the city
now, when the khalifa abdullah saw that thelast army that remained to him was broken, that all his attacks had failed, and thatthousands of his bravest warriors were slain, he rode from the field of battle in haste,and, regaining the city, proceeded like a brave and stubborn soldier to make preparationsfor its defence, and, like a prudent man, to arrange for his own flight should furtherresistance be impossible. he ordered his great war-drum to be beaten and the ombya to beblown, and for the last time those dismal notes boomed through the streets of omdurman.they were not heeded. the arabs had had enough fighting. they recognised that all was lost.besides, to return to the city was difficult and dangerous.
the charge of the 21st lancers had been costly,but it was not ineffective. the consequent retirement of the dervish brigade protectingthe extreme right exposed their line of retreat. the cavalry were resolved to take full advantageof the position they had paid so much to gain, and while the second attack was at its heightwe were already trotting over the plain towards the long lines of fugitives who streamed acrossit. with the experience of the past hour in our minds, and with the great numbers of theenemy in our front, it seemed to many that a bloody day lay before us. but we had notgone far when individual dervishes began to walk towards the advancing squadrons, throwingdown their weapons, holding up their hands, and imploring mercy.
as soon as it was apparent that the surrenderof individuals was accepted, the dervishes began to come in and lay down their arms—atfirst by twos and threes, then by dozens, and finally by scores. meanwhile those whowere still intent on flight made a wide detour to avoid the cavalry, and streamed past ourfront at a mile's distance in uninterrupted succession. the disarming and escorting ofthe prisoners delayed our advance, and many thousands of dervishes escaped from the field.but the position of the cavalry and the pressure they exerted shouldered the routed army outinto the desert, so that retiring they missed the city of omdurman altogether, and, disregardingthe khalifa's summons to defend it and the orders of their emirs; continued their flightto the south. to harry and annoy the fugitives
a few troops were dismounted with carbines,and a constant fire was made on such as did not attempt to come in and surrender. yetthe crowds continued to run the gauntlet, and at least 20,000 men made good their escape.many of these were still vicious, and replied to our fire with bullets, fortunately at verylong range. it would have been madness for 300 lancers to gallop in among such masses,and we had to be content with the results of the carbine fire. while all this had been going on, the advanceof the army on omdurman was continuing. nor was it long before we saw the imposing arrayof infantry topping the sandhills near surgham and flooding out into the plain which laybetween them and the city. high over the centre
brigade flew the black flag of the khalifa,and underneath a smaller flash of red marked the position of the headquarters staff. theblack masses of men continued to move slowly across the open ground while we fired at theflying arabs, and at twelve o'clock we saw them halt near the river about three milesfrom the city. orders now reached us to join them, and as the sun was hot, the day dragged,all were tired and hungry, and the horses needed water, we were not long in complying,and the remnants of the dervish army made good their retreat unmolested. we marched back to the nile. the whole forcehad halted to drink, to eat, and to rest at khor shambat. the scene was striking. imaginea six hundred yards stretch of the suez canal.
both banks are crowded with brown- or chocolate-cladfigures. the northern side is completely covered with the swarming infantry of the britishdivision. thousands of animals—the horses of the cavalry, the artillery mules, the transportcamels—fill the spaces and the foreground. multitudes of khaki-clad men are sitting inrows on the slopes. hundreds are standing by the brim or actually in the red muddy water.all are drinking deeply. two or three carcasses, lying in the shallows, show that the soldiersare thirsty rather than particular. on all sides water-bottles are being filled fromthe welcome nile, which has come into the desert to refresh the weary animals and men. during the attack on macdonald's brigade theegyptian cavalry had watched from their position
on the southern slopes of the kerreri hills,ready to intervene, if necessary, and support the infantry by a charge. as soon as the dervishonsets had ended and the whole mass had begun to retreat, broadwood's cavalry brigade formedin two lines, of four and of five squadrons respectively, and advanced in pursuit—firstwest for two miles, and then south-west for three miles more towards the round-toppedhill. like the 21st lancers, they were delayed by many dcrvishes who threw down their armsand surrendered, and whom it was necessary to escort to the river. but as they drew nearerthe mass of the routed army, it became apparent that the spirit of the enemy was by no meansbroken. stubborn men fired continually as they lay wounded, refusing to ask for quarter—doubting,perhaps, that it would be granted. under every
bush that gave protection from the lancesof the horsemen little groups collected to make a desperate stand. solitary spearmenawaited unflinching the charge of a whole squadron. men who had feigned death sprangup to fire an unexpected shot. the cavalry began to suffer occasional casualties. inproportion as they advanced the resistance of the enemy increased. the direct pursuithad soon to be abandoned, but in the hope of intercepting some part of the retreatingmob major le gallais, who commanded the three leading squadrons, changed direction towardsthe river, and, galloping nearly parallel to khor shambat, charged and cut into thetail of the enemy's disordered array. the arabs, however, stood their ground, and, firingtheir rifles wildly in all directions, killed
and wounded a good many horses and men, sothat the squadrons were content to bring up their right still more, and finally to rideout of the hornet swarm, into which they had plunged, towards surgham hill. the pursuitwas then suspended, and the egyptian cavalry joined the rest of the army by the nile. it was not until four o'clock that the cavalryreceived orders to ride round the outside of the city and harry such as should seekto escape. the egyptian squadrons and the 21st lancers started forthwith, and, keepingabout a mile from the houses of the suburbs, proceeded to make the circle of the town.the infantry had already entered it, as was evident from a continual patter of shots andan occasional rattle of the maxim guns. the
leading soudanese brigade—maxwell's—hadmoved from khor shambat at 2.30, formed in line of company columns and in the followingorder:— ^ direction of advance ^xivth xiith maxims 8th 32nd xiiith soudanese soudanese egyptians field batterysoudanese the sirdar, attended by his whole staff, withthe black flag of the khalifa carried behind him and accompanied by the band of the xithsoudanese, rode in front of the xivth battalion. the regiments were soon enveloped by the numberlesshouses of the suburbs and divided by the twisting streets; but the whole brigade pressed forwardon a broad front. behind followed the rest of the army—battalion after battalion, brigadeafter brigade—until all, swallowed up by
the maze of mud houses, were filling the openspaces and blocking and choking the streets and alleys with solid masses of armed men,who marched or pushed their way up to the great wall. for two miles the progress through the suburbscontinued, and the general, hurrying on with his staff, soon found himself, with the band,the maxims, and the artillery, at the foot of the great wall. several hundred dervisheshad gathered for its defence; but the fact that no banquette had been made on which theycould stand to fire prevented their resistance from being effective. a few ill-aimed shotswere, however, fired, to which the maxim guns replied with vigour. in a quarter of an hourthe wall was cleared. the sirdar then posted
two guns of the 32nd field battery at itsnorthern angle, and then, accompanied by the remaining four guns and the xivth soudanese,turned eastwards and rode along the foot of the wall towards the river, seeking some meansof entry into the inner city. the breach made by the gunboats was found temporarily blockedby wooden doors, but the main gate was open, and through this the general passed into theheart of omdurman. within the wall the scenes were more terrible than in the suburbs. theeffects of the bombardment were evident on every side. women and children lay frightfullymangled in the roadway. at one place a whole family had been crushed by a projectile. deaddervishes, already in the fierce heat beginning to decompose, dotted the ground. the houseswere crammed with wounded. hundreds of decaying
carcasses of animals filled the air with asickening smell. here, as without the wall, the anxious inhabitants renewed their protestationsof loyalty and welcome; and interpreters, riding down the narrow alleys, proclaimedthe merciful conditions of the conquerors and called on the people to lay down theirarms. great piles of surrendered weapons rose in the streets, guarded by soudanese soldiers.many arabs sought clemency; but there were others who disdained it; and the whirringof the maxims, the crashes of the volleys, and a continual dropping fire attested thatthere was fighting in all parts of the city into which the columns had penetrated. alldervishes who did not immediately surrender were shot or bayoneted, and bullets whistledat random along or across the streets. but
while women crowded round his horse, whilesullen men filed carefully from houses, while beaten warriors cast their spears on the groundand others, still resisting, were despatched in corners, the sirdar rode steadily onwardthrough the confusion, the stench, and the danger, until he reached the mahdi's tomb. at the mosque two fanatics charged the soudaneseescort, and each killed or badly wounded a soldier before he was shot. the day was nowfar spent, and it was dusk when the prison was reached. the general was the first toenter that foul and gloomy den. charles neufeld and some thirty heavily shackled prisonerswere released. neufeld, who was placed on a pony, seemed nearly mad with delight, andtalked and gesticulated with queer animation.
'thirteen years,' he said to his rescuer,'have i waited for this day.' from the prison, as it was now dark, the sirdar rode to thegreat square in front of the mosque, in which his headquarters were established, and whereboth british brigades were already bivouacking. the rest of the army settled down along theroadways through the suburbs, and only maxwell's brigade remained in the city to complete theestablishment of law and order—a business which was fortunately hidden by the shadesof night. while the sirdar with the infantry of thearmy was taking possession of omdurman, the british and egyptian cavalry had moved roundto the west of the city. there for nearly two hours we waited, listening to the droppingfusillade which could be heard within the
great wall and wondering what was happening.large numbers of dervishes and arabs, who, laying aside their jibbas, had ceased to bedervishes, appeared among the houses at the edge of the suburbs. several hundreds of these,with two or three emirs, came out to make their submission; and we were presently soloaded with spears and swords that it was impossible to carry them, and many interestingtrophies had to be destroyed. it was just getting dark when suddenly colonel slatingalloped up. the khalifa had fled! the egyptian cavalry were at once to pursue him. the 21stlancers must await further orders. slatin appeared very much in earnest. he talked withanimated manner to colonel broadwood, questioned two of the surrendered emirs closely, andhurried off into the dusk, while the egyptian
squadrons, mounting, also rode away at a trot. it was not for some hours after he had leftthe field of battle that abdullah realised that his army had not obeyed his summons,but were continuing their retreat, and that only a few hundred dervishes remained forthe defence of the city. he seems, if we judge from the accounts of his personal servant,an abyssinian boy, to have faced the disasters that had overtaken him with singular composure.he rested until two o'clock, when he ate some food. thereafter he repaired to the tomb,and in that ruined shrine, amid the wreckage of the shell-fire, the defeated sovereignappealed to the spirit of mohammed ahmed to help him in his sore distress. it was thelast prayer ever offered over the mahdi's
grave. the celestial counsels seem to havebeen in accord with the dictates of common-sense, and at four o'clock the khalifa, hearing thatthe sirdar was already entering the city, and that the english cavalry were on the paradeground to the west, mounted a small donkey, and, accompanied by his principal wife, agreek nun as a hostage, and a few attendants, rode leisurely off towards the south. eightmiles from omdurman a score of swift camels awaited him, and on these he soon reachedthe main body of his routed army. here he found many disheartened friends; but the factthat, in this evil plight, he found any friends at all must be recorded in his favour andin that of his subjects. when he arrived he had no escort—was, indeed, unarmed. thefugitives had good reason to be savage. their
leaders had led them only to their ruin. tocut the throat of this one man who was the cause of all their sufferings was as easyas they would have thought it innocent. yet none assailed him. the tyrant, the oppressor,the scourge of the soudan, the hypocrite, the abominated khalifa; the embodiment, ashe has been depicted to european eyes, of all the vices; the object, as he was believedin england, of his people's bitter hatred, found safety and welcome among his flyingsoldiers. the surviving emirs hurried to his side. many had gone down on the fatal plain.osman azrak, the valiant bishara, yakub, and scores whose strange names have not obscuredthese pages, but who were, nevertheless, great men of war, lay staring up at the stars. yetthose who remained never wavered in their
allegiance. ali-wad-helu, whose leg had beenshattered by a shell splinter, was senseless with pain; but the sheikh-ed-din, the astuteosman digna, ibrahim khalil, who withstood the charge of the 21st lancers, and othersof less note rallied to the side of the appointed successor of mohammed ahmed, and did not,even in this extremity, abandon his cause. and so all hurried on through the gatheringdarkness, a confused and miserable multitude—dejected warriors still preserving their trashy rifles,and wounded men hobbling pitifully along; camels and donkeys laden with household goods;women crying, panting, dragging little children; all in thousands—nearly 30,000 altogether;with little food and less water to sustain them; the desert before them, the gunboatson the nile, and behind the rumours of pursuit
and a broad trail of dead and dying to markthe path of flight. meanwhile the egyptian cavalry had alreadystarted on their fruitless errand. the squadrons were greatly reduced in numbers. the men carriedfood to suffice till morning, the horses barely enough to last till noon. to supplement thisslender provision a steamer had been ordered up the river to meet them the next day withfresh supplies. the road by the nile was choked with armed dervishes, and to avoid these dangerousfugitives the column struck inland and marched southward towards some hills whose dark outlineshowed against the sky. the unknown ground was difficult and swampy. at times the horsesfloundered to their girths in wet sand; at others rocky khors obstructed the march; horsesand camels blundered and fell. the darkness
complicated the confusion. at about ten o'clockcolonel broadwood decided to go no further till there was more light. he therefore drewoff the column towards the desert, and halted on a comparatively dry spot. some muddy pools,which were luckily discovered, enabled the bottles to be filled and the horses to bewatered. then, having posted many sentries, the exhausted pursuers slept, waking fromtime to time to listen to the intermittent firing which was still audible, both fromthe direction of omdurman and from that in which the dervish army was flying. at 3 a.m. on the 3rd colonel broadwood's forcemoved on again. men and horses seemed refreshed, and by the aid of a bright moon the groundwas covered at a good pace. by seven o'clock
the squadrons approached the point on theriver which had been fixed for meeting the steamer. she had already arrived, and thesight of the funnel in the distance and the anticipation of a good meal cheered everyone,for they had scarcely had anything to eat since the night before the battle. but asthe troopers drew nearer it became evident that 300 yards of shallow water and deep swampintervened between them and the vessel. closer approach was prevented. there was no meansof landing the stores. in the hopes of finding a suitable spot further up the stream themarch was resumed. the steamer kept pace along the river. the boggy ground delayed the columns,but by two o'clock seven more miles had been covered. only the flag at the masthead wasnow visible; and an impassable morass separated
the force from the river bank. it was impossibleto obtain supplies. without food it was out of the question to go on. indeed, great privationsmust, as it was, accompany the return march. the necessity was emphasised by the reportsof captured fugitives, who all told the same tale. the khalifa had pushed on swiftly, andwas trying to reorganise his army. colonel broadwood thereupon rested his horses tillthe heat of the day was over, and then began the homeward march. it was not until eleveno'clock on the 4th of september that the worn-out and famished cavalry reached their camp nearomdurman. such was the pursuit as conducted by the regulartroops. abdel-azim, with 750 arabs, persisted still further in the chase. lightly equipped,and acquainted with the country, they reached
shegeig, nearly a hundred miles south of khartoum,on the 7th. here they obtained definite information. the khalifa had two days' start, plenty offood and water, and many camels. he had organised a bodyguard of 500 jehadia, and was, besides,surrounded by a large force of arabs of various tribes. with this numerous and powerful followinghe was travelling day and night towards el obeid, which town was held by an unbeatendervish garrison of nearly 3,000 men. on hearing these things the friendly arabs determined—notunwisely—to abandon the pursuit, and came boastfully back to omdurman. in the battle and capture of omdurman thelosses of the expeditionary force included the following british officers killed: capt.g. caldecott, 1st royal warwickshire regiment;
lieut. r.g. grenfell, 12th royal lancers,attached 21st lancers; hon. h. howard, correspondent of the times. in total, the british divisionand egyptian army suffered 482 men killed or wounded. the dervish losses were, from computationsmade on the field and corrected at a later date, ascertained to be 9,700 killed, andwounded variously estimated at from 10,000 to 16,000. there were, besides, 5,000 prisoners. chapter xvii: 'the fashoda incident' the long succession of events, of which ihave attempted to give some account, has not hitherto affected to any great extent othercountries than those which are drained by
the nile. but this chapter demands a widerview, since it must describe an incident which might easily have convulsed europe, and fromwhich far-reaching consequences have arisen. it is unlikely that the world will ever learnthe details of the subtle scheme of which the marchand mission was a famous part. wemay say with certainty that the french government did not intend a small expedition, at greatperil to itself, to seize and hold an obscure swamp on the upper nile. but it is not possibleto define the other arrangements. what part the abyssinians were expected to play, whatservices had been rendered them and what inducements they were offered, what attitude was to beadopted to the khalifa, what use was to be made of the local tribes: all this is veiledin the mystery of intrigue. it is well known
that for several years france, at some costto herself and at a greater cost to italy, had courted the friendship of abyssinia, andthat the weapons by which the italians were defeated at adowa had been mainly suppliedthrough french channels. a small quick-firing gun of continental manufacture and of recentmake which was found in the possession of the khalifa seems to point to the existenceor contemplation of similar relations with the dervishes. but how far these operationswere designed to assist the marchand mission is known only to those who initiated them,and to a few others who have so far kept their own counsel. the undisputed facts are few. towards theend of 1896 a french expedition was despatched
from the atlantic into the heart of africaunder the command of major marchand. the re-occupation of dongola was then practically complete,and the british government were earnestly considering the desirability of a furtheradvance. in the beginning of 1897 a british expedition, under colonel macdonald, and comprisinga dozen carefully selected officers, set out from england to uganda, landed at mombassa,and struck inland. the misfortunes which fell upon this enterprise are beyond the scopeof this account, and i shall not dwell upon the local jealousies and disputes which marredit. it is sufficient to observe that colonel macdonald was provided with soudanese troopswho were practically in a state of mutiny and actually mutinied two days after he assumedcommand. the officers were compelled to fight
for their lives. several were killed. a yearwas consumed in suppressing the mutiny and the revolt which arose out of it. if the objectof the expedition was to reach the upper nile, it was soon obviously unattainable, and thegovernment were glad to employ the officers in making geographical surveys. at the beginning of 1898 it was clear to thosewho, with the fullest information, directed the foreign policy of great britain that noresults affecting the situation in the soudan could be expected from the macdonald expedition.the advance to khartoum and the reconquest of the lost provinces had been irrevocablyundertaken. an anglo-egyptian force was already concentrating at berber. lastly, the marchandmission was known to be moving towards the
upper nile, and it was a probable contingencythat it would arrive at its destination within a few months. it was therefore evident thatthe line of advance of the powerful army moving south from the mediterranean and of the tinyexpedition moving east from the atlantic must intersect before the end of the year, andthat intersection would involve a collision between the powers of great britain and france. i do not pretend to any special informationnot hitherto given to the public in this further matter, but the reader may consider for himselfwhether the conciliatory policy which lord salisbury pursued towards russia in chinaat this time—a policy which excited hostile criticism in england—was designed to influencethe impending conflict on the upper nile and
make it certain, or at least likely, thatwhen great britain and france should be placed in direct opposition, france should find herselfalone. with these introductory reflections we mayreturn to the theatre of the war. on the 7th of september, five days after thebattle and capture of omdurman, the tewfikia, a small dervish steamer—one of those formerlyused by general gordon—came drifting and paddling down the river. her arab crew soonperceived by the egyptian flags which were hoisted on the principal buildings, and bythe battered condition of the mahdi's tomb, that all was not well in the city; and then,drifting a little further, they found themselves surrounded by the white gunboats of the 'turks,'and so incontinently surrendered. the story
they told their captors was a strange one.they had left omdurman a month earlier, in company with the steamer safia, carrying aforce of 500 men, with the khalifa's orders to go up the white nile and collect grain.for some time all had been well; but on approaching the old government station of fashoda theyhad been fired on by black troops commanded by white officers under a strange flag—andfired on with such effect that they had lost some forty men killed and wounded. doubtingwho these formidable enemies might be, the foraging expedition had turned back, and theemir in command, having disembarked and formed a camp at a place on the east bank calledreng, had sent the tewfikia back to ask the khalifa for instructions and reinforcements.the story was carried to the sirdar and ran
like wildfire through the camp. many officersmade their way to the river, where the steamer lay, to test for themselves the truth of thereport. the woodwork of the hull was marked with many newly made holes, and cutting intothese with their penknives the officers extracted bullets—not the roughly cast leaden balls,the bits of telegraph wire, or old iron which savages use, but the conical nickel-coveredbullets of small-bore rifles such as are fired by civilised forces alone. here was positiveproof. a european power was on the upper nile: which? some said it was the belgians fromthe congo; some that an italian expedition had arrived; others thought that the strangerswere french; others, again, believed in the foreign office—it was a british expedition,after all. the arab crew were cross-examined
as to the flag they had seen. their replieswere inconclusive. it had bright colours, they declared; but what those colours wereand what their arrangement might be they could not tell; they were poor men, and god wasvery great. curiosity found no comfort but in patienceor speculation. the camp for the most part received the news with a shrug. after theireasy victory the soldiers walked delicately. they knew that they belonged to the most powerfulforce that had ever penetrated the heart of africa. if there was to be more war, the governmenthad but to give the word, and the grand army of the nile would do by these newcomers asthey had done by the dervishes. on the 8th the sirdar started up the whitenile for fashoda with five steamers, the xith
and xiiith battalions of soudanese, two companiesof the cameron highlanders, peake's battery of artillery, and four maxim guns. three dayslater he arrived at reng, and there found, as the crew of the tewfikia had declared,some 500 dervishes encamped on the bank, and the safia steamer moored to it. these stupidfellows had the temerity to open fire on the vessels. whereat the sultan, steaming towardstheir dem, replied with a fierce shell fire which soon put them to flight. the safia,being under steam, made some attempt to escape—whither, it is impossible to say—and commander keppelby a well-directed shell in her boilers blew her up, much to the disgust of the sirdar,who wanted to add her to his flotilla. after this incident the expedition continuedits progress up the white nile. the sudd which
was met with two days' journey south of khartoumdid not in this part of the nile offer any obstacle to navigation, as the strong currentof the river clears the waterway; but on either side of the channel a belt of the tangledweed, varying from twelve to twelve hundred yards in breadth, very often prevented thesteamers from approaching the bank to tie up. the banks themselves depressed the explorersby their melancholy inhospitality. at times the river flowed past miles of long grey grassand swamp-land, inhabited and habitable only by hippopotami. at times a vast expanse ofdreary mud flats stretched as far as the eye could see. at others the forest, dense withan impenetrable undergrowth of thorn-bushes, approached the water, and the active formsof monkeys and even of leopards darted among
the trees. but the country—whether forest,mud-flat, or prairie—was always damp and feverish: a wet land steaming under a burningsun and humming with mosquitoes and all kinds of insect life. onward and southward toiled the flotilla,splashing the brown water into foam and startling the strange creatures on the banks, untilon the 18th of september they approached fashoda. the gunboats waited, moored to the bank forsome hours of the afternoon, to allow a message which had been sent by the sirdar to the mysteriouseuropeans, to precede his arrival, and early in the morning of the 19th a small steel rowing-boatwas observed coming down stream to meet the expedition. it contained a senegalese sergeantand two men, with a letter from major marchand
announcing the arrival of the french troopsand their formal occupation of the soudan. it, moreover, congratulated the sirdar onhis victory, and welcomed him to fashoda in the name of france. a few miles' further progress brought thegunboats to their destination, and they made fast to the bank near the old government buildingsof the town. major marchand's party consisted of eight french officers or non-commissionedofficers, and 120 black soldiers drawn from the niger district. they possessed three steelboats fitted for sail or oars, and a small steam launch, the faidherbe, which latterhad, however, been sent south for reinforcements. they had six months' supplies of provisionsfor the french officers, and about three months'
rations for the men; but they had no artillery,and were in great want of small-arm ammunition. their position was indeed precarious. thelittle force was stranded, without communications of any sort, and with no means of either withstandingan attack or of making a retreat. they had fired away most of their cartridges at thedervish foraging party, and were daily expecting a renewed attack. indeed, it was with consternationthat they had heard of the approach of the flotilla. the natives had carried the newsswiftly up the river that the dervishes were coming back with five steamers, and for threenights the french had been sleeplessly awaiting the assault of a powerful enemy. their joy and relief at the arrival of a europeanforce were undisguised. the sirdar and his
officers on their part were thrilled withadmiration at the wonderful achievements of this small band of heroic men. two years hadpassed since they left the atlantic coast. for four months they had been absolutely lostfrom human ken. they had fought with savages; they had struggled with fever; they had climbedmountains and pierced the most gloomy forests. five days and five nights they had stood upto their necks in swamp and water. a fifth of their number had perished; yet at lastthey had carried out their mission and, arriving at fashoda on the 10th of july, had plantedthe tricolour upon the upper nile. moved by such reflections the british officersdisembarked. major marchand, with a guard of honour, came to meet the general. theyshook hands warmly. 'i congratulate you,'
said the sirdar, 'on all you have accomplished.''no,' replied the frenchman, pointing to his troops; 'it is not i, but these soldiers whohave done it.' and kitchener, telling the story afterwards, remarked, 'then i knew hewas a gentleman.' into the diplomatic discussions that followed,it is not necessary to plunge. the sirdar politely ignored the french flag, and, withoutinterfering with the marchand expedition and the fort it occupied, hoisted the britishand egyptian colours with all due ceremony, amid musical honours and the salutes of thegunboats. a garrison was established at fashoda, consisting of the xith soudanese, four gunsof peake's battery, and two maxims, the whole under the command of colonel jackson, whowas appointed military and civil commandant
of the fashoda district. at three o'clock on the same afternoon thesirdar and the gunboats resumed their journey to the south, and the next day reached themouth of the sobat, sixty-two miles from fashoda. here other flags were hoisted and anotherpost formed with a garrison of half the xiiith soudanese battalion and the remaining twoguns of peake's battery. the expedition then turned northwards, leaving two gunboats—thesultan and the abu klea—at the disposal of colonel jackson. i do not attempt to describe the internationalnegotiations and discussions that followed the receipt of the news in europe, but itis pleasing to remember that a great crisis
found england united. the determination ofthe government was approved by the loyalty of the opposition, supported by the calm resolveof the people, and armed with the efficiency of the fleet. at first indeed, while the sirdarwas still steaming southward, wonder and suspense filled all minds; but when suspense endedin the certainty that eight french adventurers were in occupation of fashoda and claimeda territory twice as large as france, it gave place to a deep and bitter anger. there isno power in europe which the average englishman regards with less animosity than france. nevertheless,on this matter all were agreed. they should go. they should evacuate fashoda, or elseall the might, majesty, dominion, and power of everything that could by any stretch ofthe imagination be called 'british' should
be employed to make them go. those who find it difficult to account forthe hot, almost petulant, flush of resolve that stirred the nation must look back overthe long history of the soudan drama. it had always been a duty to reconquer the abandonedterritory. when it was found that this might be safely done, the duty became a pleasure.the operations were watched with extravagant attention, and while they progressed the earnestnessof the nation increased. as the tides of barbarism were gradually driven back, the old sea-markscame one after another into view. names of towns that were half forgotten—or rememberedonly with sadness—re-appeared on the posters, in the gazettes, and in the newspapers. wewere going back. 'dongola,' 'berber,' 'metemma'—who
had not heard of them before? now they wereassociated with triumph. considerable armies fought on the indian frontier. there was warin the south and the east and the west of africa. but england looked steadfastly towardsthe nile and the expedition that crawled forward slowly, steadily, unchecked, apparently irresistible. when the final triumph, long expected, camein all its completeness it was hailed with a shout of exultation, and the people of greatbritain, moved far beyond their wont, sat themselves down to give thanks to their god,their government, and their general. suddenly, on the chorus of their rejoicing there brokea discordant note. they were confronted with the fact that a 'friendly power' had, unprovoked,endeavoured to rob them of the fruits of their
victories. they now realised that while theyhad been devoting themselves to great military operations, in broad daylight and the eyeof the world, and prosecuting an enterprise on which they had set their hearts, otheroperations—covert and deceitful—had been in progress in the heart of the dark continent,designed solely for the mischievous and spiteful object of depriving them of the produce oftheir labours. and they firmly set their faces against such behaviour. first of all, great britain was determinedto have fashoda or fight; and as soon as this was made clear, the french were willing togive way. fashoda was a miserable swamp, of no particular value to them. marchand, lordsalisbury's 'explorer in difficulties upon
the upper nile,' was admitted by the frenchminister to be merely an 'emissary of civilisation.' it was not worth their while to embark onthe hazards and convulsions of a mighty war for either swamp or emissary. besides, theplot had failed. guy fawkes, true to his oath and his orders, had indeed reached the vault;but the other conspirators were less devoted. the abyssinians had held aloof. the negrotribes gazed with wonder on the strangers, but had no intention of fighting for them.the pride and barbarism of the khalifa rejected all overtures and disdained to discriminatebetween the various breeds of the accursed 'turks.' finally, the victory of omdurmanand its forerunner—the desert railway—had revolutionised the whole situation in thenile valley. after some weeks of tension,
the french government consented to withdrawtheir expedition from the region of the upper nile. meanwhile events were passing at fashoda.the town, the site of which had been carefully selected by the old egyptian government, issituated on the left bank of the river, on a gentle slope of ground which rises aboutfour feet above the level of the nile at full flood. during the rainy season, which lastsfrom the end of june until the end of october, the surrounding country is one vast swamp,and fashoda itself becomes an island. it is not, however, without its importance; forit is the only spot on the west shore for very many miles where landing from the riveris possible. all the roads—mere camel-tracks—from
lower kordofan meet at the government post,but are only passable in the dry season. the soil is fertile, and, since there is a superabundanceof sun and water, almost any crop or plant can be grown. the french officers, with theadaptive thrift of their nation, had already, in spite of the ravages of the water-rats,created a good vegetable garden, from which they were able to supplement their monotonousfare. the natives, however—aboriginal negroes of the dinka and shillook tribes—are unwillingto work, except to provide themselves with the necessaries of life; and since these areeasily obtained, there is very little cultivation, and the fertility of the soil may be saidto increase the poverty of the country. at all seasons of the year the climate of fashodais pestilential, and the malarial fever attacks
every european or egyptian, breaking downthe strongest constitutions, and in many cases causing death. [the place is most unhealthy,and in march 1899 (the driest season of the year) out of a garrison of 317 men only 37were fit for duty.—sir william garstin's report: egypt, no. 5, 1899.] on this dismal island, far from civilisation,health, or comfort, the marchand mission and the egyptian garrison lived in polite antagonismfor nearly three months. the french fort stood at the northern end. the egyptian camp layoutside the ruins of the town. civilities were constantly exchanged between the forces,and the british officers repaid the welcome gifts of fresh vegetables by newspapers andother conveniences. the senegalese riflemen
were smart and well-conducted soldiers, andthe blacks of the soudanese battalion soon imitated their officers in reciprocating courtesies.a feeling of mutual respect sprang up between colonel jackson and major marchand. the dashingcommandant of the xith soudanese, whose egyptian medals bear no fewer than fourteen clasps,was filled with a generous admiration for the french explorer. realising the difficulties,he appreciated the magnificence of the achievement; and as he spoke excellent french a good andalmost cordial understanding was established, and no serious disagreement occurred. but,notwithstanding the polite relations, the greatest vigilance was exercised by both sides,and whatever civilities were exchanged were of a formal nature.
the dinkas and shillooks had on the firstarrival of the french made submission, and had supplied them with provisions. they knewthat white men were said to be coming, and they did not realise that there were differentraces among the whites. marchand was regarded as the advance guard of the sirdar's army.but when the negroes gradually perceived that these bands of white men were at enmity witheach other—were, in fact, of rival tribes—they immediately transferred their allegiance tothe stronger force, and, although their dread of the egyptian flag was at first very marked,boycotted the french entirely. in the middle of october despatches from francearrived for marchand by steamer; and that officer, after reading them, determined toproceed to cairo. jackson, who was most anxious
that no disagreement should arise, beggedhim to give positive orders to his subordinate to maintain the status quo, as had been agreed.marchand gladly consented, and departed for omdurman, where he visited the battlefield,and found in the heaps of slain a grim witness of the destruction from which he had beensaved, and so on to cairo, where he was moved to tears and speeches. but in his absencecaptain germain, who succeeded to the command, diverged from his orders, no sooner had marchandleft than germain, anxious to win distinction, embarked upon a most aggressive policy. heoccupied the dinka country on the right bank of the river, pushed reconnoitring partiesinto the interior, prevented the dinka sheikhs from coming to make their submission at fashoda,and sent his boats and the faidherbe steam
launch, which had returned from the south,beyond the northern limits which the sirdar had prescribed and marchand had agreed torecognise. colonel jackson protested again and again.germain sent haughty replies, and persisted in his provoking policy. at last the britishofficer was compelled to declare that if any more patrols were sent into the dinka country,he would not allow them to return to the french post. whereat germain rejoined that he wouldmeet force with force. all tempers were worn by fever, heat, discomfort, and monotony.the situation became very difficult, and the tact and patience of colonel jackson aloneaverted a conflict which would have resounded in all parts of the world. he confined histroops strictly to their lines, and moved
as far from the french camp as was possible.but there was one dark day when the french officers worked in their shirts with theirfaithful senegalese to strengthen the entrenchments, and busily prepared for a desperate struggle.on the other side little activity was noticeable. the egyptian garrison, although under arms,kept out of sight, but a wisp of steam above the funnels of the redoubtable gunboats showedthat all was ready. at length in a fortunate hour marchand returned,reproved his subordinate, and expressed his regrets to colonel jackson. then it becameknown that the french government had ordered the evacuation of fashoda. some weeks werespent in making preparations for the journey, but at length the day of departure arrived.at 8.20 on the morning of the 11th of december
the french lowered their flag with saluteand flourish of bugle. the british officers, who remained in their own camp and did notobtrude themselves, were distant but interested spectators. on the flag ceasing to fly, asous-officier rushed up to the flagstaff and hurled it to the ground, shaking his fistsand tearing his hair in a bitterness and vexation from which it is impossible to withhold sympathy,in view of what these men had suffered uselessly and what they had done. the french then embarked,and at 9.30 steamed southward, the faidherbe towing one oblong steel barge and one oldsteel boat, the other three boats sailing, all full of men. as the little flotilla passedthe egyptian camp a guard of honour of the xith soudanese saluted them and the band struckup their national anthem. the french acknowledged
the compliment by dipping their flag, andin return the british and egyptian flags were also lowered. the boats then continued theirjourney until they had rounded the bend of the river, when they came to land, and, honourbeing duly satisfied, marchand and his officers returned to breakfast with colonel jackson.the meeting was very friendly. jackson and germain exchanged most elaborate compliments,and the commandant, in the name of the xith soudanese, presented the expedition with thebanner of the emir who had attacked them, which had been captured at reng. marchandshook hands all round, and the british officers bade their gallant opponents a final farewell. once again the eight frenchmen, who had comeso far and accomplished so much, set out upon
their travels, to make a safe though tediousjourney through abyssinia to the coast, and thence home to the country they had servedfaithfully and well, and which was not unmindful of their services. let us settle the international aspect ofthe reconquest of the soudan while we are in the way with it. the disputes between franceand england about the valley of the upper nile were terminated, as far as material causewas concerned, by an agreement, signed in london on the 21st of march, 1899, by lordsalisbury and m. cambon. the declaration limiting the respective spheres of influence of thetwo powers took the form of an addition to the ivth article of the niger convention,concluded in the previous year. its practical
effect is to reserve the whole drainage systemof the nile to england and egypt, and to engage that france shall have a free hand, so faras those powers are concerned, in the rest of northern africa west of the nile valleynot yet occupied by europeans. this stupendous partition of half a continent by two europeanpowers could scarcely be expected to excite the enthusiasm of the rest. germany was, however,soothed by the promise of the observance of the 'open door' policy upon the upper nile.italy, protesting meekly, followed germany. russia had no interests in this quarter. franceand england were agreed. the rest were not consulted: and the declaration may thus besaid to have been recognised by the world in general.
it is perhaps early to attempt to pronouncewith which of the contracting powers the advantage lies. france has acquired at a single stroke,without any serious military operations, the recognition of rights which may enable herultimately to annex a vast african territory. at present what she has gained may be describedas a recognised 'sphere of aspiration.' the future may convert this into a sphere of influence,and the distant future may witness the entire subjugation of the whole region. there aremany difficulties to be overcome. the powerful influence of the senussi has yet to be overthrown.the independent kingdom of wadai must be conquered. many smaller potentates will resist desperately.altogether france has enough to occupy her in central africa for some time to come: andeven when the long task is finished, the conquered
regions are not likely to be of great value.they include the desert of the great sahara and wide expanses of equally profitless scrubor marsh. only one important river, the shari, flows through them, and never reaches thesea: and even lake chad, into which the shari flows, appears to be leaking through somesubterranean exit, and is rapidly changing from a lake into an immense swamp. great britain and egypt, upon the other hand,have secured a territory which, though smaller, is nevertheless of enormous extent, more fertile,comparatively easy of access, practically conquered, and containing the waterway ofthe nile. france will be able to paint a great deal of the map of africa blue, and the aspectof the continent upon paper may please the
patriotic eye; but it is already possibleto predict that before she can develop her property—can convert aspiration into influence,and influence into occupation—she will have to work harder, pay more, and wait longerfor a return than will the more modest owners of the nile valley. and even when that returnis obtained, it is unlikely that it will be of so much value. it only remains to discuss the settlementmade between the conquerors of the soudan. great britain and egypt had moved hand inhand up the great river, sharing, though unequally, the cost of the war in men and money. theprize belonged to both. the direct annexation of the soudan by great britain would havebeen an injustice to egypt. moreover, the
claim of the conquerors to fashoda and otherterritories rested solely on the former rights of egypt. on the other hand, if the soudanbecame egyptian again, it must wear the fetters of that imprisoned country. the capitulationswould apply to the upper nile regions, as to the delta. mixed tribunals, ottoman suzerainty,and other vexatious burdens would be added to the difficulties of soudan administration.to free the new country from the curse of internationalism was a paramount object. thesoudan agreement by great britain and egypt, published on the 7th of march, 1899, achievesthis. like most of the best work done in egypt by the british agency, the agreement was slippedthrough without attracting much notice. under its authority a state has been created inthe nile valley which is neither british nor
ottoman, nor anything else so far known tothe law of europe. international jurists are confronted with an entirely new politicalstatus. a diplomatic 'fourth dimension' has been discovered. great britain and egypt rulethe country together. the allied conquerors have become the joint-possessors. 'what doesthis soudan agreement mean?' the austrian consul-general asked lord cromer; and thebritish agent, whom twenty-two years' acquaintance with egyptian affairs bad accustomed to anomalies,replied, 'it means simply this'; and handed him the inexplicable document, under whichthe conquered country may some day march to peace and plenty. chapter xviii: on the blue nile
the authority of the khalifa and the strengthof his army were for ever broken on the 2nd of september, and the battle of omdurman isthe natural climax of this tale of war. to those who fought, and still more to thosewho fell, in the subsequent actions the climax came somewhat later. after the victory thepublic interest was no longer centred in the soudan. the last british battalion had beencarried north of assuan; the last press correspondent had hurried back to cairo or london. but themilitary operations were by no means over. the enemy had been defeated. it remained toreconquer the territory. the dervishes of the provincial garrisons still preserved theirallegiance to the khalifa. several strong arab forces kept the field. distant kordofanand even more distant darfur were as yet quite
unaffected by the great battle at the confluenceof the niles. there were rumours of europeans in the far south. the unquestioned command of the waterwayswhich the sirdar enjoyed enabled the greater part of the egyptian soudan to be at onceformally re-occupied. all towns or stations on the main rivers and their tributaries wereat the mercy of the gunboats. it was only necessary to send troops to occupy them andto hoist the british and egyptian flags. two expeditions were forthwith sent up the whiteand blue niles to establish garrisons, and as far as possible to subdue the country.the first, under the personal command of the sirdar, left omdurman on the 8th of september,and steamed up the white nile towards fashoda.
the events which followed that momentous journeyhave already been related. the second expedition consisted of the gunboats sheikh and hafir,together with two companies and the brass band of the xth soudanese and a maxim battery,all under the command of general hunter. leaving omdurman on the 19th of september, they startedup the blue nile to abu haraz. the rest of the xth battalion followed as soon as othersteamers were set free from the business of taking the british division to the atbaraand bringing supplies to omdurman. the progress of the expedition up the river resembled atriumphal procession. the people of the riparian villages assembled on the banks, and, partlyfrom satisfaction at being relieved from the oppression of the khalifa and the scourgeof war, partly from fear, and partly from
wonder, gave vent to loud and long-continuedcheers. as the gunboats advanced the inhabitants escorted them along the bank, the men dancingand waving their swords, and the women uttering shrill cries of welcome. the reception ofthe expedition when places of importance were passed, and the crowd amounted to severalthousands, is described as very stirring, and, we are told, such was the enthusiasmof the natives that they even broke up their houses to supply the gunboats with wood forfuel. whether this be true or not i cannot tell, but it is in any case certain that thevessels were duly supplied, and that the expedition in its progress was well received by the negroidtribes, who had long resented the tyranny of the arabs.
on the 22nd of september a considerable partof the army of osman digna, which had not been present at the battle of omdurman, wasfound encamped on the ghezira, a few miles north of rufaa. the sheikhs and emirs, onbeing summoned by general hunter, surrendered, and a force of about 2,000 men laid down theirarms. musa digna, a nephew of osman and the commander of his forces, was put in ironsand held prisoner. the rest, who were mostly from the suakin district, were given a safe-conduct,and told to return to their homes—an order they lost no time in obeying. the next day the general arrived at wad medina,where the dervish garrison—1,000 strong—had already surrendered to the gunboat sheikh.these men, who were regular dervishes, were
transported in sailing-boats to omdurman;and augmented the number of prisoners of war already collected. on the 29th of septembergeneral hunter reached rosaires, 400 miles south of khartoum, and the extreme limit ofsteam navigation on the blue nile. by the 3rd of october he had established garrisonsof the xth soudanese in rosaires, at karkoj, at sennar (the old seat of the governmentof the province), and at wad medina. having also arranged for gunboat patrolling, he returnedto omdurman. but there was one dervish force which hadno intention of surrendering to the invaders, and whose dispersal was not accomplished untilthree fierce and critical actions had been fought. ahmed fedil, a zealous and devotedadherent of the khalifa, had been sent, after
the defeat on the atbara, to collect all thedervishes who could be spared from the gedaref and gallabat provinces, and bring them tojoin the growing army at omdurman. the emir had faithfully discharged his duty, and hewas hurrying to his master's assistance with a strong and well disciplined force of nofewer than 8,000 men when, while yet sixty miles from the city, he received the newsof 'the stricken field.' he immediately halted, and sought to hide the disaster from his soldiersby announcing that the khalifa had been victorious and no longer needed their assistance. heeven explained the appearance of gunboats upon the river by saying that these had runpast the batteries at omdurman and that the others were destroyed. the truth was not,however, long concealed; for a few days later
two emissaries despatched by slatin arrivedat the dervish camp and announced the destruction of the omdurman army, the flight of the khalifa,and the fall of the city. the messengers were authorised to offer ahmed terms; but thatimplacable dervish flew into a rage, and, having shot one, sent the other, covered withinsults and stripes, to tell the 'turks' that he would fight to the bitter end. he thenstruck his camp, and marched back along the east bank of the blue nile, with the intentionof crossing the river near its confluence with the rahad, and so joining the khalifain kordofan. his dervishes, however, did not view this project with satisfaction. theirfamilies and women had been left with large stores of grain and ammunition in gedaref,under a strong garrison of 3,000 men. they
urged their commander to return and collectthese possessions. ahmed at first refused, but when on arriving at the place of passagehe found himself confronted with a gunboat, he resolved to make a virtue of necessityand set out leisurely for gedaref. on the 5th of september colonel parsons, incommand of the forces at kassala, heard through the italian governor of eritrea of the victoryat omdurman. the next day official news arrived from england, and in conformity with previousinstructions he set out on the 7th for gedaref. it was known that ahmed fedil had marchedtowards omdurman. it was believed that gedaref was only weakly held, and the opportunityof cutting the most powerful remaining dervish army from its base was too precious to beneglected. but the venture was desperate.
the whole available strength of the kassalagarrison was mustered. with these 1,350 motley soldiers, untried, little disciplined, wornwith waiting and wasted by disease, without cavalry, artillery, or machine guns, and withonly seven british officers, including the doctor, gedaref was taken, and, having beentaken, was held. after two long marches colonel parsons andhis force arrived at el fasher, on the right bank of the atbara. their advance, which hadhitherto led them through a waterless desert, was now checked by a raging torrent. the riverwas in full flood, and a channel of deep water, broader than the thames below london bridgeand racing along at seven miles an hour, formed a serious obstacle. since there were no boatsthe soldiers began forthwith to construct
rafts from barrels that had been brought forthe purpose. as soon as the first of these was completed, it was sent on a trial trip.the result was not encouraging. the raft supported ten men, occupied five hours in the passage,was carried ten miles down stream, and came back for its second journey on the afternoonof the next day. it was evident that this means of transport was out of the question.the only chance of success—indeed, of safety—lay in the force reaching and taking gedaref beforethe return of ahmed fedil. all depended upon speed; yet here was a hopeless delay. afterprolonged discussion it was resolved to act on the suggestion of an egyptian officer andendeavour to build boats. the work proved easier than was anticipated. the elastic woodof the mimosa scrub supplied the frames; some
tarpaulins—fortunately available—formedthe outer covering. the egyptian soldiers, who delighted in the work, succeeded in makingdaily from such materials one boat capable of carrying two tons; and in these ingeniouscontrivances the whole force crossed to the further bank. the camels, mules, and horsesof the transport—their heads supported with inflated water-skins tied under their jowls—weremade to swim across the river by the local shukrieh arabs. such was the skill of thesetribesmen that only one camel and one mule were drowned during the operation. the passagewas completed on the 16th, and the next day the advance was resumed along the west bankof the atbara. at midday on the 18th mugatta was reached, and at dawn on the 20th the littleforce—having filled their water-skins, tightened
their belts, and invoked the assistance ofthe various gods they worshipped—started off, and marched all day in single file throughthe thick bush which lies between the atbara and gedaref. the column retired to rest peacefullyduring the night of the 21st, although within twelve miles of gedaref. but at midnight startlingnews arrived. a deserter from the dervishes made his way into the camp and informed colonelparsons that the emir saadalla awaited him with 3,500 men two miles before the town.the situation was grave. a retreat through the broken country and thick bush in the faceof a powerful and triumphant enemy seemed impossible. there was no alternative but toattack. very early on the morning of the 22nd—thesame day on which general hunter on the blue
nile was compelling musa digna and his followersto surrender—colonel parsons and the kassala column set forth to march into gedaref andto fight whatever force it might contain. for the first two hours the road lay throughdoura plantations and high grass which rose above the heads even of men mounted on camels;but as the town was approached, the doura ceased, and the troops emerged from the jungleon to an undulating moorland with occasional patches of rushes and withered grass. at half-pastseven, and about three miles from gedaref, the enemy's scouts were encountered. a fewshots were fired. the soldiers pressed their march, and at eight o'clock had reached asmall knoll, from the top of which an extensive view was obtainable. the column halted, andcolonel parsons and his officers ascended
the eminence to reconnoitre. a most menacing spectacle confronted them.scarcely a mile away a strong force of dervishes was rapidly advancing to meet the invaders.four lines of white figures rising out of the grass showed by their length the number,and by their regularity the discipline, of the enemy. the officers computed the strengthof their antagonists at not fewer than 4,000. subsequent investigation has shown that theemir saadalla marched out of gedaref with 1,700 riflemen, 1,600 spearmen, and 300 horse. the swiftness of the dervish advance and theshort space that intervened between the forces made it evident that a collision would takeplace within half an hour. the valley was
rocky, and overgrown with grass and reeds;but to the right of the track there rose a high saddleback hill, the surface of whichlooked more open, and which appeared to command the approaches from gedaref. the troops knewnothing of the country; the dervishes understood it thoroughly. the high ground gave at leastadvantage of view. colonel parsons resolved to occupy it. time was however, very scanty. the order was given, and the column beganto double across the valley towards the saddleback. the dervishes, perceiving the nature of themovement, hurried their advance in the hope of catching the troops on the move and perhapsof even seizing the hill itself. but they were too late. colonel parsons and his forcereached the saddleback safely, and with a
few minutes to spare climbed up and advancedalong it in column in the direction of gedaref—the arab battalion leading, the 16th egyptiansnext, and last of all the irregulars. the dervishes, seeing that the troops hadalready reached the hill and were moving along it towards the town, swung to their left andadvanced to the attack. thereupon at half-past eight the column wheeled into line to meetthem, and standing in the long grass, which even on the summit of the hill was nearlybreast-high, opened a heavy and destructive fire. the enemy, although suffering severeloss, continued to struggle bravely onward, replying vigorously to the musketry of thesoldiers. at nine o'clock, while the frontal attack was still undecided, colonel parsonsbecame aware that a strong force of dervishes
had moved round the left rear and were aboutto attack the hospital and transport. he at once sent to warn captain fleming, r.a.m.c.,who combined the duties of medical officer and commander of the baggage column, of theimpending assault, and directed him to close up the camels and meet it. the arab sheikhs,who in the absence of officers were acting as orderlies, had scarcely brought the newsto fleming, when the dervish attack developed. the enemy, some 300 strong, rushed with greatdetermination upon the baggage, and the escort of 120 arab irregulars at once broke and fled.the situation became desperate; but ruthven with thirty-four supply department camel-menhastened to meet the exultant enemy and protect the baggage column, and the transport wasstubbornly defended. in spite of all their
efforts the rear of the baggage column wasbroken and cut up. the survivors escaped along the saddleback. the british officers, withtheir small following, fell back towards their main body, hotly pressed by the enemy. at this moment captain ruthven observed oneof his native officers, lying wounded on the ground, about to fall into the hands of thedervishes and perish miserably. he immediately went back and, being a man of great physicalstrength, carried the body off in his arms. the enemy were, however, so close that hewas three times compelled to set his burden down and defend himself with his revolver.meanwhile the retirement towards the main body continued and accelerated.
colonel parsons and his force were now betweentwo fires. the frontal attack was within 200 yards. the rear attack, flushed with success,were hurrying impetuously forward. the defeat and consequent total destruction of the kassalacolumn appeared certain. but in the nick of time the dervish frontal attack, which hadbeen suffering heavily from the fire of the troops, wavered; and when the arab battalionand the 16th egyptians advanced upon them to complete their discomfiture, they brokeand fled. colonel parsons at once endeavoured to meet the rear attack. the arab battalion,whose valour was more admirable than their discipline, continued to pursue the beatenenemy down the hill; but the 16th egyptians, on being called upon by their commanding officer,captain mckerrell, faced steadily about and
turned to encounter the fresh attack. the heavy fire of the regular battalion checkedthe dervish advance, and captain fleming, the rest of the dismounted camel-men, andruthven still carrying his native officer, found safety in their ranks. [for his gallantryon this occasion captain ruthven has since received the victoria cross.] a short fiercemusketry combat followed at a range of less than a hundred yards, at the end of whichthe assailants of the baggage convoy were completely repulsed. the action was now practicallyover and success was won. the arab battalion, and those of the irregulars that had rallied,advanced and drove the enemy before them towards gedaref, until at ten o'clock, both theirfront and rear attacks having failed, the
dervishes abandoned all resistance and a generalrout ensued. no cavalry or artillery being available, further pursuit was impossible. the town of gedaref surrendered at noon. thedervish emir, nur angara, who with 200 black riflemen and two brass guns had been leftin command of the garrison, made haste to submit. the remainder of the dervishes, continuingtheir flight under the emir saadalla, hurried to tell the tale of defeat to ahmed fedil. the casualties suffered by the kassala columnin the action were severe in proportion to their numbers and the duration of the fight.the seven british officers escaped untouched; but of the 1,400 soldiers and irregulars engaged,51 were killed and 80 wounded—a total of
131. the dervishes left 500 dead on the field,including four emirs of rank. the victory had been won, the enemy were routed,and the town was taken: it had now to be defended. colonel parsons took possession of the principalbuildings, and began immediately to put them in a state of defence. this was fortunatelyan easy matter. the position was good and adaptable. it consisted of three large enclosures,capable of holding the entire force, situated in echelon, so as to protect each other bytheir fire, and with strong brick walls six feet high. all were at once set to work toclear the approaches, to level the mud houses without, and to build ramparts or banquetteswithin the walls. the three enclosures thus became three forts, and in the principal workthe two captured brass guns were mounted,
in small bastions thrown out from the northand west corners. while the infantry were thus engaged, ruthven and his camel-men madedaily reconnaissances of the surrounding country, and eagerly looked for the first appearanceof ahmed fedil. by great good fortune a convoy of ammunitionfrom mugatta reached gedaref on the afternoon of the 27th. at dawn the next day ruthvenreported that the advance guard of ahmed fedil was approaching the town. the attack beganat half-past eight. the dervishes, who fought with their customary gallantry, simultaneouslyassaulted the north, south, and west faces of the defences. creeping forward throughthe high doura, they were able to get within 300 yards of the enclosures. but the interveningspace had been carefully cleared of cover,
and was swept by the musketry of the defenders.all attempts to cross this ground—even the most determined rushes—proved vain. whilesome made hopeless charges towards the walls, others crowded into a few straw shelters andmud huts which the troops had not found opportunity to remove, and thence maintained a raggedfire. after an hour's heavy fusillade the attack weakened, and presently ceased altogether.at ten o'clock, however, strong reinforcements having come up, the dervishes made a secondattempt. they were again repulsed, and at a quarter to eleven, after losing more than500 men in killed and wounded, ahmed fedil admitted his defeat and retired to a clumpof palm-trees two miles to the west of the town. the casualties among the defenders werefive men killed, one british officer (captain
dwyer) and thirteen men wounded. the dervishes remained for two days in thepalm grove, and their leader repeatedly endeavoured to induce them to renew the attack. but althoughthey closely surrounded the enclosures, and maintained a dropping fire, they refused toknock their heads against brick walls a third time; and on the 1st of october ahmed fedilwas forced to retire to a more convenient camp eight miles to the southward. here forthe next three weeks he remained, savage and sulky; and the kassala column were contentto keep to their defences. a few convoys from mugatta made their way into the forts underthe cover of darkness, but for all practical purposes the blockade of the garrison wascomplete. their losses in action had reduced
their strength. they were not abundantly suppliedwith ammunition. the smell of the putrefying corpses which lay around the walls and inthe doura crop, together with the unhealthy climate and the filth of the town, was a fertilesource of disease. a painful and racking fever afflicted all ranks, and at one time as manyas 270 of the 400 regular soldiers were prostrated. the recurring night alarms added to the fatiguesof the troops and the anxieties of the seven officers. the situation was indeed so unsatisfactorythat colonel parsons was compelled to ask for assistance. major-general rundle, who in the sirdar'sabsence held the chief command, immediately organised a relief expedition. the ixth, xiith,and half of the xiiith soudanese, with three
companies of the camel corps, under colonelcollinson, were at once sent from omdurman to the mouth of the rahad river. the infantrywere conveyed in steamers; the camel corps marched along the bank, completing the wholedistance of 130 miles in fifty-six hours. the blue nile garrisons, with the exceptionof the post at rosaires, were also concentrated. by the 8th of october the whole force wascollected at abu haraz. five hundred camels, which had marched from omdurman, and everyavailable local beast of burden joined the transport of the column. on the 9th the xiithsoudanese started up the rahad river for ain el owega. from this point the road leavesthe river and strikes across the desert to gedaref, a distance of 100 miles; and in thewhole distance water is only found at the
wells of el kau. owing to this scarcity ofwater it was necessary to carry a supply with the troops. the transport being insufficientto provide for the whole force, the march had to be made in two columns. the camel corpsand the xiith soudanese, about 1,200 strong, set forth under colonel collinson from ainel owega on the 17th, and reached gedaref safely on the 22nd. warned of their arrival,ahmed fedil, having made a feeble night attack which was repulsed by the garrison with aloss to themselves of two soudanese wounded, realised that he had now no chance of recapturingthe town. preparations were indeed made to attack him; but on the 23rd of october, whena reconnaissance was made in the direction of his camp, the dervish force was seen movingoff in a southerly direction, their retreat
covered by a strong rearguard, which was intendedto perform the double duty of protecting the retirement and preventing desertion. the operations conducted by colonel parsonsthus ended in complete success. great difficulties were overcome, great perils were encountered,great results were obtained. but while we applaud the skill of the commander and thedevotion of his subordinates, it is impossible not to criticise the rash and over-confidentpolicy which sent such a weak and ill-equipped force on so hazardous an enterprise. the actionof gedaref, as has been shown, was, through no fault of the officers or men of the expedition,within an ace of being a disaster. but there were other critical occasions when only theextraordinary good fortune which attended
the force saved it from destruction. first,the column was not discovered until it reached mugatta; secondly, it was not attacked inthe thick bush; thirdly, the dervishes gave battle in the open instead of remaining withintheir walls, whence the troops could not have driven them without artillery; and, fourthly,the reserve ammunition arrived before the attack of ahmed fedil. after his defeat before gedaref, ahmed fedilreverted to his intention of joining the khalifa in kordofan, and he withdrew southwards towardsthe dinder river with a following that still numbered more than 5,000. to pass the nilein the face of the gunboats appeared impossible. he did not, however, believe that steamerscould navigate the higher reaches of the rivers,
and in the hopes of finding a safe crossing-placehe directed his march so as to strike the blue nile south of karkoj. moving leisurely,and with frequent delays to pillage the inhabitants, he arrived on the dinder, twenty-five milesto the east of karkoj, on the 7th of november. here he halted to reconnoitre. he had trustedin the karkoj-rosaires reach being too shallow for the gunboats; but he found two powerfulvessels already patrolling it. again frustrated, he turned southwards, meaning to cross abovethe rosaires cataract, which was without doubt impassable to steamers. on the 22nd of october colonel lewis, withtwo companies of the camel corps and three squadrons of cavalry, started from omdurmanwith the object of marching through the centre
of the ghezira and of re-establishing theegyptian authority. his progress was in every way successful. the inhabitants were submissive,and resigned themselves with scarcely a regret to orderly government. very little lawlessnesshad followed the defeat of the khalifa, and whatever plundering there had been was chieflythe work of the disbanded irregulars who had fought at omdurman under major wortley's commandon the east bank of the nile. in every village sheikhs were appointed in the name of thekhedive, and the officers of the cavalry column concerned themselves with many difficult disputesabout land, crops, and women—all of which they settled to their satisfaction. marchingthrough awamra, haloosen, and mesalamia, colonel lewis reached karkoj on the 7th of november,almost at the same time that ahmed fedil arrived
on the dinder. for the next six weeks the movements of thetwo forces resembled a game of hide-and-seek. ahmed fedil, concealed in the dense forestand jungle of the east bank, raided the surrounding villages and worked his way gradually towardsthe rosaires cataract. colonel lewis, perplexed by false and vague information, remained haltedat karkoj, despatched vain reconnaissances in the hopes of obtaining reliable news, revolveddeep schemes to cut off the raiding parties, or patrolled the river in the gunboats. andmeanwhile sickness fell upon his force. the malarial fever, which is everywhere prevalenton the blue nile in the autumn, was now at its height. more than 30 per cent of everygarrison and every post were affected. the
company holding rosaires were stricken toa man, and only the two british officers remained fit for duty. the cavalry force which hadmarched through the ghezira suffered the most severely. one after another every britishofficer was stricken down and lay burning but helpless beneath the palm-leaf sheltersor tottered on to the friendly steamers that bore the worst cases north. of the 460 menwho composed the force, ten had died and 420 were reported unfit for duty within a monthof their arrival at karkoj. during the end of november the sheikh bakr,who had deserted the dervishes after their retreat from gedaref, arrived at karkoj with350 irregulars. he claimed to have defeated his former chief many times, and produceda sack of heads as evidence of his success.
his loyalty being thus placed beyond doubt,he was sent to keep contact with the dervishes and encouraged to the greatest efforts bythe permission to appropriate whatever spoils of war he could capture. meanwhile ahmed fedil was working his wayslowly southward along a deep khor which runs almost parallel to the blue nile and is perhapstwenty miles from it. as soon as the position of the dervish emir was definitely known,colonel lewis moved his force, which had been strengthened by detachments of the xth soudanese,from karkoj to rosaires. here he remained for several days, with but little hope ofobstructing the enemy's passage of the river. on the 20th of december, however, full—though,as was afterwards found, not very accurate—information
was received. it was reported that on the18th ahmed fedil had reached the village of dakhila, about twenty miles south of the rosairespost; that he himself had immediately crossed with his advanced guard, and was busily passingthe women and children across the river on rafts. on the 22nd, therefore, colonel lewis hurriedthe sheikh bakr up the west bank to cut off their flocks and harass the dervishes whohad already crossed the river. the irregulars accordingly departed; and the next day newswas brought that the dervish force was almost equally divided by the blue nile, half beingon one bank and half on the other. at midday on the 24th the gunboats melik and dal arrivedfrom omdurman with a detachment of 200 more
men of the xth soudanese under major fergusson,and thirty men of the ixth soudanese under captain sir henry hill. with this additionthe force at colonel lewis's disposal consisted of half the xth soudanese, a small detachmentof the ixth soudanese, two maxim guns, and a doctor. besides the regular troops, therewere also the band of irregulars under the sheikh bakr, numbering 380 men, 100 men underthe sheikh of rosaires, and a few other unclassified scallywags. colonel lewis determined to attack what partof ahmed fedil's force still remained on the east bank of the river, and on christmas day,at five o'clock in the afternoon, he marched with every man he could muster in the directionof dakhila.
moving in single file along a track whichled through a dense forest of thorny trees, the column reached adu zogholi, a villagethought to be half, but really not one-third, of the way to dakhila, at eleven o'clock onchristmas night. here they bivouacked until 3 a.m. on the 26th, when the march was resumedin the same straggling order through the same tangled scrub. daylight found them still severalmiles from the dervish position, and it was not until eight o'clock that the enemy's outpostswere discovered. after a few shots the arab picket fell back, and the advance guard, hurryingafter them, emerged from the forest upon the open ground of the river bank, broken onlyby palms and patches of high grass. into this space the whole column gradually debouched.before them the blue nile, shining in the
early sunlight like a silver band, flowedswiftly; and beyond its nearest waters rose a long, bare, gravel island crowned with clumpsof sandhills, to the shelter of which several hundred dervishes, surprised by the suddenarrival of the troops, were scampering. beyond the island, on the tall tree-clad cliff ofthe further bank, other minute figures moved and bustled. the discordant sound of hornsand drums floating across the waters, and the unfurling of many bright flags, proclaimedthe presence and the intention of the hostile the dervish position was well chosen and ofgreat defensive strength. a little to the north of dakhila the blue nile bifurcates—onerapid but shallow stream flowing fairly straight under the east bank; another very deep streamrunning in a wide curve under the west bank,
cutting into it so that it is precipitous.these two branches of the river enclose an island a mile and a quarter long by 1,400yards wide, and on this island, surrounded by a natural moat of swiftly flowing water,was the dervish dem. the western side of the island rose into a line of low sandhills coveredwith scrub and grass, with a steep reverse slope towards the foreshore of the river-bank;and here, in this excellent cover, what eventually proved to be three-quarters of the force ofahmed fedil were drawn up. backed against the deep arm of the river they had no choice,nor indeed any other wish, but to fight. before them stretched a bare slope of heavy shingle,1,000 yards wide, over which their enemies must advance to the attack, behind them thehigh precipitous west bank of the river, which
rose in some places to a height of fifty feet,was lined with the 300 riflemen who had already crossed; and from this secure position ahmedfedil and four of his emirs were able to watch, assist, and direct the defence of the island.the force on the island was under the sole command of the emir saadalla, of gedaref repute;but, besides his own followers, most of the men of the four other emirs were concentratedthere. the prospect was uninviting. colonel lewisdiscovered that he had absurdly under-rated the strength and discipline of the dervishforce. it had been continually reported that the defeats at gedaref had demoralised them,and that their numbers did not exceed 2,000 men. moreover, he had marched to the attackin the belief that they were equally divided
on both sides of the river. retreat was, however,impossible. strong as was the position of the enemy, formidable as was their strength,the direct assault was actually safer than a retirement through the nineteen miles ofgloomy forest which lay between the adventurous column and rosaires. the british officer immediatelydetermined to engage. at nine o'clock the two maxims, which represented the artilleryof the little force, came into action in good positions, while the xth soudanese and mostof the irregulars lined the east bank. musketry and maxim fire was now opened at long range.the dervishes replied, and as the smoke of their rifles gradually revealed their positionand their numbers, it soon became evident that no long-range fire could dislodge them;and colonel lewis resolved, in spite of the
great disparity of force and disadvantageof ground, to attack them with the bayonet. some time was spent in finding fords acrossthe interposing arm of the river, and it was not until past ten o'clock that bakr's mencrossed on to the island, and, supported by a company of the xth soudanese, advanced towardsthe enemy's right and took up a position at about 800 yards from their line, to coverthe rest of the passage. colonel lewis now determined to turn the enemy'sleft from the north, attack them in flank, and roll them into the deep part of the river.with the xth soudanese, under colonel nason and major fergusson, he marched northwardsalong the river's edge, sheltering as far as possible under the curve of the bank fromthe fire, which now began to cause casualties.
having reached the position from which itwas determined to deliver the attack, the battalion deployed into line, and, changingfront half left, advanced obliquely by alternate companies across the bare shingle towardsthe sandhills. as they advanced, a galling fire was opened upon the left flank by twohundred dervishes admirably placed on a knoll. major fergusson was detached with one companyto dislodge them. the remaining four companies continued the attack. the dervish musketry now became intense. thewhole front of the island position was lined with smoke, and behind it, from the high cliffof the west bank, a long half-circle of riflemen directed a second tier of converging bulletsupon the 400 charging men. the shingle jumped
and stirred in all directions as it was struck.a hideous whistling filled the air. the soudanese began to drop on all sides, 'just like thedervishes at omdurman,' and the ground was soon dotted with the bodies of the killedand wounded. 'we did not,' said an officer, 'dare to look back.' but undaunted by fireand cross-fire, the heroic black soldiers—demons who would not be denied—pressed forwardwithout the slightest check or hesitation, and, increasing their pace to a swift runin their eagerness to close with the enemy, reached the first sandhills and found coverbeneath them. a quarter of the battalion had already fallen, and lay strewn on the shingle. the rapidity of their advance had exhaustedthe soudanese, and lewis ordered nason to
halt under cover of the sandhills for a fewminutes, so that the soldiers might get their breath before the final effort. thereuponthe dervishes, seeing that the troops were no longer advancing, and believing that theattack was repulsed, resolved to clinch the matter. ahmed fedil from the west bank soundedthe charge on drum and bugle, and with loud shouts of triumph and enthusiasm the wholeforce on the island rose from among the upper sandhills, and, waving their banners, advancedimpetuously in counter-attack. but the xth soudanese, panting yet unconquerable, respondedto the call of their two white officers, and, crowning the little dunes behind which theyhad sheltered, met the exultant enemy with a withering fire and a responding shout.
the range was short and the fire effective.the astonished arabs wavered and broke; and then the soldiers, nobly led, swept forwardin a long scattered line and drove the enemy from one sandy ridge to another—drove themacross the rolling and uneven ground, every fold of which contained dervishes—drovethem steadily back over the sandhills, until all who were not killed or wounded were pennedat the extreme southern end of the island, with the deep unfordable arm of the riverbehind them and the fierce black soldiers, roused to fury by their losses, in front. the sheikh bakr, with his men and the restof the irregulars, joined the victorious soudanese, and from the cover of the sandhills, now inthe hands of the troops, a terrible fire was
opened upon the dervishes crowded togetheron the bare and narrow promontory and on the foreshore. some tried to swim across the rushingriver to their friends on the west bank. many were drowned—among them saadalla, who sankhorse and man beneath the flood. others took refuge from the fire by standing up to theirnecks in the stream. the greater part, however, escaped to a smaller island a little furtherup the river. but the cover was bad, the deep water prevented further flight, and, afterbeing exposed for an hour and a half to the musketry of two companies, the survivors—300strong—surrendered. by 11.30 the whole island was in the possessionof the troops. it was, however, still swept and commanded by the fire from the west bank.the company which had been detached to subdue
the dervish riflemen were themselves pinnedbehind their scanty cover. major fergusson was severely wounded and a third of his menwere hit. to withdraw this company and the wounded was a matter of great difficulty;and it was necessary to carry the maxims across the river and bring them into action at 400yards. firing ceased at last at three o'clock, and the victors were left to measure theirlosses and their achievement. there was neither time nor opportunity tocount the enemy's dead, but it is certain that at least 500 arabs were killed on theisland. two thousand one hundred and twenty-seven fighting men and several hundred women andchildren surrendered. five hundred and seventy-six rifles, large quantities of ammunition, anda huge pile of spears and swords were captured.
ahmed fedil, indeed, escaped with a numerousfollowing across the ghezira, but so disheartened were the dervishes by this crushing defeatthat the whole force surrendered to the gunboat metemma at reng, on the white nile, on the22nd of january, and their leader was content to fly with scarcely a dozen followers tojoin the khalifa. the casualties among the troops in the actionamounted to 41 killed and 145 wounded, including major fergusson; and the xth soudanese, onwhom the brunt of the fighting fell, suffered a loss of 25 non-commissioned officers andmen killed, 1 british officer, 6 native officers, and 117 non-commissioned officers and menwounded, out of a total strength of 511. the rest of the loss was among the irregulars,495 of whom took part in the engagement.
chapter xix: the end of the khalifa by the operations described in the last chapter,the whole of the regions bordering on the niles were cleared of hostile forces, dottedwith military posts, and brought back to egyptian authority. the khalifa, however, still remainedin kordofan. after he had made good his escape from the battlefield of omdurman, abdullahhad hurried in the direction of el obeid, moving by the wells of shat and zeregia, whichat that season of the year were full of water after the rains. at abu sherai, having shakenoff the pursuit of the friendlies, he halted, encamped, and busily set to work to reorganisehis shattered forces. how far he succeeded in this will presently be apparent. in thebeginning of november the general drying-up
of the country turned the wells at abu sheraiinto pools of mud, and the khalifa moved westward to aigaila. here he was joined by the emirel khatem with the el obeid garrison. this chief and his followers had never been engagedwith the 'turks,' and were consequently fresh and valiant. their arrival greatly encouragedthe force which the khalifa had rallied. a large dem was formed at aigaila, and here,since the water was plentiful during december, abdullah abode quietly, sending his raidingparties far afield to collect grain and other supplies. as soon as the sirdar, who had returned fromengland, received the news of the success at rosaires he determined to make an attemptto capture the khalifa; and on the 29th of
december sent for colonel kitchener, to whomas the senior available officer he had decided to entrust this honourable enterprise. thecolonel was directed to take a small mixed force into kordofan and to reconnoitre theenemy's position. if possible, he was to attack and capture abdullah, whose followers werebelieved not to exceed 1,000 ill-armed men. the 'kordofan field force,' as its officerscalled it, was formed as follows: commanding: colonel kitchener assistant adjutant-general: lieut.-colonelmitford deputy-assistant adjutant-general: major williams troops:
two squadrons egyptian cavalry2nd egyptians xivth soudanesetwo galloping maxims two mule gunsone company camel corps. camel transport was drawn from the atbaraand from the blue nile. the troops were conveyed by steamer to duem, and concentrated thereduring the first week in 1899. the camels were collected at kawa, and, although severalof the convoys had to march as much as 400 miles, the whole number had arrived by the10th of january. the prime difficulty of the operation wasthe want of water. the khalifa's position was nearly 125 miles from the river. the interveningcountry is, in the wet season, dotted with
shallow lakes, but by january these are reducedto mud puddles and only occasional pools remain. all the water needed by the men, horses, andmules of the column must therefore be carried. the camels must go thirsty until one of therare pools—the likely places for which were known to the native guides—might be found.now, the capacity of a camel for endurance without drinking is famous; but it has itslimits. if he start having filled himself with water, he can march for five days withoutrefreshment. if he then have another long drink, he can continue for five days more.but this strains his power to the extreme; he suffers acutely during the journey, andprobably dies at its end. in war, however, the miseries of animals cannot be considered;their capacity for work alone concerns the
commander. it was thought that, partly bythe water carried in skins, partly by the drying-up pools, and partly by the camel'spower of endurance, it might be just possible for a force of about 1,200 men to strike out125 miles into the desert, to have three days to do their business in, and to come backto the nile. this operation, which has been called the shirkela reconnaissance, occupiedthe kordofan field force. the report of the route from kohi was consideredencouraging. at gedid the old wells promised sufficient water to refill the skins, andwithin seven miles of the wells were two large pools at which the camels could be watered.the column, therefore, prepared for the journey. nothing was neglected which could increasethe water carried or diminish the number of
drinkers. only twelve cavalry were taken.the horses of the maxim guns and the mules of the battery were reduced to the lowestpossible number. every person, animal, or thing not vitally necessary was remorselesslyexcluded. in order to lighten the loads and make room for more water, even the ammunitionwas limited to 100 rounds per rifle. the daily consumption of water was restricted to onepint for men, six gallons for horses, and five for mules. to lessen the thirst causedby the heat colonel kitchener decided to march by night. an advanced depot was formed atgedid and food for two days accumulated there. besides this, each unit carried ten, and thecolumn transport seven, days' rations. thus the force were supplied with food up tillthe 9th of february, and their radius of action,
except as restricted by water, was nineteendays. this was further extended five days by the arrangement of a convoy which was toset out on the 30th of january to meet them as they returned. the column—numbering 1,604 officers andmen and 1,624 camels and other beasts of burden—started from kohi at 3 p.m. on the 23rd of january,having sent on a small advanced party to the wells of gedid twelve hours before. the countrythrough which their route lay was of barren and miserable aspect. they had embarked ona sandy ocean with waves of thorny scrub and withered grass. from the occasional rockyridges, which allowed a more extended view, this sterile jungle could be seen stretchingindefinitely on all sides. ten miles from
the river all vestiges of animal life disappeared.the land was a desert; not the open desert of the northern soudan, but one vast unprofitablethicket, whose interlacing thorn bushes, unable to yield the slightest nourishment to livingcreatures, could yet obstruct their path. through this the straggling column, headedin the daylight by the red egyptian flag and at night by a lantern on a pole, wound itsweary way, the advanced guard cutting a path with axes and marking the track with stripsof calico, the rearguard driving on the laggard camels and picking up the numerous loads whichwere cast. three long marches brought them on the 25th to gedid. the first detachmenthad already arrived and had opened up the wells. none gave much water; all emitted afoul stench, and one was occupied by a poisonous
serpent eight feet long—the sole inhabitant.the camels were sent to drink at the pool seven miles away, and it was hoped that someof the water-skins could be refilled; but, after all, the green slime was thought unfitfor human consumption, and they had to come back empty. the march was resumed on the 26th. the treeswere now larger; the scrub became a forest; the sandy soil changed to a dark red colour;but otherwise the character of the country was unaltered. the column rested at abu rokba.a few starving inhabitants who occupied the huts pointed out the grave of the khalifa'sfather and the little straw house in which abdullah was wont to pray during his visits.lately, they said, he had retired from aigaila
to shirkela, but even from this latter placehe had made frequent pilgrimages. at the end of the next march, which was madeby day, the guides, whose memories had been refreshed by flogging, discovered a largepool of good water, and all drank deeply in thankful joy. a small but strong zeriba wasbuilt near this precious pool, and the reserve food and a few sick men were left with a smallgarrison under an egyptian officer. the column resumed their journey. on the 29th they reachedaigaila, and here, with feelings of astonishment scarcely less than robinson crusoe experiencedat seeing the footprint in the sand, they came upon the khalifa's abandoned camp. awide space had been cleared of bush, and the trees, stripped of their smaller branches,presented an uncanny appearance. beyond stood
the encampment—a great multitude of yellowspear-grass dwellings, perfectly clean, neatly arranged in streets and squares, and stretchingfor miles. the aspect of this strange deserted town, rising, silent as a cemetery, out ofthe awful scrub, chilled everyone who saw it. its size might indeed concern their leader.at the very lowest computation it had contained 20,000 people. how many of these were fightingmen? certainly not fewer than 8,000 or 9,000. yet the expedition had been sent on the assumptionthat there were scarcely 1,000 warriors with the khalifa! observing every precaution of war, the columncrawled forward, and the cavalry and camel corps, who covered the advance, soon camein contact with the enemy's scouts. shots
were exchanged and the arabs retreated. thecolumn halted three miles to the east of this position, and, forming a strong zeriba, passedthe night in expectation of an attack. nothing, however, happened, and at dawn mitford wassent out with some mounted 'friendlies' to reconnoitre. at ten o'clock he returned, andhis report confirmed the conclusions which had been drawn from the size of the aigailacamp. creeping forward to a good point of view, the officer had seen the dervish flagslining the crest of the hill. from their number, the breadth of front covered, and the numerousfigures of men moving about them, he estimated not fewer than 2,000 arab riflemen in thefront line. how many more were in reserve it was impossible to say. the position was,moreover, of great strength, being surrounded
by deep ravines and pools of water. the news was startling. the small force were125 miles from their base; behind them lay an almost waterless country, and in frontwas a powerful enemy. an informal council of war was held. the sirdar had distinctlyordered that, whatever happened, there was to be no waiting; the troops were either toattack or retire. colonel kitchener decided to retire. the decision having been taken,the next step was to get beyond the enemy's reach as quickly as possible, and the forcebegan their retreat on the same night. the homeward march was not less long and tryingthan the advance, and neither hopes of distinction nor glamour of excitement cheered the wearysoldiers. as they toiled gloomily back towards
the nile, the horror of the accursed landgrew upon all. hideous spectacles of human misery were added to the desolation of thehot, thorny scrub and stinking pools of mud. the starving inhabitants had been lured fromtheir holes and corners by the outward passage of the troops, and hoped to snatch some foodfrom the field of battle. disappointed, they now approached the camps at night in twosand threes, making piteous entreaties for any kind of nourishment. their appeals wereperforce unregarded; not an ounce of spare food remained. towards the end of the journey the camels,terribly strained by their privation of water, began to die, and it was evident that theforce would have no time to spare. one young
camel, though not apparently exhausted, refusedto proceed, and even when a fire was lighted round him remained stubborn and motionless;so that, after being terribly scorched, he had to be shot. others fell and died all alongthe route. their deaths brought some relief to the starving inhabitants. for as each animalwas left behind, the officers, looking back, might see first one, then another furtivefigure emerge from the bush and pounce on the body like a vulture; and in many casesbefore life was extinct the famished natives were devouring the flesh. on the 5th of february the column reachedkohi, and the kordofan field force, having overcome many difficulties and suffered manyhardships, was broken up, unsuccessful through
no fault of its commander, its officers, orits men. for nearly a year no further operations wereundertaken against the khalifa, and he remained all through the spring and summer of 1899supreme in kordofan, reorganising his adherents and plundering the country—a chronic dangerto the new government, a curse to the local inhabitants, and a most serious element ofunrest. the barren and almost waterless regions into which he had withdrawn presented verydifficult obstacles to any military expedition, and although powerful forces were still concentratedat khartoum, the dry season and the uncertain whereabouts of the enemy prevented action.but towards the end of august trustworthy information was received by the intelligencedepartment, through the agency of friendly
tribesmen, that the khalifa, with all hisarmy, was encamped at jebel gedir—that same mountain in southern kordofan to which nearlytwenty years before he and the mahdi had retreated after the flight from abba island. here amongold memories which his presence revived he became at once a centre of fanaticism. nightafter night he slept upon the mahdi's stone; and day after day tales of his dreams werecarried by secret emissaries not only throughout the western soudan, but into the ghezira andeven to khartoum. and now, his position being definite and his action highly dangerous,it was decided to move against him. on the 13th of october the first soudanesebattalion was despatched in steamers from khartoum, and by the 19th a force of some7,000 men, well equipped with camel transport,
was concentrated at kaka, a village on thewhite nile not far north of fashoda. the distance from here to jebel gedir was about eightymiles, and as for the first fifty no water existed; the whole supply had to be carriedin tanks. sir reginald wingate, who was in command of the infantry, reached fungor, thirtymiles from the enemy's position, with the two leading battalions (ixth and xth soudanese)on the 23rd of october, only to find news that the khalifa had left his camp at jebelgedir on the 18th and had receded indefinitely into the desert. the cast having failed, andfurther progress involving a multiplication of difficulties, lord kitchener, who was atkaka, stopped the operations, and the whole of the troops returned to khartoum, whichthey reached in much vexation and disappointment
on the 1st of november. it was at first universally believed thatthe khalifa's intention was to retire to an almost inaccessible distance—to el obeidor southern darfur—and the officers of the egyptian army passed an unhappy fortnightreading the ladysmith telegrams and accusing their evil fortune which kept them so farfrom the scene of action. but soon strange rumours began to run about the bazaars ofomdurman of buried weapons and whispers of revolt. for a few days a vague feeling ofunrest pervaded the native city, and then suddenly on the 12th of november came preciseand surprising news. the khalifa was not retreating to the south or to the west, but advancingnorthward with omdurman, not el obeid, as
his object. emboldened by the spectacle oftwo successive expeditions retreating abortive, and by, who shall say what wild exaggeratedtales of disasters to the turks far beyond the limits of the soudan, abdullah had resolvedto stake all that yet remained to him in one last desperate attempt to recapture his formercapital; and so, upon the 12th of november, his advanced guard, under the emir ahmed fedil,struck the nile opposite abba island, and audaciously fired volleys of musketry at thegunboat sultan which was patrolling the river. the name of abba island may perhaps carrythe reader back to the very beginning of this story. here, eighteen years before, the mahdihad lived and prayed after his quarrel with the haughty sheikh; here abdullah had joinedhim; here the flag of the revolt had been
set up, and the first defeat had been inflictedupon the egyptian troops; and here, too, still dwelt—dwells, indeed, to this day—oneof those same brothers who had pursued through all the vicissitudes and convulsions whichhad shaken the soudan his humble industry of building wooden boats. it is surely a curiousinstance of the occasional symmetry of history that final destruction should have befallenthe last remains of the mahdist movement so close to the scene of its origin! the news which had reached khartoum set allwheels in motion. the ixth and xiiith soudanese battalions were mobilised on the 13th of novemberand despatched at once to abba island under colonel lewis. kitchener hurried south fromcairo, and arrived in khartoum on the 18th.
a field force of some 2,300 troops—one troopof cavalry, the 2nd field battery, the 1st maxim battery, the camel corps, ixth soudanese,xiiith soudanese, and one company 2nd egyptians—was immediately formed, and the command entrustedto sir reginald wingate. there were besides some 900 arab riflemen and a few irregularmounted scouts. on the 20th these troops were concentrated at fashi shoya, whence colonellewis had obliged ahmed fedil to withdraw, and at 3.30 on the afternoon of the 21st theexpedition started in a south-westerly direction upon the track of the enemy. the troops bivouacked some ten miles south-westof fashi shoya, and then marched in bright moonlight to nefisa, encountering only a dervishpatrol of about ten men. at nefisa was found
the evacuated camp of ahmed fedil, containinga quantity of grain which he had collected from the riverain district, and, what wasof more value, a sick but intelligent dervish who stated that the emir had just moved toabu aadel, five miles further on. this information was soon confirmed by mahmud hussein, an egyptianofficer, who with an irregular patrol advanced boldly in reconnaissance. the infantry neededa short rest to eat a little food, and sir reginald wingate ordered colonel mahon topress on immediately with the whole of the mounted troops and engage the enemy, so asto prevent him retreating before an action could be forced. accordingly cavalry, camel corps, maxims,and irregulars—whose fleetness of foot enabled
them, though not mounted, to keep pace withthe rest—set off at their best pace: and after them at 9.15 hurried the infantry, refreshedby a drink at the water tanks and a hasty meal. as they advanced the scrub became denser,and all were in broken and obstructed ground when, at about ten o'clock, the sound of maximfiring and the patter of musketry proclaimed that mahon had come into contact. the firingsoon became more rapid, and as the infantry approached it was evident that the mountedtroops were briskly engaged. the position which they occupied was a low ridge whichrose a little above the level of the plain and was comparatively bare of scrub; fromthis it was possible at a distance of 800 yards to overlook the dervish encampment huddledaround the water pools. it was immediately
evident that the infantry and the batterywere arriving none too soon. the dervishes, who had hitherto contented themselves withmaintaining a ragged and desultory fire from the scrub, now sallied forth into the openand delivered a most bold and determined charge upon the guns. the intervening space was littlemore than 200 yards, and for a moment the attack looked as if it might succeed. butupon the instant the ixth and xiiith soudanese, who had been doubled steadily for upwardsof two miles, came into line, filling the gap between mahon's guns and dismounted camelcorps and the irregular riflemen; and so the converging fire of the whole force was broughtto bear upon the enemy—now completely beaten and demoralised. two dervishes, brothers,bound together hand and foot, perished in
valiant comradeship ninety-five paces fromthe line of guns. many were slain, and the remainder fled. the whole egyptian line nowadvanced upon the encampment hard upon the tracks of the retreating enemy, who were seenemerging from the scrub on to a grassy plain more than a mile away, across which and furtherfor a distance of five miles they were pursued by the cavalry and the camel corps. threehundred and twenty corpses were counted, and at least an equal number must have been wounded.ahmed fedil and one or two of his principal emirs escaped to the southward and to thekhalifa. the egyptian loss amounted to five men wounded. the troops bivouacked in squareformation, at about four o'clock, near the scene of action.
a question of considerable difficulty andsome anxiety now arose. it was learned from the prisoners that the khalifa, with about5,000 fighting men, was moving northwards towards the wells of gedid, of which we havealready heard in the shirkela reconnaissance, and which were some twenty-five miles fromthe scene of the fight. the troops were already fatigued by their severe exertions. the waterpool was so foul that even the thirsty camels refused to drink of it, and moreover scarcelyany water remained in the tanks. it was therefore of vital importance to reach the wells ofgedid. but supposing exhausted troops famishing for water reached them only to be confrontedby a powerful dervish force already in possession! sir reginald wingate decided, however, toface the risk, and at a few minutes before
midnight the column set out again on its road.the ground was broken; the night was sultry: and as the hours passed by the sufferingsof the infantry began to be most acute. many piteous appeals were made for water. all hadperforce to be refused by the commander, who dared not diminish by a mouthful his slenderstore until he knew the true situation at gedid. in these circumstances the infantry,in spite of their admirable patience, became very restive. many men fell exhausted to theground; and it was with a feeling of immense relief that at nine o'clock on the morningof the 24th news was received from the cavalry that the wells had been occupied by them withoutopposition. all the water in the tanks was at once distributed, and thus refreshed theinfantry struggled on and settled down at
midday around a fine pool of comparativelypure water. at gedid, as at nefisa, a single dervish,and this time a sullen fellow, was captured, and from him it was learned that the khalifa'sarmy was encamped seven miles to the south-east. it was now clear that his position was strategicallymost unfavourable. his route to the north was barred; his retreat to the south lay throughwaterless and densely wooded districts; and as the seizure of the grain supplies whichhad resulted from fedil's foraging excursions rendered his advance or retirement a matterof difficulty, it seemed probable he would stand. wingate, therefore, decided to attackhim at dawn. leaving the transport under guard by the water with instructions to follow atfour o'clock, the troops moved off at midnight,
screened in front at a distance of half amile by the cavalry and their flanks protected by the camel corps. the road was in placesso thickly wooded that a path had to be cut by the infantry pioneers and the artillery.at three o'clock, when about three miles from the enemy's position, the force was deployedinto fighting formation. the irregular riflemen covered the front; behind them the xiiithand ixth soudanese; and behind these, again, the maxims and the artillery were disposed.cautiously and silently the advance was resumed, and now in the distance the beating of wardrums and the long booming note of the khalifa's horn broke on the stillness, proclaiming thatthe enemy were not unprepared. at a few minutes before four o'clock another low ridge, alsocomparatively bare of scrub, was reached and
occupied as a position. the cavalry were nowwithdrawn from the front, a few infantry picquets were thrown out, and the rest of the forcelay down in the long grass of the little ridge and waited for daylight. after about an hour the sky to the eastwardbegan to grow paler with the promise of the morning and in the indistinct light the picquetscould be seen creeping gradually in; while behind them along the line of the trees faintwhite figures, barely distinguishable, began to accumulate. sir reginald wingate, fearinglest a sudden rush should be made upon him, now ordered the whole force to stand up andopen fire; and forthwith, in sudden contrast to the silence and obscurity, a loud cracklingfusillade began. it was immediately answered.
the enemy's fire flickered along a wide half-circleand developed continually with greater vigour opposite the egyptian left, which was consequentlyreinforced. as the light improved, large bodies of shouting dervishes were seen advancing;but the fire was too hot, and their emirs were unable to lead them far beyond the edgeof the wood. so soon as this was perceived wingate ordered a general advance; and thewhole force, moving at a rapid pace down the gentle slope, drove the enemy through thetrees into the camp about a mile and a half away. here, huddled together under their strawshelters, 6,000 women and children were collected, all of whom, with many unwounded combatants,made signals of surrender and appeals for mercy. the 'cease fire' was sounded at half-pastsix. then, and not till then, was it discovered
how severe the loss of the dervishes had been.it seemed to the officers that, short as was the range, the effect of rifle fire undersuch unsatisfactory conditions of light could not have been very great. but the bodies thicklyscattered in the scrub were convincing evidences. in one space not much more than a score ofyards square lay all the most famous emirs of the once far-reaching dervish domination.the khalifa abdullah, pierced by several balls, was stretched dead on his sheepskin; on hisright lay ali-wad-helu, on his left ahmed fedil. before them was a line of lifelessbodyguards; behind them a score of less important chiefs; and behind these, again, a litterof killed and wounded horses. such was the grim spectacle which in the first light ofthe morning met the eyes of the british officers,
to some of whom it meant the conclusion ofa perilous task prolonged over many years. and while they looked in astonishment notunmingled with awe, there scrambled unhurt from under a heap of bodies the little emiryunes, of dongola, who added the few links necessary to complete the chain. at omdurman abdullah had remained mountedbehind the hill of surgham, but in this his last fight he had set himself in the forefrontof the battle. almost at the first discharge, his son osman, the sheikh-ed-din, was wounded,and as he was carried away he urged the khalifa to save himself by flight; but the latter,with a dramatic dignity sometimes denied to more civilised warriors, refused. dismountingfrom his horse, and ordering his emirs to
imitate him, he seated himself on his sheepskinand there determined to await the worst of fortune. and so it came to pass that in thislast scene in the struggle with mahdism the stage was cleared of all its striking characters,and osman digna alone purchased by flight a brief ignoble liberty, soon to be followedby a long ignoble servitude. twenty-nine emirs, 3,000 fighting men, 6,000women and children surrendered themselves prisoners. the egyptian losses were threekilled and twenty-three wounded. the long story now approaches its conclusion.the river war is over. in its varied course, which extended over fourteen years and involvedthe untimely destruction of perhaps 300,000 lives, many extremes and contrasts have beendisplayed. there have been battles which were
massacres, and others that were mere parades.there have been occasions of shocking cowardice and surprising heroism, of plans conceivedin haste and emergency, of schemes laid with slow deliberation, of wild extravagance andcruel waste, of economies scarcely less barbarous, of wisdom and incompetence. but the resultis at length achieved, and the flags of england and egypt wave unchallenged over the valleyof the nile. at what cost were such advantages obtained?the reader must judge for himself of the loss in men; yet while he deplores the deaths ofbrave officers and soldiers, and no less the appalling destruction of the valiant arabs,he should remember that such slaughter is inseparable from war, and that, if the warbe justified, the loss of life cannot be accused.
but i write of the cost in money, and theeconomy of the campaigns cannot be better displayed than by the table below: railway: â£e 1,181,372telegraph: â£e 21,825 gunboats: â£e 154,934military expenditure: â£e 996,223 total expenditures: â£e 2,354,354 (â£e1 = â£10s.6d.) for something less than two and a half millionssterling active military operations were carried on for nearly three years, involving the employment—farfrom its base—of an army of 25,000 disciplined troops, including an expensive british contingentof 8,000 men, and ending in the utter defeat of an enemy whose armed forces numbered atthe beginning of the war upwards of 80,000
soldiers, and the reconquest and re-occupationof a territory measuring sixteen hundred miles from north to south and twelve hundred fromeast to west [lieut.-colonel stewart's report: egypt, no.11, 1883], which at one time supportedat least twenty millions of inhabitants. but this is not all. of the total â£e2,354,354only â£e996,223 can be accounted as military expenditure. for the remaining â£e1,358,131egypt possesses 500 miles of railway, 900 miles of telegraph, and a flotilla of steamers.the railway will not, indeed, pay a great return upon the capital invested, but it willimmediately pay something, and may ultimately pay much. the telegraph is as necessary asthe railway to the development of the country; it costs far less, and, when the egyptiansystem is connected with the south african,
it will be a sure source of revenue. lastly,there are the gunboats. the reader cannot have any doubts as to the value of these vesselsduring the war. never was money better spent on military plant. now that the river operationsare over the gunboats discharge the duties of ordinary steamers; and although they are,of course, expensive machines for goods and passenger traffic, they are by no means inefficient.the movement of the troops, their extra pay, the supplies at the end of a long line ofcommunications, the ammunition, the loss by wear and tear of uniforms and accoutrements,the correspondence, the rewards, all cost together less than a million sterling; andfor that million egypt has recovered the soudan. the whole â£e2,354,354 had, however, to bepaid during the campaigns. towards this sum
great britain advanced, as has been related,â£800,000 as a loan; and this was subsequently converted into a gift. the cost to the britishtaxpayer of the recovery and part acquisition of the soudan, of the military prestige, andof the indulgence of the sentiment known as 'the avenging of gordon' has therefore beenâ£800,000; and it may be stated in all seriousness that english history does not record any instanceof so great a national satisfaction being more cheaply obtained. the rest of the moneyhas been provided by egypt; and this strange country, seeming to resemble the camel, onwhich so much of her wealth depends, has, in default of the usual sources of supply,drawn upon some fifth stomach for nourishment, and, to the perplexity even of those bestacquainted with her amazing financial constitution,
has stood the strain. 'the extraordinary expenditure in connectionwith the soudan campaign,' wrote mr. j.l. gorst, the financial adviser to the khedivein his note of december 20, 1898 [note by the financial adviser on the budget of 1899:egypt, no. 3, 1899], 'has been charged to the special reserve fund. at the present momentthis fund shows a deficit of â£e336,000, and there are outstanding charges on account ofthe expedition amounting to â£e330,000, making a total deficit of â£e666,000.' 'on the other hand, the fund will be increased,when the accounts of the year are made up, by a sum of â£e382,000, being the balanceof the share of the government in the surplus
of 1898, after deduction of the excess administrativeexpenditure in that year, and by a sum of â£e90,000, being part of the proceeds of thesale of the khedivial postal steamers. the net deficit will, therefore, be â£e194,000;and if the year 1899 is as prosperous as the present year, it may be hoped that the deficitwill disappear when the accounts of 1899 are closed.' a great, though perhaps academic, issue remains:was the war justified by wisdom and by right? if the reader will look at a map of the nilesystem, he cannot fail to be struck by its resemblance to a palm-tree. at the top thegreen and fertile area of the delta spreads like the graceful leaves and foliage. thestem is perhaps a little twisted, for the
nile makes a vast bend in flowing throughthe desert. south of khartoum the likeness is again perfect, and the roots of the treebegin to stretch deeply into the soudan. i can imagine no better illustration of theintimate and sympathetic connection between egypt and the southern provinces. the water—thelife of the delta—is drawn from the soudan, and passes along the channel of the nile,as the sap passes up the stem of the tree, to produce a fine crop of fruit above. thebenefit to egypt is obvious; but egypt does not benefit alone. the advantages of the connectionare mutual; for if the soudan is thus naturally and geographically an integral part of egypt,egypt is no less essential to the development of the soudan. of what use would the rootsand the rich soil be, if the stem were severed,
by which alone their vital essence may findexpression in the upper air? here, then, is a plain and honest reason forthe river war. to unite territories that could not indefinitely have continued divided; tocombine peoples whose future welfare is inseparably intermingled; to collect energies which, concentrated,may promote a common interest; to join together what could not improve apart—these are theobjects which, history will pronounce, have justified the enterprise. the advantage to great britain is no lessclear to those who believe that our connection with egypt, as with india, is in itself asource of strength. the grasp of england upon egypt has been strengthened twofold by theevents of the war. the joint action and ownership
of the two countries in the basin of the uppernile form an additional bond between them. the command of the vital river is an irresistibleweapon. the influence of france over the native mind in egypt has been completely destroyedby the result of the fashoda negotiations; and although she still retains the legal powerto meddle in and obstruct all financial arrangements, that power, unsupported by real influence,is like a body whence the soul has fled, which may, indeed, be an offensive encumbrance,but must ultimately decompose and crumble into dust. but, apart from any connection with egypt,britain has gained a vast territory which, although it would be easy to exaggerate itsvalue, is nevertheless coveted by every great
power in europe. the policy of acquiring largewaterways, which has been pursued deliberately or unconsciously by british statesmen forthree centuries, has been carried one step further; and in the valley of the nile englandmay develop a trade which, passing up and down the river and its complement the railway,shall exchange the manufactures of the temperate zone for the products of the tropic of cancer,and may use the north wind to drive civilisation and prosperity to the south and the streamof the nile to bear wealth and commerce to the sea. the appendix text of the soudan agreement of the 19th ofjanuary, 1899, and of the declaration of the
21st of march, 1899 agreement between her britannic majesty'sgovernment and the government of his highness the khedive of egypt, relative to the futureadministration of the soudan whereas certain provinces in the soudan whichwere in rebellion against the authority of his highness the khedive have now been reconqueredby the joint military and financial efforts of her britannic majesty's government andthe government of his highness the khedive; and whereas it has become necessary to decideupon a system for the administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconqueredprovinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled conditionof large portions thereof, and for the varying
requirements of different localities; andwhereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to her britannicmajesty's government, by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and futureworking and development of the said system of administration and legislation; and whereasit is conceived that for many purposes wady halfa and suakin may be most effectively administeredin conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent: now,it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned, duly authorised for thatpurpose, as follows:- art. i. the word 'soudan' in this agreement meansall the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which: 1. have never been evacuatedby egyptian troops since the year 1882; or
2. which having before the late rebellionin the soudan been administered by the government of his highness the khedive, were temporarilylost to egypt, and have been reconquered by her majesty's government and the egyptiangovernment, acting in concert; or 3. which may hereafter be reconquered by the two governmentsacting in concert. art. ii. the british and egyptian flags shall be usedtogether, both on land and water, throughout the soudan, except in the town of suakin,in which locality the egyptian flag alone shall be used. art. iii.
the supreme military and civil command inthe soudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'governor-general of the soudan.'he shall be appointed by khedivial decree on the recommendation of her britannic majesty'sgovernment, and shall be removed only by khedivial decree, with the consent of her britannicmajesty's government. art. iv. laws, as also orders and regulations withthe full force of law, for the good government of the soudan, and for regulating the holding,disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to timebe made, altered, or abrogated by proclamation of the governor-general. such laws, orders,and regulations may apply to the whole or
any named part of the soudan, and may, eitherexplicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing law or regulation.all such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to her britannic majesty's agentand consul-general in cairo, and to the president of the council of ministers of his highnessthe khedive. art. v. no egyptian law, decree, ministerial arrete,or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to the soudan or anypart thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by proclamation of the governor-generalin manner hereinbefore provided. art. vi.
in the definition by proclamation of the conditionsunder which europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or residein the soudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall beaccorded to the subjects of any one or more power. art. vii. import duties on entering the soudan shallnot be payable on goods coming from egyptian territory. such duties may, however, be leviedon goods coming from elsewhere than egyptian territory; but in the case of goods enteringthe soudan at suakin, or any other port on the red sea littoral, they shall not exceedthe corresponding duties for the time being
leviable on goods entering egypt from abroad.duties may be levied on goods leaving the soudan, at such rates as may from time totime be prescribed by proclamation. art. viii. the jurisdiction of the mixed tribunals shallnot extend, nor be recognised for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the soudan, exceptin the town of suakin. art.ix. until, and save so far as it shall be otherwisedetermined by proclamation, the soudan, with the exception of the town of suakin, shallbe and remain under martial law. art. x.
no consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agentsshall be accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the soudan, without the previousconsent of her britannic majesty's government. art. xi. the importation of slaves into the soudan,as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. provision shall be made by proclamation forthe enforcement of this regulation. art. xii. it is agreed between the two governments thatspecial attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the brussels act of the 2nd of july, 1890,in respect to the import, sale, and manufacture of fire-arms and their munitions, and distilledor spirituous liquors.
done in cairo, the 19th of january, 1899. signed: bourtros ghali-cromer. declaration relative to the british and frenchspheres of influence in central africa (signed at london, march 21st, 1899) the undersigned, duly authorised by theirgovernments, have signed the following declaration:—the ivth article of the convention of the 14thof june, 1898, shall be completed by the following provisions, which shall be considered as formingan integral part of it: 1. her britannic majesty's government engages not to acquire either territoryor political influence to the west of the
line of frontier defined in the followingparagraph, and the government of the french republic engages not to acquire either territoryor political influence to the east of the same line. 2. the line of frontier shall startfrom the point where the boundary between the congo free state and french territorymeets the water-parting between the watershed of the nile and that of the congo and itsaffluents. it shall follow in principle that water-parting up to its intersection withthe 11th parallel of north latitude. from this point it shall be drawn as far as the15th parallel in such manner as to separate, in principle, the kingdom of wadai from whatconstituted in 1882 the province of darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as topass to the west beyond the 21st degree of
longitude east of greenwich (18â° 40' eastof paris), or to the east beyond the 23rd degree of longitude east of greenwich (20â°40' east of paris). 3. it is understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallelthe french zone shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which shall start fromthe point of intersection of the tropic of cancer with the 16th degree of longitude eastof greenwich (18â° 40' east of paris), shall run thence to the south-east until it meetsthe 24th degree of longitude east of greenwich (21â° 40' east of paris), and shall then followthe 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontierof darfur as it shall eventually be fixed. 4. the two governments engage to appoint commissionerswho shall be charged to delimit on the spot
a frontier-line in accordance with the indicationsgiven in paragraph 2 of this declaration. the result of their work shall be submittedfor the approbation of their respective governments. it is agreed that the provisions of articleix of the convention of the 14th of june, 1898, shall apply equally to the territoriessituated to the south of the 14â° 20' parallel of north latitude, and to the north of the5th parallel of north latitude, between the 14â° 20' meridian of longitude east of greenwich(12th degree east of paris) and the course of the upper nile. done at london, the 21st of march, 1899. (l.s.) salisbury.(l.s.) paul cambon.